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The research aims to make descriptive and explanatory generalisations about Turkish 
elites and the Turkish power elite by using empirical data which is gathered from the Turkish 
elite groups themselves. The major goals were to construct a social portrait of Turkish elites 
and to test the idea of the existence of a Turkish power elite. If a power elite existed in 
Turkish society, what is its social anatomy? 
Multiple methodological approaches were used to define the research subject, to 
outline the research universe. Extensive field researches comprise the major data sources of 
the study. Very detailed interviews were conducted with members of Turkish elite groups and 
the Turkish power elite. Four large original data sets were created from the data which was 
gathered in the field. In addition to this, several subsidiary techniques were used to achieve the 
goals of the research, including documentary and historical data techniques. Also, secondary 
data was obtained from the studies of other researchers which was rather useful. 
The study demonstrates the existence of a Turkish power elite, which comprised four 
major key elite groups: business, political, military and media elites. The Turkish power elite, 
or in other words the key elites of contemporary Turkish society is composed of people of 
broadly similar social origins, similar educational backgrounds and broadly similar 
occupational backgrounds. Furthermore, they have similar styles of life and life views. It was 
perceived that various attitudes, interests, values, norms and behaviour patterns are shared by 
the members of Turkish elites and the Turkish power elite. 
At the end of a detailed investigation, it can be said that the Turkish elites present a 
higher level consensually unified national elite character. Also, there has been both 
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fundamental and operative consensus inside each elite group. This consensus can be labelled 
the "relative internal consensus". 
Findings clearly show that, there is a high degree of "relative elite consensus" among 
the Turkish elites. This consensus confirms the existence of "relative elite homogeneity" 
among Turkish elites. As a result of these findings, it is possible to claim the existence of a 
relatively cohesive power elite in contemporary Turkey. 
Ali Arslan 
Guildford, August 1999. 
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CHAPTER-1 
1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1. INTRODUCTION: 
Social equality is an ideal but it is far from reality. Relatively, westernised political 
systems provide more civil liberties and rights to the people than other socio-political systems. 
Also, western democracy provides more equal social and political opportunities. Nevertheless, 
Western democracy is not "government by the people" and has not created equality for every 
section of society. Some social groups are more privileged, more autonomous and more 
powerful than the other people in social and political life. They have more money, more 
prestige and they are more influential. They control either social resources or the socio- 
political decision-making process. 
As Stone stated (1984: 1) contemporary society is a complex society characterised by 
bureaucratisation, specialisation and differentiation. Elites have been located traditionally 
within this context. 
Elite studies stress obviously elites, their existence, their positions and reputations, 
their careers, their roles in society. Also these particular studies look for answers to these 
kinds of questions: How do elites manipulate and exercise power? How does the circulation of 
elites (either horizontal or vertical mobility) occur? What kind of relationships exist among the 
elites in their own group and also between elite groups? Who are they, do they come from 
another planet? What kind of values influence their behaviour? What do they think and how 
do they behave? How did they become so powerful? How do they see themselves? Do the 
elites possess group consciousness and coherence and practice conspiracy within their own 
elite group, and also is there homogeneity between elite groups? What is their life style and 
world-view? What kind of relationship exists between elites and non-elites?. 
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Elite studies have great importance within sociological and political studies, because 
elites are the main agents of social change. They manage the direction, the speed and the form 
of social change, because they hold institutional power and influence social decisions on a 
macro level, and they can affect the political outcomes within society. In this sense, elites are 
not only the guardians but also the potential destroyers of democracy. 
1.2. GENERAL AIMS AND OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY: 
The author aims to realise the first "Turkish National Elite Survey" in this study. It is 
targeted to produce highly detailed and large scale systematic and scientific knowledge. This 
accumulation will be presented for the use of Turkish social scientists and other researchers 
who are interested in Turkish society. 
As explained in the methodology chapter, it was planned that all Turkish elite groups 
(about ten groups nation-wide) would be taken into account in this study. Nevertheless, it was 
understood by the author that this was a very unrealistic objective to achieve for a PhD 
project. Therefore, the size of the sampling group was reduced and the following major elite 
groups were selected for the research: political elites, media elites, labour union elites, military 
elites and business elites. 
This study aims to analyse, the general power structure of Turkish society, and 
specifically Turkish elites and their role and functions in society, the relationships within and 
between the elite groups, and the distribution of power. Firstly, all the elite groups will be 
examined individually in terms of particular characteristics. Then, the major findings for each 
single elite group will be compared with each other. Finally, general portraits of the power 
structure of Turkish society and its power elite will be provided. 
It will also examine the existence of Turkish elites, their positions and reputations, 
their careers and their social backgrounds. Furthermore, social and moral integration amongst 
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and inside such Turkish elite groups will be examined. As mentioned in the Giddens and 
Stanworth study (1974: 5-10), "moral integration" is related to common ideas, common ethos 
and consciousness of an overall solidarity amongst elites. On the other hand, "social 
integration" is correlated with the frequency and nature of the social contacts and relationship 
between elite groups, marriage ties among elite families, friendship between and within elite 
groups. 
Three other important objectives of this study are: 1) to highlight the factors and 
recruitment channels of elite positions in Turkish society, such as family background, 
educational, bureaucratic and occupational career patterns, 2) to analyse the nature and the 
form of decision making and the decision taking process in Turkish society, 3) to examine 
Turkish decision makers carefully and comprehensively. 
This paper will also try to understand and explain the distribution of power in Turkish 
society: How far is power (effective power) diffused in society or how far it is centralised and 
concentrated in the hands of elite groups? 
1.3. SPECIFIC AIMS AND OBJECTIVES OF EACH CHAPTER: 
Generally, the research falls into five parts: the general methodological and theoretical 
background takes place in the first part of the study. Also, the political development of Turkey 
and an evaluation of Turkish democracy are examined in the same section. In the second part, 
some detailed information and rather elaborated findings about major Turkish elite groups are 
provided. Five major elite groups, such as political, media, trade union, business and military 
elites are examined one by one. 
In the third part, an extensive information and discussion about the general social 
anatomy of contemporary Turkish elites takes place. The "cream of the cream" or the elite of 
the elites were examined in the fourth part of the study. In other words, the top decision 
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makers or the "Turkish Power Elite" are investigated in section four. Finally, general findings, 
discussions and further research recommendations are to he found in the final part. 
More specifically, this research project contains 12 chapters. The first chapter is the 
introduction in which very brief information about the project will he provided. The second 
chapter deals with the methodology. Major research methods and techniques which have been 
used in elite studies are examined in this chapter. In addition, the methodology used in this 
research is also explained. Moreover, the major difficulties of elite studies, the main problems 
of studying sensitive topics with elites is discussed and some suggestions on successful field 
research with elites are presented. 
Turkish modernisation and an evaluation of Turkish democracy are discussed in detail 
in the third chapter. The roots of Turkish modernisation is investigated and the development 
of Turkish democracy since the establishment of contemporary Turkish Republic is examined. 
Also, some information about Kemalist Turkish Revolution and Kemalism, which have shaped 
contemporary Turkish society is provided, in that chapter. In addition, all parliamentary elites 
and political leaders who served in Turkey since the beginning of the Republican period (from 
early 1920s to 1990s) are investigated in terms of specific social indicators. 
Chapter 4 deals with the theoretical background of the study. The main concepts of 
the research are defined and "elite theory" explained. In addition, problems and dilemmas of 
elite theory and class theory are discussed. In chapter five a social, political and demographic 
portrait of contemporary Turkish political leaders is given. Chapter six focuses on Turkish 
media elites after examining the roles, functions and the power of the media in general, and 
roles, functions and power of contemporary Turkish media in particular. It also presents the 
main findings on Turkish media elites. 
Chapter seven is about labour unions and labour union elites: firstly, brief information 
on theoretical and historical background of labour (trade) unions is given, then major findings 
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about contemporary Turkish labour union elites are presented. Turkish business elites are 
examined and discussed in chapter 8. General information, findings and discussions about the 
Turkish military elites are presented in Chapter 9. The following chapter (chapter 10) consists 
of a more general analysis and interpretations of Turkish elites. 
The distribution of power and the power elite in contemporary Turkish society are 
examined in chapter eleven. General findings, discussion, further research questions on 
Turkish elites, and a brief conclusion are given in the final chapter. Also, the major hypotheses 
were also tested in this chapter. 
1.4. THE MAJOR HYPOTHESES: 
Parallel to the already mentioned objectives, the following major hypotheses which are 
related to Turkish society will be tested in this study: 
" The military, business, media and political elites set up the key elite groups in Turkey. 
" Effective power has been centralised (concentrated) in the hands of the key elite groups in 
the Turkish society. 
" The major social-political decisions are taken by these four key elite groups. 
" There is a relatively lower level of external homogeneity among Turkish elite groups. (The 
degree of external homogeneity is lower than the degree of internal homogeneity among 
contemporary Turkish elites). 
" As the result of homogeneity, there is a relative social integration among contemporary 
Turkish elites. 
" There is a higher level of internal social homogeneity and social consensus inside Turkish 
elite groups. 
" Turkish elites present social and moral integration within their own elite group. 
" Political decisions are controlled directly or indirectly by the economic elites. 
" Turkish elites have an upper-middle and upper social class status. 
" Turkish elites have mostly middle class social origins. 
23 
" The satisfaction rate of the Turkish elites from their social and occupational positions is 
very high. 
" Those elites who have higher class background are more satisfied with their jobs than those 
elites who have lower class background. 
" There is genderism (sexism) among Turkish elites: Turkish elites are mostly male 
dominated. 
" Contemporary Turkish elites are well educated. 
" There is ageism among contemporary Turkish elites: there is a high degree of domination 
of middle aged people over other age groups. 
" Youth are the least represented age group among contemporary Turkish elites. 
" Power and authority has an "aristocratic" character in contemporary Turkish society 
(Power and authority based on family and wealth). 
" There is a higher correlation between educational background, family background and elite 
circulation in contemporary Turkish society: there is a higher correlation between elite 
status and educational and family background in contemporary Turkey. 
" There are inter-group and inter-class marital attitudes amongst contemporary Turkish 
elites: they prefer to many those people who have a similar or the same social class status. 
" Some universities, such as Istanbul University, AUSBF (Ankara University, Faculty of 
Political Sciences), ITU (Istanbul Technical University), METU (Middle East Technical 
University), Bogazici have an important influence on elite recruitment in contemporary 
Turkish society. 
" Some elitist clubs (social clubs and student fraternities), like Rotary and Lions, Masonic 
societies, Anatolian Club, Galatasaraylilar, Mulkiyeliler have an important affect on elite 
recruitment process in contemporary Turkish society. 
" Elite clubs are highly influential in the decision making process in contemporary Turkey. 
" Turkish elites usually send their children to elitist schools. 
" There is a relation between elite recruitment and birth place in Turkey (in terms of urban or 
rural settlements): Most Turkish elites are originally from the big or metropolitan cities. 
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" There is not any relation between elite status and birth place (in terms of geographical 
region) in Turkey: there is a high degree of plurality according to their geographic regional 
identity among Turkish elites. 
" The relative elite autonomy in contemporary Turkey is very weak. 
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CHAPTER-2 
2. METHODOLOGY 
This study was designed not only as quantitative research, but also as a qualitative 
cross-sectional national elite survey. Respondents are holders of elite positions in various 
sectors, i. e. - political elites, business elites, military elites, mass-media elites, trade and labour 
unions elites. Therefore, the study has a comparative character, like the German National Elite 
Study 1981 (carried out by Ursula Hoffmann-Lange), studies of national elites in the United 
States (Barton: 1985) and Australia (Higley et al.: 1979). Moreover, the study has an 
international comparative nature, because many questions asked in the previously mentioned 
national elite studies, were also used in this study. 
This research has a trichotomous character that the micro level, meso level and macro 
level objectives will attempt to realise. On the micro level, the defined Turkish elite groups 
will be examined singularly within their own structure. Each elite group will be analysed in 
terms of particular characteristics, such as roles, beliefs, attitudes, behaviour patterns and 
social backgrounds of their members. Then, the findings which are related to the elite groups, 
will be compared each other in terms of similarities (isomorphist technique) and differences 
(heteromoiphist technique). 
On the meso level, it will be concerned with the general characteristics of the Turkish 
elites and power structure of Turkish society followed by causal, isomorphist and 
heteromorphist approaches. Finally, the researcher will compare his findings with other 
researchers' findings, on the macro level, because the aim of this step is to generate the 
common peculiarities of Turkish elites and if possible to draw a general portrait of Turkish 
elites. 
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2.1. GENERAL METHODOLOGICAL CONTEXT OF ELITE STUDIES: 
The aim of these techniques is to define elites or in other words the top decision makers in 
society: who has the power and influences the social-political decision-making process. Social 
scientists use the following major approaches to identify and research elites in this kind of empirical 
study: 
I- Positional approaches 
2- Reputational approaches 
3- Decisional approaches 
4- Synthesising techniques (Snowball analysis). 
Decisional analysts stress the important decisions to find the major decision makers. They 
see power as direct participation in the political decision-making process. Positional approaches are 
widely used to define and examine the elites. Positional analysts use institutional records to define 
the top decision makers. As done by decisional analysts, they concentrate on formal power and 
direct participation. 
Reputational analysts are concerned with the reputation, asking selected respondents who 
have more power in the organisational hierarchy, who is at the top and who is at the bottom. They 
understand power more widely and are concerned with either formal power or informal power, as 
well as direct or indirect participation in the political decision-making process. Snowball analysts 
use some or all of the above techniques to define elites. On the other hand, various analytical 
techniques are used for analysing the data in elite studies: 
- Cohort analysis 
- Content analysis 
- Causal modelling 
- Network analysis 
- Roll-Call analysis: The analysis of recorded votes in a legislature (Moyser & Wagstaffe, 1987: 51- 
62). It is usually used to analyse the anatomy of conflict and the nature of policy coalitions. 
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2.2. SAMPLING TECHNIQUES & SAMPLING PROCEDURES: 
The multi-method approach was used in this study. Both the "reputational" and 
"positional" approaches were used for identifying the elites: the positional approach was used 
to identify the individuals who have a potential for power because of their status and social 
position within society; the reputational approach was used to select those respondents who 
have a reputation for power and influence. 
The positional approach was used to define the elite universe. Firstly, a list of elite 
sectors was set up. Following this, the most important organisations within each sector were 
specified. Then, the top positions within each organisation were determined. Finally, the 
current incumbents of these positions were considered as members of the elite. Furthermore, 
the reputational approach was also used as a supplementary approach to select the effective 
members of some elite groups, such as mass-media elites and political elites following the 
simple random sampling techniques. Those sectors, organisations and positions were used for 
the sampling procedure and to outline the research universe as follows: 
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Table-La 
The Research Universe and Sampling Procedure 
SECTORS ORGANISATIONS POSITIONS 
Politics 
Judiciary 
The associations 
Of white collar 
Occupations 
Business 
Academic 
Cultural elites 
Military 
State 
Bureaucracy 
(Civil Service) 
- Presidency 
- Government 
- Political Parties 
-Anayasa Mahkemesi (The Constitutional Court) 
-Yargitay (The High Court of Appeal) 
-Danistay (The Council of State) 
-Sayistay (The Exchequer and Audit Department) 
-Devlet Guvenlik Mahkemesi (The State Security 
Courts) 
-Hakimler ve Savcilar Yuksek Kurulu (The 
Supreme Council of Judges and Prosecutors) 
-TBB-The Union of Turkish Bars 
-TNB-The Union of Turkish Public Notaries 
-TTB-The Turkish Medical Society 
-TMMOB-The Union of Chambers of Turkish 
Engineers and Architects 
-1-LOB-The Union of Turkish Aculture 
-The Fifty Largest Holdings (Groups) 
-The 500 largest Companies 
-YOK (The Higher Education Council) 
- Universities 
- TUBITAK (Turkish Scientific and Technological 
Researches Institute) 
- The Ataturk Research Centre 
- Turkish Language Society 
- Publishing companies 
- Others 
-The General Staff 
-The Military Court of Appeals 
-Chief Commandants: 
-Army 
-Navy 
-Air Force 
-Gendarmerie 
-DIE, DPT 
-Police 
-Central Bank 
-THY, PTT, TEK, IIB K,... 
- President 
- Prime minister 
- ministers 
- The leaders of political parties 
- the general secretaries of political 
sties 
- The Presidents 
- The members 
- Chief Executives 
- Owners 
- Top managers 
- Top directors 
- The president of YOK 
- The presidents of universities 
(rectors) 
- The deans of the faculties 
- The presidents & 
chief executives 
- Owners and chief editors 
- Famous writers 
- Famous film directors 
- Famous film and theatre actresses 
and artists 
- The chief of the general staff 
- The president and the embers of 
the military court of appeals 
- The chief commanders 
- The commanders 
- Department heads 
- Sub-department 
heads 
- State secretaries 
- General directors 
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Table-Lb 
The Research Universe and Sampling Procedure 
SECTORS ORGANISATIONS POSITIONS 
- TUSIAD (The Association of 'Turkish Industrialists 
and Businessmen) - Chief executives 
- TUGIAD (The Association of Turkish Young - Boards of directors 
Businessmen) 
Business - MUSIAD (The Association of Independent 
Associations & Industrialists and Businessmen) 
Unions - TOBB (The Union of Chambers of Commerce, 
Industry and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey) 
- ATO (Ankara Chamber of Commerce) 
- ASO (Ankara Chamber of Industry) 
- ISO (Istanbul Chamber of Industry) 
- ITO (Istanbul Chamber of Commerce) 
- TISK (The Confederation of Employers' 
Associations of Turkey) 
- TKSK (The Confederation of Traders and Artisans 
Associations of Turkey) 
- DISK (The Confederation of Revolutionary Workers' 
Union) - The General Presidents 
Confederation of - HAK-IS (The Islamist Trade Union) - Chief executives 
Labour Unions - TURK-IS (The Confederation of Turkish Trade 
Unions) 
- Other Trade Union Confederations 
- AGENCIES: - Chief executives 
-Anatolian Agency & Others - Owners 
Mass Media - Press: Dailies, Weeklies & the others - Presidents 
- Broadcasting - Chief editors 
- RTUK (Radio Television Higher Committee) 
Source: Created by the researcher. 
All the elites in these sectors constitute the power structure of society. Sometimes, the 
composition of all elite groups is referred to as the "national elites". The researcher was 
planning to carry out the first national elite survey of Turkey at the very beginning of the 
study. Nevertheless, the constraints of PhD study and the restrictions of time limited the 
researcher to focusing on five elite groups. 
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2.3. SAMPLING GROUP: 
As mentioned, at the beginning of the research, the researcher was planning a rather 
large size of the sampling group. Nevertheless, when in the field it was decided that, a more 
realistic sample size had to be chosen in order to carry out the major interviews. The research 
on elites was unusually expensive and time consuming, and the researcher had a limited 
amount of time and financial resources. 
Nevertheless, when compared with most of other elite researchers', the size of the 
sampling group was still highly idealistic (large size); using five major elite groups. They were 
political elites, media elites, business elites, military elites and the elites of the confederations 
of Turkish labour unions. The researcher carried out face to face interviews with the elite 
members of the three elite groups which are media, politics and labour unions. On the other 
hand, secondary data and documentary research techniques were used to gather data about 
business elites and military elites. 
The political elites were chosen because they are one of the most powerful elites 
groups in Turkey. The study on media elites would be interesting and useful. As there has 
been a great deal of speculation about Turkish media and its power, as happens in both 
developed and developing countries: was the media really the fourth power in a democracy? 
For this reason, Turkish media elites attracted the interests of the researcher who planned to 
examine and to measure the power of the media elites systematically and scientifically. On the 
other hand, the military elites and business elites were the two most powerful elite groups. 
They always have been an inseparable part of the power elite in both developing and 
developed countries. 
Labour union elites were selected because this elite group was relatively less studied. 
Labour unions have enormous potential power. If they wished they could mobilise millions of 
people in a short time. This kind of action has already taken place several times in the recent 
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history of Turkey. Therefore, governing political elites are forced to take into account the 
views and the desires of the leaders of the most influential union confederations, such as 
TURK-IS, DISK, HAK-IS. 
For the reasons given above, 6 major and most powerful confederations of the Turkish 
labour and white collar unions were included in the sampling group. Their historical- financial- 
physical powers, membership density, reputation and their previous militant actions were 
taken into account in the selection procedure. 
Three of them were the most powerful labour union confederations of Turkey: TURK- 
IS (The Confederation of Turkish Trade unions), DISK (The Confederation of Revolutionary 
Workers' Union) and HAK-IS (The Confederation of Islamist Labour Unions-Confederation 
of Rights of Turkish Workers' Trade Unions). The other three confederations were mostly 
white collar workers' unions: KESK (The Confederation of Public Sector Workers' Unions), 
KAMUSEN (The Confederation of Civil Servants' Unions) and EGITIM-SEN (The 
Confederation of Teachers' Unions). The presidents and chief executives of these 
organisations were classified as the Turkish labour union elites. 
The selection of the Turkish political elites was quite difficult and complicated at the 
beginning as there is a large plurality in Turkish politics: more than 30 political parties are 
competing and trying to become influential in the social and political life of Turkey. To 
overcome this problem, the researcher first looked at the composition of the Turkish 
parliament (1997-8): about 7 political parties have their members in the Turkish Grand 
National Assembly as a result of the last general election which was held in 1995. Three of 
them were liberal rightist, two of them were social democrats and the remaining two were 
radical Islamists parties. Six of the seven political parties had their own group in the assembly 
and only one of them did not have enough MPs to set up a group. 
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In addition to these 7 parties, there were two other important and influential Turkish 
political parties outside the Parliament: the Workers' Party (IP-Turkish Socialist Party) and 
Nationalist Movement Party (MHP-the party of grey-wolves or ulkucu commandos) were 
included in the sampling group. The general presidents, the presidents and deputy presidents, 
and general secretaries of these Turkish political parties, the President of the Turkish Grand 
National Assembly, Prime Minister and the President of the Republic were accepted as the 
most powerful Turkish political elites. 
There was the same plurality and complication existing in the Turkish media as well: 
there were a large number of small and large scale media groups which were publishing or 
broadcasting in Turkey. Almost every political and ideological group had their audio-visual or 
written media tools. There were hundreds of local-national-international television channels, 
more than one thousand radio stations and countless small or large-scale weekly or daily 
newspapers. Nevertheless, the BIMAS (the united organisation of the two largest Turkish 
media groups) has control of about 70-80 % of Turkish media. Cumhuriyet is another 
influential daily Turkish newspaper. Also, Islamists have highly effective media groups. 
Almost all the powerful groups were active either in written media or visual media, 
and most of the columnists or journalists were working both for a newspaper and television 
channels. It is quite difficult to separate newspaper journalism and television journalism in 
Turkey. The three largest and the most influential Turkish daily newspapers belonging to the 
BIMAS (United Media Group) were selected. Two of them were known as liberal rightist and 
one of them was a moderate leftist paper. In addition to them the Cumhuriyet newspaper was 
chosen as the most intellectual and most effective leftist newspaper of Turkey, and a daily 
paper was chosen from the radical Islamist papers. Finally, the well known columnists and 
editors of these papers were accepted as the most effective Turkish media elites. 
At the beginning of the research, it was planned that the owners of the most powerful 
Turkish media groups would be accepted as the media elites. However, after preliminary 
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research it was discovered that almost all the owners of Turkish media groups were operating 
in many different sectors (from finance to automotive) and they were businessmen much more 
than journalists. For this reason, they were excluded from the media elites. 
Table 2 
The Sampling Group 
SECTORS ORGANISATIONS POSITIONS RESPONI)ENT 
NUMBER 
- Presidency - The President 
Political - Government - The Prime Minister 45 
Elites - Major Turkish Political - General Presidents, Presidents, 
Parties Deputy Presidents and General 
Secretaries of Parties 
Business Elites -The Fifty Largest Holdings - Owners Secondary 
(Groups) Data 
-The 500 largest Companies 
Military Elites -The General Staff - The chief of the general staff Secondary 
-Chief Commandants: - The chief Data 
-Army commanders 
-Navy 
-Air Force 
-Gendarmerie 
Media Elites The Largest and Most Columnists and editors 
Influential Media Elites 40-45 
6 Most powerful 
Labour Union Confederations of Turkish - General Presidents 
Elites Labour and White Collar - Chief Executives 35 
Workers Unions 
2.4. DATA SOURCES AND DATA COLLECTION: 
The following four major data collecting techniques are usually used by elite studies 
researchers: 
1. Interviewing: mailing or postal interview, face to face interview, telephone interview, inter- 
net (computerised) interview. Three kinds of questionnaire or interview schedules can be used 
in these kind of studies: 
a) Fully structured 
b) Semi-structured 
0 Unstructured 
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2. Examining the recorded behaviour patterns 
3. Participant observation 
4. Documentary research techniques 
No single source of data or data collecting techniques was chosen. The study was 
operationalised using the multiple methods of observation, documentary analysis and focused 
interviews. The majority of the data which is used in this study was obtained from field 
research and documentary sources. Observations helped the researcher to get more detailed 
and reliable information concerning elites and the existence and operation of elite 
organisations. 
In addition to field research using questionnaires and semi-structured interview 
schedules, written and printed materials were used for data collecting. The data archives, 
publications and bulletins of the related private and state institutions, such as the Istanbul 
chamber of Commerce (ICC)-ITO, Istanbul Chamber of Industry (ICI)-ISO, Ankara Chamber 
of Industry (ACI)-ASO, Ankara Chamber of Commerce (ACC)-ATO, Turkish Industrialists 
and Businessmen Association (TIBA)-TUSIAD, State Institute of Statistics Prime Ministry 
Republic of Turkey (SIS)-DIE, the TGNA (Turkish Grand National Assembly), the General 
Staff of the Republic of Turkey (Genelkurmaybaskanligi), the Ministry of National Defence, 
major Turkish political parties, business and labour unions, the business corporations and 
chambers were examined. 
Related studies which had been done by other researchers, biographies and 
autobiographies of elites, newspapers and journals, internet data sides and personal and 
institutional web pages on internet were the other important data sources which were used for 
the study. 
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2.5. INTERVIEW SCHEDULES: 
As Hertz and Imber argue (1995: 78), semi-structured interviews have a very special 
importance for meso and macro level elite studies. Following this tradition, these particular 
types of interview techniques were chosen 
The questionnaire will be used for semi-structured interviews to get more detailed and 
specific data from the field. In addition to completely structured questions, open-ended 
(unstructured) questions have also been used. In general, semi-structured questionnaires have 
been widely used in elite studies and have great popularity amongst elite researchers. This 
particular kind of interview schedule is more suitable and valuable than the fully structured or 
unstructured questionnaire for realising the major goals of this research. It will be especially 
helpful in gaining more detailed information about the respondents' social backgrounds, 
attitudes, beliefs, values, behaviour and roles. 
Two different interview schedules were created in both Turkish and English. This 
highlights one of the dilemmas of bilingual research. Firstly, the questionnaire was created in 
English. Then, it was translated into Turkish and adapted to Turkish society by taking in to 
account its peculiarities. The adaptation of the interview schedule could be called the 
redefinition of the schedule or creation of a new one. When the questionnaire was completed 
in English, my supervisor had to be sure that it could measure what would be expected to be 
measured in British culture and society. In the second phase, the researcher had to be sure 
himself that the questionnaire could work in Turkish society: this meant that, it should carry 
its own characteristics of Turkish culture and society, and it should be understood clearly by 
Turkish respondents. 
A total of 84 questions have been used in the interview schedule. All the questions 
have special purposes to realise. Whilst some of them aim to measure single peculiarities, 
others have multiple targets. 
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The first 10 questions are related to the respondents' occupation and elite group. The 
researcher aims not only to define occupational background and career pattern of the elites, 
but also to measure the satisfaction rate from their occupation and to find out about elite 
recruitment by using the first group of questions. 
The second group of questions that are located from II to 37 are related to the social 
and family background of the respondents. By using these questions the elites' marriage 
attitudes and behaviour will be observed as well as the inter-group and inter-class marital 
attitudes amongst the elite groups. Additionally, the relations between family background, 
educational background, elite circulation and marital attitudes fall in to this category. 
Questions 38 to 41 are about the elites' relations with the elitist clubs, and occupational 
associations and societies. They aim to measure the influence of those special kinds of clubs 
and societies on the circulation of elites in Turkish society. 
Questions 42-47 are related to the political affiliations of Turkish elites. Question 48 is 
related to religious orientation. These questions also will help to measure the homogeneity 
among and within the elite groups. Questions 49 and 55 aim to discover the extent of elite 
solidarity and elite consciousness in contemporary Turkish society. The other group of 
questions that is from 49 to 55 is about the power structure of Turkish society. The researcher 
aims to identify key elite groups in Turkish society and to define the decision-making process 
in Turkey. The objective of the researcher with questions 56 and 57 is to measure the relative 
elite autonomy within the Turkish power structure. 
Question 58-71 are concerned with the socio-psychological peculiarities of Turkish 
elites. These questions aim to define their values, beliefs and attitudes, and to measure 
whether there is homogeneity or heterogeneity within and between Turkish elite groups. The 
last questions are concerned with the daily life and leisure activities of respondents. Questions 
62,65,67,68,77,78 and 80,81 are also important in defining whether the respondents are 
liberal minded or conservative. 
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2.6. PILOT STUDY: 
A successful pilot study was accomplished before the main field research. The pilot 
research had two major purposes: firstly to obtain an overview of the field and to get more 
detailed information about the elites. The second objective was to test the interview schedule 
to ascertain whether it worked or not and to test the questions as to whether they measured 
what was expected. 
The researcher arranged his first visit to Turkey for the pilot study. The labour union 
elites were chosen for the pilot research. There were a number of reasons for this decision. 
Firstly, the Turkish labour union elites were a part of the major sampling group and the 
researcher would interview them in the major field research. Secondly, the researcher knew 
little about labour unions and labour union elites. 
On the one hand, four Turkish labour unions and two confederations of the unions 
were selected randomly as the target elite groups. Access to the elites of labour unions was 
not too difficult and most of them were reachable. The major difficulty was in fording them in 
their office at the pre-arranged time, because most of them were extraordinarily busy and 
mobile. Unfortunately, it was the season of collective bargaining for most of the labour unions 
which made the situation more complicated. 
After a couple of failures, two appointments were arranged with the leaders of two 
different trade unions. One of them was the general secretary of a quite powerful labour union 
that was operating in the metal industry and the other was the president of a textile union. 
After conducting an interview with the general secretary of the union, it was realised 
that the difficulties had just started; although, the time and place had been decided the 
respondent did not attend the meeting three times. However, the fourth was successful; after 
about an hours talk and discussion on the research topic the respondent said "it is a very 
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important and useful study, but it includes rather sensitive topics. Therefore, we have to talk 
and decide about your questionnaire in the managerial meeting with the other chief executives. 
You give me 5 questionnaires and I will transmit them to the relevant people. If they decide to 
reply you can get them back from me one week later. " Approximately 10 days later, again 
after a couple of failures, the voice of the people was heard on the telephone: saying "you can 
get the filled forms from Mr. V. 
As expected, Mr. X was not in his office as well and the following day was the 
beginning of the holiday of the religious feast day which would continue for about two weeks. 
It was impossible to find anybody from the directoral board in the union centre during that 
period. At the end of the holiday, when Mr. X was contacted by telephone he said "none of 
our members will answer any of your questions". 
The results of the second attempt with the president of a second union were more or 
less the same as the lust attempt. After a half an hour friendly chat, tea and coffee, he said "I 
have no time today so I will go to Istanbul. If you put a number of interview schedules both 
for me and for the other guys, I distribute them. You can get all the completed interview 
schedules from my office in two weeks time". The researcher called several times and went to 
the office three times, but it was impossible to find and talk with the president. Nobody knew 
the fate of the interview schedules. 
Some ideological reasons, doubts about the researcher and objectives of the research, 
unstable social and political conditions at that time, the abundance of their business at that 
time because it was the time of collective bargaining or a combination of these reasons caused 
the lack of success of the first two attempts. However, these difficulties did not deter the 
researcher who learnt many useful lessons about field research and a great deal of information 
about the nature and operation of labour unions and their elites. 
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Access to the leaders of other labour union confederations was relatively easier 
compared to the earlier experience. At the end of the pilot research, it was decided that the 
questionnaire worked except for minor changes and corrections. When these had been 
completed the large, detailed and piloted interview schedule was ready for the main field 
research. 
2.7. IN THE FIELD: 
Relatively, few researchers study elites in the social sciences, because of their very 
nature, where access and conducting interviews with elites is unusually difficult. Also, an elite 
study requires a great deal of time and money. 
The difficulties of gaining access and establishing rapport are the most important 
aspects of field research with elites. It is impossible to conduct any interview without trust and 
respect. Also, status difference between the researcher and elite subject is another important 
obstacle that needs to be confronted. These principles are essential in dealing with elites. They 
help the researcher to carry out successful field research in a numbers of ways by: 
" conducting preparatory background work about related people before attempting to enter 
the field 
" making the right contacts in the correct order 
" starting with those elites who are senior post holders and have more respect and honour in 
their own elite group and gaining their support and references to access the remaining elites 
" having good communication skills 
" previous research experience. 
Media elites were selected as the first target elite group and the researcher used the 
inter-net for his first contacts. Most of the Turkish columnists and editors had their own e- 
mail addresses and this gave the researcher an invaluable possibility of solving the access 
problem. 
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A number of months were spent doing preparatory background work before entering 
the field. The researcher was prepared to explain the importance and priorities of the research 
for Turkey and how the project might be useful to the power elite to assist them in setting out 
their priorities and future planning. These preparations were of great assistance to the 
researcher in solving the access problem. Most of the elites gave priority to pragmatism and 
the practicalities of the research rather than theoretical and purely scientific goals. 
Interviewing elites is remarkably different from interviewing non-elites. Thus, elites 
usually prefer to talk to well educated, highly experienced and qualified scientists rather than a 
field researcher. The researcher has to know: 
1. How to control of the interview situation most effectively in order to obtain good data, 
2. How to deal with upper class persons' tendencies to converse easily and freely, 
3. How to ask critical questions on sensitive topics to powerful people to get substantial 
answers. 
A letter outlining the background of the researcher, the methodology of the research 
and its aims and objectives was prepared and sent to most of the Turkish media elites by e- 
mail. Also, priorities of the research topic for Turkish society and its importance for the 
Turkish media were explained in the letter. After that, the researcher received about 15 letters 
in which respondents stated they were willing to participate in the study within one month. 
Most of them had sent their home and mobile phone as well as their day time business 
numbers in their letters. 
Senior position-holders in the three elite groups were selected. The researcher 
conducted all the interviews with the persons from the three different elite groups using the 
same interview guide. It was planned to use a tape recorder at the beginning of the field 
research, but this proved to be difficult. Usually, there was a very warm and friendly relation 
between respondent and researcher in the first 20-25 minutes of the talk and this helped to get 
more elaborate and reliable data from the respondents. The researcher observed that the use of 
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a tape recorder destroyed this naturally warm atmosphere and people were no longer 
spontaneous. As a matter of fact, most of the questions were structured and close-ended 
except a limited number of open-ended questions. Therefore, it was decided not to use the 
tape recorder. 
The length of the interview time was at least two hours and in some cases, as long as 
three or four hours. It has to be mentioned that one interview lasted more than 4 hours. The 
respondent was talking in such a willing, free and confident way that it was impossible to get 
him to stop or cut the conversation. He was an experienced and knowledgeable person. He 
had a remarkably long and esteemed career in Turkish politics and had a lot to say about the 
subject matter contained in the interview schedule. 
All the respondents were well known people and the researcher knew something about 
most of them. In addition to this information, preliminary research was conducted about social 
background, interests, political and ideological identities of the respondents before attending 
to the meetings. Some other lessons and experiences which were acquired from the field could 
be summarised as follows: 
" The researcher has to be aware of and possess some information on particular pressing 
issues in the country and wider world. Also, the researcher has to have a scientific career in 
his area and something to say about the topic being studied. Usually, elites may want to 
check this out by asking hard questions and verifying the depth of your scientific 
knowledge. 
" Having an interview schedule is a necessity but the researcher has to be flexible about the 
order and timing of the questions. 
" Elites are extremely busy people, consequently gaining access alone does not solve the 
problem. The most important thing is to find a suitable time for conducting the interview. 
The length of the questionnaire makes the problem more complicated. Most of the labour 
union elites and political elites do not have a daily agenda and work plan. By the nature of 
their work, they are extremely dynamic and the work plans are indefinite. 
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This situation had a significant influence on the work plan of the researcher. It was 
impossible to define an exact daily working agenda because, one did not know whether it 
would be possible to conduct the interviews at the pre-arranged time or not; most interviews 
began at least an hour later than the agreed time. 
As mentioned earlier, most elites do not have clear time plans; they do not know 
whether they will be in their office at a particular time or not. Many of them told the 
researcher "I would he very happy to talk about your research project, but I cannot promise 
any particular date for the interview. Hopefully, I will be in my office at this particular date. If 
I am there, why not". In the event, when the researcher arrived at the office at that date the 
respondent was not there and nobody knew what time he/she would he back. The researcher 
had no option but to wait. A couple of hours later the secretary received a phone can from the 
elite member saying that, after attending a directoral board meeting or party general assembly 
meeting he would be back in his office. A couple of hours later, there was another phone call 
saying that the person would not be coming to the office after all because he was attending a 
burial service or a wedding ceremony. This was the most common story which was repeated 
several times during the study. 
Another important problem was interruptions during the interviews. Most of the 
respondents were dealing with very serious, intensely important and urgent matters. Despite 
informing the secretary of the importance of the interview with the researcher, it was 
impossible to complete any meeting without interruption. They had been called sometimes by 
the party president, by the prime minister or a minister, or sometimes by a big businessman or 
influential member of the army staff, or in some cases by his wife. A couple of times the 
interviews were interrupted by an urgent or unexpected party meeting or directors board 
meeting. These interruptions sometimes lasted a couple of hours, sometimes half a day. 
The number of questions and the nature of the topics increased the interview time. 
There were about one hundred questions or sub-questions in the interview schedule. Also, 
44 
some of them were open ended questions. Under the best conditions, the duration of the 
interview was at least two hours. However, both the nature of the research topic and the 
sampling groups and the researcher's previous field research experiences were able to keep 
the attention and co-operation of the respondents thus making these difficult interviews easier. 
There were very few refusals, nevertheless confirmed interview appointments were not 
as great as expected during the first visit to Turkey. On the second visit, a relatively higher 
number of interviews were completed but this was still insufficient for the researcher. Only at 
the end of a third visit was it possible to attain a sufficient response rate. 
Although, none of the respondents refused to be interviewed most of them could not 
give any definite interview appointments. This uncertainty was worse than complete refusals. 
It was time consuming as well as financially expensive. Almost all the completed interviews 
necessitated more than 5 contacts. Sometimes, the cost of failed attempts was higher than that 
of completed interviews. 
Most of the elites inquired about the possibility of receiving a brief report about the 
research findings. The researcher promised to present them with a short report or to invite 
them to a research seminar about the findings which might be held in Turkey. Also, the 
researcher explained his expectations to publish several articles in professional journals or 
maybe a book from the data that would be collected. 
The co-operation of respondents during the interviews was excellent except in two 
cases which happened with a deputy president of a political party and the president of a labour 
union confederation. The response rate of labour union elites was more than 85 percent and 
that rate was higher than for the other groups. Overall response rate was nearly 70-75 percent. 
About 35 of the target persons could not be interviewed. 
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In particular 30 members of the Turkish labour union elite were interviewed. All of them were 
occupying the highest posts at the major confederations of Turkish labour and white collar workers 
unions. Only two general presidents of the six major confederations could not he interviewed. The 
remaining interviews were done with the chief executives of the confederations (including presidents 
and deputy presidents). 
Exactly the same number of elite members of the Turkish political elite were interviewed. The 
general presidents of the political parties were extremely busy, because it was the time of general 
elections. Only, about 40 percent of them could be interviewed . Nevertheless, response rate with the 
presidents, general secretaries and deputy presidents of the parties were rather high. Also, it was 
planned to make interviews with the three top elites of the Turkish politics (including the President of 
the Republic, the President of the Turkish Grand National Assembly and the prime minister), 
nevertheless all attempts failed with the President of the Republic and prime minister. On the other 
hand, the President of the TGNA was very welcoming and very co-operative: a very successful meeting 
was achieved with him at his office in the parliament. 
On the other hand, like the first two elite groups, 30 members of the media elite were 
interviewed (including the editors, directors and influential columnists). A large majority of them were 
members of the BIMAS Group which is the largest joint-media group of Turkey and controls around 
80 percent of Turkish media (either electronic or printed). Although, access to the media elite was 
rather easy, the most expensive and time consuming interviews were done with them. Because, a large 
majority of them were living in Istanbul and hotel and travelling expenses were rather high: sometimes 
to achieve a single interview, the researcher had to spend at least one in Istanbul. Sometimes failed 
interviews were costed to the researcher higher than achieved ones. 
2.8. ANALYSIS: 
The research has both a qualitative and quantitative character. Nevertheless, it is especially a 
descriptive kind of quantitative research. The data was analysed using the SPSS program. For the 
analysis of the data, a set of specific techniques were used: cross tabulation to determine the strength 
and direction of the relationship. 
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Political Development of 
7uiieu, FvAluAtian of 
7urkl*sh OemacrACy and 
harAcLeristics of 
11aliticAl ell*te 
"Sovereignty belongs without reservation or condition to the nation.: the system of 
administration rests on the principle that the people personally and 
effectively directs its own destinies". 
ýýý 
"One day I shall die, but the Republic live on! " 
K. Ataturk. 
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CHAPTER-3 
3. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT OF TURKEY AND THE 
EVOLUTION OF TURKISH DEMOCRACY 
This chapter will concern itself with Turkish political development from the early 
nineteenth century up to the present time: Firstly, brief geographical and demographic information 
about Turkey will be given. Secondly, the term modernisation will be explained and the historical 
roots of Turkish modernisation will be examined. Then, it will be concerned with the development 
of Turkish democracy. Also, the late Ottoman Period will be looked at very briefly, because 
Turkish modernisation began in the Ottoman Empire. 
3.1. A GENERAL VIEW OF TURKISH CULTURE AND TURKEY: 
It can be said that a contemporary Turk is the harmonious combination of the western 
mind, oriental heart, European appearance, Anatolian body and a central Asian spirit. 
Contemporary Turkish culture and Turkish society comprises a permanent mixture of five 
major elements that are cultural and social aspects of the Central Asian Turks; religious 
aspects which came from Perso-Arabic culture with Islam; cultural and social aspects of the 
first Anatolian Civilisations (such as Hittites, Frigians, Lydians, Ionians, Macedonians, ... etc. 
); 
social and cultural aspects of the Graeco-Roman culture and civilisation; and finally a heavy 
predominance of contemporary Western culture and civilisation. This is a real, original and 
harmonious combination of several different aspects and established a very original and 
permanent new way of life, culture and society. 
Contemporary Turkey lies in the northern hemisphere with an area of 311.780 square 
miles. It has approximately 65 million inhabitants, 65 percent of whom live in urban areas and 35 
percent in the countryside. The country is on the point of intersection of the three continents that 
are Europe, Asia and Africa. It is a natural link between Europe and Asia. Turkey is a peninsula 
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which is surrounded by the Black Sea in the north, the Mediterranean in the south and the Aegean 
Sea in the west. There is also an important internal sea, the Marmara, in the north-west. 
The Anatolian peninsula, which has been called "the cradle of the civilisations", has a very 
rich cultural inheritance of the 13 different civilisations that have existed from the Palaeolithic Age 
to the present time: Earliest cultures (Neolithic Age, Chalcolithic Age, Bronze Age cultures), 
Hittites, Frigians, Urartuans, Lydians, Ionians, Persians, Macedonians, Romans, Byzantine, Seljuks, 
Ottomans and contemporary Western Civilisations 
The new state was created from the ruins of the Ottoman Empire in the 1920s. Turkey has 
turned her face completely to the west since the foundation of the Republic. Economic and social 
development, as Hale argues (Hale, 1981), have proceeded in a predominantly liberal competitive 
political system since the 1940s. 
Turkey has a strategic place in world politics. As Ahmad has noted (Ahmad, 1991: 226), 
Turkey's strategic location on the Straits and on the cross-roads between Europe and Asia will 
remain unchanged. Turkey is a meeting point between Europe and Asia not only geographically, 
but also ideologically between Eastern and Western civilisation. The Turkish secular and 
democratic system has provided a model to both the Islamic Middle East and the new Turkish 
states of the former Soviet Union. 
3.2. MODERNISATION AND MODERNISATION PROCESS OF TURKISH SOCIETY: 
After definition of the concepts, the roots of Turkish modernisation will be examined. 
Modernisation is a social process that comprises the whole of society including its economy, belief 
system, culture and politics. It consists of industrialisation, rationalisation, secularisation and 
bureaucratisation. As Jary noted (Jary & Jaty, 1991: 405), modernisation began in Europe in the 
ages of the Renaissance and Reformation. Europeans experienced modernisation as a process of 
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discovery and invention rather than of response and adaptation. The main interest of this section 
will be political modernisation rather than the general meaning of modernisation. 
Political modernisation, as defined by Jary, is the process usually seen as crucially affected 
by economic modernisation, in which traditional or colonial forms of political organisation and 
state forms, including modern political parties are involved (Jary & Jary, 1991: 477). 
Modernisation in general, and political modernisation in particular, are open-ended 
processes. In Huntington's words (Huntington, 1968: 328), political development is never complete, 
and no political system ever solves the problems of confronting it. According to Huntington, a 
politically modern society has rationalised authority, differentiated structure and mass participation. 
Every modernising society confronts these major political problems which may be called the 
growth of authority and public service, the search for national identity and unity, and the demand 
for political equality and participation (Rustow, in Kar-pat, 1973: 113). Ataturk followed this order 
in his modernisation of Turkey; authority, identity, equality. 
The following sections will concern themselves with the political modernisation of Turkish 
society. In particular, the historical roots of Turkish modernisation will be examined. The late 
Ottoman Period (under the name of the pre Republic era) will be looked at, because the origins of 
Turkish modernisation can be found in the late Ottoman Empire. 
The modernisation process in Turkey began in the Ottoman Empire at the time of Selim III 
and Mahmut II. Nevertheless, this process reached its real and certain meaning with the Ataturk 
reforms. The face of Turkey was turned completely to the west by Ataturk. Turkish modernisation 
was shaped by the Kemalist Revolution. Ataturk defined the form and the way which should be 
followed by the Turkish people to become a more civilised and westernised society. 
Following very brief information about the Pre-Republic era the Turkish Independence 
Movement and the Ataturk Revolution will be examined. Secondly, Ataturk's reforms and the 
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basic principles of Kernalism will be set out. After a very brief overview of the single party period, 
the multi-party period will be investigated. 
3.3. PRE REPUBLIC ERA (OTTOMAN PERIOD): 
The Turkish historian Halil Inalcik divides the Ottoman Empire into 6 periods: Formative 
1300-1.402, consolidation and reorganisation 1402-1481, attempt at world-wide empire 1481- 
1671, crisis and development struggle 1581-1699, defeat and acceptance of European superiority 
1699-1826, abolition of Janissaries to Abdulhamid's overthrow 1826-1906 (Kai-pat, 1973: 28-28) 
Turkish efforts at modernisation first began in the military area with Selim III and Mahmut 
H. Sultan Selim, who lost his throne and his life in the fight against traditional forces of resistance, 
established a body of new troops, entirely trained in the European style. Later, Mahmut II (1803- 
1839) used the new army to destroy the anti-reformist Jannisaries (Yeniceri). At the beginning of 
the nineteenth century Sultan Mahmut replaced the degenerate Jannisaries with a reorganised and 
modernised army model that was the "Assakir-i Mansure-i Muhammediye" (the victorious 
Mohammedan Soldiers). 
Social and political reforms followed the military reforms. Sultan Mahmut decided with 
Alemdar Mustafa Pasa to co-operate with the Ayan (Council of Notables) by the "Sened-i Ittifak " 
(Deed of Agreement). With this document, the absolutist authority of the Sultan began to diminish. 
As Onulduran discussed (Onulduran, 1974: 30), following the abolition of the Jannisaries, 
reforms were introduced which intended to modernise the political structure and the economic and 
financial systems of the Empire. As Rustow noted, military reforms expanded into cultural 
transformation and defensive modernisation turned into an integral modernisation (Karpat, 1973). 
Sultan Mahmut made great efforts to create a new bureaucracy in the governmental 
machinery staffed by people who had Europeanised minds and a European style of education. As a 
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result of the pressure of the new elite, Tanzimat (reorganisation) Rescript (Gulhane Hatti 
Humayunu -the Imperial Edict of Gulhane) was proclaimed in the reign of Sultan Abdulmecid. 
The Edict was engineered by Mustafa Resit Pasa who was a civil servant, a diplomat and 
the Ottoman foreign minister. With this document, as Onulduran stressed, all citizens -Moslem or 
non Moslem- would be treated equally before the law and criminal and civil trials would be 
conducted in public. To prepare the new legislation, the existing Supreme Council of Judicial 
Ordinances (Meclis-i Vala-yi Ahkam-i Adliye) was to be increased in number, and the members of 
the Council would be charged with codifying the general principles of the Rescript into concrete 
law (Onulduran, 1974: 31). The Supreme Council of judicial Ordinances was an advisory body 
where discussion on the laws took place (like a quasi- parliament). Another rescript was declared in 
1856 which was the Islahat (Reform) Edict. This Edict emphasised the equality of all religious 
groups and forbade religious and racial discrimination in the empire. 
The military, medical and administrative academies, modelled on their Western 
counterparts, were established in the subsequent years of the Islahat Edict. The European style 
educational system of the Tanzimat produced a new social elite that adopted European tastes in 
dress and in its social life, literature and thought. These new ruling elites were significantly different 
from the classic Ottoman ruling elites. They are known as the "Young Turks". 
Following the Tanzimat period, the first attempt at transition into a constitutional monarchy 
took place on the 23rd of December, 1876. This period is known as the First Constitutional period 
(I. Mesrutiyet). The first Constitution was modelled on the 1831 Belgian Constitution, with Mithat 
Pasa as its chief author. It defined the sovereign right of the Sultan on the one hand and the basic 
rights of the individuals on the other hand. However, this was to be ended by the absolutist 
monarch Abdulhamid II in 1878. He suspended the 1876 Constitution and dissolved the parliament 
until 1908. 
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Hamidian repression brought its antithesis. Several secret revolutionary organisations 
against Abdulhamid rose up in the empire. By far, the most effective one was "the Society 
(Committee) of Union and Progress" (Ittihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti) which was organised by the 
Young Turks. This society was particularly effective amongst young army officers. 
The first reaction against Hamidian despotism occurred in Monaster, orchestrated by 
Besneli Niyazi on July, 1908. Abdulhamid was not successful in suppressing the uprising and he 
was compelled to sign the declaration of the Second Constitutional Period (II. Mesrutiyet) in 1908. 
The second Constitutional Government was established on July 23,1908, and was the beginning of 
a new phase in the political development of Turkey. This period (1908-1918) covered four 
assemblies. 
As Turhan noted (1991), these periods are of prime importance for Turkish political life; 
when many new social groups -such as civil and military officers, civil bureaucrats and 
professionals- first began to emerge among the political elites. 
3.4. TURKISH INDEPENDENCE MOVEMENT AND THE TURKISH REVOLUTION: 
As Rustow noted (Karpat, 1973: 109), the Anatolian resistance (Turkish Independence) 
movement was a civilian organisation with a military apex: all decision given by the TGNA 
(Turkish Grand National Assembly-Buyuk Millet Meclisi) since 1920. As stressed by Lewis 
(1961: 390), the first parliament of young Turkey was a colourful and mixed body, including 
some 125 civil servants, 13 municipal officials, 53 soldiers (10 of them pasha), 53 men of 
religion (including 14 muftis), and 5 tribal chiefs. It also comprised 40 merchants, 32 farmers, 
20 lawyers, 1 journalist, 2 engineers and 1 artisan. 
The occupation of Izmir by the Greeks in May, 1919 was the last blow that transformed 
the resistance movement into a true struggle for independence. A few days after this, Mustafa 
Kemal went to central Anatolia from Istanbul. At that time all Turkey was occupied apart from a 
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small part. There were no regular armed forces and no powerful weapons. After the Erzurum 
Congress which took place between July 23- August 7,1919, the "Declaration of Independence" 
(Misak-i Milli) was proclaimed. According to this declaration, "the people and territory of Turkey 
should form an indivisible and complete whole, mandates and foreign dominance were 
unacceptable, and the National Will of the people was to be the only valid power". This resulted in 
the establishment of the National Sovereignty Principle as the basis of the new state. Then, the 
second congress gathered in Sivas between 4-11 September. 
Mustafa Kemal organised small groups of people who fought for independence, and set up 
a regular aimed force in a very short time. He started a big counter attack. Under commander- in- 
chief Mustafa Kemal, the Turkish army defeated the invading armies. As a result of this victory the 
Lausanne Treaty was signed on July 24,1923. With the signing of Lousanne, the humiliating 
Treaty of Serves was abrogated and Turkey's independence, integrity and sovereignty were 
recognised by the world powers. 
Mustafa Kemal had successfully completed the first step of the Kemalist Revolution; 
defending Turkish sovereignty (1919-1922). Now came the time for the realisation of the second 
but the most important step of his revolution -creating a totally new state, a new society and a new 
country. His real objective was to create a truly modern, democratic, secular (laic), republican and 
independent Turkey based on the sovereignty of the people. From 1923 to 1938, the main activities 
of Mustafa Kemal consisted of placing the state and Turkish society on the road to Westernisation. 
3.5. ATATURK'S REFORMS: 
As a product of the Turkish Revolution, the new secular nation state of Turkey was 
established by Mustafa Kemal in Anatolia between 1919 and 1923 (Dunn, 1972: 192). Now the 
time came for the proclamation of the Republic and the promulgation of the new constitution. 
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In a country where the Ottoman Sultans had ruled for centuries, as Allah's Shadow on 
earth, Mustafa Kemal had the courage and vision to do away with centuries of tradition and 
corruption by announcing that: "The Turkish State is a Republic", on October 29,1923. To 
achieve this first of all he separated the Caliphate (religious leadership of all Moslems) and 
Sultanate (political leadership), then abolished the Sultanate, and secondly the Caliphate. Later, he 
replaced the Sheriat, which is the Law of Koran, with a modern civil code adopted from the Swiss 
civil code, and a penal code modelled on the Italian Penal Code. This new legal system was based 
on Roman Law (1925-6). 
Another far-reaching cultural reform was the reform of the alphabet: he abolished the use 
of Arabic script and adopted Latin characters in 1928. After that, Ataturk gave to Turkish women 
complete equality in society. They acquired the right to vote and to be elected to parliament before 
the women of many European Countries. 
Reform was carried out in every area of social life. The first political party of the Republic, 
the Republican People's Party, was established. As Frey emphasised (Frey, 1965: 40-42), the 
statement that Islam was the religion of the state was deleted from the constitution. Religious 
tribunals were done away with, the fez was outlawed, and the religious dervish order was 
proscribed. The wearing of religious garb outside of religious buildings was forbidden. The 
Western calendar and time standards were adopted. A national system of education was 
established, a national railway network was built, and the expansion of secular higher education 
began. On account of these exceptional services, Turkish people gave to Mustafa Kemal the name 
"Ataturk" a venerable name, which means the father of all Turks. 
Ataturk's Revolution accomplished the basic modernisation of the educated elite and 
brought it into active political participation. As Frey said, now the possibly more difficult task of 
modernising the ill-educated masses of society and involving them in the political process was 
undertaken. 
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3.6. THE BASIC PRINCIPLES OF ATATURKISM (KEMALISM): 
As Dankwart Rustow said, Ataturk achieved the transformation of an empire into a nation, 
of a transitional society into a western cultural image. Mustafa Kemal combined the three roles of 
victorious battlefield commander, state founder and chief sponsor of large-scale educational 
establishments (Rustow, in Karpat, 1973: 10). 
Ataturk was a man of action, a man of ideas and a pragmatic far-seeing statesman. The 
driving force of his life was science, particularly the positive sciences. He built up a socio-political 
system, called Kemalism/ Ataturkism. These are the basic principles of Ataturkism: 
" Fullindependence 
" Anti-imperialism 
" Rationalism and scienticism 
" Republicanism 
" Nationalism (Patriotism) 
" Etatism (policy of state control), which is very different to socialism and communism 
" Laicism (Secularism) 
" Revolutionism 
" Contemporaneitism 
" Populism 
" Pacifism: Ataturk formulated the most essential principles of Turkey; " peace at home, peace 
in the world". This compact sentence summarised Ataturk's thoughts about the internal and 
external policies of Turkey with complete clarity. 
3.7. SINGLE PARTY PERIOD: (1923-1946) 
There is a wrong but popular idea that Communism and Fascism constitute the only two 
possible type of single party. As Duverger argues, such an idea does not correspond with reality. 
There are some single parties that are not really totalitarian either in ideas or organisation. The best 
example of this is provided by the People's Republican Party which operated in Turkey from 1923 
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to 1946 as a single party (Duverger, 1964: 276). It had a democratic ideology, in which all the 
power was given to the Great National Assembly by the Turkish Constitution. 
The Turkish single-party system did not give any official recognition to the monopoly of 
power and did not make any attempt to justify it by the existence of a classless society. In 
Duverger's words, it was always embarrassed and almost ashamed of the monopoly (Duverger, 
1964: 277). Mustafa Kemal several times attempted to end it. 
No parallels can be drawn with Hitler's Germany, nor the Italy of Mussolini. Factions 
developed freely inside the party without destroying it. The Grand National Assembly has had an 
opposition since the establishment of the first National Assembly (23 April 1920), such as "Second 
Group". But the first opposition political party was founded officially on November 17,1924 by 
the two former commanders, Kazim Karabekir and All Fuat Cebesoy: it was the Progressive 
Republican Party (Trakkiperver Cumhuriyet Firkasi). It was abolished by cabinet decree on June 5, 
1925 because its members were neither republican nor progressive. Their linkage with the Shaikh 
Said Rebellion, which was a fanatical religious and anti-revolutionist revolt, brought about their 
end. 
The second stage in the transformation to a multiparty system took place in 1930. The 
Liberal Republican Party was established by Fethi Okyar, at Ataturk's suggestion. In a short time, 
fanatics joined the Liberal Party and started to campaign against the secular state. As a result of 
this, the Liberal Party was abrogated by its president Fethi Okyar on December 17,1930. 
Nevertheless, the opposition continued with their activity in the Parliament up to 1946 under the 
name of the Independent Group. 
The last experiment in the transition to a multi-party system took place in 1945, with the 
establishment of the Democratic Party and their peaceful triumph in the 1950 elections. Turkey 
passed from a single-party system to pluralism, as Duverger said (1964: 280) with neither checks 
nor disturbance. 
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3.8. MULTI-PARTY PERIOD: (From 1946 up to date): 
Although many political parties were established between 1945 and 1950, only the 
Democratic Party was ultimately successful. As mentioned by Tezic (1975: 253), the first party was 
the National Development Party, a religious conservative party. It was established by Nuri 
Demirbas, Huseyin Avni Ulas and Cevat Rifat Atilhan on July 18,1945, but they did not manage to 
play the game of democracy according to its rules. 
3.8.1.1946-1960 PERIOD: 
The Democratic Party was established by Adnan Menderes, Celal Bayar, Fuat Koprulu and 
Refik Koraltan who were the members of RPP (Republican People's Party), on January 7,1946. It 
grew rapidly in a very short time, with the election of 61 deputies in the 1946 elections. The eighth 
Assembly (1946) was the first real multi-party Assembly, but the first completely free and openly 
contested election in Turkey was not achieved until 1950. The period of 1946-50 could be labelled 
the "Transitional Period" to a multi-party system. 
The Democratic Party won the election of 1950 with 53.35 % of the popular vote and 
83.57 % of the Grand National Assembly seats and established the government while RPP gained 
39.78 % of the votes and 14.40 % of the seats. Furthermore, the populist politics, good weather 
conditions, inflationary economic policies and foreign capital brought social and economic welfare 
for the people in the following years. As the result of all these factors the Democrats won 503 
seats, whereas the Republican had only 31 in spite of 34.78% of the popular vote in the 1954 
general elections. 
This honeymoon did not continue very long. In the late 1950s, like the social and 
economic indicators of Turkish society, the vote for the Democratic Party began to decline. 
However, the Democratic Party still won the 1957 election with 47.3 % of the vote while RPP 
achieved 40.6 %. Adnan Menderes' despotic and neurotic behaviour and politics led to his downfall 
and his party's end as a result of the 27th May 1960 overthrow. According to Ozbudun (Kircak, 
58 
1993: 95), the deviation from democracy, privileges given to his own supporters and a deviation 
from Kemalist principles, were an invitation to young patriots and Kemalist soldiers. 
3.8.2.1960-1971 PERIOD: 
Turkish people began their daily life on 27 of May, 1960 with a radio announcement that 
they had never heard before. It was an extraordinarily beginning to the day and the announcement 
ushered in a highly different period in the social-political life of Turkey. The announcement that 
was heard on the Turkish state radio at 7: 00 am on 27 May 1960 was: "Honourable fellow 
countrymen!... The Turkish armed forces have taken over the administration of the country. Our 
armed forces have taken this initiative for the purpose of extricating the parties from the 
irreconcilable situation into which they, have fallen ...! 
" (Ahmad, 1993: 126). 
The Armed forces restored their traditional respected status in the societal hierarchy. The 
Junta or the National Unity Committee (NUC) prepared a new constitution for the professors 
Commission. This Constitution was very civilised and radical. 
Under the 1961 Constitution, as Ahmad noted (Ahmad, 1993: 136), Turkey enjoyed a 
greater degree of freedom than ever before. People had more civil rights, the universities had 
greater autonomy, and students were given freedom to organise their own associations. Workers 
were given the right to strike. Turkey had been thoroughly politicised in the 1960s and ideological 
politics were permitted. The ultra-nationalist and neo-fascist National Action Party (NAP) and the 
Socialist Workers Party (WPT) had been founded in those years. The Socialist Workers Party 
would get 16 seats in the Parliament of the 1960s. It was the first and last great success of the 
Turkish Socialists in Turkish modern history. The Islamist movement also became quite powerful. 
Two new political parties were formed in 196las the inheritors of the Democratic Party: 
the New Turkey Party (NTP) and the Justice Party (JP), to compete in the first election under the 
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new election law. The two biggest parties were RPP and JP in all the elections during this period. 
The 1960s could be labelled the period of coalition governments. 
However, as a result of high inflation, high political tension, rising unemployment, and 
rapid social and political change, Turkey dissolved into chaos. As Ahmad emphasised (1993: 147), 
the Islamist movement had become more aggressive and its party, the National Order Party, openly 
rejected Ataturk and Kemalism. On account of this, the generals presented a memorandum to the 
President and the chairmen of the two chambers in 12 March 1971. The Generals demanded the 
formation of a strong, credible government capable of implementing the reforms envisaged by the 
constitution. 
3.8.3.1971-1980 PERIOD: 
Following Demirel's resignation, the ex-leftist new rightist Nihat Erim formed the 
government. According to Erim and the Military High Command, the liberal constitution of 1961 
was a luxury for Turkey. They started a campaign against civil rights and liberties. This 
modification covered every institution of the state, such as the unions, the universities, the press, 
radio and television, the Council of State, the Constitutional Court, the Court of Appeal, the 
Assembly and the Senate. The philosophy and activities of the 12 March regime was totally 
different from the 27 May regime. It could be labelled the antithesis of the 27 May spirit. 
Youth organisations, meetings and seminars of professional associations and unions, and all 
the publications of the left were prohibited whereas the publications of right could be circulated 
freely. Thousands upon thousands of Kemalist and socialist intellectuals, writers, scientists, 
university students and unionist leaders were arrested under the twin regime of Erim-Tagmac 
(Kircak, 1993: 233). 
Ecevit's populist and "peace and unity" policies were not enough to bring about a cease 
fire. Political terrorism had become a regular feature of Turkish social life. As Ahmad argued 
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(Ahmad, 1993: 163), there were fundamental differences between the terrorism of the left in the 
early 1970s and the terrorism of right and left in the mid/late 1970s: in the first period, the action 
was against imperialism, western influences and capitalism whereas in the second period, the aim 
was to create chaos and demoralisation. The aim of the Grey-wolves (Commandos), who are the 
militants of the neo-fascist Action Party, was to destroy the electoral potential of RPP by 
demoralising the RPP's supporters. In addition, rising unemployment, increasing inflation and 
declining wages encouraged the conflagration. 
Ecevit's RPP (Republican Populist Party) won 41.4 % of the popular votes and 213 seats 
as compared with 36.9 % for Dernirel's JP in the 1977 election. Ecevit established a minority 
government but he could not get a vote of confidence. This was the beginning of one of the darkest 
periods in Turkey's modern history which would eventually culminate in the 12 September 1980 
Coup D'etat. 
3.8.4.1980-1998 PERIOD: 
The junta set up the National Security Council (NSC) under the chief of Staff Kenan 
Evren. The other members of the National Security Council were the chiefs of the armed forces 
comprising army, navy, air force and gendarmery. They ruled Turkey until November 1983. 
In the first place, the military junta suspended the constitution and dissolved parliament, 
then they closed down the political parties, detained their leaders and suspended the professional 
associations and confederation of trade unions. They attempted to change all areas of social life 
except foreign policy and the economic stabilisation programme which had been in place since 24 
January 1980. As Ahmad commented (Alunad, 1993: 185), arrests and trials were the principal 
features of daily life. 
As a result of external and internal repression, the Junta decided to hold general elections in 
November 1983. Evren and the Junta openly supported the retired general Turgut Sunalp's 
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Nationalist Democratic Party (NDP). They did not permit free competition in the elections; they 
always vetoed the powerful rival of their preferred candidate. However, the Junta could not 
prevent the victory of Ozal's Motherland Party, because Ozal had the support of patrons and 
America. In Ahmad's words "Turkey had selected a salesman and not a statesman" in the 1983 
general elections (Ahmad, 1993: 209). 
Ozal had a colourful political identity like his party, the Motherland Party which was a 
transitional period political party. They claimed that they were conservative like the Justice Party, 
Islamist like the Nationalist Salvation Party (NSP), nationalist like the Nationalist Action Party, 
even social democrat. Is it possible to be everything at the same time for either an individual or a 
political party? Certainly, according to the saying "everything means nothing! " 
As a parallel to the former Islamic candidate Ozal's rise in politics, the Islamist movement 
began to increase in Turkey. The Junta and later the Twin union of Evrem-Ozal appropriated the 
"Turkish-Islamic Synthesis" as the ideology of the state. As Guvenc (1991) and Kircak (1993) 
emphasised the Islamist element was more overpowering than the Turkish element in this 
unsystematic philosophy. It was the powan of the Islamists who wanted to abolish the secular 
Republic and create an Islamic state based upon the Sheriat. 
The Junta encouraged and supported the Islamists because they saw Islam as the antidote 
to all forms of left-wing politics (Ahmad, 1993; 214). But, there was the other, maybe the more 
important side of the coin, that they were clearly breaking down the barriers that were in the way of 
the Sheriat. Moreover, they were doing it in the name of Ataturk and on behalf of Ataturkism. 
The period of Motherland governments would continue until the 1991 general elections. 
These brought into power the coalition government of Demirel's True Path Party (TPP) and 
Inonu's Social Democratic Populist Party (SPP). 
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One of the most effective Turkish columnists Emin Colasan describes very accurately the 
social situation in Turkey in the 1980s and also in the 1990s: "The Motherland Party (1980s) has 
destroyed all the values we held sacred. Ten years ago we as a nation used to consider swindling, 
theft, bribery and corruption as dishonourable. Now, they are normal things; Yalcin, whom we 
would have criticised and disgraced a few years ago, has become everyone's darling today. Where 
will it all end, dear sir!?... " (Ahmad, 1993: 209). I also agree with Ahmad (1993: 208) that, the 
1980s created a society of "the haves, the have nots, and the have lots" in Turkey. 
3.9. THE POLITICAL STRUCTURE OF THE MODERN TURKISH REPUBLIC: 
The Turkish Republic is based on a democratic laic (secular), pluralist and parliamentary 
system where human rights are protected by laws and social justice. The National Assembly is 
elected by popular vote and the nation is governed by a Council of Ministers directed by the prime 
minister. These main state organs of the Turkish Republic are discussed below: 
3.9.1. THE TURKISH GRAND NATIONAL ASSEMBLY: 
The Turkish Grand National Assembly has been Turkey's 450 (recently increased to 550) 
seat unicameral Parliament since 1980. It is the sole legislative authority. Its members are elected 
for a five year term through universal suffrage, however, the Parliament can decide on early 
elections before the end of this period. 
Besides its legislative power, the Parliament elects the president, has the authority to 
declare war, proclaim Martial Law, ratify international treaties and debate requests for 
parliamentary investigations into high ranking state officials. The Parliament can also amend the 
constitution with a two-thirds majority. All Turks who are at least 30 years old and are not 
disqualified according to Article 76 of the Constitution, are eligible to become candidates for 
election to parliament. 
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3.9.2. THE PRESIDENT: 
The President of the Republic is the Head of State. He represents the Turkish Republic and 
the integrity of the Turkish nation. The President is elected by secret ballot and a two-third majority 
plenary session of the Parliament for a term of seven years. He is elected from among the members 
of the Turkish Grand National Assembly who are at least 40 years old and have had a higher 
education or are recruited from among Turkish citizens who fulfil these requirements and are 
eligible to be deputies. The present President of the Republic of Turkey is Suleyman Demirel, who 
is the ninth President of the Republic and also the third civil President in modern Turkish history. 
3.9.3. THE CABINET: 
The Council of Ministers or Cabinet is led by the prime minister and is made up of his/her 
ministers. The prime minister is appointed by the President from among the members of the 
Parliament. Once the President has approved the cabinet list, the government programme has to be 
read in Parliament within a week. Then a vote of confidence is taken two days after the reading in 
Parliament of the government programme and one day after the debate over the programme has 
ended. 
In the event of general elections, the Prime Minister is required to replace the ministers of 
the interior, justice and communication with independents. In the event of early elections, the Prime 
Minister is also required to replace these ministers within five days of the Parliament's decision to 
hold new polls 
3.10. SOCIAL ANATOMY OF TURKISH POLITICAL ELITES: SINCE 
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE REPUBLIC TO 1990s: 
One of the most effective elite groups in Turkey is the political elite. Turkish political elites 
make up the key elites together with the military, media and economic (business) elites. These four 
elite groups can be described as the "Turkish Power Elite' using the Weberian approach. 
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They are in command of the major hierarchies and organisations of society. They are the 
owners of power, wealth and celebrity and their decisions greatly effect the everyday life of 
ordinary people. They rule the big corporations, run the machinery of state and direct the military 
establishment. The major social, economic and political decisions are mostly made by this small 
minority group. They not only control the decision making process, but also the process of elite 
circulation. 
The major focus of this chapter will be the Turkish political elites. Both top political 
leaders and parliamentary elites will be identified as the Turkish political elites. All the members of 
the Turkish parliament who served since the establishment of the Republic (including the assembly 
of 1920) to 1995 were examined under the name of "Turkish parliamentary elites". 
The second group is Turkish political leaders. They also can be classified as the Turkish top 
political elites. This category comprises all the presidents, the presidents of the Turkish Grand 
National Assembly (TGNA) and prime ministers. In addition, the ministers who served 4 or 
more times for the entire Republican period were accepted as top political leaders and taken 
into account in the research. The general social composition of the modern Turkish political elites 
will be described in this chapter. The major social background characteristics, such as age, gender, 
family size, marital status, educational and occupational qualifications will be used to achieve this. 
3.10.1. AGE AND AGEISM: 
Age is still an important factor not only in Turkish society but also in the world. The figure 
of Table 1 proves that ageism is one of the common problems of the political arena. In spite of 
declining importance in recent years, it seems that age still has a special and traditional prestige in 
most countries. Youth have been deliberately isolated from political life by middle and advanced 
aged politicians. 
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As seen on Table 1 The reality is more or less the same in Turkey. Although young people 
are an important proportion of the whole Turkish population, they have been isolated and legally 
prevented from participating in political life. Nevertheless, Turkish parliamentary elites are younger 
than many western countries. All these realities clearly show that, either in Turkey or in Western 
countries, the older generation could not envisage competition with the younger generation under 
equal conditions. 
When Ataturk first came to power, he brought into parliament with him a relatively 
youthful group of politicians. The mean age of parliamentary elites was approximately 43 in the 
first three assemblies (the assemblies of 1920,1923 and 1927). By the 1935 general elections, it 
had risen to 45 and by the following election it increased to 46. The mean ages of the assemblies of 
1939,1943,1946 and 1950 were nearly 46 (Arslan, 1995). 
Table 1 clearly shows that the mean age of Turkish parliamentary elites for the whole 
Republican period is 45 and it can be said that the Turkish Parliament is a middle aged parliament. 
On the other hand, Turkish political leaders are older than other Turkish political elite groups. The 
general mean age for Turkish top leaders is 54. 
Table 1 
Age Groups and Mean Ages of Turkish Political Elites 
(*) 
(**) 
AGE 
GROUPS °lo 
TURKISH POLITICAL 
ELITES (* 
TURKISH TOP POLITICAL 
LEADERS ** 
30-34 7.6 0.4 
35-39 19.2 7.2 
40-44 20.3 18.3 
45-49 18.2 10.6 
50-54 14.1 15 
55-59 9.3 12.9 
60-64 6.5 13 
65 and + 4.8 22.7 
MEAN AGE 44.8 54 
The category comprises all the MP's from the beginning of the Republic lip to date. 
The category consists the presidents, the presidents of the TGNA, prime ministers 
and the ministers who served 4 or more times for all the Republican period. 
Source: Reorganised from Arslan, 1995. 
66 
In brief, the young age range has an approximately 27 % share in the whole parliamentary 
elites, whereas the middle aged group comprises 53 % and the proportion of the older generation is 
20 % for the whole period. Generally the dominant age group is of advanced age with a 496 % 
share in the Turkish top political leadership. The second biggest group which is middle age, has a 
rate of 44 %. The proportion of the younger generation is only 8 %. From this we can easily 
conclude that the top leadership is dominated by late middle-aged or early advanced aged people. 
3.10.2. EDUCATIONAL BACKGROUNDS AND FOREIGN LANGUAGE 
ABILITIES OF TURKISH POLITICAL ELITES: 
Educational background is another important phenomenon that affects the daily life of 
the people in today's world. Not only the quantity but also the quality and the type of the 
education received is highly important in obtaining better and more prestigious positions in 
society. Also, as mentioned by Lipset and Eisenstadt (Etzioni, 1993: 63), there is an 
association between stable democracy, the level of economic development and the educational 
levels of the people. A higher level of education abates radicalism and authoritarianism 
amongst the working class and also increases the size of the middle class that is usually seen 
as the moderator between the public and the elites. 
Elite studies highlight the fact that educational background is among the most 
important factors that affect the elite recruitment process of societies. This reality can be seen 
in the Turkish case study. The findings demonstrate that the road to power, wealth and 
prestige depends partly upon the education received together with several other social factors. 
These factors will be examined in the later chapters of this study. 
The heavy predominance of university educated elites among Turkish parliamentary 
elites can be observed in Table 2. The average rate of university-educated parliamentary elites is 
76.1 % for all periods. The mean of deputies who received only lycee (high school) education is 7 
% and the average rate of deputies with a middle-school level (junior high school) education is 9.1 
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%. The proportion of primary school-graduates is the lowest, at 4.7 % of Turkish parliamentary 
elites. 
Also Table 2 shows clearly that Turkish top political leaders are very well educated. 95 % 
of Turkish leaders have been university trained, the residue of 5% being shared by those people 
who received high school (lycee) and private education. Moreover, 90 % of Turkish top political 
leaders can speak a foreign language, with 41.4 % of them knowing two or more foreign 
languages. All of the Turkish presidents know a foreign language, with 33 % of them knowing two 
or more. The mean foreign language ability of the Turkish top leaders is 1.5 for the whole 
Republican period. 
Table 2 
Educational Backgrounds of Turkish Political Elites 
EDUCATIONAL LEVEL FOREIGN LANGUAGE ABILITY Average 
% (%) numb. Of 
ASSEMBLY Univer- Lycee Middle Primary One Two Three Four, No Fo. Foreign 
sity + Lang. Language 
Turkish 
Parliamentary 76.1 7 9.1 4.7 45.1 20 8.1 2 25 1.17 
Elites 
Turkish Top 
Political 94.75 5.25 - - 48.6 26 13.1 2.3 10.7 1.5 
Leaders 
Source: Reorganised from Arslan, 1995. 
The foreign language ability of Turkish parliamentary elites exhibits an elitist view as 
compared with the whole of Turkish society as well. The vast majority of the elites know at least 
one foreign language with only 25 % of them who do not have this ability. Furthermore, 45 % of 
the parliamentary elites have ability in one foreign language, 20 % of them in two, 8% of them in 
three and 2% of them know four or more foreign languages. The Average number of foreign 
language of Turkish parliamentary elites is 1.17. 
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3.10.3. OCCUPATIONAL BACKGROUND OF TURKISH POLITICAL ELITES: 
Occupational background is another important component that affects the elite circulation 
process. Some occupational groups are more popular. Even, they are more imminent to the power 
centres of the state apparatus. Therefore, those occupations are more advantaged, more privileged. 
more prestigious. Their members have more chances and advantages in obtaining more powerful 
positions in the social hierarchy and becoming more active in the decision making process. 
Nevertheless, the terms of advantage and prestige have relative meanings. They may differ 
in terms of time and place. The types of dominant occupations may change from time to time from 
one society to next. Social, political and cultural conditions together define the meanings. When a 
particular kind of occupation or occupations have more privilege and advantage in a particular 
society, other kinds of occupational groups may be more privileged and dominant in another 
society of a particular time. This general rule is valid for Turkish society. 
The Turkish Grand National Assembly was dominated by both civilian and military 
government officials in the single party period, from 1920 to 1946. Then, two groups -educators, 
and trade and industry- followed them. There was an increase in the percentage of educators from 
1923 to 1946. They took nearly 11 % of seats, the same as the group of trade and industry, in the 
parliament in the single-party period. 
The free professions (that is, lawyers, engineers and architects, doctors and other medical 
practitioners such as veterinary surgeons, dentists and pharmacists) took the leading position from 
government officials after the elections of 1946. The free professions had an important proportion 
in the Democratic Party group, which continued until the early 1980s. By the time of the 1983 
elections, civil bureaucrats and administrators would again take the dominant position in the 
parliament and this situation still continues at present. 
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Very briefly, Table 3 demonstrates that the largest occupational group is civil bureaucrats 
and administrators in all the Turkish parliamentary elites. The second dominant occupational group 
is law, that is lawyers, judges and public prosecutors; and the third group is trade and industry 
which includes merchants, businessmen and other related vocations. Military officers, educators 
and doctors follow these three. 
Table 3 
Occupational Backgrounds of Turkish Political Elites 
TURKISH POLITICAL ELITES 
OCCUPATIONS TOP POLITICAL 
LEADERS (%) 
PARLIAMENTARY ELITES 
(%) 
Civil Bureaucrat & Managers 33.3 21 
Law 16.3 19 
Engineering 0.6 2 
Medicine & Medical Sciences 2.5 9.5 
Independent Contractor 0.4 7.9 (1983-1995) 
Education 10.2 8 
Military 29.9 9.8 
Trade & Industry 1.1 14 
Forestry Eng. & Agriculture. Spec. 0.2 9.9 (1961-1983) 
Trade Union 0.2 2.2 (1983-1995) 
Others 5.3 11.7 
Sources Reorganised from Arslan, 1995. 
As seen in Table 3, civil bureaucrats and administrators take the largest proportion, 33.3 
%, in the occupations of Turkish top political elites. The second biggest group is military officers 
with a proportion of 30 %, the third most popular occupation is law and the fourth group is 
education. The rate of educators is 10.2 %. 
3.10.4. SEX, MARITAL STATUS AND FAMILY SIZE OF TURKISH 
POLITICAL ELITES: 
Like ageism, sexism can be accepted as one of the most common dilemmas of the 
societies. This phenomenon has been in favour of males. Sexual discrimination has been 
among the common problems of world women. A very heavy prevalence of males can be 
observed in every sphere of social life. 
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Males are more advantaged and they have more opportunities to acquire more 
prestigious and powerful positions in social life. The size of the female political elites all 
around the world clearly proves this idea. This situation does not change in the process of elite 
circulation. Males have much more chance than females to become members of elite groups. 
Legally, there is an equality among the sexes in Turkish society, but this formal equality is 
not observed in reality in political life where women are always disadvantaged. It has to be noted 
that, this feature is not peculiar to Turkish society but is a characteristic of all world societies. Also, 
it has to be stressed that, as a product of the Kemalist Revolution, Turkish women acquired the 
right to vote and to be elected to parliament before women in many other European countries. 
Turkish women were eligible to become candidates for election to parliament after 1934. 
The word male was abandoned from the necessary qualification for both electors and deputies in 
1934 (Law No. 2595). Nevertheless Turkish women had first received voting rights in the 
municipal elections of 1930. This was followed by 18 female deputies entering the Turkish 
parliament in the fifth assembly, in 1935. Turkish women had their largest numbers in the 
assemblies of 1935,1939 and 1943. Subsequently their position began to decline in the Turkish 
parliament. The predominance of Turkish males in the parliament has continued since the 
establishment of the Republic down to the present day. Table 4 clearly shows that the 
overwhelming proportion is male - 98.6 %, whereas females have a mere 1.4 % rate in the 
parliamentary elites. 
The situation of single or widowed persons is not much different from that of Turkish 
females. The vast majority of parliamentary elites in the history of the Turkish parliament have been 
married. The proportion of married members of parliament has begun to rise since the early 1940s 
and this trend has not changed since. The proportion of married deputies is 91.4 per cent whereas 
the rates of single and widowed persons are 8.6 % in the parliamentary elites. This fact could be 
attributed to the fact that Turkish society ascribes a great value to marriage as an institution and a 
life-style. 
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The family size of the parliamentary elites consists of the average number of children per 
deputy. In the 1920s, the family size was 2.8, but this curved downwards from the late 1920s up to 
1957. The size began to increase by the assembly of 1961, but in the 1980s the size declined again 
to 2.37. The average number of children of the deputies for the whole Republican period is 2.56, 
which means that the great majority of deputies have a small family in comparison with the rest of 
Turkish society. However, a small proportion of deputies have had very large families -for example 
in 1977, one deputy had 18 children. Nearly all of those deputies who have had large families are 
from the east especially from the south-eastern region of Turkey. 
Table-4 
Sex, Marital Status and Family Size of Turkish Political Elites 
GENDER MARITAL STATUS AV. 
(%) (%) NUMB. 
TURKISH OF 
POLITICAL ELITES FEMALE MALE MARRIED WIDOWED- CHILDREN 
SINGLE 
TOP POLITICAL 1.5 98.5 89.6 10.4 2.10 
LEADERS (%) 
PARLIAMENTARY 1.4 98.6 91.4 8.6 2.56 
ELITES(%) 
Source: Reorganised from Arslan, 1995. 
Table 4 also shows that the overwhelming majority of Turkish top leaders are male. There 
has been no female president or president of the TGNA in the whole Republican period. Only one 
of the 17 Turkish prime ministers has been-female. The proportion of females among the ministers 
who served four or more times is 1.5 %. 
Moreover the vast majority of Turkish top leaders have been married while the rate of 
single and widowed leaders has been 10.4 %. Turkish top leaders have small families compared 
with Turkish society as a whole. The average number of children of Turkish leaders is 2.1. On the 
other hand, Arslan (Arslan, 1995: 57) discovered that, 32 % of Turkish top decision makers have 
three children and 31 % of them have two. The proportion of childless leaders is 16.6 %, while 
10.6 % of them have one child. On the other hand, 7.5 % of the top leaders have four children and 
1.5 % of them have five or more children. 
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3.11. DESIGNATION OF THE MAJOR ACTUAL AND FUTURE PROBLEMS 
FACING TURKEY: 
Turkey has been struggling with several social and economic problems for many years. 
The most important and serious problems of Turkey (that need to be solved urgently) are 
economic problems (such as high inflation, unemployment, income inequalities, low wages, 
... etc. ), terrorist actions of PKK and the rise of radical Islamic movements. The medium 
priority problems are democratisation, education, political instability and ethical corruption. 
The findings of the research support this. 
The view of the elites on the major problems of Turkey is related to their occupation. 
Nevertheless, economy related problems are the most commonly stressed problems of Turkey: 
more than half of the Turkish elite mentioned the economic problems as being among the most 
important problems of society. The problem of terrorist actions by the PKK and the rapid rise 
of radical Islam have followed them. 
Table 5 
Major Problems of Contemporary Turkey 
Elites (% 
The Two Major Problems of Turkey Political Trade Union Media Total 
Economy-Democracy 7 37 7 17 
Political Unstability 17 10 7 11 
Education-Economy 16 13 10 13 
Terror-Democracy 7 20 10 12 
Terror-Education 3 3 7 4 
Econom -Terror 20 7 13 13 
Radical Islam-Teffor 13 10 20 15 
Ethical Corruption 10 - 3 4 
Radical Islam-Economy 7 - 23 10 
The major problems of Turkish society at the macro level can be seen from Table 5: 
1. Economy related problems, 
2. Terrorist actions of PKK, 
3. Rise of radical Islam, 
4. Democratisation, 
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5. Education, 
6. Political instability, 
7. Ethical corruption. 
The rank order of the major problems of Turkey differs in terms of the ideological 
identity of elites: for example social democratic oriented elites ascribe the highest priority to 
the problems of economy, democracy, terror and rising radical Islam; radical left oriented 
elites mostly give higher priority to the problems of terror, economy, rising radical Islam and 
democracy. Left minded Turkish elites, both social democrats or socialists, mention exactly 
the same problems, even though the rank orders differ. 
On the other hand the liberal right minded elites mention the problems of economy, 
terror, education and democracy among the major problem of Turkey. Radical rightist elites 
specify the economy, political instability, democracy and terror in that rank order. As can be 
seen, the right viewed both liberal and radical elites concern on similar problems. It is an 
important fording that the rising radical Islamic movement is mentioned by none of the liberal 
rightist elites. Although, this finding is important it is not unexpected and unusual. In fact, 
radical Islam has been supported and developed by the liberal (! ) rightist political leaders for 
more than 5 decades. The major centre-right wing political parties are still carrying the root of 
the religious orders inside their organisations. 
The findings of the research support the view that "the most important actual and 
future problem facing Turkey is rising radical islamist movement". According to Turkish 
elites, radical islamist movement is one of the most important problems facing Turkey. Most 
of them agree that the radical Islamist danger is rapidly growing. They added that, the radical 
Islamists are so powerful because their leaders have very close relations with effective Turkish 
politicians. A substantial majority of the Turkish elites are perceiving these close relations 
between the political leaders and the leaders of religious orders as a very dangerous situation 
for the democratic regime and future of Turkish society. A substantial majority of them are 
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against this dangerous dependence. According to Turkish elites, the "vote hunters are 
gambling on the future of Turkish society and the future of Turkish democracy". 
Table 6 
The Views of Turkish Elites About Rising Islamist Movement 
Elites (%) 
The Reasons of Rising Radical Islam Political Trade Union Media Total 
Religious Propaganda-Poverty 13 10 20 14 
Failure of Other Parties-Poverty 20 13 20 18 
Failure of Other Parties- Religious Propaganda 23 33 4 20 
Organisation Ability- Religious Propaganda - 10 7 6 
Poverty 10 7 3 7 
Failure of the Leftist Parties-Religious 
Propaganda- Usage of Leftist Slogans 
17 24 40 27 
Poverty- Religious Propaganda 7 3 3 4 
Support of America 10 - 3 4 
There are numbers of reasons for the rapid growth of the radical Islamist danger. 
According to Turkish elites, the most important reasons are faulty attitudes and miscalculation 
by the narrow minded politicians. As presented clearly in Table 6, the other major reasons 
which are connected with this problem are: 
1. Poverty (economic problems) 
2. Failure of other right wing political parties 
3. Incapacity and inadequacy of leftist (social democratic and socialist) parties 
4. The use of socialist slogans 
5. Religious propaganda (use of religion as a propaganda tool) 
6. Organisational ability and effective propaganda 
7. Mysterious size of their financial resources 
8. Their attribution of the biggest priority to education and human resources 
9. Support of America 
10. Support of other countries (especially Arabic countries). 
It is easy to predict that, the most important problem of Turkey will be the Radical 
Islam or ideological Islam and the activities of the Islamist groups. Because, as examined by 
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several researchers (such as Ugur Mumcu, Hikmet Cetinkaya, Caglar Kircak, Cetin Yetkin), 
they are very well organised and very well financed in every strata of society. Their militants 
have infiltrated every major social institution, except the Turkish army. 
As stressed by almost all Turkish elites, terrorist activities of the PKK group is also 
one of the most important problems facing Turkey. The terrorist actions of this organisation 
have caused the death of more than 30 thousand people. Innocent Kurdish women and 
children occupy the highest proportion among the victims of the PKK terrorists. In addition to 
innocent local people, they have also killed defenceless teachers, nurses, doctors and civil 
servants serving local people. 
In addition to its huge ethical and humanitarian costs, according to official statistics, 
this dirty war has cost the Turkish economy more than 50 billion dollars. Furthermore, this 
war has delayed the social and economic development of eastern and south-eastern Anatolia. 
On the other hand, ethical corruption in social and political administration is one of the 
major dilemmas facing Turkish society. Political institutions are one of the most corrupt 
institutions in Turkish society. It is an irony that, the Turkish political elites have worried 
much more than the other elites about corruption, in particular political corruption among 
political elites and in general ethical corruption among all the elite groups. It is a further irony 
that, almost all the elite groups mentioned political organisations and their own elite groups as 
the two most corrupted elite sectors of society. 
Ethical corruption was repeatedly mentioned by the elite respondents during the study. 
Most of them agreed that, ethical corruption had a direct or indirect effect on the most of the 
other major social problems. The findings on ethical corruption are demonstrated in the 
figures of Table 5 and Table 7. 
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Table 7 
The Major Problems of Turkish Elites 
Elites (%) 
The Major Problems of Own Elite Group Political Trade Union Media Total 
Legal Procedure-Political Isolation 3 17 3 8 
Leg ad Procedure-Membership Scarcity 3 23 3 10 
Legal Procedure-Economic Problems - 37 - 12 
Legal Procedure-Autonomy - 23 - 8 
Political Corruption -Political Instability 27 - 3 10 
Democracy Inside Organisation- ualit of Elite 20 - 4 8 
Ethical Corruption 34 - 24 19 
Election System-Organisational Democrac 13 - - 4 
Deunionisation-Occu ationat Security - - 7 2 
Autonom - - 20 7 
Education-Economic Problems - - 3 1 
Autonom -Economic - - 3 1 
Promotion-Quality - - 20 7 
The Relation Between Media and Politics - - 10 3 
Table 8 
Importance of Self Occupation Among Turkish Elites 
Elites (%) 
The Importance of Self Occupation Political Trade Union Med otal 
Inseparable Component of Democracy 3 23 10 12 
Im ortant-Effective 10 43 47 
T 
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Have Bad Reputation 24 24 20 22 
Inseparable Component of Democracy- Effective 3 10 10 8 
Servant and Director of the Society 37 - 7 15 
Director of the Society 23 - 6 IO 
In addition, it can be seen from Table 8 that more than 20 elite respondents 
complained about the bad reputation of their occupations. 24 percent of both political elites 
and labour union elites, and 20 percent of media elites mentioned corruption in their elite 
sectors. A large majority of Turkish elites agree that, a number of their fellows have been 
behaving in ways that go against the ideology of professionalism and professional ethics. They 
also agree that, most of their colleagues have been using their social and occupational 
positions to gain personal wealth and to acquire social and economic advantages for their 
relatives. 
77 
7heoretical ýAClc9raund: 
71w "Ajar Concepts 
end Stite weary 
"He who applies and administers a decision is always more powerful than he 
who makes it". Kemal Ataturk. 
C TER 
4 
78 
CHAPTER-4 
4. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND: THE MAJOR 
CONCEPTS AND ELITE THEORY 
4.1. THE MAJOR CONCEPTS: 
4.1.1. ELITE: 
a) Epistemological and Historical Roots of the Concept of the Elite: 
The concept of elite comes from the French. Arslan explains in his previous study 
(1995: 3) that, "elite" originally derived from the Latin "eligre" which means select, shares a 
common basis with "electa" that means elected or the best. 
Bottomore has demonstrated that the term "elite" was used to describe commodities 
of particular excellence in the seventeenth century. The usage was later extended to refer to 
superior social groups, such as prestigious military units or higher ranks of the nobility. 
However, it was not widely used in social and political studies until the late nineteenth century 
(Arslan, 1995: 3). The elite concept acquired world-wide popularity in social science as a 
result of the writings of Italian sociologists Vilfredo Pareto and Gaetano Mosca in the 
nineteenth century. Then it became popular in Britain and America in the 1930s. 
b) The term elite: 
Theoretically, elites can be defined as those people who hold institutionalised power, 
control the social resources (include not only the wealth, prestige and status but also the 
personal resources of charisma, time, motivation and energy) and have a serious influence 
(either actively or potentially) on the decision-making process. They can realise their own will 
in spite of opposition. 
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According to this theoretical definition, the term elite does not necessarily involve only 
the occupier of the top strata. It may comprise both those people who are at the top, bottom 
or outside the organisations. Also it may include the people in the capitalist, middle or 
working class. Power, control and influence are major words in this definition. If the people 
have power actively or potentially, they have a direct or indirect effect on the decision-making 
process and are controlling the social resources they can be identified as the elite. Their class 
positions or organisational positions are not a major criterion in this description. This 
theoretical definition will be used during this study except sampling procedure. 
For pragmatic methodological purposes and simplification, a "positional" definition of 
elites will be used during the sampling procedure. In accordance with the positional approach, 
elite can be defined as those people who occupy a position at or near the top of important 
institutional hierarchies, such as economic, political, judicial, civil service, military, mass 
media, educational. They have power because of their social positions. 
4.1.2. NATIONAL ELITES: 
Higley (1979: 29) defines national elites as "those people who hold power 
individually, regularly and seriously to affect political outcomes at the macro level of 
organised societies". The researcher of this paper will conceptualise the national elites as those 
people who occupy the key command positions of the major nation-wide institutional 
hierarchies of power and wealth. They have the greatest share from the national system of 
status, power, wealth and institutional prestige. Military and business elites come first in the 
rank order of Turkish national power system. They have greater share in the national power 
structure. Political elites and media elites follow them. This order depends on the time and 
conditions: the place of the elites in this rank is interchangeable 
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4.1.3. POWER & POWER STRUCTURE: 
Power is a system of social relationships and it takes its meaning within a set of social 
relationships. People are powerful in relation to other people. Power is highly related to 
control, ownership and influence on the decision-making process. It can be defined as capacity 
through the decision-making process and realisation ability of objectives inspite of the 
resistance of others. 
There is not a general consensus on the definition of power among sociologists, 
nevertheless, Weber's definition has wide usage. He defines power as the "probability that one 
actor within a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his own will despite 
resistance" (Giddens, 1974: 17). Power structure can be defined as the patterns of 
relationships that exists amongst elite groups, and between elites and the state. 
4.1.4. KEY ELITES: 
It is a reality that, there are some major elite groups in the power structure that are 
significantly more powerful than other elite groups. As Etzioni mentioned (1993: 77), elites of 
elites are usually called the "key elites". Key elites may vary in terms of time and place. It 
means that, when political elites and/or military elites play the major role in the decision- 
making process in a particular society, business elites and/or religious elites may have a key 
role in other societies. 
Also, while a particular elite group has the key role in a particular society in a 
particular time span, a different elite group or groups may occupy a key position in the 
decision-making process in that same society within a different time period. 
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4.2. THEORETICAL CONTEXT: 
One of the major objectives of modern political scientists and political sociologists is 
to understand and to explain the socio-political structure of society. They are concerned with 
the power structure and power relations which are based on inequality to realise that aim. 
Two main strategies have been used for analysing and explaining that inequality. The first and 
most popular strategy is "class theory" which stresses ownership and control to explain class 
differentiation. It concentrates on the inequalities based mainly on the ownership or non- 
ownership of economic resources. The second strategy is elite theory which was historically 
overshadowed by class theory. Elite theory concerns power and influence, and aims to analyse 
elite and non-elite (mass, public) differentiation. 
The major theories in power structure research: 
1. Class Theory 
" Marxist Class Theory 
" Weberian (Mainstream) Class Theory 
2. Elite Theory 
" Pluralist Elite Theory 
" Elitist Elite Theory 
" Democratic Elitism 
" Demo-Elite Perspective 
4.2.1. CLASS THEORY: 
Class theory was fathered by Karl Marx and especially developed by Marxist writers. 
Class analysts focus on identification of classes as the major social forces of society. There are 
two main schools of thought in class theory with their variations within each school: 
1. Marxist Class Theory 
2. Weberian (Mainstream) Class Theory 
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Class is defined in two ways in the Marxist tradition: firstly, as a category of similarly 
situated individuals, and secondly as a collective social actor-a cultural and political agency 
(Hindess, 1987: 21). Marxist theory analyses social classes as based on the relationship to the 
means of production and accept them as social actors and conflict groups. Class is a social 
reality that its members occupy a common position in the organisation of production and its 
members have the awareness of a community of interests (class consciousness). The members 
of each class have collective ties of solidarity to realise common purposes. 
All societies have at least two classes that have common relationships to the means of 
production: the first one is the "ruling class" which owns and controls the means of 
production. As Etzioni mentioned (1993: 14), according to Marx, the class which controls the 
means of material production also controls the means of mental production. Therefore, it rules 
not only economically but also by shaping and disseminating its ideology. 
As Etzioni has argued (1993: 68-9), Marxists distinguish between the "ruling class" 
and the "governing class" and they claim that the state apparatus best serves the interests of 
the ruling class not a governing class. The governing class execute the daily routine duties of 
administration and political process. Whereas the ruling class hold the decisive power that 
compels the political process to serve the rulers' interests. The state serves the interest of the 
ruling class because the capitalists and those who are in command of the state apparatus have 
a common social background and mentality. In addition to this the capitalists exhibit an 
extremely powerful interest group structure and they can pressurise the state towards their 
common interests. 
Briefly, classes are defined in terms of the relations of production in the Marxist 
approach and described as the major social force in history. Also, according to Marxist 
scholars: 
1. Class structure of capitalist society is related to two dynamics: the class struggle and 
capitalist economic dynamics that effect the classes and class relations. 
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2. Classes exist and have effects whether people recognise them or not. The classes have 
conflicting interests that are shaped by the economic dynamics of capitalism (Hindess, 
1987: 49-50). 
On the other hand, Weber defines classes as the identifiable group of individuals who 
share a common market situation (Giddens, 1974: 4). He defines classes in terms of groupings 
of related class situation. Class situation is set out in terms of the market situation of 
individuals and, it may be differentiated according to the sorts of property used to obtain 
returns in some market or, for those without property, according to the types of services 
offered for sale (ibid.: 37). Similar class situation may develop common patterns of life and 
common interests, but this is not necessary. 
The idea of class situation differentiates Weber's idea far more than the Marxists. In 
the Marxist tradition, classes are a phenomena of the organisation of production. However, 
class situations are a phenomena of the commercial life of a society in the Weberian sense. 
Nevertheless, this differentiation between the Marxist and Weberian view is for pre-capitalist 
societies. Both of these traditions accept that capitalists and workers are two different classes 
in the capitalist era. Class is the main distinctive element for understanding differentiation in 
capitalist society. 
Mainstream (Weberian) theory focuses on resources and it accepts material resources 
as a major basis of class division (Etzioni, 1993: 14). Weber stresses the three different but 
interrelated aspects of social stratification: class, status and party. According to Weber, class 
is based on property and position in the market or social life chances. There are three major 
social classes; 
1. Owners of property 
2. Non-owners of property but their market position is intensified by their skills and 
knowledge. 
3. Those who can sell only their labour 
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If the Marxist class analysis and Weberian class analysis are examined carefully it will 
be clearly seen that, as Abercombie and Urry have said, these two approaches are 
incompatible and it is impossible to synthesise them. Nevertheless, Hindess (1987: 48) sees 
Weber's view as the correction of and supplement to Marx's ideas rather than an alternative. 
When the ideas of Marx and Weber are compared, it will be clearly seen that both Marx and 
Weber explain classes in relation to the economy. Nevertheless, while Marx defines classes in 
terms of the relations of production, Weber defines them in relation to the market. 
On the other hand, Weber does not agree with the Marxist' idea of class struggle that 
"history is the history of the class struggles". For Weber, of course the class struggle may be 
important in some circumstances, but nevertheless, there is no reason to accept the class 
struggle as the dynamo of history. Classes take place within the markets and the formation of 
market relations cannot be explained by the class struggle. Classes provide only one possible 
basis of collective action amongst others. As Hindess discussed (1987: 50), whereas Marx 
aims at generating a general theory of the history and particular theory of the dynamics of 
capitalist society, Weber's approach seems more classificatory. 
4.2.2. THE MAJOR PROBLEMS OF ELITE THEORY: 
The major concern of this study will be elite theory. Therefore, detailed information 
about elite theory and its sub-theories will be provided. Firstly, emphasis will be put on the 
problems of elite theory, misunderstandings about it, and its real face. Then, elite theory and 
its extensions will be examined in detail. 
In spite of its very important contribution to the analysis and understanding of political 
systems, as the result of misunderstanding and misrepresentation, elite theory has not received 
world-wide popularity. It has been abandoned under the shadow of class theory for long 
periods. Furthermore, it has been accepted as more conservative, elitist, non-egalitarian and 
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undemocratic, and it has been disparaged and marginalised in the social sciences. The reasons 
for this situation can be explained by a combination of several important agents: 
a. The halo effect of the founding fathers: The popularity of the theories has been affected 
by the founding fathers. Marx has had more influence and popularity than the classical elite 
theorists Pareto, Mosca and Michels within the social scientific universe. 
b. The halo effect of ideology: Where class theory was developed within the communist 
environment in relation to socialism, elite theory was generated in the early twentieth century 
under the influence of fascist ideology. 
c. Problems of terminology: Elite theory has some problems of terminology, but nevertheless 
class theory also has not solved the terminology problem as discussed before. As Etzioni 
explained (1993: 26), there are four terminological misunderstandings about elite theory: 
1. The term elite brings to mind a selected group of people who are the most capable and 
have moral excellence. 
2. The term elite calls to mind elitism and praise of the elites and their rule. 
3. Seemingly, elite theory has been misunderstood as over simplistic and as the dichotomous 
map of the socio-political structure of society. On the other hand, it has been accepted that 
the class theory constructs a more detailed and problematic power structure map for 
society. 
4. It seems that, while class theory defines clearly and in terms of some criteria the sub 
categories of the class, elite theory sufficiently describes only the elites. According to that 
idea, the remaining part of the society is not described in terms of their characteristics, but 
only their exclusion from the elites. 
d. The neglect of the public: In Marxist Class Theory, seemingly the lower ranks of the 
social hierarchy are active in shaping their destiny and they are struggling for their interests. 
This appearance makes class theory relatively more democratic and egalitarian, and also more 
attractive to the intellectual ambience. Elite theory labels the rest of the society as the non- 
elite or masses. These words may be understood as apparently inactive, apathetic and have no 
identity according to some scholars. 
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e. Negative effects of some elite theorists: Some elitist theorists have used strictly elitist 
views in their studies either deliberately or unconsciously. This kind of ideology oriented 
approach has had a negative effect on the popularity of elite theory. 
4.2.3. THE REAL FACE OF ELITE THEORY: 
Nevertheless, it seems that its unpleasant and unjust reputation will not continue and 
elite theory will take its real place within the social sciences. If elite theory is examined 
carefully and objectively it can be seen very clearly that: 
a. Elite theory is not inherently simplistic: Mills' and some other elite theorists' studies 
clearly show that, in addition to the dichotomous hierarchy of power structure, elite 
theories also use a trichotomous viewpoint. That categorisation is at least as adequate as 
the classification of the class analysis. For the trichotomous viewpoint, society is formed 
by the three major categories that are elites, sub-elites and the public. This simplification 
of society is not much more simplistic than the division of the society into three classes. 
Furthermore, social scientists need to simplify the complex structure of society to 
understand and to analyse its peculiarities. 
b. Elite theory and elites are not inherently elitist: Etzioni shows clearly that (1993: 30), 
elite theory is ideologically neutral and elites are not necessarily the cream of society or 
better than anybody else. Elite theory does not praise or condemn the elites. It only 
examines the elites as a social subject without giving them any ideological meaning. Elite 
theory is not linked to any particular ideology and certainly not fascism (Moyser, 1987: 
13). Nor can it be claimed that Marxist class theory is "classist" because it examines 
classes. For this reason, nobody can claim that elite theory is "elitist" because its subject is 
elites. In a theoretical context, Elitism is only one perspective within elite theory. There 
are many other perspectives within elite theory that have antithetical views to elitism. 
c. Elite theory is not inherently undemocratic and non-egalitarian: The democratic elite 
theory has clearly proved that, elite theory is not undemocratic and does not contradict 
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and deny democratic theory. A more detailed explanation of the democratic elite theory 
can be found within the next pages. 
d. Elite theory is not inherently neglectful of the public: The theory does not attribute 
any negative means to the terms of non-elite or public, such as inactive, apathetic or 
having no identity. Elite theorists never hold the public in contempt. They use the concept 
of public within the scientific sense as a neutral concept. 
4.2.4. ELITE THEORY AND ITS MAJOR EXPANSIONS: 
Elite theory is one of the major theories which aims to analyse and explain the power 
structure and power relations. It investigates power and control and aims to analyse elite and 
non-elite (mass, public) differentiation. Elite theorists are concerned almost exclusively with 
on inequalities based on power or lack thereof. This distinguishes elite theory from class 
theory. Power in turn, is based on other resources (such as economic assets and organisational 
strength) and for its part may give rise to control over other resources as well. But, as Etzioni 
(1993: 19) stressed, elite theory is concerned primarily with the other resources which are 
related to it. 
According to elite theory, societies are divided into the "few" who hold power and 
rule, and the "many" who are ruled. The ruling group called an elite, effectively monopolises 
power and makes the important decisions. The others (non-elites), the public or the masses 
have relatively no power and no choice but to accept the decision of the minorities. 
There are four major sub-theories of elite theory: 
1. Pluralist Elite Theory 
2. Elitist Elite Theory 
3. Democratic Elitism 
4. Demo-Elite Perspective 
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In addition to these major theories, there are some other theories which are related to 
elites and try to explain the power structure and power relations. Marxism based theories, 
corporatism, state centred views are noteworthy to mention amongst these theories. 
4.2.4.1. PLURALISTS AND PLURALIST ELITE THEORY: 
Pluralist theories takes their roots from the liberal tradition. They gained a widespread 
reputation in the 1950s and 1960s. The pluralist view was popularised by major pluralist 
theorists such as Dahl (1956), Lindblom (1965), Riesman (1961) and Galbraith (1952). This 
idea has become more sophisticated and detailed in the works of Truman (1971), Bealey 
(1988), Polsby (1985), and Sartori (1987). The major emphasis of the pluralists is the plurality 
of pressure groups. Pluralist elite theory stresses the plurality of power groups and the 
decentralisation of power. Nevertheless, they do not emphasise elite autonomy which is one of 
the major principles of democracy. 
The major ideas of pluralist elite theory are the plurality of the power centres and the 
distribution of power. Power has been shared by several pressure groups or elite groups. All 
these groups have some decisive affect on the decision-making process in some way. e. g., to 
Dahl who is one of the most important pluralist scholars, a number of groups have effective 
impact on the policy outcomes in some respects. Businessmen, trade unions, politicians, 
consumers, farmers, voters and many other groups are highly influential on the decision- 
making process (Hewitt, in Giddens and Stanworth, 1974: 48). 
The power of the government was confined by the other power groups, such as elites 
of business, of bureaucracy, of white collars, of business and trade unions, of the major 
opposition parties, of the farmers, ... etc.. While elitists think that public opinion is checkable 
by the ruling group, to pluralists power of the ruling group is controlled and reduced by the 
other elites and the public. Pluralist elite theory is concerned with checking and 
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counterbalancing the power exercised by the other power groups, but nevertheless they do not 
make any clear distinction between elites and key elites. 
A quite recent version of pluralism is neo-pluralism which, in some respects, differs 
from pluralism. It concentrates major attention on political elites and business elites. They try 
to make pluralism closer to Marxism. Some pluralists (now they are named neo-pluralists), 
like Lindblom and Dahl give a privileged position to the capitalists within the power structure 
(Etzioni, ibid.: 83). Dahl argued at a 1964 conference that "the key political, economic and 
social decisions are made by tiny minorities". As a reason for this situation, Schattschneider 
says that the large majority of society is politically disorganised, fragmented and passive 
(Bachrach, 1967: 7). 
To neo-pluralists, business elites have more power than the other elites within society. 
They play a very important role in politics and they control the political economy. As Etzioni 
said (1993: 83), while pluralists and pluralist elite theorists see the government 
counterbalanced by multiple pressure groups or elite groups, neo-pluralists accept the 
government counterbalanced mostly and especially by the business elites. Although, Dahl 
stresses autonomy, nevertheless his focus is quite different from the democratic elite 
theorists'. He concentrates his attention on the importance of the autonomy of the 
organisations, not the autonomy of the elites and elite groups as happened in democratic elite 
theory. 
Pluralism is a highly idealistic approach. It usually stresses the equality and 
fragmentation of power and also pluralists assign an important role to the public in the 
decision-making process. The pluralist suppositions are acceptable and desirable, but not 
realistic. The social reality is highly different from the arguments of pluralism. As Freeman 
concludes, pluralism is more mythology than fact (Presthus, 1964: 45) 
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4.2.4.2. ELITIST ELITE THEORY: 
Whereas, Field and Higley (1980: 1) mention the three pioneers of classical elite 
theory as being Vilfredo Pareto, Roberto Michels and Gaetano Mosca. Moyser & Wagstaffe 
(1987: 5) mention Michels' study as the first elitist book. Peter Bachrach accepts Mosca as 
the first elitist thinker. Bachrach says "Mosca's Ruling Class can be said to constitute the first 
formulation of democratic elitism" (Bachrach, 1967: 10). 
Mosca argues that always a small minority group rules any society. There are at least 
two classes in all societies which are the class that rules and the class that is ruled. The first 
class is always a minority and has fewer members. Mosca says that "the Few" rules "the 
Many" and adds "those on high, who have their forger in the pie, or who make the good and 
the bad weather" (Meisel, 1962: 33). Those people who are known as the "ruling elite" 
accomplish all political functions, hold and exercise decisive power. Briefly, they control the 
rest of society. The masses do not have an important affect on the ruling class (Bachrach, 
ibid.: 12). According to Mosca, dominant minorities derive from the majority by "natural 
selection" or the political election process, and then they control the majority impressively 
(Meisel, 1962: 371). 
Meisel accepts Ludwig Gumplowicz as Mosca's intellectual father and Henri de Saint 
Simon as grandfather of Mosca's intellectual ideas (Meisel, ibid.: 255). Mosca discovered the 
elite concept being influenced by French thinker Henri de Saint Simon, but nevertheless, 
Pareto gained international scientific popularity by using this concept (Meisel, ibid.: viii). 
Mosca argues that "according to Saint Simon, power in all organised societies is . split 
between two orders: one controls the intellectual and moral, the other the material forces. 
These two powers are exercised by two organised minorities together form the ruling class" 
(Quoted from Meisel, ibid.: 255). 
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Mosca specifies "knowledge" as another important social source of power which will 
counterbalance the power of property. Personal achievement will become as worthy as birth 
and wealth (Meisel, ibid.: 50-1). On the other hand, the source of the inevitability and 
domination of the ruling elite is their organisational ability and cohesion. The Few rule 
because they are strong. They are so strong because they are so few. The ruling elite has 
organised and co-ordinated group character (Meisel, 1962: 40). Also, James Meisel 
introduces his "Three C's Formula" in his analysis. To Meisel, all elites had "the three C's" 
which are group Consciousness, Coherence and Conspiracy (Meisel, 1962: 4). Their power is 
inevitable and their influence is irresistible because they have been organised and united, they 
also control the elite recruitment process (Bachrach, ibid.: 12-3). 
To Field and Higley (1980: 17-20), the elitist paradigm concerns the consensual 
unified elite, political stability and representative democratic government. There is a causal 
relationship between these three facts. Representative democratic government requires 
political stability which in turn necessitates consensual unified elites. Consensual unity makes 
the elites more powerful within the policy-making process. Nevertheless, Field and Higley 
argue that elites are imperfectly unified and representative institutions are highly unstable, 
especially in most modern developing societies. 
Elitist theory adopts the opposite view to the pluralists. The main thesis of the elitist 
view is that power has been concentrated and centralised in the hands of the small numbers of 
the elite group (Presthus, 1964: 10) which is the most powerful in the power structure. It is 
dominant over other groups. This dominant group knows what others do not know, can do 
what others can not do, is permitted to do what others may not do (Thoenes, 1966: 42). On 
the other hand, pluralists argue that power has been diffused and fragmented among many 
people, pressure groups or elite groups which participate to the decision-making process in 
one way or another. 
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Hewitt counts F. Hunter, C. W. Mills and W. Domhoff amongst the most important 
American elitist scholars. On the other side, he accepts Aaronovitch and Miliband as the 
effective British elitist theorists. To Hewitt (Giddens & Stanworth, 1974: 47), American 
sociologist C. W. Mills has some elitist aspects. Mills sees the three most vigorous and 
influential elite groups within the power structure as political elites, business elites and military 
elites. These three elite groups have got social inter-connections, common interests and affairs 
and similar social backgrounds. This unity constitutes the power elites which formulate the 
most significant policy issues and make macro level social, economic and political decisions. 
Another important name amongst the American elitist sociologists is Domhoff. He 
sees the power elite as the "operating arm of the upper class". The most important social 
and political issues are shaped and the rules are defined by the members of the upper class. To 
Domhoff, they have a significant influence on foreign affairs and social welfare legislation 
(Hewitt, ibid.: 47). 
The two important British sociologists in the elitist perspective are Aaronovitch and 
Miliband. Aaronovitch accepts the finance capitalists as the ruling class. Finance capitalists or 
their representative take the most critical political and economic decisions in favour of 
themselves out of the discussion and popular control. They control the state and also the lives 
of millions of people. According to Miliband "economically dominant class rules through 
democratic institutions. The holders of the state power are the agents of private economic 
power - that those who wield that power also, therefore, and without unduly stretching the 
meaning of words, an authentic ruling class. " (Quoted from Hewitt, ibid.: 47). 
As Hewitt (ibid.: 49) explained, elitists pay attention to a relatively unified and 
cohesive ruling group. Nevertheless, there is not any common conceptualisation amidst the 
elitist writers. Some elitists accept this ruling group as a social class (like Domhoft), some of 
them call it an economic class (like Aaronovitch and Miliband) and some others see it as an 
organisational elite (like Hunter and Mills). 
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4.2.4.3. DEMOCRATIC ELITE THEORY: 
Democratic elite theory concentrates on equality but, with a small but important 
difference from the theory of democracy. While democracy idealises the equality of power 
within society, the democratic elite theory stresses the equality of opportunity to obtain a 
position of power. This is much more realistic than the idealistic principle of democracy 
(Bachrach, 1967: 97-8). 
The explicit principle of this perspective is the relative autonomy, but never absolute 
autonomy, of elites from one another, especially from the governing political elites. The 
relative autonomy of elites is at the heart of democratic elite theory. It accepts this autonomy 
as the unavoidable component for democracy. The separation of power is inevitable not only 
to save democracy but also to frustrate despotic regimes. Free elections, freedom of speech 
and association are the major elements of democracy which help to protect the elite's 
autonomy (Oyen, 1990: 114). Elites requires to the public and to the other elites for well- 
being of democracy (Bachrach: 106). It is impossible for the liberties to survive, to preserve 
the democracy from the totalitarian dangers and to create a more democratic system without 
active public support and counterbalancing the social forces and institutions. 
The idea of autonomy is related to liberal democratic thought. Liberal democracy 
takes its roots from the idea of limitation of state power for individual rights and freedoms. 
The pioneers of this school of thought are John Locke, David Hume and James Madison. 
Nevertheless, some of the major principles of liberal thought, such as the idea of the 
separation of legislative, executive and judicial powers were clearly defined and explained by 
Montesquieu in the eighteenth century. To Montesquieu, concentrated power is very 
dangerous, because it risks bringing despotism, tyranny, oppression and abuses. Controlling 
one power by means of another power/s can keep away this kind of danger. 
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Liberal democracy is based on the separation of powers (legislative, executive and 
judicial powers) within the state. In addition to this division, James Mill and Jeremy Bentham 
add and clearly explain the idea of electoral representative democracy that includes free 
elections, freedom of speech, press and association. Nevertheless, as Etzioni mentions (1993: 
54), there is no perception about holders of power and influence that they identified as elites 
in that perspective. They also, do not concentrate on the importance of the autonomy of non- 
state elites for limitation of state power and advancement of civil sovereignties whereas 
democratic elite theory concentrates on and aims at explaining in detail all the mentioned 
points. 
It is thought that examining the historical and theoretical backgrounds will be helpful 
to understanding the theoretical perspective. This will be followed to explain democratic elite 
theory. As mentioned by Oyen, the most effective scholars in the democratic elite theoretical 
perspective are Max Weber, Gaetano Mosca, Joseph Schumpeter and Raymond Aron. 
Weber stresses authority and bureaucracy, and analyses bureaucratic and political 
elites in his theory. To Weber, power is the realisation of objectives and wishes in spite of the 
resistance of others within social relations. This ability takes its roots from its position in the 
social hierarchy. Weber accepts that elites are unavoidable even in a democratic system. He 
stresses charismatic authority and charismatic leaders in particular and pays special attention 
to the role of charismatic leaders in the democratic process. To Weber, the democratic 
process is a competitive struggle of leaders for public support bringing forward the most 
qualified leaders who have genuine charisma. The autonomous charismatic leaders give new 
political directions to political life and avoid bureaucratic oppression. These leaders must be 
controlled by parliamentary assemblies because if the leaders loose their charisma, or their 
control over the public they become oppressive power holders. 
Mosca is recognised as one of the pioneers of democratic elite theory. He stresses the 
idea of the separation of powers. To him the nature and formation of the ruling class is 
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substantial in defining the political structure of society. Political systems that are feudal and 
bureaucratic regimes play an important part in his analysis. The members of the ruling class 
practise all governmental functions that are judicial, economic, administrative and military in 
the feudal system. Nevertheless, the members of the ruling class are more specialised within 
the bureaucratic regime. The different parts of the class, such as governmental, bureaucratic, 
military..., exercise the different duties within the governmental body in the bureaucratic 
system. Social and political changes in Western societies culminated in the replacement of the 
absolutist bureaucratic state with the modern, bureaucratic parliamentary state. 
Whereas the Weberian representative democracy view is not concerned with 
sovereignties of the people, the democratic elite theory is. Public discussion of governmental 
actions, parliamentary, individual and press freedoms are also highlighted in Mosca's political 
analysis. 
Separation of powers and elections are inevitable elements of democratic regimes. The 
ruling class has been divided into distinct sections within the democratic state. It is very 
important to check the powers by the other powers, because uncontrolled and concentrated 
power bear the dangers of authoritarian and oppressive regimes. In addition to that, though 
elections beget elected assemblies, nevertheless they may lead to the party based political 
corruption or electoral dictatorship of elected politicians. Therefore, only the autonomy of 
judiciary and bureaucracy prevents this kind of danger. Briefly, the basic rule to create a more 
democratic system is that the power of governing political elites has to he checked by the 
power of the other autonomous elites. 
While Weber and Mosca stress the segregation of power within the state, Austrian 
sociologist Joseph Schumpeter concentrates on the separation of power outside the state as 
well. Schumpeter analyses not only the autonomy of state elites but also the autonomy of the 
non-state elites. He pays extensive attention to countervailing power of autonomous elites 
because, to him, electors do not control the power of elected politicians. Elected people can 
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be controlled only by the independent elites, such as academic, bureaucratic, judicial elites, 
media elites. Schumpeter argues that the idea of broad participation of the public in the 
decision-making process is very unrealistic. Democracy is not rule by the people, but by 
elected elites (Etzioni, 1993: 60). 
Like Schumpeter, French sociologist and liberal thinker Raymond Aron appreciates 
the significance of the autonomy of the state and non-state elites. As Etzioni points out 
(1993: 61), for Aron, elite structure is more than the entire reflection of the structure of 
society, and makes a crucial impression up on it. The type of elite structure has great 
importance for the limitation of the elites power and the type of political regime. 
There are a lot of power groups in modern societies, but, five of them are very 
significant. These five very substantial elite groups are political leaders, government 
administrators, economic directors, labour leaders and military chiefs. For Aron, the balance 
of elite unity is very important for the democratic regimes, because entire unification of elites 
means the end of freedom, on the other hand complete disintegration of elites means the end 
of the state. 
Etzioni emphasises that, "although there is a basic consensus among democratic elites 
on the most basic issues, elites are internally divided on a whole variety of less fundamental 
issues" (1993: 61). Other elites have a relative independence from political rulers, and they act 
to defend their interests (Etzioni, ibid.: 61). Aron differentiates the state and society in the 
democratic regime, and also he sees the authority of rulers as controlled and limited. 
Seymour Martin Lipset examines the evolution and preservation of liberal democracy 
(1981). He shows that stable democracy is highly associated with the level of economic 
development and the educational levels of the people. A higher level of education diminishes 
radicalism and authoritarianism amongst the working class, and also it increases the size of the 
middle class. A substantial middle class reduces the conflict between working class and upper 
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class, and it also acts as a moderator between government and the public. He identifies the 
middle classes as the autonomous association or centres of power (Etzioni, 1993: 63). 
Israeli sociologist Shmuel Eisenstadt's work on the comparative study of empires, 
civilisations and modernisation can be mentioned under the label of the Weberian- 
Schumpeterian tradition. To Eisenstadt, solidarity and consensus among elites is related to the 
rules and values of the political game. The separation of elites is one of the essential elements 
of democracy. 
Berelson (1954) and Kornhauser's (1959) studies can be pigeonholed within elitist 
democratic theory. Kornhauser stresses the importance of relatively autonomous power 
groups. For him, relatively autonomous power groups restraint the power of elites and control 
the undemocratic tendencies of the masses. These power groups play a countervailing role 
between the elites and the public. Elitist-democratic elite theorists see a large amount of public 
participation to be dangerous. They prefer public apathy to public participation. 
4.2.4.4. DEMO-ELITE PERSPECTIVE: 
The demo-elite perspective is a branch of democratic elite theory. Although, it uses 
some parts of the other theories and has some similarities with them, it tries to follow a new 
path in analysing elites: whereas Marxist and state centred theories concern the complete 
autonomy of the state from other sources, demo-elite perspective stresses placing check on 
state power by the other powers. Unlike pluralists and pluralist elite theory, the demo-elite 
perspective focuses on both elites and sub-elites. Pluralists stress on the pressure groups and 
accept the elites as the representative of pressure groups. In contrary with pluralist elite 
theory, demo-elite perspective distinguishes clearly powerful pressure groups and inferior 
interest groups. 
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Pluralist elite theory distributes power among the pressure groups. The key elites and 
sub-elites monopolise power consistently in the demo-elite perspective. The demo-elite 
perspective ascribes higher value to elites' relative autonomy from government in terms of the 
control of resources, and accept it as more significant than a large number of power holders 
for democracy. It defines established and non-established elites clearly and accepts the elites as 
the major dynamic force for social change. 
On the other hand, although the demo-elite perspective takes place within the 
framework of democratic elite theory, it is more elaborate and detailed. Whereas, the liberal 
philosophy and democratic elite theory examine the separation and autonomy of power 
holders very generally, demo-elite perspective analyses comprehensively the autonomy in 
terms of control of substantial resources. While liberal philosophy associates the segregation 
of power with liberal governance and democratic elite theory links the autonomy with the 
democracy at a very general level, demo-elite perspective accepts the autonomy as the very 
heart of democracy. 
The demo-elite perspective analyses not only the general associations between relative 
elite autonomy and democracy, but also examines historical/causal relationships among them. 
It sees as necessary this autonomy for the preservation and development of democracy. It 
aims to further democratic and egalitarian democracy, and also to give a more egalitarian 
appearance to democratic elite theory. This perspective provides a trichotomous division in 
describing the power structure of society. They are elites, sub-elites and the public: 
1. Elites; those people who have greater share of power because they are controlling the 
major social resources actively. They have usually settled in the highest echelons of the power 
and influence structures. The major elites are the members of government, the leaders and 
effective-active members of major political parties, the top occupants of military, police, 
judiciary, bureaucracy, the operative owners and the top managers of the large scale 
companies. 
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Additionally higher ranking academic staff and scientists, editors and directors of the 
major broadcast companies, highly popular writers and artists, leaders of labour or trade 
unions and the leaders of the major social movements can he called major elites. This final 
sentence clearly shows that, elites are not only members of the most advantaged but may also 
be the most influential and active members of the disadvantaged. 
2. Sub-elites; those people who come after the elites and occupy the medium echelons of the 
power structure. Sub-elites cover the owners and directors of the medium-scale companies 
and the occupants of those posts which come after the elite positions within the elite groups. 
They may be accepted as mediators between the elites and the public. 
3. The Public; who occupy the lowest stratum of the power structure. The public is not 
completely powerless, nevertheless, they take the fewest share from power, wealth, prestige 
and the major social resources. 
According to the researcher of this paper, as shown in Figure 1, in addition to this 
trichotomous division two major sub-categories can be added: that of "shadow (potential) 
elites" and "aspirant sub-elites": 
1. Shadow (potential) Elites: Shadow elites can be defined as those people within the sub- 
elites who potentially have the greatest opportunity to obtain an elite position, because of their 
social background. The number of the shadow elite is as high as the number of elite positions 
in the power structure of any society. This happy and lucky minority group within the sub- 
elites becomes an elite at the end of the process of elite circulation. 
2. Aspirant Sub-elites: It can be defined as the category of those people within the public, 
and have the highest opportunity and potential to obtain, firstly a position in the sub-elite; and 
then maybe become a member of the elite within the elite recruitment process because of their 
social background, personal abilities and personalities. They can be identified as the potential 
sub-elites and elites. 
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The demo-elite perspective does not neglect the public and its power, because the 
circulation of elites cannot be understood and explained unless the circulation of the public is 
understood and explained. The health and fulfilment of 
democracy depends on institutionalised 
channels for the circulation between the public and the elites. 
The public has great importance 
not only for political elites but also for the other elites. As Etzioni said (1993: 108), elites need 
public support for sustaining their positions and the realisation of their aims. 
It is absolutely 
essential for the elites and sub-elites to communicate with the public, 
because the public act as 
the voters, listeners, readers or customers for the elites. 
/ 
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The autonomy of the elites is not the same as the autonomy of the organisations, and it 
is also not identical to elite pluralism. The autonomy of elites is usually interpreted as 
autonomy from the major social resources. These resources comprise either material or non- 
material things that are deficient and wanting. The most important resources cover the 
physical resources, organisational-administrative resources (like bureaucratic organisations), 
the symbolic resources (such as knowledge, information) and the ability to control symbols, 
financial-economic resources (such as capital, means of production, exchange and 
enterprises), and psycho-personal resources like charisma, time, motivation and energy. These 
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resources are usually interrelated and can be found within different combinations. Etzioni 
(1993: 98-99) stresses that the autonomy of the elites necessitates the following conditions: 
" Autonomy from the coercion of the coercive resources of others 
" Autonomy from the control of the material resources of others 
" Autonomy from the restraint of the directoral and regulatory expedients of others 
" Freedom from control of the symbolic resources by others. 
When the above explanation is examined it should be clearly seen that, it is impossible 
to talk about absolute autonomy as often some resources are controlled by the other elites. 
Therefore, the demo-elite perspective prefers to use the term relative autonomy rather than 
absolute autonomy. It is possible to talk about the relative autonomy of elites and sub-elites, 
either some of their resources are controlled by the other elites or sub-elites. 
In the demo-elite perspective, the relative autonomy of elites and sub-elites has the 
means of independence not only from each other, but especially from the state and the 
governmental elites. The relative autonomy from the state and the governmental elites are key 
features of democracy, and also it is the guardian of the power balance within the power 
structure. Whereas elite theory concerns the role of the autonomy of elites for the appearance 
and perpetuation of democracy, the demo-elite perspective stresses the role of autonomy for 
stabilising and promoting democracy. Nevertheless, the degree of relative autonomy is 
changeable and fragmentary in Western democracies. 
Sometimes, elite co-operation is necessary to operate the political system and to 
achieve some of the social and political tasks of society. Etzioni differentiates elite co- 
operation and elite solidarity-consensus. He accepts that elite co-operation is more important 
than elite solidarity-consensus for the conventional running of any political system including 
democracy. 
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Elite co-operation is not essentially grounded on elite solidarity and consensus. It may 
contradict absolute elite autonomy, but there is no contravention between relative elite 
autonomy and elite co-operation. "Without elite co-operation there can be no democracy, but 
without elite autonomy there can be no democracy either" (Etzioni, 1993: 110). Co-operation 
of elites on the duties of society does not mean the end of the struggle among elites. 
Sometimes, the social conditions of the country, emergence of duty and the high benefits to 
society may necessitate the urgent co-operation of elites. Nevertheless, the competition and 
the struggle among the elite groups has not ended. 
A recent Turkish case can be cited as a good example of elite co-operation: in 1996, 
the elites of the Turkish labour union acted voluntarily with Turkish business elites against 
governmental elites, in opposition to the "Law of the tax free auto-import". Although, 
theoretically these two elite groups must struggle with each other because of their 
contradictory interests. In terms of this contradiction, they acted together, because some 
common profits of these two groups necessitated a united and collaborative action against the 
government. 
In addition, the solidarity and incorporation of the democratic elite groups against the 
provocative actions of the "Refah-yor' Islamist government forms a good example about the 
importance and necessity of elite co-operation. The solidarity and co-operation among the 
Turkish military, media, business, trade union and scientific elites not only slowed down the 
growing Islamist movement but also brought the end of the "Refah-yol" government. 
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CHAPTER-5 
5. SOCIAL PORTRAIT OF CONTEMPORARY 
TURKISH POLITICAL ELITES 
The following chapters will try to give a full picture of important social, political and 
demographic characteristics of Turkish political elites, media elites and labour union elites. 
Firstly, it will be concerned with Turkish political elites in this chapter. Then, Turkish labour 
union elites and Turkish media elites will be examined in the next two chapters. A similar 
system and techniques will be used to analyse three elite groups. 
As has been explained in the methodology chapter, the sampling group comprises 
presidents of political parties and those five people who occupy the most affective positions 
after the president in each political party in contemporary Turkish politics. This sampling 
group can be identified as "the cream of the cream" of Turkish politicians. 
5.1. DEMOGRAPHIC PECULIARITIES OF CONTEMPORARY 
TURKISH POLITICAL LEADERS: 
5.1.1. AGE: 
Age and gender are the two most important demographic factors which are used to 
outline the demographic portrait. As in the past, age is still one of the most important social 
indicators which affects peoples social and individual life in the contemporary world. It is 
influential not only in traditional or less developed countries but also in industrialised and 
developed countries. The major target of this heading is to outline the range of age 
dominance, in other words ageism among contemporary Turkish political leaders. 
Table 1 gives the first signs of the predominance of middle aged people among 
Turkish political elites: The mean age of contemporary Turkish political leaders is nearly 53, 
and whereas the youngest member of the political elites is 38 years old, the oldest one is 74 
years. 
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Table 1 
Age of Contemporary Turkish Political Leaders 
Variable Mean Minimum Maximum 
AGE 52.87 38 74 
Table 2 
Age Characteristics of Contemporary Turkish Political Elites 
Age 
Count t7, 
Lowest thro. 39 1 3.3 
40-44 7 23.3 
45-49 9 26.7 
50-54 3 10.0 
55-59 3 10.0 
60 and over 9 26.7 
Figure 2 
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Table 2 and Figure 2 clearly shows a predominance of middle aged people in 
contemporary Turkish politics. The age of the vast majority of contemporary Turkish political 
leaders is between 40 and 59. In addition to the massive predominance of middle aged people, 
the elderly have also occupied an important place in contemporary Turkey. As can be seen in 
the figures, the recruitment channels are mostly closed to young people in contemporary 
Turkish politics. It can be deduced from the figures that age is one of the most important 
factors that effect the circulation of elites in Turkish politics. 
5.1.2. GENDER: 
Another important demographic indicator is gender. Woman have been isolated from 
important positions in politics and in other parts of social life for centuries. It is possible to 
observe gender discrimination in almost every society to a greater or lesser degree. Although, 
this situation has changed gradually, the prevalence of men still continues in the contemporary 
world, especially in the world of politics. 
Table 3 
Gender Characteristics of Contemporary Turkish Political Leaders 
Gender 
Count % 
Female 2 6.7 
Male 28 93.3 
As in most other countries in the world there is heavy predominance of men over 
women in Turkish politics. This male domination can be observed in Table 3 and Figure 3. 
Almost 93 percent of contemporary Turkish political leaders are male. Females only represent 
7 percent. It can be concluded from these findings that, gender is another highly important 
demographic factor in the circulation of elites. 
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5.2. EDUCATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS OF TURKISH POLITICAL ELITES: 
Education is one of the most important social indicators in the contemporary world. 
There has been a rapid transformation from the capital based society to the knowledge based 
society. As a result of this, education has become more important than ever before, in 
determining success. 
Therefore, educational levels, education and school types will be investigated in this 
section. In addition, foreign language ability will also be examined. Not only will the 
educational characteristics of Turkish political elites themselves be examined, but also the 
educational background of their fathers, spouses and their children. 
5.2.1. EDUCATIONAL LEVELS OF TURKISH POLITICAL ELITES: 
The quantity of education experienced has a significant importance in the recruitment 
process of contemporary societies. Undergoing a university education has become one of the 
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most significant commonalties of elites in today's world. In accordance with social and 
technological development, in addition to a high school education, possessing at least one 
university degree has become one of the most necessary conditions of the elite recruitment 
process. 
Table 4 
Education Levels of Turkish Political Elites, Their Spouses and Their Fathers 
Educational Level (%) E 
University High 
School 
J. Hig. 
School 
Primary 
School 
No Sc. 
Education 
I Respondent 96.7 3.3 - - - 
Respondent' Father 13.3 13.3 6.7 40 26.7 
Respondent's Spouses 56.7 30 13.3 - - 
In accordance with the rapid development of Turkish society, university education has 
gained great importance in contemporary Turkey. If people want to achieve a higher and 
prestigious social position they have to possess at least one university degree. This 
precondition is valid in contemporary Turkish politics too. As can be seen in Table 4, almost 
97 percent of Turkish political leaders have at least one university degree. 
Furthermore, a majority of their spouses have received university education. The 
proportion of high school educated spouses is also meaningful: about 87 percent of them 
possess high school qualifications. It can be seen from these findings that, Turkish elites prefer 
to marry people with at least high school education. On the other hand, most Turkish political 
leaders come from lower educated families. Only 27 percent of their fathers possess high 
school qualifications and only 13 percent of the fathers have a university degree. 
5.2.2 QUALITY AND TYPES OF EDUCATION OF CONTEMPORARY 
TURKISH POLITICAL LEADERS: 
The quality and type of education obtained also has a very significant influence in 
achieving an elite position in the contemporary world. Quality of education is associated with 
economic opportunities in capitalist societies and there is only a limited number of prestigious 
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and high quality schools. As a natural result of that, only restricted numbers of people have 
the chance to obtain a higher quality of education. 
Table 5 
School Types of Turkish Political Elites and Their Children 
School Types (%) 
Mostly State 
Normal 
Mostly State 
Prestigious 
Mostly Private 
College 
Not Applicable 
Respondents 76.7 10 10 3.3 
Respondents' Children 20 10 60 10 
The findings which are presented in Table 5 clearly show that, the quality of education 
did not have much influence on the elite recruitment process in Turkish politics. Nevertheless, 
the situation has changed in contemporary Turkish society, and the quality of education has 
become substantially more important. Turkish elites are aware of this situation and a large 
proportion of them send their children to prestigious schools. 
Table 6 
Education Types of Turkish Political Elites and Their Fathers' 
Education Types Respondents (%) Respondents' Fathers (%) 
Social Sciences 6.7 10 
Law 13.3 
Technical Sciences 23.3 - 
Economy 20 - 
Education 16.7 3.3 
Mathematics 3.3 - 
Public Administration 3.3 - 
Medical Sciences 6.7 - 
Agriculture 3.3 - 
Military - 3.3 
Not Applicable 3.3 83.3 
The type of education also has a degree of influence on the process of elite 
recruitment. Technical sciences, economy, education and law are highly influential educational 
fields in contemporary Turkish politics. This situation is related to the policy priorities of 
society. There has been a predominance of engineers in Turkish politics for decades. Most of 
the presidents of political parties were engineers until the end of the 1980s. Also, the two 
most recent Presidents of the Republic were also engineers. Although the domination of 
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engineers still continues, the situation has begun to change in the 1990s. The direction of 
movement is now towards the social sciences (including politics and economics). Table 6 
clearly shows that the most popular education type among Turkish elites is technical science 
(predominantly engineering). However, economics, education and law are also highly popular 
among Turkish political leaders. 
Table 7 
University Names of Turkish Political Elites 
School Names Proportion 
Ankara University 50 
Istanbul University 16.7 
Istanbul Technical University 16.7 
Others 13.3 
Not Applicable 3.3 
As in other Western societies, there are certain elite schools in Turkey. Ankara 
University, Istanbul University and Istanbul Technical University can be counted among the 
important elite schools. Table 7 clearly shows that, Ankara University is the most important 
elite school. The Faculty of Political Science in particular (SBF-MULKIYE) is very popular 
among social and political administrators in Turkey. 
5.2.3. FOREIGN LANGUAGE ABILITIES AND FOREIGN LANGUAGE TYPES OF 
CONTEMPORARY TURKISH POLITICAL LEADERS: 
Foreign language ability is an inseparable component of high quality education. Most 
of the prestigious schools produce graduates who understand and speak at least one foreign 
language. Foreign language ability also has a large degree of influence on elite recruitment 
process in contemporary Turkish society. As can be seen in Table 8, the vast majority of 
Turkish elites (about 90 percent) have a knowledge of at least one foreign language. 
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Table 8 
Foreign Language Abilities and Foreign Language Types of 
Contemporary Turkish Political Leaders 
Foreign Language Ability Foreign Language Types 
Number of For. Lan. Proportion % Name of Foreign Lang. Proportion 
No 10 Not Applicable 10 
One 76.7 English 50 
Two 6.7 French 10 
Three and More 6.7 German 6.7 
Arabic 6.7 
English-French 6.7 
English-German 3.3 
Others 6.7 
Total 100 Total 100 
Another important factor in relation to this is the type of foreign language. As in other 
countries, English as a foreign language has predominance in contemporary Turkey. This can 
be explained by the strong relation to America and American influence in the world. It can be 
also seen from Table 8 that the most popular foreign language among Turkish political 
leaders is English. Also, as a result of its strong ties and relations with Europe, other 
European languages, such as German and French are important. 
5.3. OCCUPATIONAL BACKGROUNDS OF CONTEMPORARY TURKISH 
POLITICAL ELITES: 
Turkish political elites present a high degree of plurality in terms of their occupational 
backgrounds. Nevertheless, there is a clear predominance of some occupations over others. 
Educators in particular (both school teachers and university lecturers) and public 
administrators are the highest proportion among Turkish political leaders. It can be seen in 
Table 9 that more than half of the Turkish political leaders come from education and public 
administration backgrounds. Also lawyers, engineers and architects, contractors and 
journalists have important positions in Turkish politics. Briefly, it is very easy to observe the 
predominance of white collar occupations. Almost all Turkish political leaders have been 
recruited from white collar occupations. 
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Table 9 
Occupational Background of Turkish Political Leaders, Their Fathers and Their Spouses' 
Fathers Occupations and Favourite Occupations in Their Adolescence 
Proportion (% ) 
Occupations Respondent Respondents' 
Fathers 
Respondents' 
S u. ' Fathers 
Favourite Oc. of 
Respondents 
Tradesman-Artisan- 
Merchant 
- 23.3 30 - 
Public Administration 23.3 10 6.7 6.7 
Medicine-Medical Sciences 3.3 - 3.3 13.3 
Farmer - 30 3.3 - 
Worker - 3.3 6.7 - 
Civil Servant - 10 - - 
Law 10 3.3 3.3 6.7 
Soldier-Police 3.3 6.7 10 - 
Politician - 6.7 - 20 
Education 30 - 3.3 26.7 
Businessman - - 10 - 
Ind. Contractor 10 - - - 
Engineer-Archit. 10 - - 16.7 
Other Professions - 6.7 20 - 
Manager (Priv. ) 3.3 - - 3.3 
Journalism 6.7 - 3.3 6.7 
Total 100 100 100 100 
Politics, education, medicine and engineering can be counted among the "dream 
occupations" of Turkish elites when they were adolescents. As seen in Table 9, politics and 
education are the two most popular education types. Engineering, medicine, public 
administration and law follow them. 
On the other hand, blue collar or semi-white collar occupations predominate among 
the fathers of Turkish political elites and their spouses' fathers. Over half of the fathers have 
blue or semi-blue collar occupations. Nevertheless, fathers of spouses of Turkish political 
elites have higher occupational positions in comparison with Turkish political elites' own 
fathers. Important proportions of both groups are tradesmen-artisants or merchants. 
Furthermore, an important proportion of Turkish political elites come from farming families. 
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Table 10 
Occupational Backgrounds of Mothers, Spouses and Spouses' Mothers of Turkish Political Elites 
Proportion (%) 
Occupations Respondents' Mothers Respondents' 
Spouses 
Respondents' Spouses' 
Mothers 
Housewife 100 43.3 90 
Teacher - 30 - 
Lawyer - 3.3 - 
Journalist - 3.3 - 
Social Scientist - 3.3 - 
Public Administrator - 6.7 - 
Engineer - 3.3 - 
Merchant - 3.3 - 
Politician - 3.3 
Civil Servant - - 10 
Total 100 100 100 
The findings about the occupations of Turkish elites' mothers and their spouses' 
mothers are highly important. As has been presented in the figure of Table 10, almost all 
Turkish elites' mothers are housewives. 90 percent of their spouses' mothers are also 
housewives. Occupational positions of spouses of Turkish political elites differ slightly from 
their mothers. Nevertheless, housewives still occupy the largest group among wives. 
Table 11 
Occupational Satisfaction and Occupational Satisfaction Rate Among Turkish Political Leaders 
Occupational Satisfaction Proportion 
% 
Occupational 
Satisfaction Rate 
Proportion 
(%) 
Prefer Present Job 83.3 Very Satisfied 60 
Do not Prefer Present Job 16.7 Satisfied 33.3 
Unsatisfied 3.3 
Very Unsatisfied 3.3 
Total 100 Total 100 
There is a very high degree of occupational satisfaction among Turkish political 
leaders. As seen in Table 11, more than 90 percent of them are satisfied with their actual 
occupational positions. In addition, more than 80 percent of them reported, if they had 
another chance that they would still prefer their actual occupation. 
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Table 12 
Occupational Tenures and Future Occupational Plans of Turkish Political Leaders 
Future Occupational Plans Proportion (%) Occupational Tenure Proportion (%) 
Continue Politics 96.7 One-Five Years 10 
University Lectureship 3.3 Six-Ten Years 30 
Eleven-Fifteen Years 16.7 
Sixteen and Over 43.3 
Total 100 Total 100 
Turkish political elites have a long occupational tenure. Table 12 shows that, almost 
60 percent of Turkish political leaders have been occupying a higher position in Turkish 
politics. In addition, over 43 percent have been politicians for more than fifteen years. 
5.4. FINDINGS ON SOCIAL ORIGINS AND SOCIAL STATUS OF TURKISH 
POLITICAL ELITES: 
Turkish political leaders possess very high social class positions in terms of economic 
and social indicators. Almost 97 percent of Turkish political elites identified themselves as 
belonging to the upper class. As can be seen in Table 13, only 3 percent of them described 
themselves as middle class. 
Table 13 
Social Class Status of Turkish Political Leaders, Their Fathers and Their Spouses' Fathers 
Proportion (%) 
Social Class Status Respondents Respondents' 
Fathers 
Respondents' Spouses' 
Fathers 
Lower Class - 3.3 3.3 
Lower Middle Class - 20 6.7 
Middle Class 3.3 43.3 43.3 
U er Middle Class 53.3 26.7 36.7 
Upper Class 43.3 6.7 10 
Total 100 100 100 
On the other hand, a large proportion of Turkish elites have moved from the middle 
stratum of society to their current social position. Table 13 demonstrates that, approximately 
90 percent of Turkish political leaders have middle (both lower-middle, middle and upper- 
middle) social class origins. The social origins of their spouses are considerably higher than 
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the social class backgrounds of Turkish political leaders. Nearly half of the spouses comes 
from upper-middle or upper class families. 
5.5. FAMILY BACKGROUNDS AND FAMILY STRUCTURE OF 
CONTEMPORARY TURKISH POLITICAL ELITES: 
As discussed in detail before, Turkish society and Turkish culture ascribe high value to 
the family and marriage. Therefore, marital status is a highly influential social indicator of the 
elite recruitment process. It is possible to observe this situation in Turkish politics. Almost a 
hundred percent of Turkish political leaders are married. On the other hand a large majority of 
Turkish political leaders have very small or small families. As can be seen in Table 14, 
approximately 67 percent of them have a maximum of two children. The proportion of 
Turkish political leaders who have more than four children is only 3 percent. 
Table 14 
Family Size of Turkish Political Leaders and Their Fathers 
Proportion (%) 
Number Of Children Respondents Respondents' Fathers 
No Child 10 - 
One Child 16.7 - 
Two Children 40 6.7 
Three Children 26.7 16.7 
Four Children 3.3 23.3 
Five Children - 26.7 
Six Children - 3.3 
Seven and More 3.3 23.3 
Total 100 100 
When the family size of Turkish elites and their fathers is compared the findings 
become more meaningful. It can be seen in figure Table 14 that, the vast majority of Turkish 
elites comes from large or medium size families. More than half of Turkish elites' fathers have 
at least five children. This fording gives a very clear idea about social development and the 
direction of differentiation in the family structure of contemporary Turkish society. 
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Table 15 
Marriage Ages of Turkish Political Leaders and Their Spouses 
Prop rtion (%) 
Marriage Age Respondents Respondents' Spouses 
Lowest throw h 20 3.3 30 
21-23 16.7 33.4 
24-26 40.1 26.7 
27-29 26.7 6.6 
30 and over 13.2 3.3 
Total 100 100 
Another important factor is marriage age in distinguishing the social portraits of 
people. Average marriage ages of Turkish elites is substantially higher in comparison with the 
average marriage age among the general Turkish population. Also, like the entire Turkish 
population average marriage ages of males is always higher than average marriage ages of 
females among Turkish political leaders. Table 15 shows that, the most popular marriage age 
among Turkish political elites is 24 and over. On the other hand, marriage age of Turkish 
political elites' spouses is lower than Turkish political elites'. A large majority (more than 63 
percent) of the spouses got married before they were 23 years old. 
5.6. RELIGIOUS AFFILIATIONS OF CONTEMPORARY TURKISH POLITICAL 
ELITES: 
Religion is one of the most important social institutions. It plays important roles both 
in the life of individuals and societies. It organises the relations between human beings and 
God. It also meets the requirement of beliefs of the people. 
Although, more than 90 percent of the Turkish population are followers of Islam, 
there are followers of every religion among the citizens of contemporary Turkey. Also, Islam 
has been historically divided into several different doctrines and sects. The researcher initially 
hoped to examine the doctrinal divisions among Turkish elites. However, it was realised that 
this was a very sensitive topic and that it would be almost impossible to get objective 
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information from Turkish elites. Therefore, the researcher decided to focus upon the extent of 
religious belief amongst Turkish elites. 
As presented in Table 16, Turkish political leaders do not have strong religious 
affiliations. Almost 70 percent of them have little or no religious ties. None of Turkish 
political elites identified themselves as being very strong believers. On the other hand, almost 
53 percent of political elites believed in life after death. 
Table 16 
Religious Belief of Turkish Political Leaders 
Religious Belief Life After Death Relation Between 
Religion and Politics 
No 23.3 Totally Believe 20.0 Totally Approve - 
Little 46.7 Believe 33.3 Approve 23.3 
Average 13.3 No Idea 13.3 No Idea 6.7 
Strong 16.7 Unbelieve 10.0 Against 23.3 
Very Strong - Totally Unbelieve 23.3 Totally Against 46.7 
Total 100 Total 100 Total 100 
Another important subject is the relationship between politics and religion. Laicism is 
one of the most important principles of the Kemalist Revolution and secularism is one of the 
most important characteristics of the Turkish Republic. As a result of the secular character of 
the state, religious beliefs and religious differentiation of Turkish citizens has been protected 
by the law. Believers of all religion can carry out their worship and religious duties freely. 
Nobody can control, disturb or discriminate against people because of their religious beliefs. 
This freedom has been guaranteed and protected by the Turkish Constitution. 
Nevertheless, although it is illegal, some religious exploiters and short sighted 
politicians have exploited the religious beliefs and identities of Turkish people to gain socio- 
economic benefits or to obtain votes, sometimes overtly sometimes covertly. This situation 
gained important dimensions in the 1980s and 1990s. Almost 80 percent of Turkish political 
leaders are against the use of religion for political and financial gain. 
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5.7. SOCIAL HOMOGENEITY AND SOCIAL CONSENSUS AMONG 
CONTEMPORARY TURKISH POLITICAL LEADERS: 
There is a high level of social homogeneity among Turkish political elites. The degree 
of this homogeneity is high in terms of particular characteristics. Contemporary Turkish 
political elites present a very homogeneous appearance in terms of their educational levels. 
Almost 97 percent of them have at least one university degree. Also, they have common 
characteristics according to their actual social class positions. Like their educational levels, 
almost 97 percent of them have an upper-middle or upper class social status. 
It is possible to observe a high levels of homogeneity according to other important 
social indicators: there is a high degree of homogeneity in terms of their marital status. As 
explained earlier, almost all contemporary Turkish political leaders are married. Also, a large 
majority of them are members of a "nuclear" family structure. Over 93 percent of Turkish 
political leaders have a maximum of three children. 
Turkish political leaders present a high degree of homogeneity in terms of foreign 
language ability and job satisfaction. Almost 90 percent of them know at least one foreign 
language, such as English, French, German. There is also a large degree of job satisfaction 
among contemporary Turkish political leaders: over 93 percent are satisfied with their actual 
social and economic positions. 
Table 17 
Social Consensus Among Contemporary Turkish Political Leaders 
Proport ion (%) 
Approve Against 
Abortion 60.0 30.0 
Family Planning 96.7 3.3 
White Collar Union 83.3 13.3 
Idea on 8 Years Obligatory Education 73.3 26.7 
Polygamy 10.0 83.3 
Capital Punishment 26.6 60.0 
Relations Between Politicians and Sheikhs 23.3 70.0 
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Also, there is a high level of social consensus among Turkish political leaders in terms 
of major social issues. A large majority of Turkish political leaders are liberal minded (people). 
Almost 80 percent of them agree that women have to play more important roles in every 
sector of social life. As can be seen from Table 17, almost 97 percent of them approved of 
family planning. In addition, 60 percent support abortion so long as it is necessary. On the 
other hand, over 80 percent of Turkish political elites are against polygamy and the same 
number support white collar unions with the rights to collective bargaining and strikes. A 
large majority of Turkish elites support the idea of "8 years obligatory education" for Turkish 
people. Also more than 70 percent of them are against a special relationship between 
politicians and religious sheikhs. 
In concluding these findings, it can be argued that there is a high degree of social 
homogeneity and a social consensus among contemporary Turkish political leaders. As a 
result there is a high level of social integration among Turkish political elites. 
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CHAPTER-6 
6. THE FOURTH POWER-MEDIA AND SOCIAL PORTRAIT OF 
CONTEMPORARY TURKISH MEDIA ELITES 
6.1. THE FOURTH POWER-MEDIA: 
6.1.1. A GENERAL VIEW ON MEDIA, ITS POWER AND INFLUENCE: 
The first and most primitive form of communication is body language. Human beings 
first used their body and non-verbal languages to manifest their sentiments and needs. As 
noted by Barrett and Braham (1995: 5-6), in spite of increasing sophistication and complexity 
of interaction between people, and technological inventions in communication technologies, 
this first form of communication has not lost its importance and validity today. It is the 
lifeblood of communication, especially interpersonal communication. 
Of course interpersonal communication, local communication or regional 
communication are very important research topics for social scientists. Nevertheless, this 
research is a study of elites and for this reason it should be concerned with communication on 
a larger scale, in other words mass (public) communication. The modem mass media in 
Turkey will be the subject matter of this chapter. 
Mass media provides the greatest communication opportunities to the people and 
plays a very substantial role in the production and social distribution of knowledge. The term 
of media contains various kind of disclosures: television, radio, press (includes newspapers, 
journals and magazines) are the most influential mass media apparatus. 
As stressed by some scholars, media recreates, reshapes, reproduces and interprets the 
existing social forms, relations and order. They are not only the tools of entertainment but also 
one of the most effective ways of influencing and changing attitudes and behaviour in 
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individuals. The symbols, gestures, numbers, words, pictures, signs not only carry messages, 
but also they create and interpret the human world. 
There are two opposing ideas about the influence of media: media are "passive 
transmitters" or "active interveners" in the shaping of messages. According to the followers of 
the idea of the "passive transmitters", media are a "mirror to reality". It reflects reality as 
objectively and impartially as possible free from any bias (Barrett & Braham, 1995: 70). 
Marxist accounts argue that, the media is not free from bias which distorts objective 
reality. Media and their products are shaped by the ruling political and economic class. In 
Connell's words, the media is a kind of megaphone of ruling class ideas (ibid.: 71). The power 
of the media is highly related to the power of contemporary ruling classes. As stated in the 
German Ideology by Marx and Engels (1970: 64) "the class which has the means of material 
production at its disposal has control at the same time over the means of mental production". 
Also, Miliband and some other researchers argue that (Barrett & Braham, 1995: 54), "the 
function of mass media is to legitimise the state in capitalist society and, by extension, 
delegitimate those forces or groups that can be seen to be actively or potentially in opposition 
to the dominant interest". 
Studies in semiology and linguistics on the mass media have brought new extensions to 
the Marxist approach which are "Structuralist Studies", "Political Economy' and "Culturalist 
Studies". There are some theoretical differences between these paradigms. Structuralist 
accounts are frequently informed by Althusserian Marxism. It gives priority to ideology 
instead of the economic base of the mass media. Whereas, according to political economists, 
ideology, which is determined by the economic base is less important than economy in the 
cultural production process. Ownership and control of the mass media are two important 
factors that effect the ideology of media production. 
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Culturalist studies take the opposite view to economic reductionism. They reject the 
formulation of "base/superstructure" that tries to explain the relationship between ideas and 
material forces. Culturalists conceptualise the culture "as both the means and values which 
arise amongst the distinctive social groups and classes, on the basis of their given historical 
conditions and relationships" (Barrett & Braham, 1995: 76). Culturalists argue that the media 
is a powerful shaper of public consciousness and popular acquiescence. 
The Marxist approach and the liberal approach have opposing views. The liberal 
tradition underestimates the impact of the media. As stated by Curran et al. (in Barrett & 
Braham, 1995; 63), "Marxist critiques have contributed to a growing recognition within 
empirical communication research that more attention needs to be paid to the influence of 
media on the ideological categories and frames of references through which people understand 
the world". 
6.1.2. MEDIA AND POLITICS: 
Is the media voice, eyes and ears of the public or is it the voice and operating arm of 
powerful dominant groups in society? Is it the major and very effective weapon of politicians 
helping them by manipulating the socio-economic problems of society and canalising the 
interest and energy of the public to different subjects? Different writers may give different 
answers to these questions, but in reality the media is extremely powerful and provides 
effective weapons to obtain power, wealth and prestige in society. 
The relation between the media and politics (especially governmental elites) has a 
reciprocal character. The media supports political parties for two reasons: economic ties and 
ideological ties or both. The media may support political parties in several ways. Firstly, the 
media is highly influential in the process of elite circulation in general and political 
mobilisation in particular. In a very basic situation, it may support a political party as the 
creator of public opinion by broadcasting its voice, policies and ideology. It may also serve a 
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political party by attacking and being the opposing voice to combatant political parties. Also, 
political or government elites need the support of the media in the formation of popular 
majorities and to be successful in the decision making process. 
For this invaluable service, when the political party comes to power, it opens all the 
channels of credit to the supporter media group, and makes the necessary legislative 
arrangements in favour of them. Furthermore, they can open the advertisement opportunities 
of the public sector to the media group which has supported them on very favourable terms. 
Marxist analysts see the media as being locked into the power structure. They accept 
the media as the reproducer of the perspectives of dominant institutions. Governmental elites 
in particular have opportunities to put pressure on the media and to control them by using 
their political power. They may also attempt to restrict freedom of information by using the 
label of "secret" or reasons of "national security". In addition, they may put pressure on 
television companies and forbid, reschedule or withdraw some programmes. This kind of 
restriction can be observed, not only in Turkey but in most other countries (Etzioni, 1993: 
183-4). 
According to some Marxist scholars "media portrayals of elections constitute 
dramatised rituals that legitimise the power structure in liberal democracies; voting is seen as 
an ideological tool that helps to sustain the myth of representative democracy, political 
equality and collective self determination" (Barrett & Braham, 1995: 62). 
6.1.3. THE MEDIA IN CONTEMPORARY TURKEY: 
Turkey is one of the most rapidly developing and urbanising countries in the world. 
The latest technological developments and innovations can be seen in every part of the social 
fabric of contemporary Turkey. Parallel to this rapid development and urbanisation, Turkey 
has lived through a very important media revolution through out the 1990s. Several 
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international and hundreds of local and national television channels, and more than a thousand 
radio stations have been broadcasting in contemporary Turkey. According to the latest 
statistics (which were published by Ankara University, Faculty of Communication, Media 
Documentation Unit in July 1999), there are 3,500 printed media apparatuses (including daily- 
weekly-monthly newspapers, journals and magazines), 1056 radio stations and 280 television 
channels (230 local, 15 regional and 35 national) (Hurriyet Newspaper, 27.7.1999). 
As in other countries (Curran et aL in Barrett & Braham, 1995: 57-58), usage of high 
technology has given to the media the opportunity of creating large scale mass audiences in 
Turkey. Urbanisation and industrialisation created a society that was volatile, unstable, 
rootless, alienated and innately susceptible to manipulation. Urbanised human beings become 
relatively defenceless, an easy prey to mass communications since they are no longer anchored 
in the network of social relations and stable, inherited values that characterise settled, rural 
communities. 
As in some other countries, the media are predominantly owned and controlled either 
by large business groups or the state who dominate economic and political power in Turkey. 
As stressed by Necati Dogru one of the most effective Turkish columnists, the Turkish media 
are financially dependent not only on the state but also on the private entrepreneurs who are 
the owners of large scale capital (Nebiler, 1995: 56-7). 
The political economy of the media is an important factor that has a significant 
influence on the outcomes of the mass media. The control of the economic dynamics of the 
media is highly related to the content of messages emanating from it. The meaning of 
messages is usually determined by the economic base of organisations. Advertisements are the 
lifeblood of the media, and organisations usually take into the account the needs and benefits 
of the advertiser. 
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The mass media have a great influence in changing knowledge, beliefs, opinions, 
attitudes, feelings and behaviour patterns of individuals. Individuals, social groups, 
organisations, social institutions, the whole society and culture can be affected by mass 
communications. The direction of this change can be either negative or positive. This depends 
on the conditions and controllers of the media. As McQuail argues (in Barrett & Braham, 
1995: 96), in some circumstances the media play the role of the agent of de-socialisation by 
challenging and disturbing the values held by parents, educators and other agents of social 
control. 
The influence of the two largest media groups in Turkey the "Dogan Group" and 
"Sabah Group" are worth noting. These two groups exercise control over the most effective 
print or electronic media in Turkey. In fact more than half of the Turkish population are the 
audiences or readers of the products of these two media groups. Recently, Dogan Group and 
Sabah Group have merged their power under the umbrella of BIMAS and as a result have 
attained enormous power. 
BIMAS media group play a very substantial role in Turkey in the late 1990s and wield 
much power over Turkish social and political life. This group owns the two most popular 
national and international television channels: Kanal-D (DTV) and ATV. Also, they are the 
owners of five of the largest and the most effective Turkish daily newspapers that are 
Hurriyet, Milliyet, Radikal, Sabah and Yeni Yuzyil. They also own or control approximately 
one hundred large or small scale journals, magazines and other daily or weekly papers, and 
many radio and television channels. 
The BIMAS media group has had a widespread effect in Turkish politics in 
comparison with other Turkish elite groups through out the 1990s. They put massive pressure 
on the "Refah-yol" Islamist coalition government in the years of political crisis. In fact, they 
played a crucially important part in abolishing the "Refah-yol" government. Also, the BIMAS 
group played a substantial role (formally and informally) in establishing the coalition 
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government of the "Anasol-D". They openly supported the parties represented in the coalition 
government and developed very friendly and interdependent relations with that government. 
There are a couple of other relatively effective media institutions and media groups in 
Turkey. Nevertheless, their power is rather small in comparison with the BIMAS media 
group. However the "Cumhuriyet" newspaper must be mentioned: it was established in the 
first years of the Turkish Republic through the encouragement of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk. It is 
the representative of a different kind of tradition amongst the media institutions, not only in 
Turkey but also in the world. It is a leftist intellectual paper and almost all of its columnists are 
amongst the most effective members of the Turkish media elite. It may be accepted as the 
most autonomous and rooted media institutions in Turkey. Its intellectual power is enormous 
when compared with its quantitative size. 
There are about ten local, national and international state owned television and radio 
stations. Theoretically, all the state television and radio stations are independent and free from 
pressure by political elites. Nevertheless, the reality is different, and as in most European 
countries and the USA, they function as the operating arms of the political elites, particularly 
governmental political elites. 
Also, almost every political or ideological group (from the Greywolves-Ulkucu 
Commandos to the radical islamists) have their own television channels, newspapers and 
journals depending on their size. The television channels TGRT, Kanal 7, Samanyolu TV, 
Mesaj TV and those newspapers Turkiye, Zaman, Milli Gazete, etc. are among the influential 
Islamist media organisations. 
The mass media serves substantial and useful communication services to the people. 
However, it is not only a tool for communication but an important agent of socialisation. As 
stressed by Scannell (1992,13), the press and broadcasting are a part of the system of cultural 
production. They carry the cultural products into homes and living rooms. 
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Nevertheless, there is the other side of the coin that the mass media may be used as a 
very powerful tool of propaganda or brainwashing on a mass scale. The owner or controller of 
the media may bias the news and try to monopolise opinion and meaning. Also, the media may 
be used for cultural domination or as a threat to cultural identity. It may have some effect on 
the level of national cohesion. 
In addition, the media may cause a collective reaction, like panic, riot or general 
public disorder. Also, provocative and ideological broadcasts of the media may encourage 
civil terrorism. "Istanbul-Gazi" and "Sivas-Madimak Oteli" cases carry very substantial 
examples about the role of the media on social panic and public disorder in society: 
Incomplete and misleading information caused widespread panic and civil disorder in Gazi in 
Istanbul in 1995. As a result of this provocative action, many people died or were injured. 
Another example of the ideologically shaped content and provocative action of the 
media is the case of "Sivas-Madimak Hotel": a group of Islamist militants organised civil 
disorder against the state and democracy. They incited the people about the cultural activities 
and festival, which was organised by mostly socialist and communist poets, artists, writers and 
scientists in memory of Pir Sultan Abdal (famous poet and cultural figure) in Sivas on 2 July 
1993. They worked in co-operation with the local Islamist media. At the end of this civil 
terrorism and riot, the Madimak Hotel was set on fire and about forty leftist intellectuals were 
killed by the Islamist militants and mobs. 
According to the presidents of the two most important Turkish media organisations- 
the Union of Turkish Journalists (Turkiye Gazeteciler Sendikasi) and the Association of 
Turkish Journalists (Turkiye Gazeteciler Cemiyeti)- the most important actual problems of the 
Turkish media are monopolisation, anti-trade unionism and ethical corruption (the deviation 
from the ethics and values of media professionalism) (Nebiler, 1995: 19-22). According to 
them, monopolisation may damage not only the freedom of the press, but also the job security 
of Turkish journalists, the ethical values of journalism and also democracy, because the 
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freedom of the press is one of the most important principles of democracy. To Nail Gureli 
who is the president of the association of Turkish journalists, the freedom of the press is much 
more important than the individual autonomy of journalists because it involves the people's 
right to learn about reality (Nebiler, 1995: 22). 
The organisational structure of media institutions has significant effects on media 
outputs. Power and control are structured by the organisational hierarchy. Some media studies 
demonstrate that most media organisations are controlled indirectly via informal channels. 
Also, the power of the media is located at the top of the hierarchy of media organisations. As 
stressed by political economists, ownership and control of the media are important factors that 
effect the ideology of media production. 
Nebiler (1995: 18) argues that about 70 % of the Turkish press is controlled by the 
associates of the BIMAS media group. This figure highlights the degree of monopolisation in 
the Turkish media. It is also important to note that, these media groups not only work in the 
media sector, but also have interests in different sectors such as finance (insurance and 
banking), marketing, tourism, car industry, new technology etc. (Nebiler, 1995: 19). This may 
cause ethical corruption directly or indirectly. 
As explained above the media is one of the most important institutions in society. If 
media owners and elites are so powerful, the identification of media elites is of great 
importance. Hence, a social portrait of contemporary Turkish media elites will be given in the 
remaining part of this chapter. 
6.2. SOCIAL PORTRAIT OF CONTEMPORARY TURKISH MEDIA ELITES: 
Both the social background and social characteristics of this elite group will be 
investigated in terms of major social, political and demographic indicators. 
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6.2.1. DEMOGRAPHIC PECULIARITIES OF TURKISH MEDIA ELITES: 
a) Age: 
Age is one of the most important demographic indicators in contemporary societies. 
Some age groups monopolise the important influential positions in societies. This situation is 
generally in favour of old or middle aged people. Young people have traditionally been 
dominated by the members of these two age groups. 
The large majority of Turkish media elites are late middle aged or of advanced age. 
This can be clearly demonstrated from the figures in Tables 1 and 2, and Figure 4. According 
to Table 1, the mean age of Turkish media elites is 51. They have a minimum age of 35 and 
maximum age of 63. 
Table 1 
Age Description of Turkish Media Elites 
Variable Mean Minimum Maximum 
AGE 50.53 35 63 
Table 2 
Age Characteristics of Turkish Media Elites 
Age 
Count % 
Lowest thro. 39 2 6.7 
40-44 8 26.7 
45-49 4 13.3 
50-54 4 13.3 
55-59 6 20 
60 and over 6 20 
The most important and influential positions in the Turkish media are occupied by 
middle aged people. Almost 73 percent of media elites are middle aged. Young people only 
make up 7 percent of the Turkish media elites. The number of advanced aged people in the 
Turkish media is three times more than young people. 
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Figure 4 
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b) Gender: 
Another important dimension of contemporary societies is gender. As in other Western 
countries, there is male domination in Turkish media elite: the most powerful positions have 
been occupied by men. Table 3 and Figure 5 clearly show that, almost 87 percent of the 
media elite are male. Nevertheless, the proportion of female elites in Turkish media is still 
higher than the proportion of females in any other elite groups. For example, the proportion of 
women is only 7 percent in the contemporary Turkish political elite. Moreover, male 
domination is very assertive in the Turkish labour union elite: the proportion of its female 
members is only 3 percent. 
Table 3 
Gender Characteristics of Turkish Media Elites 
Gcndcr 
Count `%, 
Female 4 13.3 
Male 26 86.7 
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Figure 5 
Gender of Turkish Media Elites 
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6.2.2. EDUCATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS OF TURKISH MEDIA ELITES: 
Turkish media elites possess a high level and high quality of education. The vast 
majority of Turkish media elites have at least one university degree. Only a small proportion 
of them have only high school education. The proportion of university educated Turkish 
media elites is higher than 93 percent. Also, their fathers' educational level is fairly high in 
comparison with the general educational level of Turkish people and educational level of other 
Turkish elites' fathers. Table 4 shows that, more than 60 percent of Turkish media elites' 
fathers have at least a high school education. In addition, almost 43 percent of them have a 
university education. 
The spouses of Turkish media elites have a very high level of education in comparison 
with the spouses of other Turkish elites. Almost 80 percent of their spouses have at least one 
university degree. If these findings are compared with the actual size of university educated 
people in contemporary Turkish society, the numbers became more meaningful and clear: 
approximately 9 percent of entire Turkish population have a university degree. 
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Table 4 
Education Levels of Turkish Media Elites, Their Spouses and Their Fathers 
Educational Level (%) 6 
University High 
School 
J. Hig. 
School 
Primary 
School 
No Sc. 
Education 
Respondent Res 93.3 6.7 - - - 
Father 43.3 20 3.3 23.3 10 
Res ondent's Spouses 80 13.3 3.3 3.3 - 
Table 5 
School Types of Turkish Media Elites and Their Children 
School Types (%) 
Mostly State 
Normal 
Mostly State 
Prestigious 
Mostly Private 
College 
Not Applicable 
Respondents 40 20 40 - 
Respondents' Children 6.7 - 83.3 10 
Turkish media elites have experienced a high quality of education. A large majority of 
them have been educated in prestigious (both private and state owned) schools. As can be 
seen in Table 5, only 40 percent of Turkish media elites graduated from normal state schools. 
In accordance with their high social and economic positions, the majority of their children 
have the opportunity to attend privately owned prestigious schools. Table 5 shows that, more 
than 83 percent of their children are educated in private colleges. 
Turkish media elites have a pluralist appearance according to their types of education. 
Whereas the largest proportion of Turkish media elites have studied the social sciences and 
politics, only 13 percent of them have been educated in a department of journalism. As can be 
seen from Table 6, those people who graduated from the departments of social sciences and 
politics, economy, law, technical sciences, education and journalism have more opportunity to 
obtain an elite position in the Turkish media. 
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Table 6 
Education Types of Turkish Medial Elites and Their Fathers' 
Education Types Respondents (%) Respondents' Fathers (°! o) 
Social Sciences-Politics 30 - 
Law 13.3 23.3 
Technical Sciences 10 3.3 
Economy 13.3 - 
Education 10 6.7 
Philology 3.3 - 
Journalism 13.3 - 
Medical Sciences - 6.7 
Military - 3.3 
Not Applicable 6.7 56.7 
Total 100 100 
On the other hand, a large proportion of university educated fathers of Turkish media 
elites graduated from the faculty of law. Engineering, medicine, education and military 
education are the other popular educational subjects among the fathers. 
Table 7 
School Names of Turkish Media Elites 
School Names Proportion (%) 
Ankara Universi 36.7 
Istanbul Universit 20 
Istanbul Technical University 6.7 
Gazi University 3.3 
METU-ODTU 3.3 
Bogazici University 6.7 
Others 16.6 
Not Applicable 6.7 
Total 100 
Table 7 gives a very accurate idea about elite schools in Turkey. As mentioned earlier, 
the most influential and most prestigious elite school in Turkey is Ankara University, 
particularly the faculty of political sciences (SBF). A large proportion of the most powerful 
positions in social and political life in Turkey are occupied by SBF graduates. The graduates 
of Ankara University, Faculty of Political Sciences have a strong clique character. They 
possess a strong group consensus and highly effective group solidarity. 
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Istanbul University is also another highly influential elite university. It has a long 
history and it was the first modern university in the Turkish Republic. Almost 20 percent of 
Turkish media elites graduated from Istanbul University. Also, Istanbul Technical University, 
Bogazici University, Middle East Technical University (METU) and Gazi University can be 
counted among the important elites schools in Turkey. 
Table 8 
Foreign Language Abilities and Foreign Language Types of Contemporary Turkish Media Elites 
Foreign oreiAbility Foreign Lanua e Types 
Nur of For. Lan. be Proportion (%) Name of Foreign Lang. (%) Proportion 
No 10 Not Applicable 10 
One 43.3 i English 20 
Two 40 French 6.7 
More r 6.7 German 6.7 
E lash-French 26.7 
En lish-German 10 
Arab le-European 10 
Others 10 
Total 100 Total 100 
Foreign language ability is an inseparable component of high quality education in the 
contemporary world. This ability is also one of the most important indicators that has 
important affects on the elite circulation process. In accordance with high level and high 
quality education, almost 90 percent of the Turkish media elite knows at least one foreign 
language. In addition to that, nearly half of them have the ability to speak two or more foreign 
languages. 
As in the world generally and in the other Turkish elite groups, the most popular 
foreign language among Turkish media elites is English. Table 8 clearly shows that, other 
European languages, such as German and French, also have an important influence. This 
predominance of European languages is associated with the domination of Western European 
culture and values on a world-scale. 
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6.2.3. OCCUPATIONAL BACKGROUNDS OF TURKISH MEDIA ELITES: 
The large majority of Turkish media elites worked as journalists at the beginning of 
their occupational career. As can be seen in Table 9, an important proportion (57 percent) 
have not worked in any other sector except journalism in their occupational life. A large 
proportion of Turkish media elites have some degree of previous job experience in the sectors 
of education (especially lectureships in universities) and public administration. Some of them 
are also originally lawyers, engineers and managers. 
Fathers of Turkish media elites have substantially different kind of occupations. 
Nevertheless, the largest proportion of them are tradesmen, merchants and artisans. The 
second largest proportion of the fathers are public administrators. Lawyers are in third place 
among Turkish media elites' fathers. In addition, journalists, educators, doctors, farmers, 
workers and civil servants have exactly the same proportion among their fathers. It can be 
outlined from the findings that, a large majority of Turkish media elites come from white 
collar and semi-white collar families in terms of their fathers' occupations. 
The spouses of Turkish media elites possess a better family background in terms of the 
occupations of their family. Table 9 shows that, fathers of the spouses of Turkish media elites 
mostly have white collar occupations. 
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Table 9 
Occupational Background of Turkish Media Elites, Their Fathers' and Their Spouses' Fathers' 
Occupations and Favourite Occupations in Their Adolescence 
Prop rtion (%) 
Occupations Respondent Respondents' 
Fathers 
Respondents' 
Sou. ' Fathers 
Favourite Oc. of 
Respondents 
Tradesman-Artisan-Merchant - 26.7 30 - 
Public Administration 10 16.7 10 6.7 
Medicine-Medical Sciences - 6.7 6.7 13.3 
Farmer - 6.7 3.3 - 
Worker - 6.7 3.3 - 
Civil Servant - 6.7 3.3 - 
Law 3.3 10 6.7 13.3 
Soldier-Police - 3.3 3.3 
Politics-Di lomac - - 3.3 20 
Education 20 6.7 3.3 10 
Businessman - 3.3 16.7 
Fine Arts - - - 3.3 
Engineer-Archit. 3.3 - - 10 
Other Professions 3.3 - 6.7 - 
Manager (Priv. ) 3.3 - - - 
Philosophy - - - 3.3 
Journalism 56.7 6.7 3.3 20 
Total 100 100 100 100 
On the other hand, journalism and politics were their most popular occupations when 
the members of Turkish media elites were children and adolescents. Medicine, law, 
engineering, education and public administration were also among their favourite occupations 
when they were young. 
Table 10 
Occupational Backgrounds of Turkish Media Elites, Mothers, Spouses and Spouses' Mothers 
Proportion 
Occupations Respondents' 
Mothers 
Respondents' 
Spouses 
Respondents' Spouses' 
Mothers 
Housewife 86.7 20 73.3 
Teacher 3.3 30 10 
Social Scientist - 3.3 - 
Journalist - 13.3 - 
Painter (Artist) - 6.7 - 
Public Administrator - 23.3 - 
Engineer 3.3 - - 
Others 3.3 3.3 - 
Hostess - - 3.3 
Civil Servant 3.3 - 13.3 
Total 100 100 100 
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A large majority of Turkish media elites' mothers and mothers of their spouses are 
housewives. Nevertheless, the proportion of those media elites whose mothers have paid work 
is slightly higher than the proportion in the political and labour union elite. The media elites 
present a slightly liberal appearance in terms of their spouses occupation in comparison with 
other Turkish elite groups, such as media and politics. As can be seen from Table 10, a 
substantial majority of the spouses of Turkish media elites, that is 80 percent, work in a paid 
job. Most of them are teachers, public administrators and journalists. 
Table 11 
Occupational Satisfaction and Occupational Satisfaction Rate Among Turkish Media Elites 
Occupational Satisfaction Proportion 
% 
Occupational 
Satisfaction Rate 
Proportion 
(%) 
Prefer Present Job 76.7 Ve Satisfied 70 
Do not Prefer Present Job 23.3 Satisfied 23.3 
Unsatisfied 6.7 
Total 100 Total 100 
Resulting from its high status, journalism is one of the well paid occupations in 
contemporary Turkey. Nevertheless, as the result of Ozalist politics, its close relations with 
politicians since the mid 1980s and monopolisation in the media sector has damaged its good 
reputation. As discussed earlier (in chapter 3, Table 7 and 8), more than 20 percent of Turkish 
media elites repeatedly mentioned occupational corruption in their sectors and stressed the 
bad reputation of their occupation in the wider society. Although most Turkish journalists are 
not very happy with this unpleasant situation, there is a high degree of occupational 
satisfaction among Turkish media elites. As seen from Table 11, more than 93 percent of 
them are satisfied with their occupational and social positions. Also, a large majority of them 
argue that, if they had a chance to change their occupation they would still choose journalism. 
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Table 12 
Occupational Tenures and Future Occupational Plans of Turkish Media Elites 
Future Occupational Plans Proportion (%) Occupational Tenure Proportion (%) 
Continue to Work in Media 86.7 One-Five Years 3.3 
University Lectureship 6.7 Six-Ten Years 6.7 
Attendance to Politics 6.7 Eleven-Fifteen Years 16.7 
Sixteen and Over 73.3 
Total 100 Total 100 
The rate of elite circulation is very low in the Turkish media. Young people need to 
make enormous efforts to obtain an elite position in the Turkish media sector. Table 12 
clearly shows that, almost 90 percent of Turkish media elites have been occupying their 
position more than 10 years and 87 percent of them wanted to continue to occupy that 
position in the future. Also, exactly the same proportion, that is 6.7 percent of Turkish media 
elites argued that they are planing to work as a lecturer in a university or want to enter active 
politics. 
6.2.4. FINDINGS ON SOCIAL ORIGINS AND ACTUAL SOCIAL STATUS 
OF TURKISH MEDIA ELITES: 
Turkish media elites have the highest level of class consciousness among all Turkish 
elites. In addition, they have a high level of education, and occupy high social and economic 
positions. As a result of all these factors, almost 97 percent of Turkish media elites have 
reported that they are the members of the upper class. As displayed in Table 13, only 3 
percent of them have middle class status. 
Table 13 
Social Class Status of Turkish Media Elites, Their Fathers and Their Spouses' Fathers 
Proportion % 
Social Class Status Respondents Respondents' 
Fathers 
Respondents' Spouses' 
Fathers 
Lower Class - 6.7 - 
Lower Middle Class - 16.7 13.3 
Middle Class 3.3 36.7 43.3 
Upper Middle Class 50 33.3 33.3 
Upper Class 46.7 6.7 10 
Total 100 100 100 
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Unlike other Turkish elite groups, Turkish media elites have higher social origins: a 
large majority of them have middle class backgrounds. In addition to that, almost 40 percent 
of them have an upper-middle and upper class family background. Turkish media elites have 
similar social class backgrounds. In addition, none of their spouses have a lower class 
background. This means that, no members of Turkish media elite are married to people from 
the lower class. 
6.2.5. FAMILY BACKGROUNDS AND FAMILY STRUCTURE OF TURKISH 
MEDIA ELITES: 
Turkish media elites represent a slightly more modern appearance than the other 
Turkish elites in terms of their family structure. As in other Turkish elite groups, marriage is 
still important. Nevertheless, unlike the other elite groups, almost 7 percent of them are 
divorced. 
Table 14 
Family Size of Turkish Media Elites and Their Fathers 
Pro ortion (%) 
Number Of Children Respondents Respondents' Fathers 
No Child 6.7 - 
One Child 36.7 3.3 
Two Children 40 13.3 
Three Children 13.3 30 
Four Children 3.3 30 
Five Children - 13.3 
Seven and More - 10 
Total 100 100 
Table 15 
Average Number of Children of Turkish Media Elites and Their Fathers 
Variable Mean Minimum Maximum 
Number of the Children 1.70 0 4 
Father's Children Number 4.07 1 11 
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A substantial majority of Turkish media elites have small modern families. As can be 
seen from Table 15, they have an average of 1.7 children whereas average number of children 
of their fathers was 4. Furthermore, whereas Turkish elites as a group have maximum of 4 
children, their fathers had up to 11. These numbers give a clear idea about the social distance 
which characterises Turkish media elites: whereas their fathers mostly had medium size and 
traditional families, they usually have modem nuclear families. 
There is an important association between the age at which people marry and 
educational level, social status and social class background. The findings on Turkish media 
elites support this hypothesis. As can be seen in Table 16, both Turkish media elites and their 
spouses have high average marriage ages in comparison with Turkish society in general. In 
addition, their marriage ages are substantially higher than other Turkish elite groups'. 
Table 16 
Average Marriage Ages of Turkish Media Elites and Their Spouses 
Variable Mean Minimum Maximum 
Spouse's Marriage eAe 22.97 19 30 
Marriage Ae 27.37 21 40 
Table 17 
Marriage Ages of Turkish Media Elites and Their Spouses 
Pro rtion (%) 
Marriage Age Respondents Respondents' Spouses 
Lowest through 20 - 16.7 
21-23 16.7 53.3 
24-26 26.7 20 
27-29 43.3 6.7 
30 and over 13.3 3.3 
Total 100 100 
Average marriage age of Turkish media elites is 27, whereas their spouses average 
marriage age is 23. In addition to this, the maximum marriage age of Turkish media elites is 
40 and their spouses is 30. As displayed in Table 17, a large majority of the spouses of 
Turkish media elites were between 19 and 23, when they married. On the other hand, a large 
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majority of media elites were 24 or over when they married. Most of them prefer to marry 
after the age of 25. Preferring young partners is a common attitudes amongst Turkish media 
elites, in the same way as the Turkish people in general and other Turkish elites. A large 
majority of wives of the Turkish media elites are younger than their husbands. 
6.2.6. RELIGIOUS AFFILIATIONS OF TURKISH MEDIA ELITES: 
Religion is one of the most important social institutions. It plays a key role in the life 
of both individuals and societies. It is very sensitive to social reality and it may become a 
dangerous weapon in the hands of religious exploiters or clergy, as in Christianity in the 
Middle Ages and in many contemporary Muslim countries. 
Turkey is a unique country in that it has a democratic political system, a republican 
regime and a secular state despite the fact that the large majority of its citizens are Moslems. 
As the result of a far seeing revolution, religion and politics were separated from each other 
by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk as a major part of the Kemalist Turkish Revolution in the first 
quarter of the twentieth century. This revolution is usually known as "Laicism (or 
secularism)". It can be called the first and the most important step in the direction of 
enlightenment in the Muslim world. As a result of the Kemalist revolution, Turkey has taken a 
long distance on the road to democratisation, rationalisation, westernisation and to becoming 
a European country. 
Table 18 
Religious Belief of Turkish Media Elites 
Religious Belief Life After Death Relation Between 
Religion and Politics 
% % % 
Very Strong - Exactly Believe 6.7 Totally Approve 3.3 
Stron 10 Believe 16.7 Approve 3.3 
Average 3.3 No Idea 10 No Idea 3.3 
Little 40 Unbelieve 23.3 Against 23.3 
No 46.7 Exactly 
Unbelieve 
43.3 Totally Against 66.7 
Total 100 Total 100 Total 100 
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Table 18 illustrates this argument. As in other Turkish elite groups, a large majority of 
media elites have little or no religious beliefs. Only 10 percent have strong religious ties. Also, 
a large majority of them do not believe in life after death. Table 18 also demonstrates that a 
large majority of Turkish media elites are secular minded and supporters of laicism. Almost 90 
percent of them are against a special relationship between religion and politics. 
6.2.7. POLITICAL IDENTITY OF TURKISH MEDIA ELITES: 
There is domination of left minded journalists among influential Turkish media elites. 
Table 19 clearly shows that the majority of Turkish media elites hold social democratic and 
socialist views. On the other hand, a large proportion of them did not want to talk about their 
political preferences for occupational reasons and preferred to be called "undecided". 
Table 19 
Political Identity of Turkish Media Elites and Their Fathers 
Prop rtion (%) 
Political Choice Respondents Respondents' Fathers 
Liberal Right 6.7 20 
Radical Right 6.7 16.7 
Social Democrat 30 60 
Radical Left 23.3 3.3 
Undecided 33.3 - 
Total 100 100 
Turkish media elites have been largely affected by their fathers' political choice when 
they were forming their own political identity. As can be seen from Table 19, a large majority 
of their fathers hold leftist views too. Most of them are followers of the traditions of the 
Republican Populist Party which is a pioneer of social democratic parties in Turkey and was 
established by Ataturk in the 1920s. 
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6.2.8. SOCIAL HOMOGENEITY AND CONSENSUS AMONG TURKISH 
MEDIA ELITES: 
As in other elite groups, there is a high level of social homogeneity among Turkish 
media elites in terms of basic social indicators. They possess a very high level and high quality 
of education. Almost 93 percent of them possess at least one university degree. In addition, 90 
percent of them know at least one foreign language. Occupational satisfaction is very high 
among Turkish media elites. Almost 93.3 percent of them are satisfied with their social and 
occupational positions: a large majority of them occupy upper social class positions. 
Table 20 
Social Consensus Among Turkish Media Elites 
Proport ion (%) 
Approve Against 
Abortion 76.7 13.3 
Family Plannin 96.7 3.3 
White Collar Union 96.7 3.3 
Idea on 8 Years Obligatory Education 93.3 6.7 
Polygamy 6.7 86.7 
Capital Punishment 16.7 80 
Relations Between Politicians and Sheikhs 6.7 90 
There is large degree of consensus among Turkish media elites on major social issues. 
Almost a hundred of them hold liberal ideas about the place of women in society. Almost 97 
percent of them support family planning and the establishment of white collar unions. As can 
be seen from Table 20, a substantial majority of Turkish media elites approve the introduction 
of obligatory education from 5 years to 8 years. In addition, a large majority of them approve 
of abortion if it is necessary. 
Almost 87 percent of Turkish media elites are against polygamy (both polygyny and 
polyandry). They do not support capital punishment either: 80 percent of them are against the 
death penalty. Like other Turkish elites, Turkish media elites are opposed to a special 
relationship between religion and politics. Almost 90 percent of them identified the 
relationship between politicians and religious sheikhs as very dangerous for the future of 
Turkish society and Turkish democracy. 
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CHAPTER-7 
7. LABOUR UNIONS AND SOCIAL PORTRAIT OF 
CONTEMPORARY TURKISH LABOUR UNION ELITES 
7.1. A GENERAL OVERVIEW ON THE ISSUE OF LABOUR UNIONS: 
Trade unions can be identified as the organisations of employees that are struggling to 
improve the social and economic situation of their members. They are democratic institutions 
that operate on behalf of their members. Collective bargaining, creating better working 
conditions and gaining more advanced social rights for their members can be listed among 
their major activities and the reasons for their existence. 
The first emergence of workers' organisations occurred in seventeenth century Britain. 
The first labour unions were craft unions. The development of trade unions is parallel to the 
development of capitalist society. Industrialisation stimulated the rise of the first industrial 
trade unions. Hence, industrial unions of unskilled or semiskilled workers followed the craft 
unions. 
Trade unions are the most important organisations of employees in contemporary 
capitalist societies. Unionism functions to communicate the collective and effective voice of 
workers to the employers. As Freeman and Medoff (1984: 5) put it, "unions are an important 
voice for some of our society's weakest and most vulnerable groups, as well as for their own 
members". Also, Freeman and Medoff conclude that "unions are associated with greater 
efficiency in most settings, reduce overall earnings inequality, and contribute to, rather than 
detract from, economic and political freedom". 
The unions engage in for collective bargaining and sign contracts with employer or 
government. The contract may cover many employers in an industry nation-wide, may be with 
a specific employer or may cover only one factory or group of plants. As Mark Blau points 
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out (Greenwald, D., 1994: 629), more than one union may have contracts with one employer. 
Sometimes, if the collective bargaining process does not end successfully, unions may decide 
to strike. On the other side, some employers may declare a lock out in certain circumstances. 
There are three major kinds of union which are the craft union, the industrial union and 
the general union. The craft union is a union composed of members who share a common set 
of skills whether they work in the same industries or different industries. It is the oldest type 
of union organisation. The industrial union is a union composed of all the workers in a plant 
or industry, whatever their level of skills. The general union is the largest kind of union. It is 
composed of workers who have neither a common skill nor work in a single industry 
(Stiegeler, 1976: 31). 
Trade unions are the research focus of various disciplines in the social sciences. They 
have been investigated especially by sociologists, economists and political scientists. While 
economists are concerned with the economic importance of trade unions and their effect on 
employment, productivity and prices, sociologists examine the roles and functions of trade 
unions in society. Sociologists also examine the relations of trade unions with government and 
other social groups. 
There are two contradictory views about trade unions: negative views of trade unions 
and positive views of trade unions. The negative view (the monopoly face) criticise unionism 
and argue that trade unions are dispensable, unproductive and unnecessary. From this point of 
view, unions are socially unresponsive, elitist, non-democratic and crime-riddled institutions. 
Whereas the positive view (the collective voice/ institutional response face) sees the unions as 
the unavoidable and beneficial component of capitalist societies. This view rejects the 
suppositions of the view of "the monopoly face". According to the positive view, better 
management and good skills, improved morale and higher productivity are correlated with 
unionism. 
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It seems that, there is some truth to both sides of the debate, nevertheless, research 
findings mostly support the positive side of the coin. Of course some negative aspects of some 
trade unions in some sectors might be observed, however these negative appearances cannot 
be generalised to all trade unions. Freeman and Medoff (1984: 78) clearly shows that the idea 
that unionism increases wage inequality is not reflected in reality. Unionism increases wage 
inequality between organised and unorganised blue collar workers, but it decreases the 
inequality between the white collar and blue collar labours. As Clegg argues (McCarthy, 1985: 
84), the primary task of a trade union is to protect its members from the actions of employers. 
However, there is the idea introduced by Robert Michels that the unions may not 
represent the interests of their members in all situations because of their oligarchic and 
hierarchical structures. 
Unionism represents the labour side of a special kind of power relations. The power of 
capital forms the other side of the coin. Trade unions symbolise the united power of labour. 
They play a very substantial role against the capitalist: they aim to modify the power of the 
capitalist in an industrial society. There is a positive relation between membership density and 
union power. High membership density increases the power of the union, nevertheless, this is 
not the only factor which affects the endowment of the trade union. As mentioned by Booth 
(1995: 74), union power is also affected by some other factors, such as the elasticity of labour 
demand, managerial resistance and the structure of collective bargaining. 
Trade union elites represent their members interests. Most of the trade unions provide 
some social benefits to their members, such as benefits of old age, sickness, unemployment. 
Like the other elite groups, trade union elites can be accepted as a highly powerful elite group 
which can influence the decision making process to obtain some benefits for their members. 
However, the type and extent of their influence may vary in terms of time, subject, conditions 
and societies. Whereas some trade unions have indirect effects on politics, as stated in the 
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Modern Economics Dictionary (McGraw-Hill, 1965: 522) sometimes they directly take part in 
the governmental decision making process. 
Most trade unions have intimate ties with political parties. The political colour of the 
unions differs from one country to another, such as from communist unions in Italy to socialist 
oriented unions of the UK and Scandinavia, and the conservative Catholic unions of Belgium. 
Even, The American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organisations (AFL-CIO) 
provides another kind of unionism: they call themselves neutral and support different parties at 
different times. 
As explained by Freeman and Medoff (1984: 192-3), trade unions may effect politics 
in several ways: 
" By propagandising among their members to vote in particular ways 
" By spending union funds to register votes 
" By contributing to the expenses of pro-union candidates 
" By allocating union resources, including staff time and volunteers to political campaigns. 
7.2. DEVELOPMENT OF LABOUR UNIONS & UNIONS OF TRADE 
AND INDUSTRY IN CONTEMPORARY TURKISH POLITICS: 
The Turkish economy was traditionally an agriculture one, so there were a small 
number of industrial workers in the early years of the Republic. The number of wage earners 
was too low to establish a labour union. Nevertheless, the young Republic inherited a tradition 
from the Ottoman Empire. The first workers' union was founded in 1871, that was the Pro- 
Workers Union (Amele Perver Cemiyeti) and was formed by workers in the food, textile and 
paper industries. Two other important labour organisation were established in 1908. They 
were the Workers' Mutual Association and the union of the workers of Tophane Factories. 
The first strike occurred in the early years of the twentieth century to gain higher 
wages and better working conditions. The year 1908 saw a large number of strikes, but the 
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Balkan Wars and World War 1 inhibited their development. The extraordinary conditions of 
two wars necessitated solidarity and co-operation rather than class struggles. 
Efforts to establish labour unions in the Republican period began in 1922. The leaders 
of workers from twenty different industries came together to try to set-up a western-style 
union in Istanbul. The formation of "meet and establish associations", which was granted in 
the Constitution of 1924 gave rise to workers' associations and they began to spread 
throughout the country. 
The first labour federation was formed in 1947. But, the first national federation - 
TURK-IS- was set-up in July 1952. TURK-IS (The Confederation of Turkish Labour Unions) 
is one of the three largest and most influential labour confederations in Turkey. More than 30 
Turkish labour unions are affiliated to TURK-IS. According to statistics in 1992, the total 
number of their members was about 1,723,998. TURK-IS is a member of the Free World 
Trade Unions Confederation and also the Union of Free World Asian Trade Unions Advisory 
Committee. Its administration has a board of directors with 38 members and a Board of 
Executives with 5 members. They outline their major aims as "fighting poverty and ignorance, 
protecting democracy, attaining a high level of the national democratic, secular and social 
state structure based on Atatürk's principles and the Constitution". 
The second most important Turkish labour union confederation is DISK which is The 
Turkish Revolutionary Workers' Unions Confederation. It was formed on February 13,1967. 
However, the activities of the confederation were suspended by the military junta on 
September 12,1980. They re-acquired their legal rights by a decision of the Military Court of 
Appeal on July 16,1991. DISK is a member of the European Unions Confederation and has 
about 30 affiliated member unions from various fields of industry. 
The third important Turkish labour union confederation is HAK-IS (The 
Confederation of Islamist Labour Unions-Confederation of Rights of Turkish Workers' Trade 
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Unions). It was established on October 22,1976. The confederation describes its major 
objectives as "to respect national and moral values, to abide by the rule of social order and 
rights, to create peace and harmony between workers and employers, to upgrade the living 
conditions of workers and enable them to fully utilise human rights and freedoms and to create 
a prosperous and developed Turkey based on national unity". 
One can observe the plurality of labour unions with different political colours in 
contemporary Turkey. The Turkish trade unions have close connections with all the political 
parties. Whereas the liberal democrat parties have close links with TURK-IS, social 
democratic parties have close ties with DISK. Also, Islamist parties have friendly ties with 
HAK-IS which is the confederation of Islamic trade unions. 
Turkish business associations and the trade unions have become highly influential in 
the social and political life in Turkey throughout the 1990s. They have in particular begun to 
play a substantial role in Turkish politics. Important progress has occurred in elite solidarity 
and elite co-operation among the different Turkish elite groups during the same period. The 
solidarity and co-operation of Turkish trade unions and Turkish business associations is worth 
mentioning. When the origins, ideological ties and conflicting objectives of these elite groups 
are remembered, the meaning and the significance of this solidarity can be understood more 
clearly. 
The five largest confederations (unions of the unions) of the Turkish business 
associations and trade unions set up a solidarity and co-operation front under the name of the 
"pentad civil block" (5'LI SIVIL BLOK). Whereas two of these organisations were the 
confederations of the unions of employees, the other three represented the associations of 
Turkish employers. 
TURK-IS (politically right) and DISK (the Confederation of Revolutionary Workers' 
Union-politically left) are the two most powerful confederations of Turkish trade unions. The 
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other three which are on the employer side are TISK, TESK and TOBB: TOBB is the union 
of Chambers of Commerce, Industry and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey. TISK is the 
Confederation of Employers' Associations of Turkey. TESK is the Confederation of Traders 
and Artisans Associations of Turkey. 
The civil block issued a declaration against the activities of the Refahyol coalition 
government at the end of 1996. They warned the government about the worsening social and 
economic situation in Turkey and demanded that it find urgent solutions to the major social, 
political and economic problems confronting society. The elites of these confederations 
worked in co-operation with other Turkish elite groups to stop the provocative actions and 
decisions of the "Refahyol" (Welfare-way) coalition relating to the future of society. 
Eventually, heavy pressure from Turkish elites and other social organisations brought about 
the end of the Islamist "Refahyol" coalition. 
This block and other elite groups also played a very substantial role in creating a new 
coalition government. All the major elite groups and other social groups supporting 
democracy worked in co-operation to establish a new coalition government- the solution 
government or "problem-solver". This represented a coalition of the three major Turkish 
political parties. The two partners in the new coalition government were from the political 
right: the Motherland Party (ANAP-Anavatan Partisi) and the Democratic Turkey Party 
(DTP-Demokratik Turkiye Partisi). The third partner was the left wing Democratic Leftist 
Party (DSP-Demokratik Sol Parti). 
The solidarity and co-operation between confederations of the Turkish business 
associations and confederations of the Turkish trade unions has a very significant meaning, 
because, these organisations are historically and theoretically rivals and opponents. 
Nevertheless, the increasing social and economic problems and rapidly growing Islamist 
movement pushed them in to co-operation to preserve Turkish democracy. 
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Their solidarity and co-operation has continued. They have been monitoring the 
activities of the new coalition government very closely too, to check whether they are carrying 
out their promises. As a result of this, they have found the performance of the new 
government to be insufficient. In February 1998, they announced that if the government did 
not improve its performance and make some urgent reforms to tackle the major social 
problems of the country, they would not continue to support the new government. Instead the 
civil block would support alternative political parties which promised to make the necessary 
reforms after the next elections. 
It seems that a very new but very positive and useful tradition has begun in Turkey. 
Both trade unions and business unions and associations have become much more sensitive 
toward the problems of society than ever before. It appears that this solidarity and co- 
operation will continue in the future. 
This recent case illustrates how the unions, either business or trade, have become more 
powerful and more effective in the decision making process in modern Turkey. Also, it 
demonstrates that the autonomy of elites and elite co-operation have importance for the 
maintenance of the democratic polity. The following part of this chapter will examine the 
social anatomy of Turkish labour union elites. 
7.3. SOCIAL PORTRAIT OF CONTEMPORARY TURKISH LABOUR 
UNION ELITES: 
A full picture of Turkish labour union elites in terms of important social, political and 
demographic indicators will be given in this section. As mentioned in the "Methodology" 
chapter, the leaders of unions of labour unions (in other words the presidents and chief 
executives), are identified as labour union elites. Firstly, the chapter will concentrate on the 
demographic peculiarities of Turkish labour union elites. Then, the educational background 
and family structure will be examined. Also, the social origins and other social characteristics 
of Turkish labour union elites will be investigated. 
154 
7.3.1. DEMOGRAPHIC PECULIARITIES OF TURKISH LABOUR UNION ELITES: 
As in previous chapters, age and gender are accepted as the major demographic 
indicators. Firstly, the findings on the age characteristics of Turkish labour union elites will be 
analysed. Then, their gender peculiarities will be discussed. 
a) Age: 
As can be seen in Table 1 and Figure 6, there is enormous predominance of middle 
aged people among Turkish labour union elites. Almost 87 percent of them are middle aged or 
late middle aged. Advanced aged people also have been non-represented among Turkish 
labour union leaders: there is nobody who are higher than 57 years old among them. 
Table 1 
Age Characteristics of Turkish Labour Union Elites 
Age Count % 
Lowest thr. 39 4 13 
40-44 6 20 
45-49 12 40 
50-54 6 20 
55-59 2 7 
Although the proportion of young labour union elites is higher than any other elite 
groups, young people are still under-represented in this elite group. Although the youth have 
been the largest age group in the entire Turkish population, their proportion in leadership 
positions of Turkish labour unions confederations is only 13 percent. Nevertheless, the mean 
age of Turkish labour union elites is younger than the mean age of labour union elites of most 
other countries. The mean age of Turkish labour union elites is almost 46. Whereas the 
minimum age of Turkish labour union leaders is 30, their maximum age is 57. 
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b) Gender: 
As in other Turkish elite groups, it is possible to observe large male domination among 
Turkish labour union elites. A large majority of those people who occupy the highest and the 
most important positions in Turkish labour unions confederations are male. Only one of the 
most influential positions in white collar unions confederations has been held by a woman. 
Table 2 
Gender Characteristics of Turkish Labour Union Elites 
(lender 
Count 'l: 
Female 1 3 
Male 29 97 
This male domination, among Turkish labour union elites can be observed in Table 2 
and Figure 7. As can be clearly seen, more than 97 percent of Turkish labour union elites are 
males, whereas the proportion of females is only 3 percent. 
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Figure 7 
Gender Characteristics of 
Turkish Labour Union Elites 
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7.3.2. EDUCATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS OF TURKISH LABOUR 
UNION ELITES: 
The leaders of confederations of Turkish labour unions have a highly elitist character 
according to their educational levels, in comparison with the general educational level of the 
entire Turkish population. Nevertheless, the quantity and quality of their education is lower 
than any other Turkish elite groups. This situation is related to their occupational 
backgrounds. An important proportion of labour union elites have come from blue collar and 
semi-blue collar occupations that do not necessitate a high level and quality of education. 
Table 3 shows that, approximately 67 percent of Turkish labour union elites have a 
university degree. The remaining 33.3 percent proportion of them graduated from high 
schools and middle (junior high) schools. It can he concluded from these findings that, 
although their occupation does not necessitate a high level of education, university educated 
members of labour unions have a much greater chance than those people who does not have 
university education to obtain a high position in the power structure of their organisations. A 
university degree privileges people in the competition for obtaining elite positions. 
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Table 3 
Education Levels of Turkish Labour Union Elites, Their Spouses and Their Fathers 
Educational Level (%) 
University High 
School 
J. Hig. 
School 
Primary 
School 
No Sc. 
Education 
Respondent 66.7 26.7 6.7 - - 
Respondent' Father 13.3 6.7 3.3 63.3 13.3 
Respondent's Spouses 46.7 33.3 10 10 - 
As can also be seen in Table 3, a large majority of the leaders of Turkish labour union 
confederations come from lower educated families. Only 13 percent of their fathers have a 
university degree. On the other hand, more than 63 percent of fathers have experienced the 
maximum primary school education. 
Another significant finding in this context relates to the spouses of Turkish labour 
union leaders. A large proportion of the spouses of Turkish labour union elites possess a 
university degree: approximately 47 percent of the spouses have a university degree. When the 
proportion of university educated female members of the Turkish population (nearly 7 
percent) is taken into account, this finding becomes more meaningful. Briefly, the proportion 
of university educated spouses of Turkish labour union elites is 7 times higher than ordinary 
Turkish women. 
Table 4 
School Types of Turkish Labour Union Elites and Their Children 
School Types (%) 
Mostly State 
Normal 
Mostly State 
Prestigious 
Mostly Private 
College 
Not 
Applicable 
Respondents 80 16.7 3.3 - 
Respondents' Children 23.3 36.7 30 10 
The quality of educational experienced by Turkish labour union elites is lower than 
other Turkish elites. As demonstrated from Table 4, a large majority of them have graduated 
from normal state schools. The proportion of those labour union leaders who graduated from 
prestigious private schools is very small. Only one of them was educated in a private college, 
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whereas the large majority of them were educated in normal state schools. Also, the number 
of those labour union elites who have been educated in prestigious state schools is extremely 
small in comparison with the members of other Turkish elite groups. Nevertheless, a 
substantial majority of them preferred to send their own children to prestigious schools (both 
privately owned or state owned). Almost 67 percent of the children of Turkish labour union 
elites have had been educated in both privately owned or state owned prestigious schools. 
Table 5 
Education Types of Turkish Labour Union Elites and Their Fathers' 
Education Types Respondents (%) Respondents' Fathers (%) 
Social Sciences 16.7 - 
Management 10 - 
Technical Sciences 10 3.3 
Economy 6.7 - 
Education 10 3.3 
Mathematics 6.7 - 
Philology 6.7 - 
Medical Sciences - 3.3 
Law - 3.3 
Not Applicable 33.3 86.7 
It is possible to observe a high level of plurality in terms of subjects studied among 
contemporary Turkish labour union elites. Table 5 clearly shows that, the most popular 
education type are the social sciences. Also, a large proportion of Turkish labour union elites 
have graduated from the departments of Management, Engineering and Education of major 
Turkish universities. It seems that there is a slight association between education types of 
Turkish labour union elites and education types of their fathers. Table 5 shows that the most 
popular education types in the times of Turkish labour union elites' fathers were law, 
medicine, engineering and education. Although this situation has begun to change in the 
1990s, these four education types have been traditionally popular in Turkish society. 
On the other hand, the most influential university in the recruitment process for 
Turkish labour organisation is Ankara University. As presented in Table 6, Ankara University 
graduates comprise the largest proportion among labour union elites. Gazi University, Selcuk 
University and Istanbul University graduates follow them. The popularity of Ankara 
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University can be explained by the "halo affect" of SBF-Mulkiye (Faculty of Political 
Sciences). As mentioned earlier, this faculty of Ankara University (SBF-Mulkiye) is one of the 
most prestigious traditional elite schools in Turkey. Also, the number of Selcuk University and 
Gazi University graduates in this particular elite group is worthy of mention. 
Table 6 
School Names of Turkish Labour Union Elites 
School Names Proportion (°! o) 
Ankara University 20 
Istanbul University_ 6.7 
Istanbul Technical University 3.3 
Gazi University 13.3 
METU-ODTU 3.3 
Selcuk University 10 
Others 10 
Not Applicable 33.3 
Table 7 
Foreign Language Abilities and Foreign Language Types of 
Contemporary Turkish Labour Union Leaders 
Foreign Language Ability Foreign Language Types 
Number of For. Lan. Proportion (%) Name of Foreign Lang. Proportion 
No 63.3 Not Applicable 63.3 
One 20 English 16.7 
Two 16.7 German 3.3 
Three and More - English-French 10 
English-German 3.3 
1 Arabic-European 3.3 
Total 100 Total 100 
In accordance with the relatively low level and quality of their education, the 
proportion of elite respondents who have knowledge of at least one foreign language is very 
small. Table 7 shows that, only 37 percent of labour union elites have foreign language ability. 
Although the large majority of Turkish labour union elites do not know any foreign language, 
the proportion of those who can understand and speak two foreign languages is quite large. 
As in other elite groups the most popular foreign language is English, followed by German 
and French. 
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7.3.3. OCCUPATIONAL BACKGROUNDS OF TURKISH LABOUR 
UNION ELITES: 
The largest proportion of Turkish labour union elites began to work as labour 
unionists in the early years of their occupational careers. As can be seen in Table 8, more than 
33 percent of them, after a short work experience in a blue collar job, became active members 
of labour unions. On the other hand, an important proportion of the leaders of white collar 
unions came from public administration and education. 
A large majority of Turkish labour union elites comes from blue collar families. Most 
of their fathers had unskilled or semi-skilled jobs. As demonstrated in Table 8, almost 80 
percent of their fathers are farmers, workers, tradesmen, artisans or merchants. The 
occupational status of their spouses' fathers is very similar to that of their own fathers'. Also, 
an important proportion of labour union elites prefer to marry children of soldiers, police and 
other professionals. 
Table 8 
Occupational Background of Turkish Labour Union Leaders, Their Fathers' and Their Spouses' 
Fathers' Occupations and Favourite Occupations in Their Adolescence 
Proportion (%) 
Occupations Respondent Respondents' 
Fathers 
Respondents' 
S u. ' Fathers 
Favourite Oc. of 
Respondents 
Tradesman-Artisan-Merchant - 40 30 - 
Public Administration 20 10 - 20 
Pilot - - - 3.3 
Farmer - 23.3 16.7 - 
Worker 10 16.7 16.7 
Civil Servant - 3.3 - - 
Law - - - 13.3 
Soldier-Police - - 6.7 - 
Fine Arts-Caricat. - - - 6.7 
Education-Science 10 - - 20 
Trade Unionist 33.3 - - - 
Engineer-Archit. - - - 20 
Other Professions 23.3 6.7 30 - Manager (Priv. ) - - - 10 
Journalism 3.3 - - 6.7 
Total 100 100 100 100 
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Table 8 also shows that, the most popular occupations among the leaders of Turkish 
labour unions confederations in their adolescence were public administration, engineering and 
education. Law, managing director in the private sector, journalism and fine arts were also 
popular. 
Table 9 
Occupational Backgrounds of Mothers, Spouses and Spouses' Mothers of 
Turkish Labour Union Elites 
Proportion % 
Occupations Respondents' 
Mothers 
Respondents' 
Spouses 
Respondents' Spouses' 
Mothers 
Housewife 100 56.7 90 
Teacher - 23.3 10 
Lawyer - 3.3 - 
Journalist - 3.3 - 
Social Scientist - 3.3 - 
Public Administrator - 6.7 - 
Bank Clerk - 3.3 - 
Total 100 100 100 
Parental families of Turkish labour union elites and their spouses follow a traditional 
pattern in terms of their mothers' occupations. Almost all Turkish labour union leaders' 
mothers and 90 percent of their spouses' mothers do not work in a paid job but are 
housewives. On the other hand, the situation is slightly different among the spouses. As can be 
seen in Table 9, although the majority of their spouses are housewives, the sectors of public 
administration and education are highly popular among the spouses of Turkish labour union 
elites. 
Table 10 
Occupational Satisfaction and Occupational Satisfaction Rate Among 
Turkish Labour Union Leaders 
Occupational Satisfaction Proportion 
(%) 
Occupational 
Satisfaction Rate 
Proportion 
(%) 
Prefer Present Job 93.3 Ve Satisfied 50 
Do not Prefer Present Job 6.7 Satisfied 50 
Total 100 Total 100 
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The leaders of Turkish labour unions confederations are very satisfied with their actual 
social and occupational positions. Table 10 shows that, almost a hundred percent of Turkish 
labour union elites are satisfied with their actual occupational positions. In addition to that 50 
percent of them are very satisfied. Also, 93 percent of them reported that if they had another 
chance in life they preferred their actual positions. 
Table 11 
Occupational Tenures and Future Occupational Plans of 
Turkish Labour Union Leaders 
Future Occupational Plans Proportion 
0 
Occupational Tenure Proportion 
% 
Continue to Same Job 73.3 One-Five Years 33.3 
Universit Lectureshi 3.3 Six-Ten Years 23.3 
Attendant to Politics 16.7 Eleven-Fifteen Years 10 
Higher Public Administr. 6.7 Sixteen and Over 33.3 
Total 100 Total 100 
Turkish labour union elites have very long occupational tenures. As can seen in Table 
11, more than 43 percent of them have been working as labour unionists for more than 10 
years. In addition 33,3 percent of them have had job tenure for over 15 years. Nevertheless, 
the proportion of newcomers is very large among Turkish labour union elites in comparison 
with other Turkish elite groups: over 33 percent of Turkish labour union leaders have 
occupied their actual positions for less than five years. 
As the natural result of a high degree of job satisfaction, a large majority of Turkish 
labour union elites are planning to continue to do the same job in the future. It is very 
meaningful that a large proportion of Turkish labour union elites are planning to be active in 
politics: almost 17 percent of them reported that their ultimate occupational aim was to 
become active in politics. Higher public administration and university lecturing are also among 
the future occupational plans of the leaders of Turkish labour union confederations. 
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7.3.4. FINDINGS ON SOCIAL ORIGINS AND ACTUAL SOCIAL STATUS OF 
TURKISH LABOUR UNION ELITES: 
The overwhelming majority of Turkish labour union elites have risen from the lower 
stratum of Turkish society to their actual social positions. Table 12 shows that a large 
majority of the leaders of Turkish labour unions come from the lower or middle social classes. 
Only 17 percent of their fathers possessed an upper middle class status. Although the majority 
of Turkish labour union elites come from petite bourgeoisie and small bourgeois families, none 
of them come from bourgeois families. On the other hand, the social class origins of their 
spouses are higher than the labour union elites' social backgrounds. A large majority of the 
spouses have a middle or lower-middle class background. 
Table 12 
Social Class Status of Turkish Labour Union Leaders, 
Their Fathers and Their Spouses' Fathers 
Proportion % 
Social Class Status Respondents Respondents' 
Fathers 
Respondents' 
Spouses' Fathers 
Lower Class - 16.7 3.3 
Lower Middle Class - 26.7 10 
Middle Class 23.3 40 66.7 
Upper Middle Class 60 16.7 20 
Upper Class 16.7 - - 
Total 100 100 100 
It appears that there is a low association between the social origins and actual social 
class positions of Turkish labour union elites. In comparison with their fathers' social class 
position, they have a very high social class position. The large majority of the leaders of 
Turkish labour unions confederations have upper-middle or upper class status. Only 23 
percent of them argue that they are the members of middle social class. When, their social 
class origins (their parental class positions) are taken in to account, it can be concluded that 
Turkish elites had engaged in inter-class marriages. 
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7.3.5. FAMILY BACKGROUNDS AND FAMILY STRUCTURE OF TURKISH 
LABOUR UNION ELITES: 
As discussed earlier, Turkish society ascribes a high value to family and marriage. As a 
natural result of socio-cultural factors, almost 100 percent of Turkish labour union leaders are 
married. On the other hand, a large majority of Turkish labour union elites have small families. 
Table 13 shows that almost 80 percent of Turkish labour union leaders have a maximum of 
two children. 
Table 13 
Family Size of Turkish Labour Union Leaders and Their Fathers 
Prop rtion (%) 
Number Of Children Respondents Respondents' Fathers 
One Child 30 3.3 
Two Children 50 6.7 
Three Children 16.7 16.7 
Four Children 3.3 20 
Five Children - 16.7 
Six Children - 10 
Seven and More - 26.6 
Total 100 100 
The findings, which have been presented in Table 13, provide a clear idea of the rapid 
social development in Turkey. Almost 90 percent of Turkish labour union elites' fathers have 
more than two children, and some of them have large families. Whereas the fathers of Turkish 
labour union leaders had an average number of 4.87 children, the average number of children 
of Turkish labour union elites is only 1.93. Also, whereas the fathers had up to 9 children, the 
sons have only a maximum of 4. 
The most common age for marriage among the leaders of Turkish labour union 
confederations is 24 and over. As can be seen in Table 14, only 30 percent of the leaders 
married when they were 23 years old or younger. As in wider Turkish society, Turkish labour 
union elites prefer to marry younger women. Almost 67 percent of their spouses married at 
the age of 23 or younger. 
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Table 14 
Marriage Ages of Turkish Labour Union Leaders and Their Spouses 
Pro portion (%) 
Marriage Age Respondents Respondents' Spouses 
Lowest through 20 6.7 26.7 
21-23 23.3 40 
24-26 23.3 13.3 
27-29 23.3 10 
30 and over 23.3 10 
Tota1 100 100 
Table 15 
Average Marriage Ages of Turkish Labour Union Leaders and Their Spouses 
Variable Mean Minimum Maximum 
Spouse's Marriage Ae 23.07 16 34 
Marriage Ae 26.53 20 40 
The average age of marriage of Turkish labour union elites is higher than that of their 
spouses. Table 15 shows that whereas their average age of marriage was 27, their spouses' 
average age of marriage was 23. Also, whereas the minimum age of marriage of Turkish 
labour union elites was 20, the minimum marriage age of their spouses was 16. The situation 
for the maximum age of marriage is more or less the same. These circumstances can be 
explained by the of social and cultural value system. There is the common unwritten law in 
Turkish society that women have to be younger than their husbands when they get married. 
7.3.6. RELIGIOUS AFFILIATIONS OF TURKISH LABOUR UNION ELITES: 
Turkish labour union elites do not have more strong religious beliefs. As has been 
presented in Table 16, more than 83 percent of the leaders of Turkish labour union 
confederations have no or little religious ties. Only 3 percent of them reported that, they 
possessed strong religious ties whereas 13 percent held average religious beliefs. This 
situation can be explained by their professional ideologies. It is well known that, the roots of 
labour unions come from leftist ideologies and they have traditionally had strong relations with 
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leftist political parties. As a result, almost 60 percent of Turkish labour union elites held very 
weak religious belief and did not believe in life after death, 
Table 16 
Religious Belief of Turkish Labour Union Leaders 
Religious Belief Life After Death Relation Between 
Religion and Politics 
% % % 
No 46.7 Totally Believe 16.7 Totally Approve - 
Little 36.7 Believe 20 A rove 10 
Averse 13.3 No Idea 3.3 No Idea 3.3 
Strong 3.3 Unbelieve 13.3 Against 36.7 
Very Stron - Totally Unbelieve 46.7 TotallAgainst 50 
Total 100 Total 100 Total 100 
On the other hand, Turkish labour union leaders are against the use of religion to gain 
political and financial benefits. As can be seen in Table 16, a large majority of them do not 
accept the religious organisations and sectarian orders as legitimate organisations in civil 
society, and they do not approve of the relationship between politics and the sheikhs. 
7.3.7. POLITICAL IDENTITY OF TURKISH LABOUR UNION ELITES: 
Historically, the idea of establishing labour unions came from leftist political 
ideologies. Therefore, labour unions have always had a very close relationship with left wing 
political parties. The findings presented in Table 17, clearly support this argument. According 
to the findings, a large majority of the leaders of Turkish labour union confederations identify 
with leftist politics. The proportion of right wing oriented labour union elites is only 20 
percent. 
On the other hand, the largest proportion of Turkish labour union elites' fathers have 
social democratic views. The number of supporters of liberal rightist parties among their 
fathers is also high. As can be seen from Table 17, the proportion of those fathers who are the 
supporters of radical rightist or Islamist parties is only 10 percent. In addition, 20 percent of 
the elite did not want to answer the question of political identity of their fathers. 
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Table 17 
Political Identity of Turkish Labour Union Leaders and Their Fathers 
Prop rtion (%) 
Political Choice Respondents Respondents' Fathers 
Liberal Right 13.3 30 
Radical Right 6.7 10 
Social Democrat 26.7 40 
Radical Left 36.7 - 
Unanswered 10 20 
Undecided 6.7 - 
Total 100 100 
7.3.8. SOCIAL HOMOGENEITY AND INTEGRATION AMONG 
TURKISH LABOUR UNION ELITES: 
Turkish labour union elites present a high degree of social homogeneity in terms of 
major social indicators. A large majority of them have upper-middle class or upper class social 
positions. Almost all of them are very happy with their social and occupational positions. 
Although their educational levels are lower than other Turkish elites, a large majority of them 
have at least one university degree. Turkish labour union elites present a different appearance 
than the other Turkish elites groups in terms of foreign language ability. Whereas a substantial 
majority of other Turkish elites speak at least one foreign language, a large proportion of the 
leaders of Turkish labour unions confederations do not. 
Table 18 
Social Consensus Among Turkish Labour Union Leaders 
Proportion (%) 
Approve Against 
Abortion 83.3 16.7 
Family Planning 86.7 13.3 
White Collar Union 93.3 6.7 
Idea on 8 Years Obligatory Education 93.3 6.7 
Polygamy 10 76.7 
Capital Punishment 13.3 83.3 
Relations Between Politicians and Sheikhs 10 86.7 
There is also a large degree of social consensus among Turkish labour union elites on 
major social issues. Table 18 shows that more than 90 percent of them support family 
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planning and abortion. Almost 93 percent of them approve the "8 years obligatory education" 
and "establishing white collar unions with the right to collective bargaining and strike". 
The findings show that a large majority of Turkish labour union elites are liberal and 
rational minded people. Almost 87 percent of them have liberal views about the place of 
women in society. They also possess a large degree of consensus about polygamy and capital 
punishment. Lastly, a large majority of Turkish labour union elites do not approve the special 
relationship between religion and politics. 
From the findings on Turkish labour union elites, it can be concluded that there is a 
high level of social consensus and social homogeneity among the contemporary labour union 
leaders. As a result of this homogeneity and consensus, it can be argued that, there is a high 
level of social integration among Turkish labour union elites. 
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CHAPTER-8 
8. THE TURKISH BUSINESS ELITES 
8.1. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE TURKISH BOURGEOISIE AND 
EMERGENCE OF THE TURKISH BUSINESS ELITES: 
Turkish business or economic elites can be defined as those people who occupy the 
major decision making positions and who hold the economic power in the corporate 
institutions of Turkish society. In other words, Turkish economic elites are those people who 
have economic power and may influence/control the decisions in the economic system. 
There was no national bourgeoisie or business elite in Turkey in the early years of the 
Republic. Turkish industry and the wider Turkish economy were controlled by the non- 
Muslim minority groups at the beginning of the 20th century. According to Ayse Bugra 
(1995: 67-68), the number of factories which employed more than 10 workers was 264 in 
Turkey around 1910. Only 19.6 % of their owners were Muslim Ottoman citizens. The vast 
majority of them, which is 80.4 %, were controlled by non-Muslim minorities. 
The efforts to create a national business elite (entrepreneur class) was started in the 
time of the Committee of Progress and Union (Young Turks) between 1908-1918. In addition 
to those people who had close relations with the Union and Progress Party, some members of 
the party entered in to business life too. This meant that, the party not only supported the 
Turkish entrepreneurs but also some of its members became business elites. These endeavours 
were continued during the Republican period. As a result of these special efforts, the Turkish 
private sector became the most powerful sector in the Turkish economy in a relatively short 
time. The size of the power of the Turkish private sector can be clearly seen in Table 1. 
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Table 1 
The Place of the Turkish Private Sector in Manufacturing Industry in the Period 1950-1986 
Number of the 
Establishments 
Annual Wages Fixed Capital 
Investments 
Value Added 
Years State Private State Private State Private State Private 
1950 3.93 96.07 59.37 40.63 53.98 46.02 58.33 41.67 
1951 4.04 95.96 58.68 41.32 55.90 44.10 59.24 40.76 
1952 3.80 96.20 55.74 44.26 46.89 53.11 61.34 38.66 
1953 4.25 95.75 53.98 46.02 44.79 55.21 55.77 44.23 
1954 3.79 96.21 51.38 48.62 61.55 38.45 50.55 49.45 
1955 3.66 96.34 50.42 49.58 59.51 40.49 50.14 49.86 
1956 3.66 96.34 50.77 49.23 61.13 38.87 47.03 52.97 
1957 3.95 96.05 47.39 52.61 54.36 45.64 44.47 55.53 
1958 3.81 96.19 44.28 55.72 57.09 42.91 45.09 54.91 
1959 3.95 96.05 47.30 52.70 36.55 63.45 54.34 45.66 
1960 3.98 96.02 49.08 50.92 48.36 51.64 59.11 40.89 
1961 3.29 96.71 45.78 54.22 47.80 52.20 51.41 48.59 
1962 5.71 94.29 48.24 51.76 78.21 21.79 52.64 47.36 
1963 7.87 92.13 51.09 48.91 51.74 48.26 51.69 47.31 
1964 8.03 91.97 49.09 50.91 59.24 40.76 51.73 48.27 
1965 9.26 90.74 50.46 49.54 44.60 55.40 57.13 42.87 
1966 9.35 90.65 50.76 49.24 36.56 63.44 54.67 45.33 
1967 8.68 91.32 49.19 50.81 36.84 63.16 62.89 37.11 
1968 8.65 91.35 48.32 51.68 35.05 64.95 61.99 38.01 
1969 - - - - - - - - 
1970 - - - - - - - - 
1971 6.73 93.27 41.40 58.60 37.79 62.21 56.01 43.99 
1972 6.72 93.28 40.46 59.54 38.47 61.53 51.81 48.19 
1973 6.37 93.63 38.36 61.64 36.39 63.61 46.52 53.48 
1974 6.60 93.40 38.85 61.15 38.84 65.16 50.24 49.76 
1975 6.41 93.59 41.74 58.26 32.96 67.04 48.05 51.95 
1976 5.65 94.35 44.05 55.95 31.69 68.31 35.54 64.46 
1977 5.81 94.19 43.15 56.85 30.69 69.31 39.89 60.11 
1978 5.34 94.66 42.39 57.61 38.10 61.90 33.40 66.60 
1979 5.31 94.69 44.35 55.65 18.38 81.92 33.14 66.86 
1980 4.68 95.32 46.49 53.51 - - 40.41 59.59 
1981 4.63 95.37 44.47 55.53 24.57 75.43 49.26 50.74 
1982 4.48 95.52 40.46 59.54 29.01 70.99 46.84 53.16 
1983 8.93 91.07 40.77 59.23 29.09 70.91 43.52 56.48 
1984 8.37 91.63 37.53 62.47 - - 38.47 61.53 
1985 8.05 91.95 34.73 65.27 - - 39.44 60.56 
1986 7.86 92.14 33.01 66.99 32.24 67.76 40.72 59.28 
Source: Adopted and Translated from Bugra, 1995,91. 
Agriculture and trade were the major economic sectors in the early years of the 
Republic. The necessary conditions for developing industry in those years were not present: 
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there was not enough capital, there was not the necessary technology, there was not enough 
accumulation of knowledge and there was not the necessary infrastructure. Also, the 
psychology of the enterprise had not developed yet. There were only a couple of factories, but 
all of them were under the control of foreigners or minority groups. 
Ataturk and his associates made enormous efforts to create the necessary conditions to 
develop Turkish industry. The state provided the necessary financial resources to the KITs 
(Kamu Iktisadi Tesekkulleri-The State Enterprises) to achieve strategic but unprofitable 
investments (such as sub-structure investments) which were essential for industrialisation. This 
was the most characteristic peculiarity of Etatism (the policy of state control) in the Turkish 
economy. 
On the other hand, co-operative investments with the state or public sector owned 
companies gained many privileges and extra benefits for the private companies. Therefore, 
most of the large holding companies have formed joint ventures and corporations with state 
enterprises. Also, the state assigned the most profitable and less risky sectors to the large 
private sector companies. 
The state has supported the development of Turkish industry in several different ways: 
in addition to the above mentioned supports, tax allowances and exemptions, cheaper state 
loans, large infrastructure investments were some of them. It can be said that the Turkish 
bourgeoisie was created and developed by the state. As a result of these very generous state 
supports, Turkish economic elites gained enormous power in the Turkish power structure. 
Furthermore, this economic power was concentrated in the hands of a small number of people 
in a very short time. 
As in other societies, the concentration of economic power is a reality in contemporary 
Turkey. The concentration of economic power can be seen in almost every sector in Turkey. 
The special support of the state has played a substantially important role in the growth of 
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capital in the Turkish private sector. This support also assisted the Turkish bourgeoisie to 
establish very powerful monopolies in several sectors. As stressed by Mustafa Sonmez 
(1992: 14), the Turkish economy was overwhelmingly controlled and directed by around 50 
large business corporations. According to his findings, the size of the total income of the two 
largest business giants in Turkey, which are Sabanci and Koc holdings, is higher than half of 
the national budget. These two business groups ultimately control the major economic sectors 
and markets. Although the situation has begun to change slightly, it is still possible to observe 
the major problems associated with the concentration of economic power, such as imperfect 
competition, monopoly and the other socio-economic problems related to these facts. 
The managerial revolution has not developed in Turkey. Owner directors, rather than 
the managers, of the large holding companies hold the real power in the economic power 
structure. Although managerial elites have an important place in the business life of Turkey 
and their power has been rapidly increasing, ownership and control are still linked: owners of 
the corporations have the ultimate control of economic power and they finalise the decisions. 
It can be said that, the contemporary Turkish economy is controlled by a very small 
number of people known as Turkish business elites who are owners and directors of the 
largest holding companies. Their number is not more than one hundred. The Sabanci and Koc 
business empires are the largest and the most powerful family holding companies in Turkey. 
The presidents (the top directors) of Koc and Sabanci groups are both second generation sons 
of the Koc and Sabanci families. The most effective and well known name is Rahmi Koc in the 
Koc group. He is the son of Vehbi Koc who was the founder of the Koc Empire and died in 
1995. The most popular and the most colourful figure in the Sabanci Holding group is Sakip 
Sabanci. He is the son of Haci Omer Sabanci who was the creator of the Sabanci Empire. 
In brief, more than 400 hundred of the "500 largest companies of Turkey" are 
privately owned firms. More than half of the private companies are controlled by the "25 
largest industrial groups" in Turkey. Also, the top 5 largest groups take more than half of the 
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total company profits. These numbers provide a clear idea about the power of the economic 
elites and the degree of monopolisation in the Turkish economy. The ranking of the giants 
may change from year to year, but the names of the first 25 holding companies appear again 
and again. 
Foreign investment also holds an important place in Turkish industry. The large 
majority of Turkish holding companies (include the Is Bankasi, Koc and Sabanci Holding) 
have an important share of joint investments with multi-national companies. Turkish firms 
were working as the branches or representatives of foreign companies until the 1950s. 
In 1950s, a new era began in Turkish business life. Although some of the largest 
Turkish holding companies started their business activities in the 1920s and 1930s (like Is 
Bankasi, Koc, Sabanci, Cukurova holding companies), most of the largest holding companies 
entered into Turkish business life after the Second World War, (in the late 1940s and 1950s). 
Cheaper state loans, high customs on foreign goods, large tax reductions and other substantial 
supports from the state made attractive the domestic production of goods to Turkish 
companies and their foreign partners. 
Also, the 1950s were highly important years for those companies which had a 
"construction-trade-industry" type of capital accumulation. Most of the construction 
companies, which would later become some of the largest Turkish holding companies, began 
their business life with state contracts. Construction companies gained large amounts of 
money from these contracts. Enka, Tekfen, Alarko and Dogus holdings can be counted among 
these kind of companies (Bugra, 1995: 180). 
The capital which was accumulated from trade assisted in the development of industry 
in Turkey. This transformation accelerated during the 1960s. A large majority of the 
representatives or agents of the international companies had become local business firms. A 
large number of Turkish companies began to produce commodities in co-operation and 
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partnership with their foreign partners. Investments of foreign capital also increased in the 
same period. 
The partners of the Turkish companies were/are mostly multi-national American, 
European (German, British, French, Swiss, Italian, Austrian, Swedish, Dutch, Belgian and 
Danish) and Japanese companies. The first American capital entered Turkish industry in the 
late 1940s. Vehbi Koc established an electric bulb factory in co-operation with the American 
General Electric Company at the end of the Second World War (Koc Holding have 
partnerships with more than 15 American companies). The second major investment in co- 
operation with foreign companies was carried out by Is Bankasi and the British-Dutch trust 
company Unilever. In addition to capital transfer, the transfers of licences and technology 
were other important relationships with foreign investors. These transfers consolidated the 
integration of the Turkish business companies with multi-national firms. 
The Turkish Industrial Development Bank (TSKB-Turkiye Sinai Kalkinma Bankasi) 
played a special role in the development of Turkish industry and also in the growth of foreign 
investment in the Turkish economy. TSKB was founded in the late 1940s. As the researcher 
has already pointed out, the state played the leading role in the accumulation of capital in the 
Turkish private sector. It gave every possible special help to Turkish enterprises to develop 
the private sector and a Turkish bourgeoisie. The Turkish bourgeoisie began to accumulate 
their capital in the 1920s and 1930s. The development of the Turkish bourgeoisie accelerated 
in the 1970s and 1980s. 
8.2. SOCIAL BACKGROUND OF TURKISH BUSINESS ELITES: 
The state sector played a substantial role in the development of the private sector. As 
stated by Bugra (1995: 96), a majority of Turkish business elites come from the state sector. 
Former traders also occupy an important place among the Turkish business elites. It is still 
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difficult to distinguish the industrialist and merchant from one another in Turkish business life. 
Both of them still carry out activities in both areas. 
Although some Turkish business elites were originally large scale landowners, the 
proportion of land owners and farmers among the Turkish business elite is very small (3.14 
per cent). Only owners of one large family holding company, Cukurova Holding, falls into this 
category. Bugra (1995: 42) argues that in contrast to some other countries (for example Latin 
America), large scale landowners have not played an important role in the development of the 
Turkish bourgeoisie. 
Table 2 
Occupational Backgrounds of the Turkish Business Elites (in Terms of 
the Establishment Years of the Firms) (%). 
Merchant Indust- 
rialist 
Farmer Free- 
enterprise 
Civil 
Servant 
Shop 
Owner 
Crafts 
-man 
Profess- 
tonal 
Before 1900 19.17 - - - 10.83 - - 70 
1901-1910 - - - - - - - - 
1911-1920 3.85 - - - 3.85 - - 92.30 
1921-1930 27.03 - - 2.70 10.81 27.03 - 32.43 
1931-1940 3.23 1.61 - - 74.19 - 1.61 19.36 
1941-1950 35.71 - - 4.55 31.17 6.49 - 22.08 
1951-1960 18.. 92 4.30 5.16 6.45 18.93 - 1.51 44.73 
1961-1969 22.97 0.35 4.24 13.08 26.15 4.59 - 28.62 
Total 20.83 1.83 3.14 6.54 24.41 2.88 0.7 39.67 
Source: Reorganised and Translated from Bugra, 1995,91. 
As discussed by Alpender (1966), Bates (1973) and Bugra (1995), a large majority of 
Turkish elites have some degree of relationship to trade: whereas some of them have a solely 
trading background, most of them have businesses straddling both trading and industrial 
sectors. Farmers and craftsmen constitute only a small minority group among the Turkish 
business elite. 
As discovered by researchers (like Alpender, Bates and Bugra), Turkish business elites 
are very well educated. A large majority of them have had a university education. In addition, 
an important proportion of them possess postgraduate degrees. According to Bugra (1995: 
177 
100), 194 out of 217 businessmen (who are members of TUSIAD-The Association of Turkish 
Industrialists and Businessmen) have both first degrees and master degrees. Also, a large 
majority of them possess at least one foreign language ability. Not only the younger members 
of the Turkish business elite have received a high level of education, but also a large majority 
of the older generation. 
Business elites rooted in the military also had an important place in the economic life 
of Turkey in the early years of the 20th century. According to Bugra (1995: 107-116), 
Sureyya Ilmen and Selahattin Adil Pasa (both came from the Ottoman army and both were 
former pashas) are among the well known members of this category: both were very well 
educated in military schools. 
Vehbi Koc and Haci Omer Sabanci have a very special place among the business elite: 
both have no formal education and yet are creators of the two largest business empires in 
Turkey. Vehbi Koc entered to business at the age of 15 before completing his high school 
education. Haci Omer Sabanci received almost no formal school education, but he was 
literate. 
8.3. BUSINESS-POLITICAL RELATIONS IN TURKEY: 
With the special support of the state, Turkish economic elites gained enormous power. 
Especially during the 1950s and 1960s, they became highly effective not only in the economic 
life but also in socio-political life. As stated by Sonmez (1992: 112), in the 1980s and 1990s 
they started to have the final say in the making and unmaking of Turkish governments. All the 
political parties and governments compete to curry favour with the business elites. 
In fact, developing good relations and organic ties with the political elite is one of the 
most advantageous ways to maximise their financial relations with the state and state sector. 
The method of elite transfers from/to the state sectors is the easiest and most profitable and 
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effective strategy for the business giants. The direction of these elite transfers is two sided: 
sometimes business firms send their managers or somebody from the family into the state 
apparatus or into politics. At other times they transfer popular bureaucratic and political elites 
or members of the elite who occupy strategic positions in the state bureaucracy and politics 
to their own companies. These transfers lead to extra profits and privileges for the holding 
companies. The goal is the same for both procedures: to enhance good relations with the state 
and the state bureaucracy, and to control the political decision making/taking process. 
The two Turkish business giants Sabanci and Koc holdings used these transfer 
methods very efficiently and gained a lot of privileges when they were creating their empires. 
There has been a hidden competition and struggle between the Koc Family and Sabanci 
Family. Whereas the Koc family have good relations with the political elites, the Sabanci 
Family have established good relations with the bureaucratic elites, especially the directors of 
banks and military commanders. Table 3 gives an idea of the dimensions of business-political 
relations in Turkey. 
Business elites uses the media (like other elite groups) to influence the state and 
population, and to create a positive public image. Also, to support particular social-cultural 
activities and voluntary works are highly effective ways to do this. These types of activities 
have become a part of the business activities of some economic elites. For example, Sakip 
Sabanci and Nejat Eczacibasi (who are among the most powerful Turkish economic elites) 
engage in these kinds of activities. 
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Table 3 
Business-Political-Army Relations in Turkey 
Business-State Relations 
Name The Position in the State The Company 
Turgut Ozal Former Prime Minister and 
the President of the State 
Sabanci Holding 
Naim Talu Former Prime Minister Akbank, Akcimento, 
Olmuksa, YKB 
Fahir Ilkel Former Minister for Power Koc Holding 
Sahap Kocatopcu Former Minister for Industry Koc Holding, Metas, Sise- 
Cam 
Memduh Yasa Member of the Parliament (DYP) Akbank, AEH, Enka, Veb 
Holding 
Nimet Ozdes Former Secretary of State Ercan Holding 
Faruk Sukan Former State Secretary, Minister for 
Health, Minister for Internal Affairs 
Ercan Holding 
Agah Oktay Guner Former Minister for Trade, Minister of 
Culture 
Bagfas 
Kemal Kurdas Former Minister of Finance AEH, STFA, Celik Halat 
Vefa Poyraz Former Governor Ercan Holding 
Yildirim Akturk Former Councillor, Member of Parliament Enka, Uluslararasi Bankasi 
Sebati Ataman Former Minister for Industry Koc Yatirim 
Mustafa Aysan Former Minister of Communication and 
Transport 
Koc Yatirim, Yapi Kredi 
Erhan Isil Former Minister for Power Profilo Holding 
Serbulent Bingol Former Minister of Public Works, Minister 
for Power 
Rabak, Akin Grubu, 
Tekstilbank 
Ihsan Soak Former Minister for Power Akbank, Rabak 
Zeki Baloglu Former Minister for Youth and Sport Den*dokum 
Ferruh Bozbeyli Former Deputy Prime Minister Is Bankasi 
Ismail Rustu Aksal Former Minister of Finance Is Bankasi 
Ferit Melen Former Minister of Finance, Former Prime 
Minister 
Is Bankasi 
Munir Guney Former Minister of Agriculture Is Bankasi 
Mesut Erez Former Minister of Finance Esbank 
Hayrettin Erkmen Former Minister of Foreign Affairs Titibank 
Kemal Satir Foreign Deputy Prime Minister Yapi Kredi 
Zeyyat Ba karg Former Minister of Justice Basak Sigorta 
Ilhan Evliyaoglu Former Minister of Agriculture Ist. Um. Sig., Garanti 
Bankasi 
Doan Oz ocmen Former Commander Yapi Kredi 
Mustak Kacmaz Retired General Turk Ticaret Bank 
Namik Kemal 
Senturk 
Former Governor, Member of Parliament Akbank 
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Business-State Relations 
Name The Position in the State The Company 
Yusuf Bozkurt Ozal Former Councillor, Member of 
Parliament 
Ercan Holding 
Korkut Ozal Former Minister for Internal Affairs Akabe, Akoz, Oztrans 
Sadi Pehlivanoglu Member of Parliament Turk Ticaret Bankasi 
Selahattin Cetinel Former Minister for Internal Affairs Garanti Bankasi 
Sefa Giray Former Minister of Public Works Akkardan 
Vehbi Dincerler Former Secretary of State, Minister of 
Education 
Pilsa 
Kazim Oskay Former Secretary of State Soytas Holding 
Zeki Yavuzturk Former Minister of Defence Keban Holding 
Vural Arikan Former Minister of Finance, Member of 
Parliament 
Enka Holding 
Adnan Baser 
Kafaoglu 
Former Minister of Finance, Member of 
Parliament 
Dogus Holding 
Namik Kemal Ersun Former Commander of Land Forces Kutlutas Holding 
Danis Koper Former Minister of Public Works STFA 
Cavit Oral Former Minister of Agriculture Pamukbank 
Source: Translated and Reorganised from Mustafa Sonmez, 1992, pp. 141-143. 
There was a strong organic relationship between Turkish business elites and political/ 
bureaucratic elites in the 1940s. Several state bureaucrats and political elites passed from the 
state sector or politics to the private sector. Corruption and black-marketering became a daily 
routine of business life during the Second World War. This involved members of the 
bureaucratic and political elites as well. The state tried to introduce radical measures to 
prevent this corruption. Nevertheless, the various measures were in effective in stopping it. 
Although it did not enter the Second World War, Turkey kept itself in a state of readiness 
because of serious pressures from Germany and Russia. These extra-ordinary conditions were 
highly expensive for the Turkish economy and Turkish people. Also, this war atmosphere 
made a small group of people very rich. 
The large holding companies not only control government but political parties as well. 
Although some of them have traditionally good relations with specific political parties, such as 
the Koc Family with the social democratic parties, and the Sabanci Family with conservative 
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and liberal rightist parties. They have always supported more than one political party as an 
insurance policy to achieve their long term economic plans. They always paid great attention 
to their relations with the major political parties. They know very well that "clever bourgeoisie 
never plays to one horse". 
Briefly, as highlighted by Bugra (1995: 39), the state has no serious control over the 
business elites. It can be said that the influence of the business elites over the state apparatus is 
greater and more effective than the influence of the state over the business elites. 
8.4. THE MAJOR ORGANISATIONS OF BUSINESS ELITES: 
The organisations of the Turkish business elites can be examined under two categories: 
1. Macro Scale Business Organisations: The major roles and functions of these 
organisations are to defend the general rights of the business world against the government 
and labour organisations, to create a common view of the business world on major issues, to 
define the key policies and to influence the political decision making process. TUSIAD (Turk 
Sanayici ve Isadamlari Dernegi-The Association of Turkish Industrialists and Businessmen), 
TOBB (Turkiye Odalar ve Borsalar Birligi-The Union of Chambers of Commerce, Industry 
and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey), TISK (Turkiye Isveren Sendikalari Konfederasyonu- 
The Confederation of Employers' Associations of Turkey) are the most powerful 
organisations in this category. 
2. Micro Scale Associations: The major organisations in terms of the industrial and business 
sector can be counted among these types of association. The major aim of these associations 
is to define the major policies which are related to their sectors, fixing the prices of sectorial 
products, finding solutions to the common problems of their sectors and creating co-operation 
and co-ordination among their members. Most of these associations have been working like a 
cartel. The major organisations of this category are for example ECID (Elektronik Cihazlari 
Imalatcilari Dernegi-The Association of Electronic Goods Producers), Ozel Sektor Demir- 
182 
Celik Ureticileri Dernegi (The Association of the Private Sector Iron-Still Producers), 
Otomobil Sanayicileri Dernegi (Automobile Industrialists' Association), Gubre Ureticileri 
Dernegi (The Association of Compost Producers), Bitkisel Yag Ureticileri Dernegi (The 
Union of Vegetal Oil Industrialists), The Employers' Association of Drug Industry, Union of 
Contractors (Muteahhitler Birligi), UND (Uluslararasi Nakliyeciler Dernegi-International 
Transporters Union. 
TUSIAD which was founded in the early 1970s is the most powerful organisation of 
Turkish business elites. The owners of the major Turkish holding companies, in other words 
the most powerful business elites of Turkey such as Vehbi Koc, Sakip Sabanci, Selcuk Yasar, 
Rasit Ozsaruhan, Ahmet Sapmaz, Feyyaz Berker, Melih Ozakat, Ibrahim Bodur, Hikmet 
Erenyol, Osman Boyner, Muzaffer Gazioglu, set up a meeting and signed a "founders 
protocol' about establishing the Association of Turkish Industrialists and Businessmen 
(TUSIAD). They announced the establishment of the TUSIAD on 2 August 1971. It 
developed rapidly and has become the most powerful club of the most powerful Turkish 
business elites. It has enormous power and influence in Turkish social, economic and political 
life. For example, their pressure brought about the end of the Ecevit government in 1979. In 
addition, they put heavy pressure on the 1980 military junta and played an important role in 
establishing the Turgut Ozal government in co-operation with the USA. It should be noted 
that, Turgut Ozal was also a member of the TUSIAD. 
The total number of members of this "wealthiest club" is not more than a couple of 
hundred. The management of TUSIAD have been controlled by the largest business groups, 
such as Koc, Sabanci, Dinckok, Tekfen, Eczacibasi, Yasar, Ercan holdings. It strengthened its 
power in the periods of the Turgut Ozal governments in the 1980s. 
The second most important and powerful business organisation is the TOBB (The 
Union of Chambers of Commerce, Industry and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey). It was the 
most powerful one in its category until the 1970s (until the establishment of the TUSIAD). 
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TOBB is the leading organisation of all large, medium and small scale business and trade 
organisations. All small, medium and large scale business and trade companies are among the 
members of the member organisations of the TOBB, whereas TUSIAD represents the 
wealthiest and largest holding companies. 
The TISK (Turkiye Isveren Sendikalari Konfederasyonu- The Confederation of 
Turkish Employers' Association) is another highly important business organisation in Turkey. 
It was established on 20 December 1962 and developed in the 1970s. The management of 
TISK was usually under the control of the Koc Holding. 
8.5. THE LARGEST BUSINESS HOLDING COMPANIES AND THE MOST 
POWERFUL BUSINESS ELITES IN TURKEY: 
Large family holding companies have significant importance in both the economic and 
socio-political power structure of contemporary Turkey. The major socio-economic strategies 
and policies have been shaped by these small number of family groups. The number of these 
family and capital groups is around 50. Koc and Sabanci families and Turkiye Is Bankasi are 
the three most powerful business groups in the Turkish economy. The major economic 
sectors, such as industry, finance and banking, trade and foreign trade, tourism have been 
controlled by the large business groups in Turkey for many years. It is time to give some brief 
information about these business giants of Turkey: 
- Turkiye Is Bankasi: Turkiye Is Bankasi is one of the most important and powerful business 
groups in Turkey. It was founded by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk and his friends in the early years 
of the Republic. All of the 17 founder members were among the most powerful politicians and 
merchants in 1924. It developed rapidly and became the most powerful business, finance and 
trading group in Turkey. It provides a very important and typical example of the relations 
between business and politics in Turkey. It is a joint stock company and this peculiarity sets it 
apart from the other Turkish holding companies. 
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The first ideas about the establishment of the Is Bankasi were put forward by 
Usakizade Muammer Bey who was Ataturk's father-in-law and Latife Hanim's father. Then, 
the idea was developed by Muammer Bey, Celal Bayar and Ataturk. As mentioned earlier, 
Ataturk was a victorious commander, a revolutionist, a statesman and founder of the modern 
Turkish Republic. 
Celal Bayar was among the most important names amongst Turkish political and 
economic elites. He was among the founders of the Turkish Republic. He played an important 
role in the Turkish National Independence Movement. He was also among the founders of the 
Democratic Party and played an important role in the transformation to a multi-party system 
in the late 1940s. Then he became the third president of the Republic between 1950-1960. 
In addition to these names, many other famous members of the political elite were also 
members of the Is Bankasi: Ismet Inonu who was Ataturk's close friend and also the most 
important commander after Ataturk in the Turkish Movement of National Independence. He 
was also the first prime minister and second president of the Turkish Republic. Yunus Nadi 
who was a politician, and also owner and founder of the Cumhuriyet newspaper which was 
one of the most influential daily newspapers in Turkey. It is perhaps significant that, Ataturk's 
shares in Is Bankasi were inherited by the CHP-RPP (Republican Populist Party) after his 
death. According to his will, a donation was given from the income of his shares to the 
Turkish Linguistic Society (Turk DU Kurumu) and Turkish History Society (Turk Tarih 
Kurumu). 
Is Bankasi is among the partners of more than one hundred business firms. It has 
business activities in nearly every sector of the economy (from finance to automotive and 
textile industries). It is the most powerful group in the glass industry. More than fifty thousand 
people work in the companies of the Is Bankasi. 
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- The Koc Business Empire: Koc Holding is the most powerful family holding company in 
Turkey and has huge investments in several sectors. They have several partnerships and joint 
investments in various areas of activity with several international companies, such as 
American, Italian, German. It was founded by Vehbi Koc (who was born in 1901) in 1920s. 
Vehbi Koc was one of the most famous and powerful members of the Turkish business elite. 
He started his business life with a grocer's shop and continued in ironmongery. His 
grandfather and father were well known merchants in Ankara in those years. 
Vehbi Koc and his father Haci Mustafa Efendi opened a grocery shop in Samanpazari 
in Ankara in 1917. They continued to work in the trade sector in the years of the Turkish 
National Independence movement. The Koc family developed their business in the late 1920s 
and 1930s. They also worked in the construction sector and entered industry in the late 1940s. 
The first enterprise of the Koc Holding was founded by Vehbi Koc in Ankara in 1946. The 
number of their companies reached 25 in the early 1960s. By 1974 there were 56. The Koc 
Family established the Koc holding in 1963, which was the first holding company in Turkey. 
By the 1990s, they had over one hundred companies which were working in nearly every 
sector of the Turkish economy. 
Koc Holding ascribed great importance to relations with the state and state sector. It 
differs from the other holding companies, in that it has a special department in their company 
structure dealing with government relations. They have large joint investment with the state 
sector companies. As a final word, as argued by Sonmez (1992: 204), it can be said "there are 
three sectors in Turkey: the public sector, the private sector and the Koc sector". 
- Sabanci Holding: The Lords Of The White Gold (Cotton): Sabanci Holding was 
founded by Haci Omer Sabanci in Adana. Haci Omer Sabanci was born in Akcakaya Village 
of Kayseri in 1906. He started work as an ordinary worker in Adana in the 1920s. Then, he 
began to trade in cotton and subsequently the family entered the construction sector. The 
Sabanci Family accumulated the first part of their capital from the trade and construction 
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sectors (Sonmez, 1992: 207). Their construction company did large scale business with the 
state and gained substantial amounts of money. Then in the 1940s, they entered the industrial, 
financial and banking sectors. 
The first major investment of the Sabanci Holding was the Bossa which was 
established with the credits which were gained from TSKB (Turkiye Sinai Kalkinma Bankasi- 
The Turkish Industrial Development Bank) in the 1950s. They founded the Bossa with the 
special support of the president Celal Bayar. They established the Akbank, which is among the 
most powerful banks of Turkey, in 1948. The 1960s were the take-off years for the Sabanci 
Group and they continued to grow in the 1970s. Sabanci Holding was established in 1967. 
They passed over in a short time the financial crisis years of the early 1980s and they 
strengthened their place among the most powerful companies in Turkey. 
As noted by Sonmez (1992: 213), in contrast to the Koc Group, the Sabanci Group 
developed without using foreign capital until the mid 1970s. After 1980, they began joint 
investments with foreign companies. Another important characteristic of this group is that 
they never had joint investments with state sector companies. 
Sabanci Holding is the second largest family holding company in Turkey and the most 
powerful competitor of the Koc Holding. The Sabanci Family have more than 40 family 
owned firms. Also, they own a large amount of shares of more in over 100 companies. Some 
companies belonging to the Sabanci Holding have been listed in the Fortune's "500 Hundred 
Largest Companies List" for many years. 
- Cukurova Holding: Cukurova Holding is also one of the most powerful family holding 
companies in Turkey. It is the joint holding company of the Eliyesil and Karamehmet families. 
It was founded in the early years of the Republic (in the 1920s). The most powerful name in 
the Cukurova Holding is Mehmet Emin Karamehmet. Both families were large scale land- 
owners in Tarsus. They entered the industry with a cotton processing factory in 1925. They 
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established their first company in the early 1940s and bought a second one in 1944. They grew 
rapidly in 1950s and 1960s, especially in the textile sector and founded the Cukurova Holding 
in Adana in 1972. Then, they became one of the most important business groups in Turkey. 
They own or control several companies in several different sectors of the economy. 
Cukurova Holding is especially powerful in the banking and financial sectors. They 
own a number of finance companies and banks. Two of their banks, which are Pamukbank and 
Yapi Kredi are among the largest banks in the banking sector in Turkey. Some of their 
companies specialise in the import and marketing of heavy-duty and agricultural machinery. 
- Enka Holding: Enka Holding is also among the most powerful holding companies in 
Turkey. It was founded by Sarik Tara and his sister's husband Sadi Gulcelik under the name 
of the "Enka Insaat Sanayii A. S. " in 1957. They increased their capital rapidly during the 
1960s and became a holding company in 1972. The patrons of the Enka Holding originally 
come from Yugoslavia and both were educated at Istanbul Technical University. 
Their major areas of activities are construction and foreign trade. They also own a 
number of companies in foreign countries. Enka Holding had strong relations with the ANAP 
(Motherland Party-Anavatan Partisi) and its former-founder president Turgut Ozal who is also 
a former prime minister and president of the state. There are also a number of other names 
from Enka Holding among the founders of the Motherland Party and later government 
ministers, such as Vural Arikan (former Minister of Finance), Vahit Halefoglu (former 
Minister of Foreign Affairs), Nejat Eldem (the former Minister of Justice). 
- OYAK (The Army Mutual Assistance Association): The Holding Of The 
Commanders: OYAK is the holding of members of the Turkish army and was founded as a 
social security institution in March 1961. The major objective of this establishment is to 
develop social and economic co-operation and solidarity among members of the Turkish army. 
It has more than 100.000 members and provides numerous services to its members. OYAK's 
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(The Army Mutual Assistance Association) capital originally come from the membership 
contributions of its members. It grew in a very short time and joined the most powerful 
business enterprises in Turkey. It provides partners for 25 companies which are working in 
several sectors, especially in automotive (car industry), food, chemicals, cement and the 
financial and service sectors. 
- Yasar Holding: Yasar Holding is the joint holding company of the Yasar Family and their 
Danish partners. The founder of the Yasar Holding is Durmus Yasar who was born in Rhodes. 
He founded his first company in Izmir under the name of the "Durmus Yasar Muessesesi" in 
the early 1930s. The Yasar Family entered industry in the 1950s with the "DYO" which was a 
paint factory. Yasar Holding rapidly developed and in the 1970s became the largest holding 
company in the Aegean region of Turkey. It is the owner of more than 50 companies 
employing over ten thousand workers. They work in the several sectors of the economy 
including trade, industry, tourism and agriculture. 
As Sonmez (1992: 235) points out, Yasar Holding lived through a serious crisis in the 
period of Turgut Ozal's Motherland Party governments in the 1980s. The Yasar family's good 
relations with the MDP (Nationalist Democracy Party-Milliyetci Demokrasi Partisi) and their 
open support for this party at election time antagonised the Motherland Party and its president 
Ozal. The MDP was the most powerful competitor of the Motherland Party and when they 
(Ozal's party) won the election, they put very big pressure on the Yasar Holding which could 
have caused a big financial crisis. 
- Dinckokler Or Akkok Group: Akkok Group is one of the largest groups in the textile 
sector in Turkey. It was founded by Raif Dinckok (the father of the Dinckok Family) who is a 
businessman with industrial experience going back more than 40 years. Until the 1950s, they 
produced goods in small scale workshops. They began large scale production in factories in 
the late 1950s. In addition to their textile empire, the Dinckok Family has important 
investments in trade and tourism. 
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- STFA Holding: STFA Holding was founded by Sezai Turkes (who was born in 1908) and 
Fevzi Akkaya (who was born in 1907). Both bosses of this holding company completed their 
higher education at the ITU (Istanbul Technical University). The mother company of the 
STFA is the "ST-FA Insaat A. S. " which was established in 1932. It is one of the oldest 
construction companies in Turkey. STFA Holding grew rapidly in the 1970s and 1980s and 
joined the business giants of Turkey. It has more than 25 companies which specialise in 
construction. Several large scale national and international projects carry their signs. 
- Profilo And Marko: The Profilo Group is the holding company of the Kamhi Family (which 
is one of the most popular Turkish Jewish families) and was founded by Jak Kamhi (who is 
the father of the family and was born in 1926) in the early 1950s. The company grew rapidly 
in the following years and became a holding company in 1971. Their firms are mostly 
concentrated in the metal goods and electronic industries. They control about 30 companies. 
The Kamhi Family have good relations with the political elites and the son Jefi Kamhi is a 
member of the Turkish parliament. 
Alarko Holding is the joint company of the Alaton and Garih families which are among 
the most popular and powerful Jewish families in Turkey. Ishak Alaton and Uzeyir Garih are 
the most powerful names in the Alarko Holding. It was established in 1954 and rapidly 
developed in the subsequent years and became a holding company in 1974. It is among the 
most powerful family holding companies in Turkey and owns more than 15 companies. 
- Eczacibasi Holding: Eczacibasi Holding was founded by Suleyman Ferit Eczacibasi in Izmir 
in the first quarter of the 20th century. Suleyman Ferit started his business life as a pharmacist. 
Eczacibasi Holding performed its biggest growth under the control of the son Nejat 
Eczacibasi, who was educated in Germany and received his PhD from a German university. 
Nejat Eczacibasi established a drug factory with credit provided by the TSKB (Turkish 
Industry and Development Bank-Turk Sanayi ve Kalkinma Bankasi) in 1952. This was the 
beginning of the rapid growth of the Eczacibasi Holding. They joined the "Top 10" Turkish 
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family holding companies in the 1990s. The major area of activities of the Eczacibasi Holding 
are drug (medicine) and construction materials industry. In addition to that, it has businesses 
in several other sectors with more than 30 companies. 
- Bodur Family-Kale Group: It was established by Ibrahim Bodur in 1957. They started 
their business in construction ceramics in Canakkale. Although the major area of economic 
activity of the Kale Group is construction materials, they entered other sectors in the 1970s. 
The Kale Group is among the most important companies in the ceramic construction materials 
industry in the world. They have control of more than 20 companies. The Bodur family also 
has good relations with the army. Former army commander General Tahsin Kaya (who was 
one of the generals involved in the 1980 military junta) and his family are among the partners 
in some of its companies. 
- Kutlutas: Kutlutas was founded by Nurettin Kocak and Hicri Haznedaroglu in 1959. The 
main partner Nurettin Kocak was born in Sivas in 1931and graduated from Istanbul Technical 
University. Kutlutas developed in the following years and became one of the largest business 
groups in Turkey. As noted by Sonmez, it is a typical example of the "construction-industry" 
type of capital group. It has good relations with the army and also has joint investments with 
the OYAK which is the holding company of the Turkish military. 
- Tekfen Holding: Tekfen Holding was founded by Feyyaz Berker, Nihat Gokyigit and 
Necati Akcaglilar. All of them have postgraduate degrees from American universities. Their 
first company was the "Tekfen Insaat ve Tesisat A. S. " Tekfen Holding is one of the most 
powerful groups in the construction sector. They also own large firms engaged in foreign 
trade and the artificial compost and electric bulb industries. They own around 20 companies, 
but also control around ten other companies. 
- Dogus Holding: Dogus Holding was founded by Ayhan Sahenk who was born in Nigde in 
1929. He was educated in the Law Faculty at Ankara University. He first entered the 
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construction sector and developed his business in a short time. They now have several large 
scale businesses in Turkey and overseas. The Group is also highly experienced in the banking 
sector, and owns a large amount of shares in the automotive (car) and food industry. Dogus 
Holding is owner of more than 30 companies. 
- ECA Or Elginkan Group: Elginkan or ECA Group is one of the largest family holding 
companies in Turkey. It was founded by three members of the Elginkan Family in the 1950s: 
they were father Ahmet Elginkan and his two sons Ekrem and Cahit Elginkan. Both sons were 
educated at ITU (Istanbul Technical University). They first entered business life in the 
construction sector. The group rapidly grew and took its place among the largest business 
holding companies in Turkey. They are owners of more than 40 companies. 
- Toprak Holding: Toprak Holding was established by Halis Toprak in the 1960s. With the 
backing of Turgut Ozal (who was a conservative politician), they built up substantial power in 
the 1980s. Their activities are in several sectors of the economy. 
- Some Other Important Business Groups In Turkey: In addition to the above holding 
companies, there are a number of other powerful business groups in Turkey. Ozsaruhanlar, 
Ozakat and Raks are among the most powerful business groups in the Aegean region (mostly 
located in Izmir) of Turkey. Ozsaruhanlar owns more than 20 companies and their major areas 
of economic activity are the iron-steel industry, foreign trade, computers and data processing. 
The Ozakat Family entered the business world in the early 1920s. They are rather 
powerful in the automotive (car manufacturing) and automotive subordinate industry. On the 
other hand, the Raks Group, which is owned by Ataman Bukey and Aslan Onel have more 
than 10 companies and they control audio-video cassette sector in Turkey. They are also 
represented in the electric and electronic goods industry. 
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The Sonmez Holding is the family holding company of the Sonmez Family and one of 
the most influential business groups in Bursa. They are very powerful in the textile sector. The 
most well-known member of the family is Ali Osman Sonmez. 
Zeytinoglu Holding is the family holding company of the Zeytinoglu Family. They are 
among the most powerful business groups in Eskisehir. The two members of the family 
Mumtaz and Yavuz Zeytinoglu are among the popular members of the Turkish business elite. 
Another important name among the "Anatolian Giants" is Ulusoy Holding. It is the 
family holding company of the Ulusoy Family. Ulusoy Holding is the most powerful Turkish 
company in the fields of national and international transportation. The Group also has 
important business interests in the automotive and tourism sectors. They began their business 
life in local transport with a small bus in Trabzon in 1937. They rapidly developed their 
business and became one of the most powerful transport firms in Turkey. 
There are a number of other important names in the business life of Turkey. Most of 
them have medium scale businesses in comparison with the giants. As noted by Sonmez 
(1992: 288-294), the most popular groups or companies in this category are the Konukoglu 
Family, Okan Family, Sagra, Colakoglu, Ekinciler, Kibar, Orpas, Akin Holding, Bezmenler, 
Borusan Grubu, Boynerler, Ulker, Uzeller, Fenis Toplulugu and Cankurtaran Grubu. 
Maritime, ship owning and harbour operations are other important economic sectors in 
Turkey. UM (Ugur Mengenecioglu) Holding, Cerrahoglu, Anadolu Denizcilik, Zihni Holding, 
Sonmez Denizcilik, Pekin Baran, Marti Grubu, Koctug Grubu can be counted among the most 
powerful companies here. 
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8.6. CONCLUSION: 
There was no bourgeoisie class in Turkey in the early years of the Republic. The 
Turkish bourgeoisie developed in the following years as the special efforts and help from the 
state played a central role in its creation. 
The Turkish economy was overwhelmingly based on trade and agriculture until the 
late 1940s. The large scale factories were established in the 1950s and 1960s, and Turkish 
industry generally started to develop rapidly during those years. In the 1990s, industry became 
the leading sector in the Turkish economy. 
A majority of Turkish business elites have worked with the primary goal of "profit 
maximisation" rather than more realistic and professional values, such as increasing 
productivity, winning the battle of international competition, ... etc.. These and some other 
factors have helped to create a negative public image of business elites among the Turkish 
people. As stated by Alpender (1966: 1), business elites were seen as speculators, even thieves 
for many years. Also, enterpreneurship was regarded as a dishonourable activity that 
honourable Turkish people would never engage in. 
The family holding companies have the most important place in the Turkish economy. 
The large majority of the most powerful business companies have been owned and controlled 
by Turkish families. This is one of the most important characteristics of the Turkish economy. 
The families are not only owners of the companies but also manage the business corporations. 
On account of this, the family holding companies have direct relations with the state and 
governmental elites. 
Ambiguity and instability which are related to economic and social policies have been a 
major problem for the business world for many years. These factors have inhibited the long 
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terms plans of the business elites. The economic elites believe that when these kinds of 
problems are solved the Turkish economy will rapidly grow. 
Nearly all of the largest Turkish holding companies have been established in the big 
urban centres. Istanbul, which is among the largest metropols in the world is the centre of the 
Turkish business world. A large majority of the Turkish holding companies have been located 
in Istanbul but there are a number of large holding companies in Ankara and Izmir. 
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71, e 7urkish M'ýlitAry Liftes 
"As long as officers remain in the Party, we shall neither build a strong Party nor a 
strong Army.... Let us resolve here and now that all officers wishing to remain in the Party 
must resign from the Army. We must also adopt a law forbidding all future officers having 
political affiliations .... ". Kemal Ataturk. 
C inzor TER 
Co 
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CHAPTER-9 
9. TURKISH MILITARY ELITES 
9.1. A GENERAL VIEW OF TURKISH ARMY AND MAJOR PROBLEMS ON 
THE RESEARCH OF ARMY AND MILITARY ELITES: 
The army has been one of the most important institutions in Turkish society and the 
military elites have been one of the most considerable and powerful elite groups in the Turkish 
power structure. Army and military elites have achieved significant duties either in the defence 
of the country or the modernisation and development of society. As a natural result of this, 
very strong and good relations were established between the Turkish army and the Turkish 
people. Turkish military elites and the Turkish army as an institution have always had a very 
esteemed and honourable place in the eyes of the Turkish people. The Turkish people have 
always nominated the army as the most reliable and trustworthy institution of the society. As 
noted by several researchers (such as Kasim Cindemir, Hurriyet Newspaper, 5 July 1999; US 
News and World Reports, July 1999; Janowitz, 1971; in several articles of Emin Colasan), the 
situation is still the same in the 1990s. 
The central institution in the process of Turkish modernisation was the army. The first 
modernisation efforts began in the military sphere during the Ottoman era. The modernisation 
of the army was understood as the creation of a European style army in terms of education, 
technology and structure. As a natural result of these efforts, Western values and norms first 
entered Turkish society via the army. As stressed by Sen (1996: 187), the major target of the 
Ottoman political elites during those modernisation efforts was to strengthen the power of the 
ruling elites. Nevertheless, contrary to their aims, these efforts culminated in the end of the 
Ottoman ruling elites and the beginning of the Kenialist Revolution. 
The Turkish military elites have played a significant role in security-defence and 
strategic policy making. They are very well experienced in the "management of violence". 
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However, they are not only sensitive and influential on foreign affairs and military issues, but 
also general domestic and international economic and social issues. Their economic and 
civilian functions are an indivisible part of their military functions. Nevertheless, they exclude 
themselves from domestic partisan politics. 
As stated by Rustow (1959: 549), "the exclusion of officers on active duty from any 
formal role in politics which was laid down in the early years of the Kemalist movement has 
been maintained to the present. Kemal Ataturk and Ismet Inonu chose to administer the 
country as civilian rather than as military rulers. They were not seen in uniform after the end 
of the War of Independence. They drew their political support from the Republican People's 
Party (CHP-RPP), the Grand National Assembly, and, increasingly, the bureaucracy". 
The first party of the Turkish Republic was the Republican People's Party (RPP) 
which was created by Mustafa Kemal in 1923 as a political instrument of his struggle for the 
reform of Turkey. The RPP as a unique political power centre of Turkey played a very 
important role in Turkish political life for more than two decades. The country was ruled by 
the elite members of the RPP from 1923 to 1946 (beginning of the multi-party period). As 
stressed by both Duverger and Lewis (1961: 377), " the Republican People's Party of Turkey 
differs more strikingly from its compeers elsewhere (such as the Fascist Party of Italy, the 
Communist Party in Russia, the Nazi Party in Germany); for no other party prepared, 
organised and accepted its own peaceful suppression. " 
Traditionally, Turkish military elites have been ascribed important non-military 
functions and accomplished several important missions as the agent of social and political 
change in the development of Turkey. As a result of these and their mutual acceptance by the 
Turkish people, they have exercised much of their political influence without violent combat 
or extensive blood-shed (Janowitz 1971: 31). A number of facts which are observed in 1990s' 
Turkey are proof of this. Especially in the late 1990s, Turkish military elites played significant 
roles in Turkish politics without any violent combat or using classical intervention techniques. 
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They used very elegant and modern pressure-group methods when exercising their political 
power. They established very effective co-operation among the major elite groups, such as 
business, media, scientific, trade union elites. Their solidarity and co-operation brought an end 
to the highly corrupt "Refah-yol" coalition government. 
Another important point to state is that, it was impossible to get detailed data about 
the military establishment and military elites for reasons of confidentiality, secrecy and 
security. As in many other countries the available research and research materials on military 
establishments and military elites is rather limited. It is also impossible to carry out extensive 
field research on military issues. This area of study is very sensitive and carries many risks. 
Therefore, it is impossible (at least today) to get a deeper understanding of military elites. 
However, some brief and general information about Turkish military institutions and military 
elites will be provided. 
Turkey has a strategic location in the world, both politically and geographically. Also, 
the Turkish army has very important internal and external matters which have to be dealt with. 
The Turkish army has been engaged in a war against the PKK separatist terrorists for more 
than a decade. Also, the increasing Islamist danger and terror is another important issue. For 
these reasons, it is easy to understand the sensitivity of the army and the state on military 
issues. When reasons of security and secrecy are added to these factors, it becomes difficult to 
conduct research on military elites. 
The researcher made a number of attempts at carrying out the first systematic research 
on Turkish military elites. As a result of the extra-ordinary social and political conditions (e. g. 
political crisis with Greece, rising political movements, terrorist actions of the PKK, political 
instability and political crisis), all attempts failed. 
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9.2. TURKISH MILITARY ELITES: 
Turkish military elites can be defined as those people who occupy the highest positions 
in the Turkish military echelons, and control the physical and social power of the army. 
According to Nordlinger (1977: 47), military elites can be identified as professional managers 
of force and violence. 
9.3. CAREER PATTERNS AND SOCIAL COMPOSITION OF CONTEMPORARY 
TURKISH MILITARY ELITES: 
Turkey employs universalistic standards in the recruitment of both top military elites 
and ordinary military officers. Educational achievements, several types of selection tests, 
physical appearance, personality, honourable (means not high status) and clean family 
background and many other tests play a crucial importance in the selection process of the 
military elite candidates. 
The Turkish military elites have been equipped with the knowledge of the latest 
technology and innovations in the world. The military academies are very well equipped and 
give the best quality of education to future generals and admirals. It can be argued that their 
educational qualities are higher than the output of most civil elite schools. 
Discipline and uniformity are among the most important principles in military 
organisations. Military institutions carefully select, train and recruit the candidate military 
elites. They standardise their careers: within this recruitment process, they acquire similar 
skills, sensibilities, outlook and characters. They become a highly intellectual product of a 
closed educational system. In Mills' words, they become modern warlords. 
The training of the future generals and admirals begins early. Their social origins and 
backgrounds are no more important than their characters: whether they are the sons of a 
farmer or a billionaire; whether they are Sunnite or Shiite; whether they are Turk, Kurdish or 
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from any other ethnic group. They have relatively equal opportunities to be successful in the 
competition to climb the military hierarchy. 
They are given a long education which is a very uniform, pre-arranged and well 
organised. The Turkish Army, Navy and Air force have their own military training academies. 
Also, as in some Western countries, the army operates its own secondary school system. On 
the other hand, most of the technical specialists are recruited into the army after they have 
completed their civilian technical education. 
Elite candidates are selected in terms of their personality, intelligence, physical 
appearance and other psychological characteristics. Having been trained and educated in the 
secondary military schools, they are enrolled in the military academies. All this basic and 
higher training and education have a critical importance for the structuring and re-structuring 
of the personality and character of future military elites. Acceptance of the national targets 
and military outlook become an inseparable part of their personalities. 
The observations and arguments of C. W. Mills (1956: 193) are easily applicable to 
Turkey: "he must be made to lose much of his old identity in order that he can become aware 
of his very self in terms of his military roles. He must be isolated from his old civilian life in 
order that he will come eagerly to place the highest value on successful conformity with 
military reality, on deep acceptance of military outlook, and on proud realisation of success 
within its hierarchy... He is made to feel that he is entering upon an important sector of the 
higher circles of the nation, and accordingly his conception of himself as a self confident man 
becomes based upon his conception of himself as a loyal member of an ascendant 
organisation". 
There is a high degree of internal cohesion and unity among Turkish military elites. 
They are relatively more cohesive than the political elites, media elites and business elites. As 
argued by Nordlinger (1977: 40), "common training and socialisation, national symbols, 
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distinctive functions, equal treatment, segregation from civilians-all these factors make for a 
relatively high level of cohesiveness". The functions of the military require unity, cohesiveness 
and `esprit de corps'. 
Superficially, the military establishment is under the control of civilian political elites. 
Nevertheless, the reality is rather different: Turkish military elites are autonomous from 
governmental politics. The most independent institution is the army among the social 
institutions of contemporary Turkey and the most autonomous elite group is the military elite. 
Their holding company OYAK (The Army Mutual Assistance Association) has helped to 
intensify this autonomy. Also, the OYAK has helped to strengthen solidarity among members 
of the Turkish army. 
The Turkish military establishment is highly successful in portraying the armed forces 
in a manner attractive to civilians, building prestige and creating respect for its personnel. 
They have been successful in creating a prestigious public image by using communications and 
public relations. They have presented a very meaningful and successful co-operation with 
other civil society organisations on major national issues. In 1997 and 1998, they arranged 
several orientation conferences and organised field trips for the leaders and key personnel in 
the various sectors of Turkish society, such as media, business, politics and education. They 
have achieved great success in the eyes of the public, in other words a "military invasion of 
civilian minds". 
Turkish military elites have been recruited overwhelmingly from middle class families. 
The proportions of sons of upper class and lower class families among them is rather small. In 
addition, Turkish military elites are mostly from rural areas or small towns. The sons of small 
land owners, civil servants, teachers and military officers have been over-represented among 
the Turkish military elite. 
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Like other western countries, there is male domination among the Turkish military 
elite. Almost all the highest rank military commanders are male. Although some of the 
regulations have changed recently, it is still difficult to see women being represented in the top 
or middle rank of the Turkish military elite in the near future. However, there are a limited 
number of lower to middle rank of women military officers in the Turkish army. 
Although they are not usually very rich, they are socially and economically secure and 
privileged. The prestige of the military as a profession is high in Turkey. As in Western 
countries (Janowitz, 1971: 58), the Turkish military do not usually come from elite 
backgrounds but develop a leadership outlook during their professional training. 
There is a very high degree of homogeneity among the Turkish military elite. Cohesion 
and harmony are among the most important peculiarities of the Turkish army. The military 
elites have a high degree of group solidarity and capability for collective action. On the other 
hand, as in other bureaucracies, the military have a hierarchical structure: authority flows 
downward and responsibility upward. As stressed by Nordlinger (1977: 44-5), "positions of 
superiority are constantly symbolised, formalised and recognised by salutes, uniforms, insignia, 
spatial positioning and differential personal perquisites". 
Turkish military elites have very extensive formal education. As stated by Janowitz 
(1971: 58), their social origins and educational backgrounds encourage the military elites to be 
accessible to politics. Turkish military elites consider themselves above partisan politics. There 
is a high degree of internal cohesion and unity amongst them. Their ideological orientations 
mostly follow the ideological preference of the creators of the Modern Turkish army, such as 
Ataturk and Ismet Inonu who were leftist politicians. 
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9.4. DEFENCE ORGANISATION OF TURKEY: THE POWER STRUCTURE AND 
HIERARCHY OF THE HIGHER ECHELON OF THE TURKISH ARMED FORCES: 
Turkey is a member of NATO and the Turkish armed forces have been assigned 
important functions within this organisation. As a result of its strategic location, both 
geographically and politically, Turkey has to possess very powerful and a large armed forces. 
Therefore, military expenditure makes up an important part of the national budget of Turkey. 
Modern technology has been continuously incorporated into the military. In Janowitz's (1971: 
20-21) classification, Turkey take a place in the category of those countries which have the 
highest level of military expenditure in the modern world. 
The contemporary Turkish army is among the "Top 10" most powerful and well 
equipped armed forces in the world. According to the latest indicators, published by the 
French "Liberation" newspaper, Turkey spends the highest proportion from its national 
budget on defence among European countries (Hurriyet newspaper, 15 July 1999). The 
research shows that, Turkey spends 3.6 % of its national budget on defence. England and 
Greece follow Turkey with 2.9 and 2.8. The share of military expenditure in the national 
budgets of France, Sweden, Poland and Netherlands is 2.5 %. Also, according to the same 
research, Turkey has the largest army (639,000) in Europe. 
Turkey has made an enormous effort to create westernised armed forces. They have 
brought in foreign experts and sent their officers to be trained in Western Europe. Turkish 
armed forces, all naval and marine forces, troops (ground forces), air forces and Gendarmerie 
possess both a modern technology and modem administration. They are experienced in the 
management of violence and control the instrument of violence management. As mentioned 
earlier, Turkish military elites are very well educated: they are not only trained in military 
issues but also educated in general issues. 
Whereas the military establishment is an indispensable part of the national power 
structure, the military elites are an inseparable part of the power elite in Turkey. As noted by 
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Janowitz (1971: vii), the military, with its symbols of authority and force, is a part of the 
apparatus of legitimate government. The roles, functions and structure of the Turkish army 
have been defined in the constitution and in related laws. According to these, the major duty 
of the Turkish army is to defend Turkey against both internal and external enemies. Therefore, 
some units of the Turkish army have internal security functions. The Gendarmerie as an 
internal security force is well organised and influential especially in the rural areas of Turkey. 
As well as these legal responsibilities, the army have always had some degree of influence on 
political life. 
The chief of the general staff occupies the top position in the Turkish army. The actual 
number of full generals is no higher than 30 among the Turkish army commanders. The 
Turkish army has in total five major forces and sub-forces: three (army, navy, air forces) of 
them are major and 2 others (Gendarmerie, Coast-Security Forces) are major sub-forces. This 
means that in addition to the chief of the general staff, there are 5 commanders-in-chief of the 
armed forces. 
The Ministry of Defence is responsible for the co-ordination and co-operation between 
the government and army. The chief of the general staff and joint chiefs of staffs are at the top 
of the power hierarchy of the Turkish military. In addition to the chief and joint chiefs of the 
general staff, the generals, admirals (including the commanders of the major forces, such as 
army, navy, Gendarmerie and air forces) make up the Turkish military elite. 
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Figure 8 
Source: Created by the Researcher by using official documents. 
Seemingly, civilian political elites exercise control over the military through a formal 
set of rules which define the roles and functions of the military and the conditions under which 
the military may exercise its power. Nevertheless, the Turkish military is highly autonomous 
from the governmental political elites. They feel responsible to the head of the state not the 
head of the government. The organisational independence of the Turkish military from the 
political elites is higher than other major organisations. 
The Turkish army is highly influential not only in the military sphere but also in social, 
cultural, political and economic life. As stated by Sen (1996: 12), in addition to their military 
roles, the Turkish army plays an important role in the ideological struggle in social life. Also, 
since the 1960s, it has become an important economic power centre in the Turkish economy 
with the OYAK (The Army Mutual Assistance Association). As a result, they have become 
very sensitive to economic affairs and major economic policy changes. 
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9.5. THE ROLE OF THE TURKISH ARMY AND TURKISH MILITARY ELITES IN 
MODERNISATION: A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW: 
The first deliberate attempt at modernisation and westernisation in Turkey began in the 
late Ottoman Era in the early eighteenth century. These efforts continued in the following 
years. Selim III attempted to Westernise the armed forces by relying on French instruction. He 
attempted to bring the army up to the level of Western armies in terms of technical equipment, 
training and skills. Serious military reforms continued throughout the rule of Mahmud II. 
Sultan Mahmud also made significant modifications in the structure and organisation of the 
central government and administration. As noted by Lewis (1961: 97), some consultative 
committees were established, such as committees for agriculture, trade, industry, and public 
works in the 1830s. The reforms of Mahmut II and his successors created a new 
administrative and governing elite in the empire. 
Clothing reforms in the army were extended to civilians. European social manners and 
protocol were adopted. As stressed by Lewis (1961: 101), "in the thirteen years between the 
destruction of the Janissaries in the 1826 and his death in 1839, Sultan Mahmud attempted to 
carry out a programme of reform as extensive as that of Peter the Great in Russia and far 
more difficult". Legal and financial reforms followed the political and social reforms in the mid 
1800s. It was very difficult to achieve the reforms because of not only the powerful reaction 
of the traditional power centres, but also the scarcity of educated and trained people to apply 
the reforms. 
Another important name was Mustafa Resit Pasha (1800-1858) among those people 
who played important roles in the early modernisation and Westernising efforts in Turkey. As 
mentioned by Lewis (1961: 108-109), he was the real architect of the nineteenth century 
Ottoman reforms. The leadership of the reform programme had passed into the hands of Ali 
Pasha (1815-1871) and Fuad Pasha (1815-1869) after Mustafa Resit Pasha. These two names 
played dominant roles in the reform movement in the era of Tanzimat (Reorganisation). 
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The Noble Rescript (Tanzimat Ferman) (1839) was the messenger of a new era in the 
Ottoman Empire. As stressed by Lewis (1961: 105), "the Noble Rescript proclaimed such 
principles, as the security of life, honour and property of subject, the abolition of tax-farming 
and all the abuses associated with it, regular and orderly recruitment into the armed forces, 
fair and public trial of persons accused of crimes, and equality of individuals of all religions in 
the application of these laws. It was this last that represented the most radical break with 
ancient Islamic tradition, and was therefore most shocking to Muslim principles and good 
taste". 
The death of Ali Pasa in 1871 brought the end of the first serious efforts at 
modernisation. In the following years Pan-Islamic doctrines became the dominant ideology. A 
form of Panislamism became the official policy of the state under the rule of Abdulhamid. 
Despotic Sultan Abdulhamid was opposed to reform and modernisation and his period of rule 
reduced the speed of Westernisation. Nevertheless, Abdulhamid's despotic regime culminated 
in a reaction. 
The movement of the "Young Turks" (at the beginning they were called the "Young 
Ottomans") rapidly grew in spite of Abdulhamid's attempts to stifle it. The new phase of 
reform was opened by the Young Turks who were the new leaders of Young Turkey. Sinasi, 
Ziya Pasa, Namik Kemal, Ali Suavi can be counted among the first Young Turks. 
The movement became highly influential among the cadets and students of the military 
and civil schools. When these cadets became captains and majors, and began to occupy 
command positions in the army, the latter became a potential revolutionary force. The new but 
highly educated and westernised members of the military elites began to occupy an important 
place in the power elite of Turkey. The power and influence of the new military elites rose day 
by day. As Lewis states (1961: 202), their political ideas were "freedom and fatherland, the 
constitution and the nation". Young army officer Mustafa Kemal was among the important 
names in the Young Turks movement. This movement would end Sultan Hamid's reign and 
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his despotic regime, and the name of Mustafa Kemal would become an inseparable part of the 
new Turkey. 
Pressure by the Young Turks brought an end to Sultan Abdulhamid's reign at the 
beginning of the twentieth century. Another new phase began in the history of Turkey in 1908 
which is called the period of the Second Mesrutiyet (Monarchy). During period 1908-1918, 
Young Turks' Committee of Union and Progress were in power, except for some brief 
intervals. As stressed by Rustow (1959: 516), the first major target of the Young Turks in the 
1908 Revolution was to restore the parliamentary constitution of 1876, which had been 
shelved by Abdulhamid. 
The star of Mustafa Kemal began to rise in the first quarter of the twentieth century. 
He gained important successes as an army commander in the 1910s. When he observed the 
desperation, incapacity and betrayal of the central ruling elites in Istanbul, he moved to 
Anatolia to preserve the integrity of the country and the independence of the nation, in co- 
operation with the Anatolian people. He resigned from his commission and turned his face to 
the Turkish people who were the real owners of the country. 
Everybody accepts that, Kemal Ataturk was a military genius. He embodied all the 
necessary characteristics of charismatic leadership and he was unique among his successors. 
As stressed by Rustow (1959: 536-7), "Kemal held a unique and unrivalled position among 
the commanders of the demobilised Ottoman Army .... 
He had built up a brilliant record of 
solid military accomplishment. His defence of Gallipoli against invading forces many times 
stronger had saved the Ottoman Empire from collapse and its capital from imminent 
occupation. ... 
No other military leader in 1919 could match Kemal's popularity or reputation 
of invincibility. " He moved to Anatolia on the 19th May 1919 and created in a very short time 
a very well organised national resistance movement. Kemal Ataturk fought not only against 
foreign invaders but also against the anti-nationalist Sultan and his supporters. 
209 
As argued by Lewis (1961: 286), "in his political ideas Kemal Ataturk was an heir to 
the Young Turks-more especially of the nationalist positivist and westernising wing among 
them .... 
His nationalism was healthy and reasonable. There was no arrogant trampling on the 
right or aspirations of other nations, no neurotic rejection of responsibility from the national 
past... " Briefly, the term patriotism defines more precisely Kemal Ataturk's nationalism. 
Rustow (1959: 543-544) argues that, the Kemalist movement is rather different from 
the Young Turks'. "The Kemalist movement, starting from a military apex, worked hard to 
provide itself with a solid civilian base. During the War of Independence, it not only registered 
striking military success, in the most trying of circumstances but also gave Turkey its first 
genuine experience of government by discussion". 
After he won the War of Independence and announced the establishment of the 
Republic, and completed the first part of his revolution successfully, Ataturk requested all of 
his chief military commanders to resign their assembly seats and the chief of the general staff 
was excluded from the cabinet in 1924 (Ozturk 1993: 57-59). As stressed by Lerner and 
Robinson (1960: 20), Ataturk noted that "I have come to the conclusion that, for the 
maintenance of army discipline in required measure for the exercise of command, it is 
incompatible that commanders should at the same time be deputies. " 
Lewis (1961) argues that, the Turkish people achieved one of the major revolutions of 
modem times under the leadership of Kemal Ataturk, involving a radical break with the social, 
cultural and political traditions of the past. As Kemal Ataturk said, "A ruined land on the edge 
of a precipice ... 
bloody battles with various enemies ... years of struggle and then, respected 
at home and abroad, a new country, a new society, a new state and to achieve these, ceaseless 
revolutions- this, in a word, is the Turkish general revolution". (Lewis, ibid. : 473). Mustafa 
Kemal Ataturk and some other military elites took the lead in creating a nationalist Turkish 
Republic out of the ruins of the multi-national Ottoman Empire (Rustow 1959: 513). Lerner 
and Robinson (1960: 21) note that, Ataturk was repeatedly quoted as declaring that "the great 
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victory won by Turkish arms was not enough to achieve real liberation; the victory had only 
provided a strong foundation for future victories, victories in science and economics". 
Briefly, as argued by Lewis (1961: 287) "... at the darkest moment in their history, the 
Kemalist Revolution brought new life and hope to the Turkish people, restored their energies 
and self-respect and set them firmly on the road not only to independence, but to that rarer 
and more precious thing that is freedom. " 
9.6. THE ROLES AND FUNCTIONS OF THE ARMY IN THE EFFORTS OF THE 
RECONSTRUCTION OF A NATION: TURKISH ARMY AS A POWERFUL 
TOOL OF MODERNISATION AND AS AN EFFECTIVE AGENT OF 
SOCIALISATION: 
The first modernisation efforts in the army began in the late Ottoman era. Rustow 
(1959: 514-5) notes that, after the abolition of the Janissary in 1826, the military became one 
of the most Westernised elements in the Empire. Liberal ideas first spread among the military 
officers and military colleges became the centre of secret political organisations in the mid- 
nineteenth century. Sen (1996: 103) argues that, Turkish military elites have always had the 
aim of representing the new values, behaviour patterns and life styles since the late Ottoman 
era. 
Political elites of military origin played fundamental roles in the social and economic 
modernisation of Turkey. As mentioned earlier, although the first modernisation efforts in 
Turkey started in the army in the late Ottoman Era, these efforts reached its real extent and 
meaning in all social, economic and political areas with the Ataturk Revolution. 
After the first World War, Ataturk, who was successful commander of the war, led 
and successfully ended the war of national liberation. Then an independent Turkish nation- 
state was established. As stated by Dodd (1983: 4), "the sultanate and caliphate, which had 
been combined in the person of Sultan, were both abolished. New European codes of law 
were also introduced to replace what was left of Islamic Holy Law; the dervish convents were 
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closed down, the official clergy (the Ulema) were deprived of power and influence; the Arabic 
script, in which Turkish was written, was changed for the Roman; the language was reformed 
to make it more Turkish; the nation's history was re-written, and in other ways a political and 
cultural revolution was carried through in order to turn Turkey into a modern secular nation- 
state". 
When the founders of the Republic (under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk) 
started to create a modern culture and modern society based on modern values, norms, 
attitudes and behaviour patterns they did not have the modern tools of capitalism. The Turkish 
army greatly aided the state in this transformation process. As stated by Sen (1996), they 
performed a great service in disseminating the values and norms of the Kemalist Revolution 
throughout society. They have always seen themselves as the servants and guardians of 
Kemalism and democracy. 
As stressed by Lerner and Robinson (1960: 37-8), the Turkish army played an 
important role as an instrument for general cultural, social and economic development. 
Turkish military elites and officers performed a great service by rapidly modernising and 
democratising Turkey culminating in the rule of civilian supremacy. 
After the 1940s, as a result of the modernisation and reorganisation efforts and 
adopting advanced technology with American military aid, the military became a major agency 
of social change. As pointed out by Lerner and Robinson (1960: 32-33), those major changes 
were introduced in the military by the Turkish general staff in 1952: 
1. "Reduction of the Turkish army from an estimated 700,000 to 400,000; 
2. Inauguration of service training schools and great expansion of technical training generally; 
3. The training abroad of a significant number of officers and non-commissioned officers, 
many of whom would later become instructors; 
4. Institution of a testing and classification system as a basis for assignments; 
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5. Organisation of personnel section in the general staff and assignment of separate personnel 
officers to each major unit head-quarters; 
6. Reorganisation of the Reserve Officers' Training School; 
7. Requirement of a year's troop duty before admission to the Military Academy; 
8. Reduction of the initial stint for non-commissioned officers; 
9. A new non-commissioned officers' law, making possible officer status for qualified NCO's; 
10. Elimination of the use of soldiers as personal servants by officers; 
11. Much improved living conditions for enlisted men. " 
All Turkish males have had common experiences in the compulsory military service 
which was five years at the beginning, then reduced to two years and later 1.5 years. This 
means that all Turkish males who are over 20 (about one third of the Turkish population) have 
been given a common and well organised education by the military elites: at least one member 
of every Turkish family has had this education. On account of this, it can be said that the army 
have/had the opportunity to reach the vast majority of the Turkish population. When all these 
things are kept in mind, the importance of the Turkish army as the tool of Kenialist ideology 
becomes more meaningful. 
Military formations and military elites are highly sensitive to emerging social, 
economic and political problems. Therefore, non-military activities have played an important 
part in the activities of the army. As stressed by Sen (1996: 106-7), in addition to the military 
drill, the basic skills in reading-writing, mathematics, geography and the social sciences have 
been acquired by all the male members of Turkish society during their compulsory army 
service. The contributions of the Turkish army in developing public works, road, engineering 
projects, ... etc. have great importance 
for Turkish society and economy. Some of the major 
non-military activities of the Turkish army can be grouped in these categories: 
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1. Public education (reading-writing and other basic skills) in the army: As argued by 
Sen (1996: 133), 351.934 soldiers attended these courses in the period between 1959-1966, 
and about two hundred fifty thousand of them were successful at the end of the courses. 
2. Technical courses and other courses: In addition to the basic reading-writing courses, the 
army has given technical and handicraft courses in several branches. The soldiers also have 
acquired important skills about modern techniques in cattle-breeding and agriculture. 
3. Afforestation activities: Hundreds of millions of trees have been planted by the members 
of the Turkish army all over the country. 
4. Brother-village activities: Turkish military units selected brother villages and prepared 
development plans to develop these selected villages. Each part of these plans was realised by 
members of the army. They played a bridging role between the new state and rural people. 
They helped to accommodate and to spread capitalist values throughout society. It can be said 
that they have done these duties very satisfactorily. As argued by Sen (1996: 146), in the 
1960s alone, the army gave substantial assistance to more than one thousand villages as part 
of the "brother village project". 
5. Large scale investments in major economic areas: As discussed earlier, the Turkish 
army established very strong relations with the capitalist system through their holding 
company OYAK (The Army Mutual Assistance Association). It has important investments in 
the major strategic sectors, such as automotive, cement, oil, petro-chemicals, food, tele- 
communications. 
It would be very difficult to popularise and diffuse the new values, norms, attitudes 
and behaviour patterns of the Kemalist Revolution throughout society without the great 
assistance of the army. Because, the state did not have today's powerful mass-communication 
tools in the 1920s and subsequent years, the army played the most important role as the agent 
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of socialisation in the Turkish modernisation process. They made very important efforts to 
transform the traditional values and structure of society, especially in the rural areas. They 
helped to carry the new values and behaviour patterns of modern culture to the most isolated 
parts of Turkish society through compulsory army service. The army worked as an important 
extensive adult education institution and military elites taught the modern values and 
behaviour norms to every adult male member of society during their obligatory military 
service. A large number of Turkish people learnt reading and writing with the new alphabet 
when they were undergoing military service. 
Parallel to technological and social developments, the capitalist state created its own 
modern ideological tools, such as schools, mass-media. These developments diminished the 
armies role as an ideological tool. Nevertheless, they could not reduce the physical and 
political power of the army. 
9.7. THE IDEOLOGY OF THE TURKISH ARMY: TURKISH ARMY AS THE 
POWERFUL GUARDIANS OF KEMALIST VALUES AND DEMOCRACY: 
The Turkish army has become unified with the Kemalist ideology and associated 
political regime. Therefore, they have been labelled as secular-nationalising Turkish soldiers 
with a common ideology and cohesion. 
Like many other countries, some of the armed forces might be more sensitive to 
ideological matters. As argued by Janowitz (1971: 33), Turkish naval units are less effective in 
domestic political issues, whereas the air force is very sensitive to domestic and international 
social and political issues. Officers of the air force usually hold leftist views. 
The Turkish military establishment and its higher echelons of generals and admirals 
have an important influence on Turkish politics. Nevertheless, the generals and admirals 
usually are rarely directly involved in politics. They prefer to be seen as playing a marginal role 
in daily political affairs. Also, the commanders avoid being seen as the supporters or critics of 
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a particular political tradition or party. They always say they are performing national duties 
which have been defined within the constitution and law: "they are the protectors and the 
guardians of the laic-democratic Turkish Republic, and the servants of the democratic 
Kemalist values". 
It is possible to find the answer to the question "what is the political colour of Turkish 
military elites? " within this sentence. They are traditionally rather sympathetic to the 
democratic left wing political tradition. They have been trained and educated under the strong 
effect of Kemalism in the military schools. Mustafa Kemal Ataturk who was the founder and 
the first president of the modem Turkish Republic, was the most popular and powerful 
member of the military elite. 
Since the beginning of the Republic and until the early years of the multi-party period, 
the army was under the control of the political-governmental elites. There was a very close 
and organic relationship between the military elites and political elites. Military elites served as 
an important tool of the Kemalist political elites to develop democracy and to popularise the 
values of the Kemalist Revolution. With the beginning of the multi-party period, they became 
autonomous from the governmental elites. Nevertheless, the Turkish army always adhered to 
Kemalist ideology. The position of the army has never changed and they played a substantially 
important role as the most powerful tool of the Kemalist political elites in the creation of the 
new individual in Turkish society. 
9.8. ARMY AND POLITICS IN TURKEY: 
Democratisation of outlook and behaviour of elites (not only military elites) is among 
the major problems of most societies, including Western ones. Nevertheless, the Turkish 
military elites have operated as a political umpire, rather than as a ruling oligarchy. Janowitz's 
(1971: 105) findings clearly support this argument. 
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Janowitz (1971: 104-105) and Ozturk (1993: 58-60) argue that, from the beginning of 
his national leadership, Ataturk had a sharp sense of the limits of the military in politics. He 
seemed to look forward to some form of party rule over which the military would be arbiter. 
Ataturk did not give permission to those army officers who wished to be active in partisan 
politics: to remain in active service they had to leave the armed forces either to retire or resign 
from their commissions. Hence, the military could preserve its unity and cohesion. The 
Turkish military have continued to follow this highly effective tradition since Ataturk's time. 
As noted by Janowitz (1971: 105), most of the new nations followed the model of Ataturk in 
military-political relations. 
Perlmutter (1981: 30) identifies the Turkish army of 1919-1923 (under the leadership 
of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk) as the "anti-traditionalist reformer army". Contrary to some ideas 
of some scholars who examined the Turkish army, Perlmutter (1981: 32) argues that the 
Kemalist army has served "as a watchdog to prevent the civilian regime from returning to 
corrupt practices. By civillianizing his regime under the auspices of the army, Ataturk also 
legitimised the army's role in politics as the defender and protector of the constitution and of 
republican and honest civilian rule by legitimising the army as its sole protector". 
Unlike most countries, the Kemalist Turkish military elites have acted as the guardian 
of the civilian authority, political stability and the constitution. As stressed by Perlmutter 
(1981: 25), the military elites and army are dedicated to protecting and preserving 
constitutional government. After social-political corruption has been eliminated and political 
stability restored, the Turkish military has always returned to the barracks in a short time. 
As Perlmutter (1981: 253) states, the balance of civil-military relations in modern 
times is dependent on the stability and/or instability of the political order. Although, mistakes 
by the political elites have damaged to some degree civilian supremacy, it is still possible to 
observe civilian supremacy in civil-military relations in modern Turkey. Nonetheless, as in 
most of other countries, potentially the military elites maintain a large influence in the major 
217 
social and political matters of Turkish society. However, the influence of the Turkish military 
elites on social-political affairs are not much more than any other contemporary western 
countries. As noted by Lerner and Robinson (1960: 22-23), despite obvious problems, 
Turkey's performance in the maintenance of civilian supremacy is "... relatively good-perhaps 
even absolutely good". 
As emphasised by Lerner and Robinson (1960: 26) and many other scholars, in the 
early years of the establishment of the Republic, Ataturk carefully isolated the military elites 
from direct involvement in any kind of partisan politics. Only nine of thirty five members of 
the cabinet who served between 1920 and 1923 were military officers, either active or retired. 
Although, any involvement in any kind of partisan politics was banned, the army remained one 
of the most important forces of society in several respects. The military elites were recruited 
into parliament after their resignation or retirement. 
As pointed out by Rustow (1959: 550-1) and Lerner and Robinson (1960: 28), 
although several retired army officers became assembly members or occupied high 
administration posts, the proportion of military elites in public life has steadily decreased since 
the War of Independence: about one-sixth of the assembly in 1920 was of military origin, the 
proportion was one-eighth in 1943, one-ninth in 1946, one-twentieth in 1950 and 1954 and 
one-twenty-fifth in 1958. 
Although, they are apolitical technicians of violence and the political role of the army 
is limited, its social and economic functions are widespread and effective in influencing 
political change. Another important point is that, as argued by Janowitz (1971: 124-5), "under 
either the democratic or the totalitarian model, the military establishment cannot be controlled. 
To achieve the objectives of the democratic elite model, it is necessary to maintain and build 
on the differentiation between civilian and military roles. A democratic society must accord 
the professional soldier a position based on his skill and on his special code of honour". 
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9.9. THE CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF MILITARY INTERVENTIONS 
(MILITARY COUPS) IN TURKEY: 
Sometimes, the hidden tensions between the military elites and political elites have 
become controversial. Turkish military elites have intervened not only when Turkish 
democracy was in danger but also when large problems have occurred in economic 
development, social justice and mass-education. One of the most common reasons for military 
interventions in Turkey has been the increasing violence of terrorist actions. As stressed by 
Dodd (1983: 29), "the military can not be criticised for intervening. They had repeatedly 
called upon the two major parties to form a coalition in order to combat effectively the 
mounting wave of violence. ... 
The military are not to be blamed if they came to believe that 
the politicians could not, as well as would not, do anything effective about the situation". The 
military as the powerful arm of the Ataturkist elite have merely done what had to be done. 
As noted by Dodd (1983: 23), on all three occasions (1960,1971 and 1980 take- 
overs) the military intervened to set up a "Roman dictatorship" intended to last only for a 
limited period until some modified form of liberal democratic system might be made to work 
once again. According to Dodd (1983: 80), in all take-overs, the Turkish military has been 
intent on recreating a democratic form of government. Moreover, power has been transferred 
peacefully after only a brief period of military rule (in 1971, the military did not rule directly). 
In addition to the socio-political and economic conditions of the country, internal 
features of the military, such as its hierarchical structure, level of professionalism, corporate 
interests, social backgrounds and political attitudes have an impact on military interventions 
and their results (Nordlinger 1977: xi). 
Also, as argued by Janowitz (1971: 29), the take over of power by the military has 
generally followed the collapse of efforts to create democratic institutions in developing 
countries. The situation in Turkey fits this argument. A high degree of corruption in major 
social, economic and political establishments, socio-political and economic crisis which were 
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mostly caused by elected political elites, created an invitation to intervene by the patriotic, 
Kemalist military elites. They intervened in social and political life to prevent the rising 
corruption and increasing problems. It is possible to argue that incapable and greedy political 
elites caused the military interventions. When the military elites took over political power, 
they were always very successful in developing a high level of mass support. 
As stated by Perlmutter (1981: 19), one of the most common reason for military coups 
is weak and unstable political elites and regimes. Nevertheless, in contrast to most other 
countries, one of the major reasons for Turkish military interventions is the vulnerability of the 
elected political elites, rather than vulnerability of the regime as such. 
Perlmutter (1981: 25-28) identifies the Turkish army as the "arbitrator army". 
According to him (ibid.: 25-28), in contrast to a "praetorian army", an arbitrator army has the 
following general peculiarities: 
"1. Acceptance of the existing social order, 
2. Willingness to return to the barracks after disputes are settled, 
3. No independent political organisation and lack of desire to maximise army rule, 
4. A time limit for army rule, 
5. Concern with improvement of professionalism, 
6. A tendency to operate behind the scenes as a pressure group, 
7. A fear of civilian retribution. " 
On the other hand, according to some scholars, in addition to increasing social, 
political and economic problems, declining political power and influence of the military elites 
triggered the military interventions. They attempted to increase their power and as well as 
their social and economic status. 
Also, Nordlinger (1977: 63-78) sees a connection between military interventions and 
the military's corporate interests: 
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" "Failure of the civilian governors to provide adequate support, 
" Attempts of governing elites to interfere with military autonomy, 
" Their attempt to create or expand military forces, 
" Thereby threaten the dissolution of the regular army. " 
Some of these reasons may be related partly to military interventions in Turkey. 
Nevertheless, these factors are far from explaining the primary causes of Turkish coup d'etats. 
Deviation from the laic-democratic Kemalist Principles, rising corruption among the ruling 
elites, increasing socio-economic problems in the country, rising terror, disorder and violence, 
and the failure of the political elites to solve these major problems can be identified as the 
most important reasons for military take-overs in Turkey. 
9.10. ARMY AND RELIGION: 
As one of the most modernised institutions in society, the Turkish military have always 
looked at religion through modernising eyes. However, they have never been against any form 
of Islam, but, like other modernising elite groups, they have been against the use of Islam as 
the tool of corrupt politicians and the exploitation of the people's religious beliefs by religious 
forgers. Briefly, they have been against bigotry, fanaticism, dogmatism, narrow-mindedness 
and Dark Age mentality. 
As the undaunted followers and guardians of Kemalist values and the Ataturk 
Revolution, Turkish military elites have followed Kemalist religious policy. As emphasised by 
Lewis (1961: 406), "the basis of Kemalist religious policy was laicism, not irreligion; its 
purpose was not to destroy Islam, but to disestablish it - to end the power of religion and its 
exponents in political, social, and cultural affairs, and limit it to matters of belief and worship. 
In thus reducing Islam to the role of religion in a modern, Westernisation state, the Kemalists 
also made some attempt to give their religion a more modern and more national form". 
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The speeches of Kemal Ataturk give some clear ideas about the Turkish Revolution: 
"... The aim of the revolutions which we have been and are now accomplishing is to bring the 
people of the Turkish Republic into a state of society entirely modern and completely 
civilised in spirit and form. This is the central pillar of our Revolution, and it is necessary 
utterly to defeat those mentalities incapable of accepting this truth". Ataturk (Lewis, ibid.: 
404). 
"To seek help from the dead is a disgrace to a civilised community.... What can be 
the objects of the existing brotherhood (tarikat) orders than to secure the well-being, in 
worldly and moral life, of those who follow them? I flatly refuse to believe that today, in the 
luminous presence of science, knowledge and civilisation in all its aspects, there exist, in the 
civilised community of Turkey, men so primitive as to seek their material and moral well 
being from the guidance of one or another Seyh. Gentlemen, you and the whole nation must 
know, and know well, that the Republic of Turkey can not be the land of seyhs, dervishes, 
disciples, and lay brothers. The straightest, truest Way (tarikat) is the way of civilisation. To 
be a man, it is enough to do what civilisation requires. The heads of the brotherhoods will 
understand this truth that 1 have uttered in all its clarity, and will of their own accord at once 
close their convents, and accept the fact that their disciples have at last come of age ". 
Ataturk (Lewis, ibid.: 405). 
As stressed by Lewis (1961: 399), "Islam has no sacraments and no ordained 
priesthood. The Imam - the authorised representative or orthodoxy - has neither priestly nor 
pastoral faction; he is a leader in prayer ... Public prayer is a disciplined, communal act of 
submission to the One remote, and immaterial God. It admits of no saints and no mediators, 
no drama and no mystery". Nevertheless, some tarikats and forger sheikhs have attempted for 
a century to create a clergy that abuses and exploits Islam. 
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CHAPTER 10 
10. SOCIAL ANATOMY OF THE TURKISH ELITES 
10.1. SOCIAL ORIGINS AND SOCIAL BACKGROUNDS OF THE 
TURKISH ELITES: 
10.1.1. GENDER: 
As discussed in earlier chapters, age and gender are still among the most important 
social factors not only in Turkish society but also in the world. Although their significance is 
declining, they still have traditional and substantial influence on the elite recruitment process in 
either eastern or western countries. It can be argued that gender and age discrimination are the 
two most important dilemmas of contemporary societies. 
The gender composition of Turkish elites is similar to American elites (Barton in G. 
Moore, 1985: 191). There is a very heavy predominance of males among Turkish elites: 
whereas 92 percent of Turkish elites are male, only 8 percent are female As seen from Table 
1, the density of male domination is very substantial among Turkish labour union elites: only 3 
percent of the leaders of Turkish labour unions are women. The proportion of females among 
Turkish media elites and political elites is slightly higher than labour union elites: 13 percent of 
Turkish media elites and 7 percent of Turkish political elites are female. From these figures, it 
can be concluded that, as in other developed or rapidly developing countries, Turkish women 
are not completely but mostly barred from careers leading to elite positions. 
10.1.2. AGE: 
Turkish elites are middle aged elites. The mean age for the entire population is nearly 
50. The average ages of the three major Turkish elite groups are very similar. Whereas the 
youngest elite group is the leaders of Turkish labour unions with a mean age of 46, the oldest 
elite group is the political elites with the mean age of 53. As seen in Table 2, Turkish media 
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elites are slightly younger than the Turkish political elites: the mean age of media elites is 
nearly 51. 
As can be seen from Table 3, there is a very distinct domination of middle aged and 
advanced aged people among Turkish elite groups. The proportion of young people (who are 
less than 40 years old) among the whole elite population is only 8 percent. Early middle aged 
(40-49) and middle aged (50-59) elites occupy the highest proportion: their size in the entire 
population is 77 percent. The advanced aged elites occupy an important proportion of elite 
positions compared with the younger population. The proportion of advanced aged people 
among the elites is almost 15 percent. 
The younger age groups have their largest representation among the labour union 
elites: the proportion of young elites is 13 percent in the group of labour union leaders. They 
have their smallest proportion among the political elites: only 3 percent. Political leadership 
has been monopolised by middle aged or advanced aged people in Turkish society. The 
proportion of advanced aged people among the political elites and labour union elites is almost 
the same. Also, the proportion of middle aged people amongst labour union leaders is slightly 
less than the other elite groups. 
When the age distribution of elite respondents and the overall age distribution of the 
Turkish population are compared the findings on the age factor will become more accurate. 
As shown in Table 4, Turkey has a very large youth population. The proportion of those 
people who are under 40 years old is 77 percent overall. Whereas the number of middle aged 
people who are in the age group of 40-59 in the Turkish population is 16 percent and 
advanced aged people whose age higher than 59 in the entire Turkish population is 7 percent. 
In other words, according to the results of the census of 1990, the number of young people 
and children is 43,446,825, the sum total of middle aged people is 8,949,072 and total number 
of advanced aged people is 4,032,656 in the whole of Turkish society. 
225 
From this, it can be concluded that advanced aged and especially middle aged Turkish 
people have been over-represented among the Turkish elites. On the other hand, young 
Turkish people have been under-represented in the entire elite population. Another substantial 
result is that there is no place from elderly Turkish women among the Turkish elites. The 
second most isolated group from elite positions are young women. All the results disfavour 
women in Turkey, as occurs in other contemporary societies. 
If the mean, median and mode of ages of Turkish elites are examined carefully it can 
be clearly observed that most of the Turkish elites are individuals from the cultural generation 
of 1960s. A large majority of them have been socialised in the youth culture of the 1960s. 
They exhibit these characteristics in their personalities, beliefs, attitudes and life views. As a 
result, a large majority of Turkish elites are liberal minded and have highly weak religious ties. 
In addition, the majority of them are supporters of leftist parties. 
10.1.3. OCCUPATIONAL BACKGROUNDS (CAREER PATTERNS) OF 
TURKISH ELITES: 
As noted by Hoffmann (in Moore, 1985: 71), it is impossible to get detailed 
information on the careers of the respondents. Elite respondents are asked about the name of 
sectors and the position in the organisation where they worked before they became an elite, 
because of standardisation. 
The average number of years respondents have spent in their present sector is another 
important variable in considering occupational career. As seen from Table 5,64 % of the 
elites have been in their present sector more than 10 years, whereas only 16 % of all elites 
have been occupying their actual position or working in the same sector for less than 6 years. 
The number of those elites who have been working in the same sector for more than 16 years 
is almost 50 percent. 
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Turkish media elites form one of the most stable elite groups among Turkish elites: 
almost 90 percent of them have been working in the media sector either as journalists or 
editors for more than 10 years. In addition, nearly 73 percent of media elites have been 
working in their sector for more than 15 years. The second most stable elite group are 
political elites: 60 percent have at least 11 years job tenure. Compared with other elite sectors, 
the circulation of elites in the media sector is low and it is more difficult to obtain an elite 
position in this sector. Almost all the major positions have been occupied by middle or 
advanced aged people. On the other hand, the channels which recruit into elite positions are 
relatively more open in the elite sectors of politics and labour unions. 
It is possible to summarise from Table 6 that, there is a plurality among Turkish elites 
in terms of their occupational background. Although, there are representatives of almost 
every occupational groups in the Turkish power pyramid, the three most popular occupations 
among Turkish elites are public administration, education and university lecturing, and 
journalism. It can be outlined from the figure of Table 6 that, 22 percent of Turkish elites were 
working as journalists and 20 percent of them were working in education as school teacher or 
university lecturer before their actual elite status. Also, 18 percent of them had higher 
administrative duties in the public administration. 
Another important fording is related to media elites: a large proportion of them (nearly 
57 percent) have never changed their occupation since the beginning of their employment 
history. An important proportion of them (20 percent) come from the education sector. On 
the other hand, public administrators and university lecturers have their largest representation 
among Turkish political elites. It is particularly meaningful that an important proportion 
(almost 20 percent) of the highest posts in politics have been occupied by building contractors 
and engineers. Politics is very important for contractors, because they will be in a position to 
control public sector adjudication and auctions. If the reality that, "politics is one of the most 
corrupted elite sectors in present day Turkey" is remembered this fording becomes more 
significant. 
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There are various factors which affect the job preference of people in contemporary 
Turkish society. These are valid for Turkish elites as well. Social-psychological factors are the 
most effective ones determining occupational preferences for Turkish elites. It is possible to 
gauge from Table 7 that, a large proportion of them mentioned personality and personality 
related components as the major factors which influenced their job decisions. Almost, 73 
percent of them mentioned personality, understanding of organised struggle and a sense of 
responsibility among the most important factors. 
These three social psychological agents are inter-related to each other. They are 
preconditions for the understanding of civil society. When it is remembered that a large 
majority of Turkish elites are the products of 1960s' youth culture, the reasons for the 
predominance of personality based factors become more comprehensible. It has to be borne in 
mind that in addition to these factors, approximately 13 percent of them stressed ideological 
reasons. It can be concluded from these findings that, personality is one of the most effective 
factors in accessing elite positions in contemporary Turkey. 
As can be seen from Table 8, the job satisfaction rate of Turkish elites is very high. 
Although, the members of Turkish elites have more or less the same degree of job satisfaction, 
degree of occupational satisfaction among the labour union elites is slightly higher than the 
others. The findings which are presented in Table 9 can also be used to support the high level 
of occupational gratification among Turkish elites: more than 84 percent of Turkish elites 
stressed that, if they have been given another chance to change their occupation they would 
have still chosen their actual occupation. Turkish labour union leaders in particular were more 
satisfied with their actual positions. 
Related to this matter is the fact that, the direction of inter-group elite mobility is 
towards political elites. As can be seen from Table 10, the natural result of their high degree 
of job satisfaction is that a substantial majority of Turkish elites would like to continue 
working in their present job in the future. In addition, apparently the most common final goal 
228 
among Turkish elites is to become part of the political elite. Although, political elites are not 
the most powerful and effective elite group in modern Turkey they are still the most important 
elite group because they give the final shape to social and political decisions. 
On the other hand, the two most powerful elite groups are the military and business. 
The political elites shares third and fourth rank with media elites on the power pyramid of 
Turkish society. It is ironic that, according to the findings of this study, even though academic 
(scientific) elites form the least powerful elite group, the university lectureship was regarded 
as the most honourable occupation among all Turkish elite groups. 
White collar occupations are the most popular jobs among Turkish people. All Turkish 
elite members were asked about their favourite occupation when they were young. As can be 
seen from Table 6, in accordance with the general preferences of Turkish people, almost all 
Turkish elites emphasised white collar occupations. Law, politics, public administration, 
journalism, medical sciences, engineering, education and university lectureship were the most 
popular occupations and idealised by Turkish elites during their adolescence. 
10.1.4. OCCUPATIONAL BACKGROUNDS OF THE PARENTS OF 
TURKISH ELITES: 
There is a large plurality among the fathers of Turkish elites in terms of their 
occupations. An important proportion of their fathers are in blue collar or semi-white collar 
occupations. As can be seen from Table 6, approximately 60 percent of the fathers are 
farmers, workers, tradesmen, merchants or artisans. This proportion is substantially higher 
than the proportion of blue collars among Turkish elites and their spouses fathers. Also, public 
administrators, civil servants and lawyers are strongly represented among fathers of Turkish 
elites. On the other hand, a significant majority of mothers of Turkish elites do not have a paid 
job. Table 11 clearly shows that, almost 96 percent of them are housewives. There is only one 
civil servant, one engineer and one teacher among them. 
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10.1.5. OCCUPATIONAL BACKGROUNDS OF THE SPOUSES OF 
TURKISH ELITES: 
An important majority of spouses of Turkish elites do not work in a paid job. In fact, 
almost 40 percent of the spouses are housewives. The most popular occupation among the 
Turkish elites' wives is education. Approximately 27 percent of them teach in primary and 
high schools. As presented in Table 11, administration, journalism and the social sciences can 
be included among the other occupations. 
A substantial majority of Turkish elites' spouses' mothers do not have a paid job. 
Almost 84 percent of them are housewives. Like their children, white collar occupations are 
the most popular jobs among working mothers. As can be seen from Table 11, a large 
majority of working mothers are teachers and civil servants. 
It is possible to observe a wide variety among fathers of Turkish elites' spouses in 
terms of their occupation. On examining Table 6 it can be seen that there are people from 
almost every occupational group amongst the fathers of spouses of Turkish elites. 
Nevertheless, white collar occupations and semi-white collar occupations are much more 
popular than other occupations. Only 9 percent of them are manual workers. Tradesmen, 
artisans and merchants occupy the largest proportion. Professionals and civil servants follow 
on behind them. Businessmen, farmers, workers, police and soldiers, and administrators 
represent similar proportions among the fathers of spouses. 
From the research findings it is possible to argue that media elites have the longest job 
tenure among Turkish elites. Also, a large majority of Turkish elites have occupied their actual 
occupational positions in the same sectors for more than 10 years. Most members of Turkish 
elites come from the public administration and education sectors. Social-psychological factors 
(personality based)are the most influential ones on the job decisions of Turkish elites. There is 
a substantially high degree of job satisfaction among contemporary Turkish elites. Turkish 
elites' fathers have mostly blue collar and semi-white collar occupations, whereas their 
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spouses' fathers have predominantly white collar occupations. Housewives make up the 
largest group among Turkish elites spouses. The most popular occupations amongst working 
spouses are teachers and administrative posts. 
10.1.6. FAMILY BACKGROUND AND FAMILY STRUCTURE OF 
TURKISH ELITES: 
As discussed before, Turkish culture ascribes a high value to marriage and the family. 
The family as a social institution has important functions in Turkish society. A large majority 
of Turkish people have very strong family ties. Solidarity and co-operation has been one of the 
major components of Turkish society for decades. 
The small (nuclear) family is the most popular family type in urbanised parts of 
contemporary Turkish society. Both the parents and unmarried children live in the same 
house. Nevertheless, as discussed by Arslan (1992) in his study on the social development and 
social structure of rural Turkey, it is possible to still observe traditional medium size or large 
family structures in the rural areas. However, this family structure has been changing as a 
result of rapid urbanisation and industrialisation. The direction of this transformation is 
towards a small urban family structure. 
Small family size is one of the most common features amongst contemporary Turkish 
elites. On examining Table 12 one can see that, the bulk of Turkish elites have small families 
comprising one or two children. In addition, nearly six percent of them have no children at all. 
Only four percent of Turkish elites have four or more than four children and only one person, 
who is a member of the political elite, has 12 children. 
It is significant that, this politician comes from a popular Kurdish tribe from the 
southern region of Turkey. He possesses a very traditional family structure and very strong 
kinship ties with his tribe. It is also significant that this member of parliament has more than 
one wife. In fact polygamy (polygyny) is still popular in southern Anatolia: most of the 
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wealthy men and leaders of the clans (Asiret) have more than one wife and a large number of 
children. This situation provides a clear idea about the social structure and socio-economic 
problems of northern Anatolia. Southern and eastern parts of Anatolia are the least urbanised 
and the least industrialised parts of Turkey. Also, the birth rate and growth of population is 
significantly higher in this part of Turkey in comparison to other regions. 
However, a large majority of Turkish elites come from traditional medium or large size 
families. As shown in Table 12, only a tiny minority of their fathers have a small family 
whereas 42 percent of the elites come from a very large size families which have 5 or more 
children. Only 11 percent of the fathers of Turkish elites have small size families that comprise 
1 or two children. This figure gives a very accurate idea about the direction of social 
transformation as regards family structure in contemporary Turkey. It appears that, there is an 
association between the numbers of the children of elites and the number of their fathers 
children. Although the large majority of Turkish elites possess a small family, those elites who 
have slightly more children come from medium or large size families themselves. 
10.1.7. MARITAL STATUS AND MARRIAGE AGES OF TURKISH ELITES: 
Marriage is one of the most important preconditions for accessing elite positions. It 
has important influence on the circulation of elites in contemporary Turkey. As can be seen 
from Table 13, a substantial majority of Turkish elites are married. Only a tiny proportion of 
them (about 2 percent) are divorced or widowed. 
Most of the Turkish elites were married in their 20s. The most common age for 
marriage is between 24-29. The media elites have the highest average marriage ages. As can 
be seen in Table 14, a large majority of Turkish media elites were married in their late 20s or 
around the age of 27. Turkish labour union elites have the lowest average marriage age in 
comparison with the other elites: approximately 30 percent of them got married at 23. 
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The marriage ages of Turkish elites also differ in terms of gender. As in the wider 
Turkish society, as a result of cultural and social values, the average marriage ages of female 
Turkish elites is lower than their male counterparts. Parallel with common behaviour in 
Turkish society, female elites usually prefer those men who are slightly older than themselves 
whereas male Turkish elites prefer younger women. 
Table 15 clearly shows that, the most common age group for the marriage of female 
Turkish elites is between 21-26. The largest proportion of them, which is nearly 89 percent, 
were married between 21 and 26. However, the most common age group for male Turkish 
elites is 24-29: an important proportion of them got married between 27 and 29. 
There is a meaningful negative correlation between the average marriage age and the 
social class origins of people in Turkish society. The average length and quality of education 
received by lower class people is substantially less than that received by the higher stratum of 
society. Members of the lower social classes usually have to enter the labour market at an 
earlier age in comparison with higher class people. 
As a result of these and other social conditions and cultural values, those people who 
come from the lower social classes usually get married at an earlier age than those from the 
higher social classes. Parallel to this social reality, the average marriage ages of Turkish elites 
with lower social class origins is relatively lower than those elites who have higher social class 
origins: as can be seen from Table 16, it is common for elites with upper social class origins 
to get married after the age of 24. 
There is an important association between educational levels and the marriage ages of 
Turkish elites. Table 17 demonstrates that, the direction of this relation is positive: when the 
level of education increases the marriage age increases, but when educational level decreases 
the average age of marriage decreases too. A substantial majority of university graduated 
Turkish elites had been married by the time they were 24 years or older. On the other hand, a 
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large proportion of high school or junior high school educated elites got married before the 
age of 24. 
10.1.8. MARRIAGE AGES OF SPOUSES OF TURKISH ELITES: 
As the natural result of cultural values and the situation of male predominance among 
Turkish elites, the average marriage ages of spouses of Turkish elites is lower than the 
average ages of Turkish elites. As can be seen in Table 18, a large majority of Turkish elites 
prefer to get married to women who are younger than 23 years old. 87 percent of the spouses 
of Turkish elites have a marriage age of a maximum 25 years. 
According to the findings, there is no significant association between the social origins 
of Turkish elites and the marriage age of their spouses. As has been presented in Table 19, 
social origin does not have a meaningful effect on this matter. The age preference of Turkish 
elites for their spouses for marriage does not differ in terms of their social class background. 
It can be concluded that Turkish elites differ significantly from the overall Turkish 
population in terms of their social background characteristics and their social portraits. There 
is a massive predominance of males over females and middle aged people over young people 
among Turkish elites. Also, a substantial majority of them are married with a small family. 
Most of them have been recruited from white collar occupations and they are very satisfied 
with their actual occupational positions. 
10.1.9. SOCIAL CLASS BACKGROUND (PARENTAL SOCIAL ORIGINS) 
AND PRESENT SOCIAL STATUS OF TURKISH ELITES: 
Mobility into elite positions from the lower middle or working classes is also an 
important feature. A substantial minority of media elites and political elites (both with the 
same proportion that is 23.3 percent) come from the lower classes of Turkish society. The 
size of working class or lower middle class originated elites is highly meaningful among the 
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labour union elites; nearly half of the labour union elites (43.3 %) have been circulated from 
the lower stratums of society. In brief, about 30 percent of Turkish elites have lower social 
class origins. 
If Table 20 is examined carefully, it can be seen that, an important proportion (30 
percent) of Turkish elites come from bourgeois and grand bourgeois families. In fact, the 
largest proportion of Turkish elites have middle class origins. However, it should be pointed 
out that most middle class Turkish families carry the characteristics of the petty bourgeois. 
When this situation is taken into account, it can be said that, most of the Turkish elites 
originally came from small or petty bourgeois families. 
Turkish elites are upper class people. Turkish elites were asked by the researcher to 
identify themselves by actual social class positions in terms of social and economic indicators. 
It is a very important finding that a large proportion of Turkish elites identified themselves as 
members of the upper-middle or upper class. As outlined in Table 20, only 10 percent of them 
saw themselves as having a middle class status. 
Turkish elites usually prefer middle class women. As presented in Table 20, the 
majority of Turkish elites marry the children of middle class people. However, an important 
proportion of them (about 37 percent) are married to upper class women. The social origins 
of spouses of Turkish media elites and political elites are relatively higher than the labour 
union elites' spouses'. This situation is in accordance with the social background of Turkish 
labour leaders, since the social background and social status of labour union elites is 
comparatively lower than the other elite groups. On the other hand, the social status and 
social class origins of Turkish media elites and political elites is higher. 
In accordance with these findings, it can be concluded that most of the Turkish elites 
are married to those people who have similar social backgrounds to themselves. The findings 
which have been presented in Table 21 demonstrate that, Turkish elites have mostly 
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participated in inter-class marriages: those elites who come from relatively lower social class 
origins are married to people who have relatively low social class origins, whereas those elites 
who come from the higher circles of society prefer high class women for marriage. 
10.2. EDUCATIONAL BACKGROUND OF TURKISH ELITES: 
As occurs in most other countries, it can be argued that education (both educational 
level and educational background-either education type or school name) is one of the most 
important factors which effects the circulation of elites in Turkey. 
10.2.1. EDUCATIONAL LEVELS OF TURKISH ELITES: 
The extent of education has a large impact on the elite circulation process. University 
degrees in particular are an almost universal precondition for recruitment to elite positions. 
This precondition is valid for the elite recruitment process in Turkey as well. Al most all 
Turkish elites have at least a high school (lycee) degree. In addition, the vast majority of 
Turkish elites have at least one university degree. An important proportion of them also have 
post-graduate (Masters, PhD, Postdoctoral, etc. ) degrees. 
It is possible to observe this situation in Table 22. According to the figures, 98 
percent of Turkish elites have completed high school education. In addition, 86 percent 
possess at least one university degree. On the other hand, the rate of elite respondents with 
only middle (secondary) school education is just 2 percent for all the three elite groups. It 
means that, two respondents who are labour union elites have only 8 year school education. 
Turkish elites differ sharply from the adult population of Turkey in terms of education. 
Whereas about 86 percent of the Turkish elites hold at least one university degree, the rate of 
university educated people among the general Turkish population is under 9 percent. 
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As occurs in Germany (Hoffmann, 1985: 67), Turkish labour union leaders have less 
formal education than other elites. The proportion of labour union elites with a university 
degree is about 67 %, whereas the proportion of elite respondents with university education 
among the political elites is 97 percent and among media elite is higher than 93 %. 
Furthermore, almost all Turkish political elites and media elites, and 98 percent of the labour 
union elites have at least a high school diploma. 
This situation is correlated with the occupational career patterns and class 
backgrounds of the elites. Thus, whereas white collar occupations necessitate a more 
advanced education, a moderate or lower educational background is enough for blue collar 
occupations. 
On the other hand, the family's social status determines the kind and extent of the 
education of their children. Generally, those people who have a higher class background have 
greater chance and opportunity to acquire a better quality and a higher level education than 
others. The people with a lower class background are more restricted socially and 
economically. They not only have economic barriers but also social barriers blocking their 
careers. Therefore, people from lower class backgrounds have to spend much more time and 
effort than others to be successful in the competition. 
Family background also has indirect effects on the elite circulation process. A better 
family background opens up connections with the top strata and provides social networks 
with the cream of the cream of society. Those people who come from bourgeoisie and petty 
bourgeoisie families do not need to make much more effort to gain power, wealth and prestige 
in socialleconomic and political life in comparison with those who come from a poor family 
background. 
The findings which are presented in Table 23 support this argument: when the social 
class background of Turkish elites increases, their educational level slightly decreases. Those 
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elite respondents who have the highest class origins have the lowest educational levels among 
Turkish elites. Whereas, roughly 89 percent of Turkish elites with lower and lower-middle 
class origins possess a university degree almost 75 percent of the elites from upper class 
origins have a university degree. 
There is a relationship between educational level of the elites and their fathers' 
occupation. Table 24 shows that those elites whose fathers have a white collar occupation 
have a higher educational level then those elites whose fathers have a blue collar occupation. 
In addition, there is also a relationship between the educational level of elites and their 
mothers' occupation. Almost all the elites whose mothers were employed in paid work (non- 
housewives) have university degrees. 
10.2.2. EDUCATION TYPES OF TURKISH ELITES: 
Respondent's type of education is also an important variable which effects future 
career patterns. It appears that the social sciences (including economics and political science) 
and technical sciences lead most often to other areas of study among contemporary Turkish 
elites. The least popular types of education among Turkish elites are medical sciences and 
engineering of agriculture (agriculturist). Nevertheless, if one looks at Table 25, a relatively 
higher level plurality in terms of type of education among Turkish elites can be observed. 
Although, no single field of study dominates any sector, the study of politics, 
economics, public administration, management and engineering are more popular than other 
subjects. As happened in Germany (Hoffmann-Lange in G. Moore, 1985: 68), this reflects the 
fact that research funding opportunities are provided by the government and public sector. It 
is also important to note that, whereas legal studies were popular among Turkish elites in the 
early period of the Republic and early-mid years of the multi-party period (Arslan, 1995: 54- 
55,65-66), their popularity has been sharply declining for two decades. This finding supports 
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Hoffmann's speculative conclusion that "the law has lost its functions as a general intellectual 
training and (re)gained the status of a specialised training in legal matters" (Moore, 1985: 70). 
10.2.3. EDUCATIONAL BACKGROUNDS OF TURKISH ELITES' FATHERS: 
Table 26 demonstrates that a large majority of Turkish elites come from less educated 
families. Most of the elites' fathers have only primary school education. The number of those 
elites whose father have no school education or only a primary school education is about 59 
percent. Only 23 percent of the elites' fathers have had a university education. 
It is worth remembering that about 86 percent of Turkish elites possess at least one 
university degree. On the other hand, only 8.5 percent of the Turkish population have had a 
university education. Nevertheless, though educational levels of Turkish elites' families are 
lower than the actual educational levels of Turkish elites, the educational levels of their 
families is still higher than the average educational level of Turkish society. If the educational 
level of Turkish elites' families is compared with the general educational level of the Turkish 
population it can be said that, Turkish elites come from relatively highly educated families. 
The educational levels of Turkish elites' fathers differ from those of elite groups. The 
fathers of media elites have a higher educational level in comparison with the two other elite 
groups'. More than 60 percent of media elites are the children of fathers who have at least 
high school education. In addition, approximately 43 of their fathers have a university degree. 
Only 13 percent of the fathers of both political elites and labour union elites have had a 
university education. 
In contrast with media elites, about 67 percent of political elites' fathers and 77 
percent of labour union elites' fathers have experienced maximum primary school education. 
Anothex important fording is that nearly 17 percent of Turkish elites' fathers have had no 
school education. 
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There is also an important degree of association between the educational level of the 
respondents and the educational level of their fathers. It can be seen in Table 27 that, there is 
a positive relationship between the educational level of elites and educational levels of their 
fathers: those members of the elite whose fathers had higher level of education also enjoyed 
education at a higher level. When father's educational level decline the educational level of 
Turkish elites also decreased. Those Turkish elites who have had the least education are the 
children of those people who have had only a primary school education or no school 
education at all. Almost all the middle school (junior high school) educated elite and 82 
percent of high school graduate elite come from more poorly educated families (the families of 
those fathers who have had a primary school education or no formal school education). 
10.2.4. EDUCATIONAL BACKGROUNDS OF TURKISH ELITES' SPOUSES: 
Another important variable related to the social composition of Turkish elites is 
spouses' educational levels. The findings on this variable can be observed in Table 28, where 
high school education is the common feature for the spouses of the elite. A large majority of 
Turkish elites prefer to marry women with at least high school education. 
There is also a relationship between the educational level of elite respondents and 
educational level of respondents' spouses. In Table 29, it can be seen that about 70 percent of 
university educated men have married university educated women. Only 9 percent of 
university graduated elites are married to middle and elementary school educated women. 
High school educated elites are mostly married to women who have had a high school 
education or lower educational level. Approximately, 73 percent of the elite with high school 
education are married to high school or lower level graduates. 
Media elites' spouses have the highest educational level in comparison with the 
members' of the other two elites groups spouses': whereas only about 3 percent of the 
spouses of Turkish media elites have had only primary school education 80 percent of them 
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possess university degree and 93 percent of them possess at least a high school diploma. 
Educational levels of the labour union elites' and political elites' spouses are more or less the 
same. In general, only 9 percent of Turkish elites have married spouses with only a primary 
school education. 
There is an association between the educational level of the spouses of Turkish elites 
and the occupations of Turkish elites' spouses' mothers'. This situation can be observed in 
Table 30: whereas 55 percent of the spouses (of Turkish elites) whose mothers' are 
housewives have had a university education, almost all the elites whose mothers' are in paid 
work are university graduates. 
There is another important fording about spouses' educational level that refers to the 
relationship between the spouses' educational level and the spouses' fathers' occupation. As 
can be seen in Table 31, there is a higher level association between spouses' fathers' 
occupations and spouses' educational levels. Almost all the spouses (of Turkish elites) whose 
fathers are in white collar occupations possess at least one university degree. 
The educational level of those spouses whose fathers have blue collar occupations are 
substantially lower than the first group. The children of farmers have the lowest educational 
level; only 29 percent of them have had a university level education. The second most 
restricted group are the children of workers: the rate of university graduates among them is 38 
percent. The children of tradesmen or artisans follow them with 41 percent having had a 
university education. 
The social class backgrounds and educational levels of the spouses of Turkish elites 
are highly related to each other too. Table 32 shows that there is a positive correlation 
between social class origins and educational levels of spouses. Those spouses who have upper 
class origins have the highest educational level whereas lower class orientated spouses have 
the lowest educational levels. 
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Another significant fording is the association between gender of elites and their 
spouses' educational level. Table 33 demonstrates that the educational level of their husband 
is extremely important for the female Turkish elites: all the spouses of the female Turkish 
elites possess at least a university degree. This factor is slightly less important among the male 
elites. Whereas almost all the female Turkish elites prefer to get married to those people who 
have at least one university degree, only about 50 percent of the spouses of the male Turkish 
elites possess a university education. 
10.2.5. SCHOOL TYPES OF TURKISH ELITES AND ELITE SCHOOLS IN 
CONTEMPORARY TURKEY: 
The majority (about 65 percent) of the members of all elite groups mostly attended to 
the normal state (public) school. The number of people who attended prestigious schools 
(both state colleges and private colleges) is about 34 percent. Table 34 shows that the number 
of media elites who were educated in prestigious schools is worth noting: whereas about 80 
percent of political elites and labour union elites have had a normal (ordinary) state school 
education, a majority (which is about 60 percent) of the media elite have received a 
prestigious private or state school education. Only 40 percent of media elites have been 
educated in state schools. 
There is a big difference between Turkish elites and the general population in terms of 
the quality of education received. As can be seen in Table 34, about 18 percent of Turkish 
elites have been educated in prestigious private schools and 16 percent of them graduated 
from prestigious state colleges. On the other hand, Table 35 demonstrates that the average 
rate of private school educated people is just 2 percent amongst the general Turkish 
population. 
Another highly important finding is on the relationship between social origin and 
educational background. Table 36 shows that there is an association between the class 
background of Turkish elites and the quality of their education. Those respondents who come 
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from bourgeois and petty bourgeois families were mostly educated in prestigious schools 
whereas 65 percent of those of upper-middle class origins and 100 percent of upper class 
originated elites have a prestigious school education only. 12.5 percent of those elites who 
come from working class backgrounds and 21 percent of the elites who come from the lower- 
middle class have enjoyed a prestigious school education. 
Also it seems there is an association between the educational level of respondents' 
fathers and the educational quality of the respondents. If Table 37 is examined this positive 
relation can be seen: when the educational level of the respondent's father increases the 
quality of the respondents' education increases, and when the educational level of the 
respondent's father decreases the quality of the respondent's education also decreases. 
Statistically, whereas 62 percent of the elites whose fathers possess a university degree 
graduated from prestigious elite schools, only 16 % of the respondents whose fathers only 
received a primary school education were educated in prestigious schools. In addition, none of 
the uneducated fathers' children had received a prestigious private school education. 
As in other countries, there are a number of famous and prestigious elite schools in 
Turkey. Some private exclusive high schools are highly prestigious and have long historical 
roots. Galatasaray High School, Robert College and some French High Schools can be 
counted among them. Their graduates have very close and strong relations and friendship ties 
with one another which are extremely effective in many aspects of political, economic and 
social life. 
On the other hand, almost all the universities have traditionally been owned by the 
state and there were no privately owned universities in Turkey until the 1980s. As a result, the 
owner of almost all the prestigious universities was the state. Ankara University (especially the 
Faculty of Political Sciences-MULKIYE), Istanbul Technical University, Bogazici University, 
Istanbul University and METU (Middle East Technical University) may be counted among the 
most prestigious state owned universities. 
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Nevertheless, as a result of changing governmental policies, some privately owned 
universities have sprung up since the 1980s. The first and most famous privately owned 
university is Bilkent University. A number of other private universities opened in the 1990s. 
Now, there are more than 70 universities (both state owned or privately owned) in Turkey. 
Table 38 demonstrates that Ankara University is the most prestigious and well known 
elite university in Turkey. The Faculty of Political Sciences, in particular, has a very long 
tradition and has a very effective clique character. The Faculty of Political Sciences of Ankara 
university has traditionally been called the "Mulkiye" and many Turkish elites have graduated 
from this school. Its graduates represent all the peculiarities of group conspiracy, coherence 
and consciousness. They are highly effective not only in Turkish politics but also in every part 
of the administration of society. Also, Istanbul University, Istanbul Technical University, Gazi 
University, Bogazici University and METU (Middle East Technical University) are highly 
popular universities among Turkish elites. 
10.2.6. SCHOOL PREFERENCES OF TURKISH ELITES FOR THEIR CHILDREN: 
As discussed earlier, not only quantity but also the quality of education has great 
importance for the future careers of individuals. The quality of acquired education is very 
influential in accessing higher positions in society. Therefore, one of the most common goals 
of people is to obtain a high quality education from prestigious private or public schools for 
their children. Nevertheless, only a tiny minority have the opportunity to obtain this kind of 
education. 
As can be seen from Table 39, a large proportion (90 percent) of Turkish elites have 
children who are in/post school age groups. The children of Turkish elites have the best 
opportunity to obtain a high quality of education. As a result of their privileged social and 
economic resources, they do not usually have any problem in obtaining a privileged education 
either in prestigious state schools or in the private schools. The findings which are shown in 
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Table 40 are proof of this argument: the overwhelming majority of children of Turkish elites 
have been educated in prestigious schools. 
There is a positive association between the social status of Turkish elites and the 
quality of education received by their children. Parallel to the increase in social class status of 
Turkish elites, the quality of education which is received by their children increases. Table 41 
shows that, the vast majority of the children of those elites who have upper class status have 
received their education from prestigious elite schools. 
10.2.7. FOREIGN LANGUAGE ABILITIES OF TURKISH ELITES: 
Another important factor which is related to the education of the elites is foreign 
language ability. Knowing a foreign language is very important in today's world. This ability 
has even greater importance for those people who occupy elite positions. Since, the world has 
become a global village, if people wish to communicate with other people who come from 
different cultures and societies they need to have foreign language ability. 
As can be seen in Table 42, the majority of Turkish elites do possess a foreign 
language. About 82 percent of them know at least one foreign language. In addition, 47 
percent of Turkish elites have the ability in at least two foreign languages and 26 percent of 
them are competent in at least 3 foreign languages. 
There is an important relation between the genders of Turkish elites and their foreign 
language abilities. Table 43 shows that almost all female Turkish elites have the ability to 
speak at least one foreign language. However, roughly 30 percent of male Turkish elites 
cannot speak any foreign language. According to Table 44, there is an association between 
educational levels and the foreign language ability of Turkish elites. Almost 80 percent of 
university educated Turkish elites can speak at least one foreign language, whilst 73 percent of 
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high school educated and 50 percent of middle school educated Turkish elites can not speak 
any foreign language. 
As in other countries of the world, the most popular foreign language among Turkish 
elites is English. Table 45 shows that more than half of Turkish elites speak English. The 
second most popular language among Turkish elites is French, and the third is German. Also, 
there is a meaningful relationship between the genders of Turkish elites and the nature of their 
foreign language abilities. As can be seen in Table 46, almost all female Turkish elites could 
speak only European foreign languages. It has to be also noted that all the female elites can 
speak English. In addition to that, 14 percent of female Turkish elites can speak both German 
and English, and another 14 percent of them could speak both French and English. However, 
male Turkish elites present a highly pluralist character when it comes to foreign language 
ability. 
Table 45 and Table 46 also provide some ideas about contemporary Turkish society. 
Turkey has turned its face completely towards western civilisation since the beginning of the 
Republic and it has taken a very large step in the process of westernisation. The tables 
illustrate this: more than 95 percent of Turkish elites who know a foreign language speak 
European languages. 
10.3. RELATIVE ELITE INTEGRATION IN TURKEY: 
10.3.1. RELATIVE ELITE INTEGRATION AND RELATIVE ELITE 
CONSENSUS IN CONTEMPORARY TURKEY: 
Elite Integration is characterised by social homogeneity and shared interests: it is 
possible to measure elite integration by investigating social homogeneity and consensus on 
major social issues. A number of measures can be used to examine the social homogeneity of 
elites: social class background, educational level, religious boundaries, attendance at exclusive 
private schools, membership of prestigious clubs, ... etc.. Elite 
homogeneity can be 
investigated under two main headings: 
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1. Internal Homogeneity: homogeneity within a specific elite group 
2. External Homogeneity: homogeneity among different elite groups. 
Hoffmann-Lange (in G. Moore, 1985: 45-6) put forward two integration types with 
subtypes in order to measure elite integration: 
1) Structural integration: 
a) Informal social integration 
b) Professional integration 
c) Integration of the policy formation process. 
2) Ideological integration 
Structural integration is related to formal and informal networks of personal 
communication and friendship (social similarity). The major indicators of informal social elite 
integration are family background (the profiles of social class origins), friendship ties among 
elite members, education, membership in voluntary associations, ... etc.. To measure 
professional integration, one can examine the networks of contacts among position holders in 
relation to organisational activities. Educational degrees (having a university education) can be 
used as an indicator of qualification too. Furthermore, to define integration of the policy 
formation process, one can look at networks of contacts through which elite members try to 
influence political decisions. Ideological integration is measured by the degree of consensus 
(e. g. sharing values, interests). 
Elite consensus is measured by using the similarities or dissimilarities among elites in 
terms of their beliefs, attitudes and behaviour patterns on major social issues. Over 20 
questions were asked to measure both internal and external homogeneity. Some of the 
questions were issue related questions whilst others were directly related to the values, beliefs 
and attitudes of respondents. In order to measure elite integration among Turkish elites, 
personal communication and friendship ties, educational level, family background (social class 
origin) and social class profile, consensus on major issues were investigated in this study. Both 
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internal homogeneity and external homogeneity will be examined using these factors. 
Nevertheless, in these section, it will be specifically concerned with external elite homogeneity 
(the homogeneity between the elite groups). Internal homogeneity within each elite group is 
measured individually within the related chapters. Exactly the same indicators were used to 
measure internal homogeneity. 
According to the findings, there is an important degree of professional integration 
among Turkish elites. If Table 47 is examined it can be seen that, Turkish labour union elites 
have the highest degree of professional integration among all Turkish elites. Political elites 
follow them with a proportion of nearly 87 percent. In comparison with these two elites, the 
degree of integration among Turkish media elites is very low: an important proportion of them 
do not have close relations with their colleagues. Only 50 percent of media elites' close friends 
are from their own occupational environment. They also have close relations with business 
and political elites. 
One can also test Meisel's "three C's" formula by using the same findings. It can be 
said that there is a higher degree of professional group consciousness, coherence and 
conspiracy among Turkish elites. Table 47 demonstrates that Turkish trade union elites and 
political elites possess a coherent group character. On the other hand, Turkish media elites 
have a relatively lower degree of group coherence in comparison with the other elite groups. 
The findings on occupational satisfaction among elites may be used as an additional 
measurement tool to determine professional integration. When Table 48 is examined, it can be 
seen that Turkish elites are very satisfied with their actual occupational positions. The degree 
of occupational satisfaction among Turkish business union elites is perfect: almost all of them 
are satisfied or completely satisfied with their occupations. Also, the degree of gratification 
among Turkish political elites and media elites is substantially higher: about 93 percent of the 
members of both elite groups are pleased or very pleased with their jobs. The overall 
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satisfaction rate among Turkish elites is 96 percent. Thus the results of this investigation 
support the idea of "the existence of professional integration among Turkish elites". 
Table 49 shows that, there is a meaningful consensus between Turkish elites. There is 
the highest degree of consensus among the elites on family planning and the idea of 
"establishing white collar labour unions with the rights of collective bargaining and strike". 
More than 90 percent of Turkish elites approve of family planning and white collar labour 
unions having these rights. There is a slightly lower degree of consensus about abortion and 
capital punishment. Nevertheless, more than 70 percent of Turkish elites support capital 
punishment and abortion. 
The idea of "8 year obligatory education" provides an important measurement tool to 
measure not only issue consensus but also ideological consensus. Radical right people have 
been against the issue of "the increase of obligatory education from 5 years to 8 years". As 
discussed before, religious junior high schools and high schools have been controlled by 
fundamentalist Islamist groups since the 1950s. The Islamist Welfare Party overtly announced 
last year, "Imamhatips (Religious High Schools) were their major vote and militant 
reservoirs". 
The relationship between politics and religion is another important and very sensitive 
issue in contemporary Turkey. Islamic fundamentalists have traditionally been hostile to 
democratic values and the laic-democratic Turkish Republic. It has been declared several 
times by the leaders of the Islamic fundamentalists, "democracy is only a tool in achieving 
their counter-revolution and, as in other Islamic countries, it will be used profusely until the 
establishment of an Islamic state which will be based on Sheriat (Holy Islamic Rules)". 
As discussed before, fundamentalist separatist Islamist groups have been struggling to 
destroy the democracy and development of democratic values in Turkey since the Turkish 
Republic was established. Therefore, it is impossible to accept these groups as civil society 
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organisations. It has been known by all Turkish elites that, some politicians have been in close 
touch with the leaders of religious organisations. Some politicians (both left wing and right 
wing) still have close relations with the sheikhs for short-term political benefits. Whereas only 
10 percent of Turkish labour union elites and 7 percent of Turkish media elites approve the 
"relations between politicians and sheikhs", about 20 percent of the political elites support 
these relations. 
In fact, it seems that, Turkish elites present a homogeneous group character in terms 
of religion. As has been discussed under the heading of the "Religious Affiliations of Turkish 
Elites", about 80 percent of Turkish elites have no or slight religious beliefs. The degree of 
religious affiliation differs in terms of political views: whereas, a large majority of average and 
strong believer Turkish elites are the supporters of right wing political parties, nearly 90 
percent of radical leftist elites have no or little religious orientation. 
This consensus proves the idea of the existence of "external homogeneity" among 
Turkish elites. This homogeneity confirms the relative elite integration in Turkish society. On 
the other hand, Turkish elites also present not only a large degree of internal homogeneity but 
also external homogeneity in terms of their social origins and their actual class identity. As 
discussed under the main heading of "social class origins and actual social class status of 
Turkish elites", a large majority of Turkish elites have middle class origins. Statistically, 87 
percent of Turkish elites comes from middle class families. 
There is also a higher level homogeneity in terms of educational level among Turkish 
elites. As has been demonstrated in the section "Educational Characteristics of Turkish 
Elites", a large majority of Turkish elites have had a university education. Approximately, 87 
percent of Turkish elites possess at least one university degree. 
Turkish elites are more homogeneous in terms of their actual class positions. As can be 
seen in Table 50, almost 90 percent of Turkish elites have upper-middle or upper class social 
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status. Actual social class positions of Turkish political elites and media elites are exactly the 
same as and higher than the social positions of Turkish labour union elites. 
Turkish elites also present a very homogeneous appearance in terms of their life views. 
When the characteristics of Turkish society are taken into account, the idea of "women's 
place in society" provides an adequate tool to measure life views (the liberal or conservative 
nature of the thought of Turkish elites). As can be seen in Table 51, more than 90 percent of 
Turkish elites are liberal minded or totally liberal minded. 
As a result of the investigation, it is possible to observe the relative elite consensus 
(both internal and external) among Turkish elites. This consensus can be called "relative elite 
consensus" using the demo-elite perspective. Whereas there is a higher level of internal 
consensus within each elite group, there is a slightly lower but still high level of external 
consensus between the Turkish elite groups. Thus, minimum consensus on basic democratic 
values is an essential requirement for the successful functioning of a democratic political 
system. This is the basic rule of the "game". 
On the other hand, elite consensus does not mean the end of conflict and struggle 
among the elites or between elite groups. Political and ideological heterogeneity can be 
tolerated. Also, political and ideological differentiation does not contradict elite consensus. 
The Turkish case is a typical example of relative elite consensus. 
Also, it should be borne in mind that, it is impossible to claim a certain elite 
integration in contemporary democratic states. One may talk only of "relative elite 
integration ". The degree of elite integration differs in terms of time and conditions. Briefly, it 
can be concluded that it is possible to observe "relative elite integration" and the existence of 
relatively cohesive power elites in contemporary Turkey. 
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10.3.2. HETEROGENEITY: 
Heterogeneity is one of the most common attributes of contemporary democratic 
societies. This situation can be observed among the elites of contemporary societies as well. It 
is possible to observe heterogeneity among elites or between elite groups in terms of these 
factors: 
1. Political-ideological heterogeneity 
2. Regional heterogeneity 
3. Occupational heterogeneity 
10.3.2.1. Regional Heterogeneity Among Turkish Elites: 
Compared to its Western counterparts, Turkey is a recently but rapidly urbanising 
country: the rapid urbanisation process began in Turkey in the 1950s. Most of the people who 
are living in cities have direct or indirect ties with rural Turkey. In the same way as most 
Turkish people, a majority of the elites have rural connections too. Nevertheless, almost all 
the Turkish elites have lived in big cities for a long time even though they may have rural 
origins. Only the big cities provide the opportunities to access elite positions, through 
attendance at prestigious high schools and universities. 
Elites in Turkey are decentralised: there is no single national elite centre 
geographically in terms of specific sectors. As can be seen from Table 52, there is 
heterogeneity in terms of geographical regions among Turkish elites. 
Thus, regional identity does not affect the elite circulation process in Turkey very 
much. Nevertheless some regions provide more opportunities to individuals to enhance their 
skills and abilities. Istanbul, Ankara and Izmir may be counted among the major regional 
centres. However, one has to bear in mind the fact that there has been a very large wave of 
immigration from every part of rural Turkey to the more urbanised parts of the country since 
the 1950s. As a result, all the big cities in Turkey have the characteristics of culturally 
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metropolitan cities. All these metropols and Istanbul megapol contain people from every part 
of the country (from north to south and from east to west) and from all Turkish sub-cultures. 
10.3.2.2 Political and Ideological Heterogeneity Among Turkish Elites: 
Ideological and political differentiation are features of contemporary democratic 
societies. Such conflicts of interests or values have to be considered normal in today's 
competitive world. Nevertheless, these differences, competition or conflicts do not mean that 
"relative elite consensus" is impossible to achieve. A degree of disagreement between elite 
groups is not only unavoidable but even desirable. 
As a result of the democratic and competitive character of Turkish society, there is a 
large degree of political and ideological differentiation. Turkish elites reflect the pluralist 
character of society. These divisions can be observed in Table 53: almost all political or 
ideological factions are represented among Turkish elites. It is possible to find people from 
both the factions and sub-factions of right and left: from liberal ideology to radical right 
ideologies (like radical Islamist or Fascist ideologies), from social democrats to radical leftists 
(socialists, national socialists and communists). It can be seen in Table 53 that the proportion 
of left minded elites is slightly higher than the others. 
It has to be borne in mind that, a heterogeneity on ideology based issues is quite 
normal and expected. Ideological differences and political divisions are common features of all 
societies and to look for a consensus on ideology or politics based issues is unrealistic. 
Therefore, the researcher did not look for homogeneity. As a result existing homogeneity can 
be called "Relative Elite Homogeneity" rather than exact elite homogeneity. 
10.3.2.3 Occupational Heterogeneity Among Turkish Elites: 
Another heterogeneous situation that may be observed among elites or between elite 
groups is heterogeneity in terms of occupational background. As in most other societies, there 
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is a high level of occupational heterogeneity among Turkish elites. Nevertheless, it can be said 
that white collar occupations predominate among Turkish elites. 
10.3.3. RELIGION AND RELIGIOUS ORIENTATIONS OF TURKISH ELITES: 
Religion is one of the most important social institutions and an important indicator of 
individual value orientation. Religion is very important in Turkish society. It effects more or 
less the attitudes and behaviour of the people. Also, religious orientation impacts on life views 
(e. g. being liberal or conservative minded) and party preference. As discussed under the 
heading of "The Major Problems of Turkey", Islam possess not only a spiritual character but 
also an ideological and political character. The religious beliefs and emotions of Turks have 
been exploited by a group of people who are sometimes called the "Religious Barons". 
This religious exploitation has given an important dimension to contemporary Turkish 
society. Although this exploitation goes against the essence of true Islam, religious exploiters 
exploit the religious beliefs of innocent Turkish people to obtain power, prestige and fortune. 
They have been attempting to create a class of religious clergy. They have become highly 
successful in achieving their goals especially in the shanty-towns of the big cities. 
It appears that a large majority of Turkish elites have very little or no religious 
affiliation. Almost 80 percent of them are rational minded people. As can be seen from Table 
54, only 10 percent of them have strong and another 10 percent average religious affiliation. It 
can be said that political elites possess slightly higher religious sentiments than the other elites. 
Another important point in this context is gender. As can be observed in Table 55, a 
majority of Turkish female elites have no or little relation to Islam. The degree of devoutness 
is relatively higher among male Turkish elites. Nevertheless, it can be concluded from this 
figure that Turkish elites are mostly liberal minded in terms of religious belief. 
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Also, education is another important factor which influences the respondents' religious 
beliefs. Table 56 demonstrates that religion is highly effective among high school (lycee) 
graduated elites. This may be the result of the "religious high school (Imamhatip Lisesi) 
effect". Religious high schools have been accepted as a potential militant source since the 
beginning of the multi-party period and have been supported and developed by radical Islamist 
groups, as well as by right wing political parties. 
The association between the religious affiliations of respondents and their family 
background can be examined in Tables 57 and 58. The most important finding is that the 
majority of fathers of those elites who have average or strong religious belief have blue collar 
or semi-white collar occupations. Almost all the elites who have no or little religious ties come 
from white collar families. Merchants' and artisans' children have the highest proportion 
among these elites with average or strong religious affiliations and farmers' children follow 
them. 
Social class origin also has a significant influence on religious affiliation. Turkish elites 
with average or strong religious affiliation come predominantly from middle class families. As 
presented in Tables 58 and 59, almost all the average believers and approximately 90 percent 
of the strong believers come from middle class (both lower middle, middle and upper-middle) 
families. 
Religious affiliation has some direct or indirect impact on party preference. Table 60 
shows that almost all the social democratic minded Turkish elites and approximately 90 
percent of radical leftist elites have little or no religious orientation. On the other hand, a large 
majority of average and strong believer Turkish elites are the supporters of right wing political 
parties. 
Another related variable to the religious affiliation of elite respondents is beliefs about 
"life after death". All the respondents were asked "Do you believe in life after death? " 
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According to the findings of the research, over half of Turkish elites did not believe in life 
after death. Only 38 percent of the elites were believers. 
10.3.4. OCCUPATIONAL UNIONS AND PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATIONS: 
Membership of occupational or professional associations is extremely important for 
elites, especially for trade union elites. For labour union elites, it is impossible to access an 
elite position in their organisational hierarchy unless they are a member of that association. 
When the findings the membership of occupational associations among labour union 
elites is examined, this situation can be clearly observed: membership of occupational 
organisations is significantly higher among labour union elites than the others. Almost all the 
labour union elites are members of their related occupational organisations. On the other hand, 
the situation differs slightly among Turkish political elites and media elites: 60 percent of the 
political elites and 80 percent of the media elites are members of their occupational 
associations. In general, 80 percent of Turkish elites are members of their relevant 
occupational association. 
The most common reasons for being members of their occupational organisation are 
"civil society" and "occupational". In Table 61 it can be seen that, Turkish labour union elites 
have mostly emphasised the "civil society" reason. This is not an unusual and unexpected 
result, because their occupation necessitates much more struggle and activity. They have to 
negotiate both business elites and ruling elites. 
Table 62 shows that Turkish business associations are more powerful and influential 
than Turkish Trade Unions. As mentioned by almost all elite respondents during the project, 
individual members of the Turkish business elite wield enormous power and they are far more 
powerful than business associations. 
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10.3.5. ELITE CLUBS AND STUDENT FRATERNITIES: 
Elite clubs and student fraternities occupy a very important place in the power 
structure of contemporary societies. They have a large influence on the decision making 
process, either directly or indirectly. Therefore, the researcher was not only interested in 
comparing different elite sectors but also in comparing the number of people who are 
members. In addition, the researcher also wanted to investigate the impact of the elite clubs on 
the circulation of elites. 
Elite clubs and student fraternities are very influential and powerful in Turkish society. 
Some exclusive high school clubs are highly prestigious and have a long tradition. These 
include Galatasaray High School, Robert College and some French High Schools. The 
graduates of these schools possess very close relations and strong friendship ties which are 
very influential in all aspects of social life. 
In higher education, "ITU'luler" (Istanbul Technical University Graduates), 
"Bogazici'liler" (Bogazici University Graduates) and "Mulkiye'hler" (graduates of Ankara 
University, Faculty of Political Sciences) have important student fraternities. The 
"Mulkiyeliler" which is a very effective clique, is well known in Turkish society. This 
fraternity has a long tradition and its members strongly present all the characteristics of group 
conspiracy, coherence and consciousness. They are highly effective in Turkish politics and 
administration of society. Also, METU (Middle East Technical University) and Bilkent 
University have relatively effective student fraternities too. 
The related statistics on club membership of Turkish elites can be found in Table 63. 
According to this, about 50 percent of Turkish elites are members of at least one elite club. It 
has to be borne in mind that most members of Turkish elite wish to keep their association with 
elite clubs secret. It should also be noted that, although all these associations are legal 
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organisations in Turkey, none of the Turkish elites wanted to discuss their relations with 
Rotary and Lion clubs, and the associations of freemasonry. 
Elite clubs are very powerful (both overtly and covertly) in Turkish society. They 
exercise their powers directly or indirectly. Table 65 clearly shows that, they have a powerful 
influence on decision making and the entire policy formation process in Turkey. Most of the 
paths to accessing elite positions have been monopolised by these elite clubs. There are other 
reasons for membership of the elite clubs for Turkish elites: in Table 64, the most common 
reasons given are solidarity, status and "civil society" understanding. 
In addition to the student fraternities, there are a number of other elite organisations or 
clubs in Turkey: 
1. Rotary, Lions, Freemasons 
2. Anatolian, Big Club, and others, 
3. Modern Foundations, 
. 
4. Classical Foundations (wakfs) or alternative organisations. 
The Rotary, Lions and the Freemasons are three of the most effective and powerful 
international organisations. In Turkey, these organisations are regarded as exclusive upper- 
class associations. They are very selective and admission to these elite clubs is very difficult. 
Most of their members are business leaders, well known and successful academics and 
scientists, famous and powerful politicians, ... etc.. 
It has to be borne in mind that, although 
they are legal organisations in Turkey none of the elites wished to discuss their ties with these 
clubs. 
Personal interaction, consensus building and friendship networks are the major 
characteristics of these types of elite clubs which have a rigid organisational structure and are 
closed groups. Although there is much speculation about their power, it can be argued that 
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they are the most powerful and influential elite clubs in Turkey. They exercise their power not 
only in the national arena but also internationally. 
Anadolu Kulubu (Anatolian Club) and Buyuk Kulup (Grand Club) are also well known 
Turkish elite clubs. They are highly prestigious and exclusive. They provide their members 
with personal interaction and friendship networks. Most effective politicians, wealthy 
businessman and well known social figures are counted among their members. Also, there are 
some modern foundations which carry elite club status in Turkey. 
Classical foundations or wakfs (Islamic elite clubs), which are also quite powerful and 
have influence on the decision making process, are an other type of important social 
organisation in Turkey. Most of them possess a religious character and connections with 
religious orders. Almost all the members of these conservative foundations are radical right in 
terms of political orientation. Some of these foundations are very selective and have an elitist 
character. Most of the politicians, businessman and scientists on the political right are 
members of these organisations. 
To summarise, there is a plurality of social clubs and student fraternities in Turkey. 
Some of them have a long tradition and some are recently established organisations. Some of 
them exercise an influence nation-wide whereas others possess an international character. 
Some of them are narrowly political and ideological, others allow members from different 
political and ideological groups. Nevertheless, despite their diversity elite clubs and student 
fraternities have an important place in the social and political structure of Turkey. In fact some 
of them are enormously powerful and effectively influence the decision making process. 
10.3.6. POLITICAL CLEAVAGES AMONGST TURKISH ELITES: 
As has been discussed under the heading "Political and Ideological Heterogeneity 
among Turkish Elites", almost all ideological and political factions and sub-factions (either 
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leftist or rightist) have been represented among Turkish elites. This reality reflects the 
democratic character of Turkish society. 
As mentioned in earlier chapters, it is possible to observe a substantial plurality in 
contemporary Turkish politics. More than 30 political parties have been struggling to obtain a 
share of political power in Turkey. As presented in Table 66,13 political groups participated 
in the last general election (1995) but only 5 of them were be able to send their members to 
the Turkish Grand National Assembly. When Table 66 is examined carefully it can be seen 
that a large majority of Turkish people voted for right wing parties. The total vote going to 
both two major liberal right parties (True Path Party-DYP and Motherland Party-ANAP) and 
one radical right party (Islamist Welfare Party-RP) was about 60 percent. On the other hand, 
the total proportion going to the two major social democratic parties (Democratic Leftist 
Party-DSP and Republican Populist Party-CHP) was only 25 percent. It is possible to observe 
the lack of success of the leftist parties. 
When it is remembered that less than 10 % of the Turkish population are currently 
members of a political party, the size elite party membership can be understood more 
realistically. The percentage for the elites is 4 times greater than the non-elite population. 
Political party membership is more widespread among the elites of trade unions. Almost 45 
percent of them are members of a political party. On the other hand, only 17 percent of 
Turkish media elites are members of political parties. 
In accordance with historical roots, a large majority of Turkish labour union elites are 
supporters of left wing parties, such as the Social Democratic and Socialist Parties. Despite 
the plurality of Turkish labour unions, there are fewer supporters of other parties (such as 
radical right wing parties-like Islamist parties and ultra nationalist parties or liberal-centre 
right parties) among labour union leaders. 
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On the other hand, whereas a large majority of members of classical foundations 
(wakfs) support the radical rightist (Islamist or ultra Nationalist) parties, most of the members 
of the modern foundations are left minded people who support the Social Democratic and 
Socialist Parties. This situation demonstrates that the "wakfs (classical foundations) are 
alternative organisations which have been established by religious minded people to cater for 
the religious oriented. 
Also, Table 67 clearly shows that almost all the members of the social clubs (e. g. Big 
Cub, Anatolian Club, Galatasaray Club) are supporters of the liberal democratic or social 
democratic (centre right or centre left) parties. There may be two different explanations for 
this situation: either the social elite clubs are closed to the marginals (both radical rightists or 
radical leftists), or radical minded people avoid joining these kind of elite clubs. 
There is an association between the gender of the elites and their political preferences. 
Table 68 shows in detail that a large proportion of female Turkish elites have leftist views. 
Only 14 percent of them are supporters of liberal right parties. None of the Turkish female 
elites support radical right wing parties (either ultra nationalist or pro-islamist parties). There 
is the effect of the male monopoly of power within these kinds of political parties, so there is 
no place for women in the higher posts. 
There is a significant association between political preference and social origin and 
education. Education has a crucial influence on political choice. Table 69 clearly shows that 
social democratic minded Turkish elites have the highest level of education: almost 92 percent 
of them have at least one university degree. Second most educated elites groups is the group 
of radical right minded elites. 
The findings on educational level and political choice are related to the family 
backgrounds of the elites and their fathers' political preferences. As presented in Table 70,87 
percent of liberal right minded elites and 82 percent of radical right minded elites come from 
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those families who are supporters of right (either liberal or radical) wing political parties. On 
the other hand 63 percent of social democratic and 76 percent of radical leftist elites are the 
children of leftist families. 
Another important finding is that when left originated elites have highly stable 
appearances, this usually reflect the political tradition of their families. All the radical left 
minded fathers' children hold left views. Social democrat fathers' children also hold mostly 
leftist views: only 8 percent of the children of social democratic families have rightist views. 
Whereas 23 percent of radical rightist and 30 percent of liberal rightist fathers' children hold 
leftist views. This situation can be related to the reality of left minded families who have 
politically and ideologically more stable characters. In addition, leftist ideologies necessitate 
mostly rational and objective thinking. 
There is an important association between social class origins and the political choices 
of Turkish elites. Lower and lower-middle class originated elites have mostly leftist views. 
The proportion of the leftist respondents among middle class and upper-middle class family 
orientated Turkish elites is lower when compared with the first group. As can be seen from 
Table 71, whereas 88 percent of lower class originated elites and 68 percent of lower-middle 
class originated elites hold leftist views, the proportion of the leftist elites among middle class 
comers is only 45 percent. There is an exceptional situation for the upper class originated 
elites: 75 percent of upper class comers have social democratic view and 25 percent of them 
are supporters of radical rightist parties. 
There is a meaningful association between the political preferences of Turkish elites 
and their religious bearing. Table 72 shows that, almost all strong believer elites are 
supporters of radical rightist political parties. A large majority of average believers supports 
the liberal right wing parties. On the other hand, a substantial majority of those elites who 
have no religious beliefs vote for left wing parties. 
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71w 7urkish Power elite 
"At this moment, nq listeners are farmers, artisans, merchants and workers. Any of these can 
become the antagonist of another. But, who can deny that the farmer needs the artisan, the 
artisan the farmer, the farmer the merchant, and all of them need one another and the 
worker". (Kemal Ataturk's speech, Izmir Economic Congress, 1923). 
cArm PTER 
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CHAPTER- I1 
11. THE TURKISH POWER ELITE 
According to Mills (1956: 363), it is not too difficult to understand the middle classes, 
but understanding the very top of modern society needs discovery and description. This is a 
very difficult task, because they are usually inaccessible, busy and secretive. It is always 
difficult to get information about their backgrounds, their characters and their activities. In 
spite of all these difficulties, the purpose of this chapter is to find the answers to these and 
similar questions: questions relating to the existence of the power elite and the structure of 
power in Turkey. 
11.1. THE TURKISH POWER ELITE: 
The findings on the Turkish power elite are rather similar to that of C. W. Mills. 
According to Mills, in America in the 1950s, there were three most vigorous and influential 
elite groups within the power structure which were political elites, business elites and military 
elites. These elite groups had social inter-connections, common interests and affairs and 
similar social backgrounds. The results of this study confirm the existence of a "power elite" 
in Turkey which is constructed by a group of individuals occupying top positions in several 
organisations. In accordance with the ideas of C. W. Mills (1956), the members of these most 
powerful and most influential elite groups form the "Turkish Power Elite". 
Differing from Mills' findings, there are four key elite groups in Turkey. The most 
dominant elite groups in contemporary Turkey are political elites, business elites, military 
elites and media elites. The unity of these four key elite groups constitutes the Turkish power 
elite which formulates the most significant policy issues and make macro level social, 
economic and political decisions. Their power is inevitable and their influence is often 
irresistible because they are well organised and co-ordinated. They control the state and the 
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elite recruitment process. Briefly, they control the lives of millions of people. Like Spanish 
elites (Alcazar and Pizarro in G. Moore, 1985: 150), they are closely integrated and relatively 
united. 
To Field and Higley (1980: 17-20), the elitist paradigm concerns the consensual 
unified elite. They argue that elites are imperfectly unified and representative institutions are 
highly unstable, especially in modern developing countries. Parallel to Field and Higley's 
argument, contemporary Turkish elites present a unified elite character, although not 
perfectly. 
On the other hand, in accordance with the pluralists views one could argue that, power 
has been diffused and fragmented among many people or elite groups which together 
participate in the decision-making process in contemporary Turkish society. Nevertheless, 
decisive and effective power (parallel with the main thesis of the elitist view) has been 
concentrated and centralised in the hands of the small number of elite groups which are the 
most powerful in the national power structure. They are predominant over other groups and 
these dominant groups know what others do not know and can do what others cannot do. 
In brief, the Turkish power elites are the most powerful and wealthy people in society. 
They define the final shape of socio-political and economic decisions. They not only define the 
roles of millions of Turkish people, they also define the future of Turkish society. These 
people can get their own way despite opposition. They are the gatekeepers of society. 
The Turkish power elites hold institutionalised power and influence the decision 
making/taking process incessantly and effectively. They control the social resources (such as 
wealth, prestige and status) and personal resources (such as charisma, time, motivation and 
energy). They define the way and the direction of society which has to be followed. 
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11.2. SOCIAL COMPOSITION AND CONSEQUENCE OF THE TURKISH 
POWER ELITE: 
The study showed without any doubt that the Turkish power elite exists; there is 
relative cohesion and unity among its members; and they exercise control over decisions. As 
stated by Mills (1956: 283), as a member of the power elite, they define each other as among 
those who accordingly must be taken into account. 
The Turkish power elite, or in other words the key elites of contemporary Turkish 
society, are composed of people of similar social origins, similar educational backgrounds and 
similar occupational careers. Also, they have similar life styles and views, and they are 
increasingly co-ordinated. Nevertheless, as noted by Mills (1956: 20), this co-ordination is not 
total and continuous. The top of the power hierarchy are more powerful, because they are 
more unified. The bottom of society (non-elites) is rather weak, because they are more 
fragmented. 
The power elite are not only the people who have succeeded but are also the wielders 
of the patronage of success. As Mills said (1956: 347), they interpret and apply to individuals 
the criteria of success. The shadow power elite and aspirant power elite are usually members 
of this clique. Also, as stated by Mills (1956: 83), the people in the higher political, economic, 
military and even media circles represent an elite of money and power. They are the biggest 
share holders in the national hierarchy of status, power and wealth. 
The findings on the Turkish power elites can be outlined as follows: 
" There are inter-class marriages among the members of the Turkish power elite 
" They have attended similar or the same types of exclusive private and state schools 
" Their actual social status is similar or even interchangeable 
" They are members of the exclusive school fraternities and elite clubs 
" They enjoy common or similar life-styles 
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" They possess exceptional advantages of social origins and training (family and education) 
" They were born into mostly middle and upper-middle class families, and upper class family 
background makes up an important proportion of the Turkish power elite 
" There is a very large male domination among them and females are underrepresented in 
the Turkish power elite 
" They are overwhelmingly middle aged although older people make up the second largest 
group. 
Turkish power elite cannot merely be defined as those people who are ordinary 
bureaucrats doing their duty. They determine not only their own duties but also the roles and 
duties of the entire Turkish population. They give orders to Turkish society, direct the 
dominant institutions and control the state apparatus. They define the rules which have to be 
followed by the Turkish people. They direct the speed and route of social change. Ultimately 
they take/make the decisions and define the major targets of Turkish society. 
11.3. GENERAL POWER STRUCTURE OF TURKEY: 
The power structure of Turkish society is neither elitist nor pluralist in itself: no single 
elite group is dominant in socio-political issues and decisive power has not been diffused 
among the numerous elite groups. In reality, the power structure of Turkey only can be 
explained by using the theories of the demo-elite perspective. 
There are two major power centres in Turkey: "internal power centres" and "external 
power centres". During the field research several Turkish elites repeatedly mentioned that, 
there were a number of external power centres which are influential on the socio-political 
decision making process in Turkey. America and specifically the National intelligence agency 
(CIA) occupies the first and most powerful position among these external power centres. In 
addition, certain international organisations have some degree of influence on particular 
issues: for example, the IMF and Worldbank have an important influence on economic affairs. 
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Figure 9 
Power Structure of Turkey 
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On the other hand, as shown in Figure 9, there are about ten major internal power 
centres dominated by the major elite groups. They form the higher circles of the nation. None 
of these elite groups have the same degree of power, wealth and prestige in the national 
power system: whereas some of them are more influential on the national decision making 
process, others have little influence. The four major elite groups have the greatest share of 
national power: political elites, military elites, business elites and media elites. These people 
comprise the power elite or "the invisible government" of Turkey: 
" army generals, military apex 
" the corporate rich, industrial executives 
" the political directorate, political party leaders and cabinet ministers 
" media chieftains, famous journalists and editors (both television and newspaper). 
Thus, there are several elite groups in the national power structure of Turkey. The big 
four which are political, military, business and media institutions are highly autonomous 
centres of national power in contemporary Turkey. Money, prestige and power is 
concentrated in the hands of higher politicians, admirals and generals, the owners and 
executives of the larger corporations, effective journalists and editors. No university rector has 
the power and influence wielded by a member of the general staff. No trade union leader is as 
influential as a businessman in the decision making process. None of the highest rank 
bureaucrats can put pressure on the political leaders in the way a powerful journalist can. 
Every member of the power elite takes into account the other members views: for 
example, when a political decision is about to be taken, the political directorate knows that the 
views of the highest rank army generals have to be taken into account. They know that, if the 
army elite are against a potential decision, they cannot realise their plans. 
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11.4. POSITIONAL INTERCHANGEABILITY IN TURKISH POWER ELITE: 
Executive ascendancy in political, military, business institutions and effective members 
of the media form the Turkish power elite which is at the centre of power and national 
decision making. Ordinary people are restricted by education, qualification, social origin as 
well as age and gender in accessing these elite positions. 
The top roles and top positions are inter-changeable: there has been a personnel 
exchange between the military, business and political establishments. The direction of this 
traffic has always been from the military to other establishments. All high-ranking Turkish 
military professionals have been trained in the management of violence. Theoretically, their 
educational and career backgrounds, and their abilities in the management of the movements 
of human and materials greatly increase the transferability of their skills from military to 
civilian roles. When members of the military elite retire, many of them become members of the 
hoards of directors of large private corporations or strategic bureaucratic committees. Also, 
some of them are involved in active politics. The direction of this interchangeability among the 
big four domains is shown in Figure 10: 
Figure 10 
Positional Interchangeability in the Turkish Power Elite 
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Whereas it is possible to talk about interchangeability between media, business and 
economic elites, in reality one can only talk about changeability for the military elites. In other 
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words, theoretically a member of the military elite can become a businessman, politician or 
journalist. However, none of the political elites, media elites or business elites have the 
opportunity to become a member of the military elite, either theoretically or in practice in 
Turkey. This is due to the military elite being carefully selected and their special training and 
military career begins at an early age. The social similarities and psychological affinities of the 
members of the power elite increase the interchange between these orders. 
11.5. THE DIVISION OF LAI3OUR AMONG THE MEMBERS OF THE 
POWER ELITE: 
All elite groups have special roles and functions within the power elite: the military 
elites provide physical power and the management of violence, business elites provide 
economic power and money, and political elites provide political power and the tools for 
democratic manipulation. The role of the media is to create a public image. 
Figure 11 
Interdependence Between the members of the Power Elite 
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They need to work in order to co-ordinate and realise their common interests. 
Because, all the members of the power elite are inter-dependent on each other. For example, 
political elites need business elites for money, the media elites for the creation of a public 
image, and the military elites for physical power and the management of violence. 
11.6. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE TURKISH POWER ELITE AND 
THE REASONS OF THE SUPREMACY OF THE MILITARY ELITE IN THE 
TURKISH NATIONAL POWER SYSTEM: 
As Lewis argues (1961: 4-5), there was a large Balkan influence on the Ottoman 
ruling class. Large numbers of Balkan Christians entered the political and military elites of the 
Ottoman Empire through the channel of the "devsirme", or the levy of boys. Also, the local 
Christian landed ruling class mostly survived and was incorporated into the Ottoman system. 
In fact, the Turkish elements in the ruling political and military elite were not large in the 
period of the Ottoman Empire. As stressed by Lewis (1961: 35), the Muslim citizens of the 
Ottoman Empire, who possessed a military, bureaucratic and feudal character, knew only four 
professions; government, war, religion and agriculture. Trade and industry were left to non- 
Muslims. 
The ideas of the French Revolution began to have an impact on the Muslim Turks at 
the end of the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth century. Parallel to the influence 
of this development and the first serious modernisation efforts, a new but powerful elite 
emerged in the mid nineteenth century. Unlike the traditional Ottoman power elite, "not from 
the army, not from the `Ulema', but from the Translation Office and the Embassy secretariats" 
(Lewis 1961: 116,125). 
Nevertheless, the twentieth century would introduce a new elite group to Turkey who 
possessed the knowledge, capability, the sense of responsibility and power to carry through 
the great social and political revolution that created modern Turkey. The new elite was well 
educated and was characterised by a highly heterogeneous background. Lewis argued that 
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(1961: 455-6), the following powerful elite groups emerged in Turkey in the late Ottoman 
Era: military elites, media elites, bureaucratic elites and judicial elites. 
The Turkish Revolution was carried out by the military elite. After the Turkish War of 
Independence most of the victorious commanders became the political elite in the Turkish 
parliament. Also, the leaders of the first Turkish political parties were ex-military elites (such 
as Ataturk, Inonu, Cebesoy and Karabekir). Military elites gained decisive political relevance 
and became important members of the Turkish power elite. In fact, Turkish military elites 
played a substantial role in the history of contemporary Turkey, sometimes overtly, sometimes 
covertly. 
Nevertheless, the influence of Turkish military elites in the socio-political life of 
Turkey can not be simply reduced to the military background of the leaders of the Turkish 
Revolution. As stated by most of the influential western writers, the Turkish Revolution and 
Independence Movement were civil movements, despite the military background of their 
leaders. On the other hand, it has to be remembered that, military elites have been very well 
educated individuals in Turkish society. The quality and quantity of their knowledge always 
added to their power alongside their sheer physical power. 
Another important factor is that, there was not a capitalist class in Turkey in the early 
Republican period. The Turkish economy was based on agriculture and trade at that time. The 
Turkish bourgeoisie (in modern meaning) began to develop in the Republican Era, but only 
became powerful in the multi-party period. Therefore, local leaders and local elites played 
important roles in the establishment of the Republic and development of Turkish society. 
There was in fact a predominance of military elites and local elites among the political elites in 
the early years of the Republic. Thus, the Turkish power elite was set up predominantly by 
political elites who had a military background. 
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The following statement gives some idea of the nature of the social structure of the 
new Turkey in the early years of the Republic: "At this moment, my listeners are farmers, 
artisans, merchants and workers. Any of these can become the antagonist of another. But, 
who can deny that the farmer needs the artisan, the artisan the farmer, the farmer the 
merchant, and all of them need one another and the worker". (Kemal Ataturk's speech, Izmir 
Economic Congress, in 1923). 
Socio-economic activities and effort by the Kenialist government created new 
elements in the social hierarchy that had never existed before: businessmen, managers and 
technicians. It meant that the emergence of the Turkish capitalist class was on its way. As 
noted by Lewis (1961: 466), of course there had been middle class elements in Turkey before, 
but they were neither Turkish nor Muslim. The Greek, Armenian and Jewish merchants and 
entrepreneurs were an important part of Ottoman society. The new Turkish capitalist class 
began to appear in the 1940s as a powerful partner in the power structure. This changed the 
balance of socio-political forces in the country. 
Like the capitalist class, the working class which is an inseparable part of the capitalist 
system was a relatively new phenomenon in Turkey. In the nineteenth century, the number of 
workers was not more than a couple of thousand. The first workers organisations began to 
appear in Turkey in the late 19th century. These included the Ameleperver Cemiyeti (Society 
in Favour of Workmen-founded in 1871), Osmanli Amele Cemiyeti (Ottoman Labour Society- 
founded in 1895). As Lewis (1961: 469) shows, trade unions were permitted, except in public 
enterprises. Nevertheless, a genuine labour organisation, in its contemporary meaning -as the 
representative of the working class- emerged as the result of efforts by Kemalist governments 
in the twentieth century. The number of labour unions increased from 73 in 1940, to 239 in 
1952. As noted by Lewis (1961: 471), an all-Turkish federation of unions was formed in Izmir 
in 1952 with an estimated membership of 150,000 workers. 
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The composition of the power elite changed parallel to the social, political and 
economic development of Turkish society. The contemporary Turkish power elite is now 
composed of economic, military, political and media elites. As stressed by Mills (1956: 277- 
8), the Marxists' "economic determinism", and the liberals' "political determinism" or "media 
and military determinism" are not sufficient to explain the reality of the power elite. 
Although the Turkish power elite was set up by the business elites, political elites, 
military elites and media elites, this does not mean that there is no elite from any other elite 
group in the power elite. But the fact is that the power elite is heavily dominated by the most 
powerful members of the most powerful elite groups. The supremacy of the power of the 
military elites, economic corporations, and political directorate is unavoidable. The emergence 
of the power of the media within the power elite is a recent phenomenon and intimately 
related to technological developments in the media sector. 
11.7. THE TURKISH MILITARY ELITE AS A MEMBER OF THE 
TURKISH POWER ELITE: 
As discussed earlier, the powerful members of the dominant institutions (such as 
military, business, political and media) have been shaped by the form of the Turkish power 
elite. The military elites have occupied a special place within this power structure since the 
beginning of the Republic. This special situation is related to the social backgrounds of the 
founding fathers of the Turkish Republic: all the members of the founding political elite were 
victorious military elites. This is not a fortuitous situation because, as discussed earlier, 
modernisation and westernisation first began in the military area in Turkey in the late Ottoman 
Era, and since then the military establishment has been the representative and defender of 
modern values. 
The Turkish military elite forms one of the most autonomous and influential elite 
group among the members of the Turkish power elite. They are relatively more autonomous 
than any other elite group. They can block any actions and decisions they do not share. They 
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are well-trained and have great experience in the making of decisions. They have increasingly 
become involved in political and economic decisions. As a result of their military training, they 
possess a coherent group structure 
When the social background and actual status of army officers and Turkish military 
elites are examined, it can be clearly seen that, they are usually better paid than members of 
other sectors. The elite members of the military may be identified as members of the upper- 
middle or upper classes. They have invariably been the sons of middle class or lower-middle 
class people, such as public officers, farmers, military officers and professionals. They are all 
male and members of a particular age group. Their ethnic origins or religious background are 
not considered when they are recruited. Also, people are never discriminated against in terms 
of their ethnic background or religion (such as Sunnite or Shiite) when they are recruited to 
higher positions in the military hierarchy. 
It may be argued that, Turkish military elites have the highest degree of group 
cohesiveness and unity among the members of the Turkish power elite. Traditionally, as 
stressed by Janowitz (1971: 69), the Turkish army has always maintained a very effective 
internal discipline and has been able to act as a solid force. As also argued by Janowitz (1971: 
70), compared with other institutions, the military establishment appears to have a capacity for 
absorbing new recruits and developing a strong sense of cohesion. 
On the other hand, as in America (Mills, 1956: 196), Turkish military elites see politics 
as frequently characterised by corruption, inefficiency and in-discipline. As a result they 
sometimes feel that they have to intervene to save the country. This sensibility and sensitivity 
encourages direct or indirect intervention of the military elites in politics. 
As politics seeps into the army, the army gets into politics, sometimes willingly, 
sometimes reluctantly and sometimes unknowingly. However, Turkish military elites always 
avoid partisan politics. They never wish to be seen as the supporter of a particular party or 
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political ideology. Especially, as the result of socio-political development and past experience, 
they are very careful when they intervene in politics at the present time: they are very sensitive 
to democratic values and make an effort to be seen as the servant of the democratic system. 
As emphasised by Dodd (1983: 4), both Young Turk and Ataturkist experiences of 
military participation in politics reveal a tradition of military closeness to the state, rather than 
a sustained desire to direct its affairs. The military has always been regarded as in the 
vanguard of revolutionary change; a very unusual relationship between the military and civilian 
components of the state characterised by coalescence and co-operation which cannot be found 
elsewhere. 
Dodd also mentions that (1983: 1), the Turkish military is frequently regarded as the 
guardian of democracy: "some military regimes have inaugurated or restored more or less 
liberal and democratic forms of government. Usually the reason has been failure or 
unpopularity of the authoritarian military regime. In Turkey, the military has not retired from 
politics for these kinds of reasons. Instead, they have invariably declared an intention to return 
to democracy at the time of take-over and, moreover and usually, they have stuck to their 
word. This is surprising, because a military organisation is not by its very nature, the sort of 
institution likely to encourage the development of democratic regimes". Dodd, rightly looked 
for the reasons for this situation in the historical background of the Turkish army. 
Although Ataturk and his successor Ismet Inonu had military backgrounds and both 
were victorious commanders, both were civilised and democratically minded individuals. As 
Lerner and Robinson state (1960: 19-20), both Ataturk and Inonu were against the direct 
participation of military officers in political affairs. When he was in the Committee of Union 
and Progress, Ataturk declared that "as long as officers remain in the Party, we shall neither 
build a strong Party nor a strong Army. In the 3rd Army most of the officers are also 
members of the Parry and 3rd Army can not be called first class. Furthermore, the party 
receiving its strength from the army will never appeal to the nation. Let its resolve here and 
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now that all officers wishing to remain in the Parry must resign from the Army. We must also 
adopt a law forbidding all future officers having political affiliations .... ". Also, Ataturk 
clarified that "to be victorious in the internal affairs of a country is due less to an army than to 
the successful offices of a government". After that, both Ataturk and Inonu resigned from the 
party in 1909 and continued to serve in the army. 
The social backgrounds of the most influential members of the Turkish political elite 
played an important role in the political choices of the Turkish army. The most popular and 
most powerful political elites were victorious army commanders. All the founder leaders of 
the Turkish Republic had military backgrounds. The founders and leaders of the CHP-RPP 
(Republican People's party), which was the first modern political party in Turkey were also 
ex-members of the military elite. It was founded by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk and his friends. 
Therefore, the major principles of Kemalism (famous 6 arrows) became the major principles of 
the RPP. As a result of these organic ties, a very strong relationship was established between 
the state, RPP and the Turkish army. 
With the beginning of the multi-party period, the Turkish military became above 
politics and above parties: they kept themselves away from active politics. Political party 
membership was strictly prohibited among members of the army. Nevertheless, they never lost 
their sympathy with the Kemalist political parties. It can be said that, the Turkish army has 
been very successful in creating an image of being above politics and above classes in the eyes 
of the Turkish people. 
Also, at the beginning of the multi-party period, relations between the army and 
governmental elites began to change. The army, which saw itself as the tool of political power 
in the Ataturk era and following the single party period (until 1940s), began to see themselves 
above-politics in the periods of Menderes governments (during the 1950s). They started to 
have direct relations with the state instead of merely the governmental elites. This tradition has 
continued until the present day. 
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11.8. THE TURKISH BUSINESS ELITES AS MEMBERS OF THE 
TURKISH POWER ELITE: 
Among the Turkish business elite, it is possible to find people born both rich and poor. 
A large percentage of the first generation of business elites were not people born rich. The 
majority of them came from lower-class or middle-class families possessing only enough 
wealth to provide essential needs. Most of them worked as small shopkeepers (like Vehbi 
Koc) and wage workers (like Haci Omer Sabanci) and gained their enormous wealth within a 
particular time span. The wealthiest business elites of Turkey, who are Koc, Sabanci and 
Eczacibasi can be included in this category. 
Whereas the size of the Turkish business elite whose social origins are in the 
entrepreneurial strata is very small among the first generation, the proportion of this kind of 
elite among the second generation of business elites is rather high. The development of Koc 
and Sabanci are worth mentioning. The founder of the Sabanci Holding who is Haci Omer 
Sabanci started from "zero point". His life history began in a small Anatolian village and 
eventually he owned a world scale business empire. 
On the other hand, a large proportion of the second generation came from families of 
higher class status and grew up in big cities: they were also very well educated. Their 
educational advantages are intimately related to their social origins. The large majority of 
them were students in exclusive private schools and well-known technical universities, such as 
Istanbul Technical University, Bogazici University, Istanbul University and Middle East 
Technical University. As a result of their advantageous backgrounds, they became more 
powerful, more privileged and more wealthy. 
Whereas the political elite set up the "visible government", the power elite constitutes 
the "invisible government". The corporate rich in particular wield very important political 
power: they are active politically and have a serious influence on the entire political decision 
making process. Many positions of power within the formal political system have been 
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occupied either by members of the business elite or by their representatives. They have the 
power to make or to influence decisions. As emphasised by Mills (1956: 162), more money 
provides more power and more power provides more freedom. Freedom means that "you 
have the power to do what you want to do, when you want to do it and how you want to do 
it". Of course like freedom, power and especially the power of money are not limitless. 
A large proportion of Turkish elites mentioned the element of luck among the major 
factors which affected their actual positions. The mean of luck or chance meant being in the 
right place at the right time together with enjoying the necessary preconditions. 
11.9. CONTEMPORARY TURKISH POLITICAL ELITES AS MEMBERS OF 
THE TURKISH POWER ELITE: 
As Mosca stressed, it is very important to check power by other powers, because 
uncontrolled and over concentrated power bears the dangers of authoritarian and oppressive 
regimes. In addition, though elections result in elected assemblies, they may bring with them 
party based political corruption or the dictatorship of elected politicians because, most 
members of the political elite are members of various interest groups. 
Personal interests and profits pushed and directed most of the elected representatives. 
When fundamental issues came up for debate in the assembly, always opposition blocs 
occurred and it became impossible to establish a majority in parliament on socio-political 
issues. A great deal of news was published on the media about the "vote and MP market" in 
Turkish politics. Some members of parliament did not work as the representative of the 
Turkish people: they worked as pawns of their party leaders. 
Turkey in the 1990s presents a very clear example of the ideas of Mosca. Turkey came 
face to face with the dangers of authoritarian and oppressive regimes in the year of the 
"Refah-Yol' coalition government and is still struggling with the party based political 
corruption and electoral dictatorship. The only way to prevent this kind of danger is to 
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establish an autonomous judiciary and bureaucracy. As emphasised by Schumpeter, ordinary 
voters do not control the power of elected politicians. They can only be controlled by the 
autonomous elite groups, such as the academic, bureaucracy, judiciary and media. 
11.10. THE TURKISH MEDIA AS A MEMBER OF THE TURKISH POWER ELITE: 
According to philosopher novelist Aleksander Solzhcnitsyn, "the press has become 
the greatest power within western countries, more powerful than the legislature, the executive 
and the judiciary" (Rives, 1982: 15). 
The media provides very distinctive and influential weapons in order to obtain power, 
wealth and prestige in society. As argued by Astiz (1969), the media forms one of the most 
effective and powerful elite groups. The term media elites comprises the managers, editors, 
influential columnists and reporters. 
Freedom of speech and information are the guardians of the relative autonomy of the 
media elites and their sub-elites. Rubin (1981: 7) argues that while freedom of the media is a 
political and legal right, institutional independence is a function of financial and economic 
conditions. As stated by Curran et al. (in Barrett & Braham, 1995: 69), there is a symbiotic 
interrelationship between media organisations and their environment. Media business is mostly 
private enterprise and most of the media institutions are economically dependent on their 
social and political environment. This relationship takes its roots not only from economic 
reasons but also the problem of "raw material". On the other hand political parties and 
political elites require media power for expanding their voice to the voters or general public, 
to become more powerful and influential in the political arena and to be successful in the 
competition that characterises electoral politics. This "interface" interaction plays a critical 
role in the media production process. 
The researcher of this paper shares the views of Marxist scholars that the form of 
outputs and the meaning of messages is usually determined elsewhere within the dominant 
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culture. It is impossible to accept the idea of the complete autonomy of media professionals. 
Nevertheless, the idea of relative autonomy of media professionals is acceptable. 
Media elites are one of the most powerful elite groups in society and the media plays a 
substantial role in contemporary politics. Politicians and political parties give priority to media 
relations. They are usually called the "fourth force" in contemporary democratic societies and 
sometimes they are as powerful as political elites. 
The media have a crucial impact on individuals' political attitudes and voting 
behaviour. Rivers labelled the American media the "second government" or the "Other 
Government" (1982). According to him (1982,213), the news media have the power to shape 
government policies. He also argues that America has a second government that acts as a 
check on the first and controls public access to it. The first one is the official government and 
the "Other Government" is the national news media (Rivers, 1982: 7-20). These findings are 
also applicable to Turkish society. 
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CHAPTER 12 
12. THE GENERAL FINDINGS, DISCUSSION, FUTURE RESEARCH 
RECOMMENDATIONS ON TURKISH ELITES AND CONCLUSION 
Inequalities in the distribution of power, wealth and prestige are common features of 
contemporary societies. To Mosca, although absolute political equality, majority government 
and free elections are a "myth" they are essential elements of an open ruling class. Researchers 
of elites aim to understand and explain the existence and persistence of inequalities in the 
distribution of power and the relationship between power and control in contemporary 
societies. 
Four major power blocs can be distinguished which dominate people's lives in 
contemporary Turkey: military, economic (business), political and media blocs. These four 
most powerful elite groups form the "Turkish Power Elite". Decisive power has become 
centralised into the hands of these groups of people. They share similar social backgrounds 
and educational careers; they went to the same or similar types of schools and universities; 
they have similar careers and life styles; and they share common sets of values, beliefs, 
attitudes and norms. In relation to these, it is possible to observe a high degree of uniformity, 
homogeneity and relative integration. 
Sometimes, these elite groups are labelled the "national elites". The national elites are 
those who occupy the key command positions of the major nation-wide institutional 
hierarchies of power and wealth. They have the greatest share of the national system of status, 
power, wealth and institutional prestige. Military and business elites come first in the rank 
order of the Turkish national power system. They have a greater share in the national power 
structure. Political elites and media elites follow them. This order depends on the time and 
conditions: the place of the elites in this ranking is interchangeable 
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12.1. ELITE THEORY: APPLIED TO TURKISH SOCIETY: 
Elite theory research is based on power and influence. It is concerned almost 
exclusively with inequalities based on power or lack thereof. This distinguishes it from class 
theory. Power in turn, is based on other resources (such as economic assets and organisational 
strength) and for its part may give rise to control over other resources as well. Etzioni 
(1993: 19) stressed that elite theory is concerned primarily with the other resources which are 
related to it. 
According to elite theory, societies are divided into the "few" who hold power and 
rule and the "many" who are ruled. The ruling group called an elite, effectively monopolises 
power and makes the important decisions. The others (non-elites), the public or the masses 
have relatively no power and no choice but to accept the decision of the minorities. 
On a general basis "Elite Theory" was used in this study to understand, to examine and 
to explain the power structure of Turkish society. As discussed in earlier pages, elite theory 
highlights power, control and influence for examining it's subject. As also discussed earlier, 
there are various elite theories within this context, such as elitist elite theory, pluralist elite 
theory, democratic elite theory, demo-elite perspective and the corporatist perspective. 
Specifically, this paper examined Turkish elites using democratic elite theory, but emphasised 
"the demo-elite perspective" within democratic elite theory. However, to some degree, it 
profited from other elite theories, such as the pluralist perspective and the corporatist 
perspective. 
12.2. KEY ELITES IN CONTEMPORARY TURKISH SOCIETY: 
Following the argument of pluralist elite theorists, power has been diffused amongst 
several elite groups in Turkey. Nevertheless, these elite groups do not have an equal share of 
the power cake. In contrast to the pluralists' view, some elite groups are significantly more 
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powerful and have a greater influence on the decision making process in contemporary 
Turkish society. These groups can be identified as the "key elites". 
As shown in Figure 12, there are four key elite groups in contemporary Turkey which 
are the business, military, political, and media elites. Turkish "key elites" have important 
similarities with C. W. Mills' American findings. They have social inter-connections, similar 
interests and familiar social backgrounds. The major socio-economic and political decisions 
are shaped directly or indirectly by the key elite groups in Turkey. However, their unity is not 
exact and unchangeable. The unity amongst Turkish key elite groups is relative and it may 
differ in terms of time and conditions. 
The key elites are more powerful, because they control major social resources: whilst 
political elites control the state machinery, business elites monopolise economic and financial 
resources, military elites control the main physical resources, such as weapons and the armed 
forces, and media elites have control of the audio, audio-visual and written aspects of the 
media. 
Figure 12 
Elite Pyramid of Turkish Society 
i{, ýi4 
iý 
Military elites Business Elites 
Political elites 
other elites 
(e. g. trade union elites) 
Media Elites 
286 
12.3. SEPARATION OF POWERS IN NATIONAL POWER STRUCTURE AND 
RELATIVE ELITE AUTONOMY IN TURKEY: 
The formal Turkish political system has a liberal democratic character: power is 
separated and legislative, executive and judicial power is held by different elite groups. These 
groups counterbalance the power of each other. Turkish democracy is an electoral 
representative democracy that characterised by free elections, freedom of speech, press and 
association. 
The Turkish elites are relatively autonomous from one another and especially from the 
governing elites. Moreover, there is relative equality of opportunity to obtain a position of 
power in Turkish society. However, as with most western societies, it is impossible to talk of 
absolute autonomy and complete equality of power in Turkey. These suppositions of 
democratic elite theory are mostly idealistic and they can not be observed in any country in 
either east or west. Therefore, the term "relative autonomy" is preferred to the more idealistic 
"absolute autonomy" concept in this thesis. 
However the degree of relative autonomy of elites is inconstant and incomplete. It 
differs according to time and conditions. Some elite groups are more autonomous than others. 
Various factors affect the degree of elite autonomy: the type of political system, the kind of 
economic system, the bureaucratic structure of society and the level of development. Business 
elites, military elites and political elites in particular have greater autonomy in comparison with 
other elites, such as bureaucratic elite groups, judicial elites and scientific elites. 
Nevertheless, it can be predicted that scientific (academic) elites will gain a more 
autonomous position within the Turkish power structure. The situation will change parallel to 
the socio-economic and political development of Turkish society. When Turkey completes its 
industrialisation and transformation from industrial society to post-industrial scientific elites 
will become more powerful and more prestigious in society. In accordance with Mosca's 
ideas, as in most of other societies, "knowledge" will become another important social source 
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of power which counterbalances the power of property. Personal achievement will become as 
worthy as birth and wealth. 
As Bell (1973) argued capital was the major resource and the capitalist was dominant 
in an industrial society. However he predicted, skills and knowledge would become the central 
resource and scientific elites would gain more autonomy and occupy dominant positions 
within post-industrial society. 
12.4. RELATIVE EQUALITY OF OPPORTUNITY: 
It can be hypothesised that people have equal opportunities to gain a position of power 
in Turkish society, but again, the reality is not very different from that in any other democratic 
society. Only the relative equality of opportunity can be discussed, because, power has been 
pawned by formal or informal socio-political and economic agents in all societies. Only a small 
minority can overcome these barriers, and only this privileged minority have equal 
opportunities to obtain power. 
12.5. ELITE UNITY AND DECENTRALISATION OF POWER IN 
CONTEMPORARY TURKISH SOCIETY: 
Counter-balancing power is very important for democratic regimes including the 
Turkish political system. Power must be countervailed by alternative bases of power, because 
uncontrolled or over-centralised power encourages the rise of authoritarian and oppressive 
regimes. It may cause political corruption or electoral dictatorship. On the other hand, over 
diffused power structures also carry serious dangers for democratic life because, it is 
impossible to talk about elite unity if power has been over-decentralised. Another important 
condition for elite unity is relative elite autonomy. 
Sometimes, elite unity has great importance in order to solve serious social and 
economic problems and to achieve urgent socio-political goals. Recent events in Turkey 
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provide a good example of this: the Turkish general election of 1995 held a very important 
place within Turkish political history. Political power was over-diffused amongst several 
political parties in this election. Five major political parties gained more than 10 % of the 
popular vote and passed the "general vote impediment". The Islamist Welfare Party-Refah 
Partisi (WP-RP) (with about 20 % of the general vote) whose "ultimate aim" is to replace 
democracy with a totalitarian theocratic regime based on Sheriat (the Holy Islamic Rule) was 
one of the five parties. 
Fundamentalist Islamists used highly systematic and Machiavellian tactics and gained 
government power. Following this success, they concentrated their pressure on the opposition 
and other elite groups to defeat the autonomy of the other elites and centralised power in their 
own hands. At the same time they began to implement their "ultimate aim". However they 
could not annihilate the autonomy of elites and become all-powerful because, large majority of 
the Turkish population were/are against the Sheriat. 
A democratic and peaceful civil movement which had no parallel in Turkish history 
began against the activities of the government. There was a widespread participation in this 
civil movement from all sections of Turkish society including elites, sub-elites and the general 
public. All the democratic contemporary action groups, labour union elites, business and 
business union elites, media elites, scientific elites, opposition political elites, military elites and 
others united and co-operated to save the democratic laic system in Turkey. And finally, the 
National Security Council-Milli Guvenlik Konseyi (MGK) issued a proclamation which invited 
the government to halt anti-laic and anti-democratic activities, and to follow the constitution 
and laws of the country. 
This example demonstrates that not only the separation of powers within the state but 
also the separation of powers outside the state have value for the health and wealth of 
democracy. As Schumpeter stressed, electors cannot control the power of elected politicians. 
Elected politicians can only be controlled by powerful and autonomous elites. 
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This example also highlights the fact that the balance of elite unity is very important 
for democracy. As Aron emphasised, elite unity means freedom, on the other hand the 
complete disintegration of elites means the end of the state. Elite unity and relative elite 
autonomy do not contradict one another. Only independent groups can realise consensus, co- 
operation and unity as regards common values, beliefs and objectives. We agree with Etzioni 
(1993: 110) that "without elite co-operation, there can be no democracy, but without elite 
autonomy there can be no democracy either". 
12.6. THE BALANCE OF POWER: THE STRUGGLE FOR POWER IN TURKEY: 
The decision making process in Turkish social and political life can be analysed by 
using the framework of "democratic elite theory". The key economic, social and political 
decisions are taken by tiny minorities who are usually called elites. The great majority of the 
population are invariably politically disorganised, fragmented and inactive. However, the 
majority are not totally helpless and voiceless. They can play an important role in the system, 
by putting pressure upon political elites, and attempting to rise to an elite position themselves. 
Nevertheless, in reality they cannot or do not use this potential. 
The recent attack of the "Refah-yor' coalition government of the WP-Islamist Welfare 
Party (RP-Refah Partisi) and TPP-True Path Party (DYP-Dogru Yol Partisi) on the other 
elite groups can be viewed as a "struggle for power". The two partners in the recent Turkish 
government have begun a systematic attack through the main Turkish elite groups. This was 
the first major step in their ultimate aim to generate a "super-governmental elite" that was a 
unique controller of social resources and the decision-making process. They planned to keep 
the other elites and the opposition under control and pressure. 
The Islamist wing (RP-proislamist party) of the government began to intensify their 
pressure on the military elites, business elites, academic (scientific) elites, judicial elites and the 
democratic segment of the media elite, because they viewed these elite groups as guardians of 
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democracy and the prime barriers to their ultimate objective which was the Islamist revolution. 
The conservative partner in the government the True Path Party (DYP-TPP) concentrated its 
pressure especially on the trade union elites, media elites and surprisingly on the business 
elites. 
The struggle between the TPP and business elites is very unusual and unexpected, 
because the Turkish business world has traditionally been the major supporter of the True 
Path Party and its liberal policies for decades. They have worked within co-operation and 
solidarity for more than forty years. Despite all these historical ties, the leader of that party is 
identifying the business elites as the "leech and blood sucker". It seems that True Path Party is 
losing it's traditional liberal mission and their ways are going to separate. 
These systematic but undemocratic attacks on the opposition and other elite groups 
had continued during 1996. The situation has very serious dangers for democracy in Turkey, 
because the autonomy of the elites is usually mentioned not only as an important aspect of 
democracy, but also the defending the other components of democracy. It appears that, this is 
the first stage in their plan to destroy democracy and the democratic regime and to generate a 
totalitarian theocratic state based on Sheriat (the Islamic rules). 
12.7. ELITE RECRUITMENT PATTERNS IN TURKEY: 
Various social, psychological, biological and inherited factors, such as social class, 
social network ties, sex, age, personality, education, ... etc., may 
have an influence on the elite 
recruitment process. Nevertheless, social origin (family background) and educational 
background are usually counted among the most common and most influential factors. 
Privileged family background is highly influential in accessing to elite positions and it provides 
people with good connections, money, self assurance, ... etc. Social origin may influence both 
education and elite status. Educational level and social background of father is highly inter- 
correlated with the respondent's. Social background may influence access to elite positions 
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directly and indirectly. Indirectly, father's social-economical status may have effects on the 
opportunity to obtain higher education. 
Although kinship has some degree of importance in elite recruitment process, as 
stressed by Putnam (1976: 172), significance of kinship steadily declined in Turkey, like in the 
Netherlands, the United States of America, Sri Lanka and Japan, and achievement has become 
the most important factors in the system of elite recruitment in contemporary Turkey. 
All the elite respondents were asked the question of "which variables had been most 
effective for your actual social and occupational position? ". If the figures in Table 1 are 
analysed it can be seen that education is the most effective factor in the elite recruitment 
process in Turkey. Both the quantity and quality of education are substantially effective on the 
circulation of elites. Also, the type of education and the type of school attended have indirect 
effects on this process. As has been discussed earlier, an important number of members of the 
Turkish elite have graduated from mostly prestigious universities, such as Ankara University 
(SBF-the Faculty of Political Sciences), Istanbul University, ... etc.. In addition, a substantial 
number of them have been educated in prestigious (both private and state) elite high schools. 
As noted by Putnam (1976: 51), like the ancient Oxbridge Colleges of England, the 
elites grander ecoles of France, the Law School of Tokyo University, Makerere University 
College in East Africa, Tunisia's Sadiki College, the National University of Mexico City, the 
Political Science Faculty of Ankara University is the foremost traditional elite school in 
Turkey. Graduation from this school substantially increases the chances of youth accessing an 
elite position in the elite recruitment process. 
Another important factor which is related to the question of education is having had a 
western education. Western educated individuals have had more priority and chances in 
accessing elite positions in Turkish society for centuries. As mentioned earlier, the intellectuals 
who had had a western education and contacts played significantly important roles, both in the 
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early attempts at modernisation and in the Kemalist Revolution in Turkey. As mentioned by 
Putnam and Frey (Putnam, 1976: 126-7), Mustafa Kemal Ataturk's revolutionary elite, 
integrated in terms of social background, recruitment patterns, solidarity and value consensus, 
successfully ruled Turkey for nearly three decades. Nevertheless, after the late 1940s this 
Kemalist unity was fractured both by "the resurrection of severe intra-elite conflict" and by the 
induction into the elite of new and highly heterogeneous elements. This created "simultaneous 
stagnation and instability" in Turkey for decades. 
Table l 
The Major Factors Connected With Elite Recruitment Process 
ELITE GRO UP 
Trade 
Political Union Media Total 
factors on personal abil. -chance Count 4 8 4 16 
occupatinal % within factors on 
position occupatinal position 
25.0% 50.0% 25.0% 100.0% 
%within ELGROUP 13.3% 26.7% 13.3% 17.8% 
personal ability-education Count 13 11 10 34 
% within factors on 
occupatinal position 38.2% 32.4°1° 29.4% 100.0% 
%within ELGROUP 43.3% 36.7% 33.3% 37.8% 
personal ability-family Count 5 7 8 20 
background % within factors on 
occupatinal position 25.0% 35.0% 40.0% 100.0°! ° 
% within ELGROUP 16.7% 23.3% 26.7% 22.2% 
education-chance Count 1 1 
% within factors on 
occupatinal position 100.0% 100.0% 
%within ELGROUP 3.3% 1.1% 
ideology and civil soc. Count 3 3 1 7 
understand. % within factors on 
occupatinal position 42.9% 42.9% 14.30! 6 100.0% 
% within ELGROUP 10.0% 10.0% 3.3% 7.8% 
family Count 5 5 10 
background-education % within factors on 
occupatinal position 50.0% 50.0% 100.0% 
%within ELGROUP 16.7% 16.7% 11.1% 
personal abilities Count 2 2 
% within factors on 
occupatinal position 100.0% 100.0% 
% within ELGROUP 6.7% 2.2% 
Total Count 30 30 30 90 
% within factors on 
occupatinal position 33.3% 33.3% 33.3% 100.0% 
%within ELGROUP 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Another important factor is family background. This has both direct and indirect 
effects on the elite recruitment process. A higher social origin provides not only good 
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financial, educational and occupational opportunities for the people but also good connections 
to obtain higher social positions. 
Personality and personal abilities are also very important social psychological factors in 
the circulation of elites in Turkey. Most of the Turkish elites mentioned these factors as the 
answer to the question of "according to your opinion, which variables had been most effective 
for your actual social and occupational position? " Personality and personal ability are effective 
in the elite recruitment process either separately or in association with other variables, such as 
education and family background. This result may be related to the mean age of Turkish elites. 
The average age of elite respondents is nearly 50. This means that a large majority of 
contemporary Turkish elites have been socialised in 1960s youth culture and they are the 
beneficiaries of this cultural tradition. 
The other two important factors which have an effect on the elite recruitment process 
are chance and ideology. As seen in Table 1, these factors, especially chance, have an 
important degree of influence on elite circulation either individually or in coalition with the 
factors of personality and education. 
12.8. TESTING MAJOR HYPOTHESES: 
At the end of a detailed investigation, all the major research hypotheses relating to 
Turkish society and Turkish elites, have been confirmed. Only a handful of the hypotheses 
necessitated minor revisions after the pilot study. When these minor amendments had been 
made, the final version of the hypotheses were tested in the field, and all the research 
hypotheses were verified by the data. Thus the major targets were achieved and the research 
project was successful: 
" The military, business, media and political elites formed the key elite groups in Turkey. 
" Effective power has been centralised (concentrated) in the hands of the key elite groups. 
" The major socio-political decisions are taken by these four key elite groups. 
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" There is a relatively lower level of external homogeneity among Turkish elite groups. (The 
degree of external homogeneity is lower than the degree of internal homogeneity). 
" As a result of homogeneity, there is a relative social integration among contemporary 
Turkish elites. 
" There is a high level of internal homogeneity and social consensus amongst Turkish elite 
groups. 
" Turkish elites are characterised by social and moral integration within their own elite 
group. 
" Political decisions are controlled directly or indirectly by the economic elites. 
" Turkish elites have an upper-middle and upper social class status. 
" Turkish elites mostly have middle class social origins. 
" The satisfaction rate of Turkish elites from their social and occupational positions is very 
high. 
" Those elites who possess a higher class background are more satisfied with their jobs than 
those elites who have lower class background. 
" There is sexism among Turkish elites: the elites are mostly male dominated. 
" Contemporary Turkish elites are well educated. 
" There is ageism among contemporary Turkish elites: there is a high degree of domination 
of middle aged people over other age groups. 
" Youth are the least represented age group among contemporary Turkish elites. 
" Power and authority has an "aristocratic" character in contemporary Turkish society 
(Power and authority based on family and wealth). 
" There is a high correlation between educational background, family background and elite 
circulation in contemporary Turkish society. 
" There are inter-group and inter-class marital attitudes amongst contemporary Turkish 
elites: they prefer to marry those people who possess a similar or same social class status. 
" Some universities, such as Istanbul University, AUSBF (Ankara University, Faculty of 
Political Sciences), ITU (Istanbul Technical University), METU (Middle East Technical 
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University), Bogazici have an important influence on elite recruitment in contemporary 
Turkish society. 
" Some elitist clubs (social clubs and student fraternities), like Rotary and Lions, Masonic 
societies, Anatolian Club, Galatasaraylilar and Mulkiyeliler have an important effect on the 
elite recruitment process. 
" Elite clubs are highly influential in the decision making process in contemporary Turkey. 
" Turkish elites usually send their children to elitist schools. 
" There is a relationship between elite recruitment and birth place in Turkey (in terms of 
urban or rural settlements): Most Turkish elites are originally from the big or metropolitan 
cities. 
" There is no relationship between elite status and birth place (in terms of geographical 
region) in Turkey: there is a high degree of plurality according to their geographic regional 
identity among Turkish elites. 
" Relative elite autonomy in contemporary Turkey is relatively weak. 
12.9. FURTHER RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
POSSIBILITIES ON TURKISH ELITES: 
Elite sociology is a new branch of sociology in Turkey and there is not much research 
on Turkish elites in the scientific literature. It appears that, as a result of social and political 
development and the increasing problems this has caused it will become highly popular in the 
near future. The researcher tried to carry out the first detailed, comprehensive, and systematic 
elite survey and study of elites in Turkish society 
The following research topics and questions can be investigated in future studies of 
elites, especially Turkish elites: the first national Turkish elite survey which should cover all 
Turkish elite groups has to be carried out, as has occurred in most of other developed 
societies. Also, these groups can be investigated in terms of all of or some of these indicators: 
" Their role behaviour and their roles in social production, 
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" Their place in the social organisation of labour, 
" Their functions and their activities, 
" Their economic positions, 
" Their social backgrounds and social ties, 
" Their interests and attitudes, 
" Their career patterns, 
" Their world outlook and life styles, 
" Their political sympathies, 
" Their psychological traits, thoughts and feelings, 
" Their educational backgrounds. 
The following research topics are also very important for the development of the social 
sciences not only in Turkey but also in the world. The findings from this type of research 
would also be helpful in solving social and political problems: 
1. Membership profiles (social backgrounds and actual social positions of their members) of 
elite clubs can be investigated. 
2. What do elites do after they have completed their occupation of an elite position? For 
example, what do military elites do when they are retired or what do political elites do 
when their membership of parliament ends? 
3. Those elites who transfer from one elite group to another can be investigated (like political 
elites who come from business, military, scientific or bureaucratic elite groups; or 
managerial elites who have transferred from political, military or bureaucratic elite 
groups). 
4. Local elites can be investigated according to indicators listed above. 
5. What do local political elites do when their service span has ended? 
6. A social portrait of political parties in terms of the social backgrounds of their elite 
members. 
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7. Comparison of local political elites and central political elites in terms of their social 
background and other factors. 
8. Corruption and semi-corruption in elite groups (its causes, results and possible solutions). 
9. Social networks among Turkish elites. 
10. The relations between elite groups. For example, the relations between political elites and 
other elite groups. 
11. The social background of political elite candidates can be investigated (those individuals 
who were candidates in particular general elections, but failed to be elected) and political 
elites (who won in the same general elections) in terms of a particular general election 
results. 
12. Examination of family bonds (the sons, grandsons, daughters, nephews, sons in law, ..., of 
members and deputies, ex-members and ex-deputies of the Turkish parliament) in 
parliament and among Turkish parliamentary elites. 
13. A comparative and cross-cultural study of corruption or semi-corruption among 
parliamentary elites (also among other elite groups too). 
14. Upper class Turkish women: Turkish female elites in politics, business, bureaucracy and 
academia. 
15. Case studies with elites of elites. 
12.10. CONCLUSION: 
This study predominantly uses the framework of the structural perspective. The 
researcher began with a formal definition of a set of positions, then those people who held 
these positions were identified as the elite. At the second stage of the proceedings, the key 
positions in the major elite sectors were defined. Finally, the occupiers of these key positions 
were accepted as the elite. The holders of these key positions may be labelled the "super 
elite", as Alcazar and Pizarro did (in Moore, 1985: 169). 
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Three major sectors were originally examined for reasons that were mentioned at the 
beginning of the thesis. The sample concentrated on a smaller and more exclusive elite circle, 
because the aim of the study was to examine "the ruling elites", in Turkish society. It was 
decided to take equal numbers of leaders from each of these three sectors for accuracy of 
sampling. Nevertheless, it was understood that the absence of some major sectors from the 
study would make the research incomplete. As a result, a total of five major elite groups were 
eventually examined. 
At the end of a detailed investigation, it was concluded that education is the most 
important factor for elite recruitment in Turkish society. Among trade union leaders, higher 
education is obviously less important than for the other elite groups. Also, the number of 
prestigious school graduated Turkish trade union elites is lower than for the other elite 
groups. When the educational levels of Turkish elites are compared the situation becomes 
more meaningful. Whereas the military elite and political elite possess the highest educational 
levels, the labour union elite have the lowest educational level among all the elite groups. This 
situation may be explained by the nature of the occupation of the labour union elite. Their 
occupation does not require higher skills and higher education. This can also be related to 
their class background: as explained above, there is a relationship between class origin and 
attendance at prestigious private schools. A privileged background provides people with 
privileged opportunities and these opportunities provide access to an elite status. 
As Hoffmann notes (in G. Moore, 1985: 67) a college degree is a nearly universal 
precondition for recruitment to elite positions. This precondition is valid for the elite 
recruitment process in Turkey too. Al most all Turkish elites possess at least a high school 
(lycee) degree. In addition the vast majority of Turkish elites possess a university degree. An 
important proportion of them have post-university (Masters, PhD, Postdoctoral, etc. ) degrees 
too. 
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The media elites and political elites share similar social backgrounds in terms of certain 
variables. The members of these two elite groups have a relatively higher social class 
background than the Turkish labour union elites. Nevertheless, the members of the three elite 
groups are predominantly recruited from middle and upper middle classes; approximately 70 
percent of both the Turkish political elite and media elite have a middle and upper middle class 
background. On the other hand, whereas about 17 percent of labour union elites come from 
blue collar or lower white collar families that are the most disadvantaged classes, only 7 
percent of media elites and 3 percent of political elites have a lower class background. Also, 
none of the current labour union elites have an upper class background, although 7 percent of 
both the political and media elite come from upper class families. 
The other important finding of the research is that the Turkish elites have a higher 
level consensually unified national elite character. There is a high degree of consensus among 
the Turkish elite groups. Also, there exists both a fundamental and operative consensus inside 
each elite group. This consensus can be called an "internal consensus". On the other hand, 
political and ideological divisions are one of the most common characteristics of 
contemporary democratic societies. It can be argued that ideological or political divisions do 
not unduly affect this consensus. 
The findings clearly show that, there is a large degree of consensus on major issues 
among Turkish elites. However as a result of its nature, this consensus is not very sharp and 
exact on some issues, as in most contemporary democratic societies. Following the demo-elite 
perspective this consensus can be called a "relative elite consensus". This relative elite 
consensus sums up the idea of the existence of "external elite homogeneity" among Turkish 
elites. This homogeneity also confirms the existence of relative elite integration in Turkish 
society. As a result of this finding, it is possible to claim the existence of a relatively cohesive 
power elite in contemporary Turkey. 
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However, over generalisation and formulation are not sufficient to analyse and explain 
the special characteristics of Turkish society. This deficiency occurs especially when one 
examines and analyses the Turkish army, Turkish military elites and their place in the national 
power structure of society. In a way different from most other countries, where modernisation 
first began, the Turkish military elite are the powerful guardians of the secular-democratic 
system and the other values of the Kenialist Turkish Revolution. 
Whereas the army was one of the most degenerate and corrupt institutions of the late 
Ottoman era until the early nineteenth century, after the abolition of the Janissarries and the 
beginning of serious modernisation efforts at the time of Selim III and Mahmut II and 
following periods, this institution became one of the most modernised within society. It 
became the dynamo of modernisation and westernisation. It is not surprising that Mustafa 
Kemal Ataturk, who was one of the most important leaders of the twentieth century, was a 
member of the military elite. 
Several socio-political events which took place in the 1990s, clearly showed that 
Turkish military elites have a very important place in the democratic power structure. The 
events also confirmed that the relative autonomy of the military elites (from the governing 
elites and other elites) have great importance in the preservation of democracy. Also these 
events showed that elected political elites who symbolise democracy, might be dangerous for 
the democratic system. Turkish military elites maintained democracy in co-operation with 
other democratic elites against the despotism and tyranny of the elected political elites. All 
these facts clearly prove the invalidation of the idea of "the army as the potential enemy of 
democracy and democratic regimes". 
Like other elite groups, military elites are a social reality and a part of the power 
structure of society. The systematic formation of all the elite groups, such as political, 
business, media, bureaucratic, judiciary, military, scientific constitute the national power 
structures of societies. There is no need to criticise the sensitivity of the military elites in 
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protecting democracy; their concern about the increasing socio-political and economic 
problems; and their solidarity and co-operation with the other elite groups to find some 
solution to these problems. All these events do not contradict the basic principles of 
democracy and democratic elite theories. If something has to be criticised, it must be the 
insensitivity, incapacity and individual greed of the elected political elites. 
Turkey has been struggling with various social, economic and political problems. 
Terrorist actions of the PKK and the rise of a radical Islamic movement were assigned top 
priority by Turkish elites among the major problems facing Turkey. Like the majority of the 
population, Turkish elites are predominantly against close relations between politics and 
religion. In addition, economic problems (such as high inflation, unemployment, low wages, 
income inequalities and job security) can be counted among the major problems facing Turkey 
that necessitate urgent solutions. 
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APPENDIXE-1: 
Code No: 
"THE TURKISH POWER ELITE" 
404 
QUESTIONNAIRE 
This interview schedule has been designed by All Arslan who is doing PhD at the 
University of Surrey, Department of Sociology. It will be used in his PhD project which will 
be the first "National Elite Survey of Turkey". The aims of this study are to define and explain 
the power structure of Turkish society and power relations amongst Turkish elite groups. 
All the data which is obtained from this field research will be employed to define the 
general characteristics of power elites and the power structure of Turkish society. The 
researcher promises to comply with all the ethical principles of scientific research. All 
individual information will be kept secret. Any personal information will not be circulated to 
either other scientists or other people and institutions. Also, it is promised that all the gathered 
data used under general headings as general information and the related names will never be 
mentioned. 
** ý 
304 
1) Which elite group do you belong to? 
() 1. Political Elites 
2. Business Elites (Owners of the large business corporations) 
()3. Military elites 
()4. Bureaucratic elites 
()5. Media Elites 
()6. Judiciary Elites 
()7. Scientific Elites 
() 8. Labour Elites 
()9. Managerial Elites (Top managers or directors of selected corporations. 
() 10. Others .......................................................................... 
2) What is your present occupation? 
.............................................................................................. 
3) Average length of the tenure of actual occupational position (Mean years in actual position? ) 
....................................................................................... 
4) Could you please give some information about your previous job/s that you did before your actual 
job (occupational background)? 
Occupational status The name of the companies/institutions 
1. .................................. 
.................................. 
.................................. 
......................................................... 
......................................................... 
......................................................... 
2. 
3. 
5) How did you decide to do your actual job? 
.................................................................................. 
6) Which occupation were you planning to do before the beginning of your occupational life 
.................................................................................. 
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7) Could you please specify your satisfaction rate with your present job? 
()1. Very satisfied 
()2. Satisfied 
( )3. NA, NI 
(}4. Unsatisfied 
()5. Very unsatisfied 
8) If you had a chance to change your present job, in which occupational area would you want to work? 
()1.1 would like to work in my present occupational area b go to 
Q. 10 
()2.1 would not like to do my present job 
9) Could you please specify in which area you would like to work? 
................................................................................................. 
10) Could you please write down, your aims and objectives about your work life in the future? 
......................................................................................................... 
......................................................................................... 
11) Could you tick your gender please? 
()1. Male 
()2. Female 
12) Could you write down please what was your age when you celebrated your last birthday? 
........................................................................................... 
13) What is your martial status 
()1. married 
()2. single b Please go to Q. 26 
()3. widowed 
()4. divorced 
14) Could you write down your marriage age please? 
................................................................................. 
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15) Could you please write down what was your wife's/husband's age when you got married? 
................................................................................ 
16) Would you specify your wife's/husband's educational level? 
................................................................................ 
17) What is your wife's/husband's occupation? 
............................................................................... 
18) What is your wife's/husband's mother's occupation? 
................................................................................. 
19) What is your wife's/husband's father's occupation? 
..................................................................................... 
20) How do you specify your wife's/husband's father's socio-economic status? 
() 1. Lower class 
()2. Lower middle class 
()3. Middle class 
()4. Upper middle class 
() 5. Upper class 
21) Do you have any children? 
(}1. No -+ Please go to Q. 26 
( )2. Yes 
22) How many children do you have? 
......................................................................................... 
23) Do you have any children in school age or post-school age? 
( )1. Yes 
{ )2. No 
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24) What are the name and the type of the schools that your children are continuing or graduated? 
Primary Sch. Junior-High & High Sch. University Post-Univ. 
First child 
Second child 
Third child 
Fourth child. 
................. 
................. 
................. 
................ 
...................... 
...................... 
...................... 
...................... 
....................................................................................................................... 
................................ 
(please write and specify if you have any more child) 
25) How many children does your father have? 
...................................................................................... 
26) Would you specify your educational level please? 
....................................................................................... 
27) Could you please give some information about name and the type of the 
school from which you graduated? 
Name of the School Type of the School 
(State or Private) 
Primary School 
J. High School 
High School 
University 
Post University 
(Post graduate) 
........................................................................... 
........................................................................... 
........................................................................... 
........................................................................... 
........................................................................... 
28) If you are a university graduate, please specify your subject area? 
..................................................................................... 
29) Would you specify your father's educational level please? 
....................................................................................... 
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30) Would you specify the type of your father's education please? 
....................................................................................... 
31) What is your father's occupation? 
................................................................................. 
32) What is your mother's occupation? 
..................................................................................... 
33) Where were you born? 
The name of the city 
()1. Urban areas 
()2. Rural areas 
............................................... 
34) Where is the birth place of your father? 
The name of the city ................................ . 
()1. Urban areas 
()2. Rural areas 
35) According to your opinion, which variables had been most effective for your actual social and 
occupational position? (would you choose in terms of importance please? ) 
() 1. My parents has got good economic and social opportunities 
()2. My parents' occupation 
() 3. My personal abilities (intelligence, personality, interests,.... ) 
()4. My educational background 
()5. Chance 
() 6. Others .................................................. 
36) How do you specify your father's socio-economic status? 
() 1. Lower class 
()2. Lower middle class 
()3. Middle class 
()4. Upper middle class 
()5. Upper class 
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37) How do you define your own class position in society? 
()1. Lower class 
()2. Lower middle class 
()3. Middle class 
()4. Upper middle class 
()5. Upper class 
38) Are you the member of any social club? 
()I. No b Please go to Q. 40 
()2. Yes Please write down the names of club/s 
................................................................................ 
................................................................................ 
................................................................................ 
............................................................................... 
(e. g. The Clubs of Anatolian-Anadolu Kulubu, The Galatasaray Club-Galatasaraylilar 
Kulubu, Mulkiyeliler Kulubu, Rotary and Lions Clubs, and the other elite clubs) 
39) What were your aims and expectations with respect to this membership? 
............................................................................. 
40) Are you a member of any business associations or societies? 
()1. No Please go to Q. 42 
()2. Yes Please specify their names 
............................................................ 
............................................................................ 
............................................................................ 
41) What were your objectives and expectations with these memberships? 
.................................................................................. 
42) What is/was your father's political choice? 
......................................................................................... 
43} How did you vote in the last general election? 
........................................................................................ 
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44) If there was a general election tomorrow, how would you vote? 
...................................................................................... 
45) Which politician (living or dead) do you most admire? 
...................................................................................... 
46) Are you a member of any political party? 
()1. Yes 
()2. No Please go to Q. 48 
47) Could you write down the name of the political party? 
............................................................................................ 
48) How would you define your religious orientation? 
() 1. No religious orientation 
()2. Little religious orientation 
()3. Average religious orientation 
()4. Strong religious orientation 
()5. Very strong religious orientation 
49) Could you please explain your occupational role and its importance for society? 
................................................................................................... 
................................................................ 
50) From which social groups do your friends mainly come from? (Could you specify your 3 choices in 
terms of importance order? ) 
(} 1. Family environment 
()2. Own occupational environment 
()3. Politicians 
()4. Military elites 
() 5. Business elites 
()6. Bureaucratic elites 
()7. Scientific elites 
() 8. Media elites 
()9. Others .................................................... 
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51) Could you define the influence of elite clubs and societies for gaining elite positions and being 
powerful and privileged in the society? 
()1. Very effective 
()2. Effective 
( )3. NI, NA 
()4. Ineffective 
()5. Very ineffective 
52) Could you please tick the three choices which you consider to be the most influential elite groups 
that affect macro level social decisions? (Please specify according to the range of importance): 
()1. Trade (White Collar and Blue Collar) Unions 
()2. Politicians 
()3. Military 
()4. Businessmen and business associations 
()5. Universities and scientists 
()6. High level state bureaucrats 
( )7. Media 
()8. The members of the high courts 
()9. Others (specify please) .................................... 
........................................................................................... 
53) According to you, how much does the elite group which belongs to it, have 
an affect on macro level social decisions? 
()1. Very effective 
()2. Effective 
()3. NA, NI 
()4. Ineffective 
()5. Very ineffective 
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54) Could you specify your opinion about the effect of the social groups on 
macro level social decisions 
1. Very effective 2. Effective 3 NI, NA 4. Ineffective S. Very ineffective 
Public (mass) () () () () () 
Political Elites () () () () () 
Military Elites () OOO() 
Scientific Elites () OOO() 
Business Elites () () () () () 
Media Elites () () () () () 
Bureaucratic Elites () () () () () 
Labour Union () OOO() 
Business Associations () () () () () 
Religious Orders () () () () () 
Mafia and other illegal 
groups () OOOO 
America & CIA () OOOO 
Others (write please) () OOO() 
55) How would you define your relation and connection with your own elite group? 
()1. Very closed 
()2. Closed 
()3. Ordinary 
()4. Weak 
()5. Very weak 
56) How much is your elite group autonomous from the state and governmental elites? 
()1. Completely autonomous 
()2. Autonomous 
()3. NA, NI 
()4. Dependent 
()5. Completely Dependent 
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57) How much is your elite group autonomous from the other elite groups? 
()1. Completely autonomous 
(}2. Autonomous 
( )3. NA, NI 
()4. Dependent 
()5. Completely Dependent 
58) What is your idea about the following statement? 
" Women should return to their traditional role in the society, return to more traditional 
standards of family life and parental responsibilities... " 
()1. Totally agree 
()2. Agree 
( )3. NI, NA 
()4. Disagree 
()5. Totally disagree 
59) What are the three most important actual social and political problems of Turkey? (Please write in 
order of importance) 
()1........................................................................... 
()2............................................................................ 
( )3 . ........................................................................... 
60) In your opinion what are the three major problems of your elite groups? (Please write in terms of 
the rank of importance) 
()1................... 
()2................... 
()3................... 
61) How could the terror (PKK) problem of Turkey be solved? 
................................................................................................... 
............................................................................................................... 
....................................................................... 
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62) What is your thinking about the increasing relations that are observed among some politicians and 
the sheikhs of the religious orders nowadays? 
() 1. Totally approve 
()2. Approve 
( )3. NI, NA 
()4. Against 
()5. Totally against 
63) According to your opinion, what are the major reason/s which influence the increase in the vote of 
the Islamist Welfare Party in the last elections? 
........................................................................ ...................... 
................................................................................ 
64) What is your idea about the white collar union with rights of collective agreement and strike? 
()1. Totally supporting 
()2. Supporting 
( )3. NA, NI 
()4. Against 
()5. Totally against 
65) Could you specify please what is your opinion about the following statement? 
"The obligatory primary school education must be increased from 5 years to 8 years" 
()1. Totally agree 
()2. Agree 
()3. NA, NI 
()4. Disagree 
()5. Totally disagree 
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66) Could you express your opinion about the results of military interventions for Turkish Society and 
Turkish politics? (Could you write your opinion individually for each military intervention) 
1. Very positive 2. Positive 3. NA, NI 4. Negative 5. Very negative 
27 May 1960 
12 March 1971 () () () () () 
12 September 1980 () () () () () 
67) Do you believe in monogamy? 
()1. Yes 
( )2. No 
68) Do you believe in life after death? 
( )1. Yes 
( )2. No 
69) What are your views on capital punishment? 
()1. Totally agree 
()2. Agree 
()3. NI, NA 
()4. Against 
()5. Totally against 
70) What are your views on family planning? 
() 1. Totally approve 
()2. Approve 
( )3. NA, NI 
()4. Against 
()5. Totally against 
71) What are your views on abortion? 
()1. Totally approve 
()2. Approve 
( )3. NI, NA 
()4. Against 
()5. Totally against 
316 
72) How do you spend your weekend and holiday? 
................................................................................................. 
........................................................................................................ 
73) Where do you mostly spend your holidays? 
Place 
City 
Country 
............................................................... 
............................................................... 
............................................................... 
74) Have you ever been abroad? 
( )1. Yes 
( )2. No cGotoQ. 78 
75) For what kinds of purposes did you go abroad? 
()1. Education 
()2. For business of occupational reasons 
()3. Tourist purposes (recreation and holiday) 
()4. Others ................................................. 
76) How often do you travel abroad? 
()1. Less than twice in a year 
()2. Twice in a year 
()3. Three times in a year 
()4. Four times in a year 
()5. More than four times'in a year 
77) Which countries do you usually travel to? 
()1. European countries 
()2. America 
()3. Middle East and Arabic countries 
()4. Far East and South Asian countries (Japan, Taiwan, Korea, Indonesia... etc. ) 
()5 Ex-East bloc countries (Russia, Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary ... etc. ) 
()6. Turkish Republics (Turkmenistan, Ozbekistan, Kazakistan, Azerbeycan, Kirgizistan ... ) 
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78) Do you know any foreign language? 
()1. No 
()2. Yes ==> Could you specify please 
() 1. English 
()2. French 
()3. German 
()4. Arabic 
()5. Japanese 
()6. Others ............................................................. . 
79) What are your personal interests and hobbies? 
....................................................................................................................................... 
............................................................................................................................................ 
80) Which daily newspaper/s do you usually read? 
................................................................................................................ 
81) Which television channel/s do you mostly watch? 
.............................................................................................. 
82) What is the brand of your car? 
.............................................................................................. 
83) How would you define yourself in your own words? According to you, who are you and which 
characteristics can define you well? 
.................................................................................................. 
84) How would you like to be remembered? 
.............................................................................. 
................................................................................. 
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X: Could you please summarise your personal views about this research and questionnaire in a couple 
of sentences 
............................................................................................................. 
....................................................................................................................... 
....................................................................................................................... 
.......................................................................................... 
X: If you do not mind and are interested in the results of this study could you please write your name, 
contact address and telephone number: 
Name 
Address 
Tel. No. 
E-mail 
..................................................................... 
..................................................................... 
.................................................................... 
.................................................................... 
. ................................................................. 
.................................................................. 
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APPENDIX-2 
Code No: 
TURK IKTIDAR SECKINLERI 
GÖRÜSME KILAVUZU 
Bu görü*me formu Surrey Universitesi, Sosyoloji Bölümü'nde akademik ýali$ma 
yapmakta olan D. Ali Arslan tarafindan, Türkiye'nin "Ulusal Nitelikli 
Ilk Elit Araýtirmasi" 
iqin hazirlanmi*tir. Iýaliýma tamamen bilimsel amaqli olup, Turk Toplumu'nun iktidar 
yapismm, Türk elitlerinin ve Turk elit gruplan arasrndaki iliýkilerin sosyolojik analizini 
gerqekleýtirmeye yöneliktir. 
Araetirmada elde edilen bütün bilgiler "Türk Iktidar Segkinleri" ve Türkiye'nin iktidar 
yapisimn genel özelliklerini ortaya koymak igin kullanilacaktir. Cahemamizda bilimsel ahlak 
ilkelerinin tamamma hassasiyetle uyulacaktir. Bütün kieisel bilgiler kesinlikle gizli tutulacak, 
hiýbir kiei ya da kuruluea her ne amacla olursa olsun hirbir bireysel bilgi verilmeyecektir. 
Ayrica, bütün bilgiler genel ba5liklar altinda kullanilacak ve kesinlikle isim anilmayacaktir. 
D. Ali Arslan 
University of Surrey 
Department of Sociology 
Guildford, Surrey 
GU2 5XH 
ENGLAND 
Tel. : +44 1483 300800 /2805 
+44 468 972 781 
E-mail: D. Arslan@surrey. ac. uk 
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1) Mensubu oldugunuz meslek grubu? 
()1. Politikaci 
()2. I$ adami 
()3. Asker 
()4. Bürokrat 
()5. Basin-Yayin 
()6. Yargi-Adalet 
()7. Bilim adami-Üniversite mensubu 
()8. Sendikaci 
()9. Yönetici 
() 10. Ba$ka (lütfen yazimz) .............. .......... 
2) $u anki mesleginizdeki konumunuzu, yaptiguuz i§i yazar misimz? 
....................................................................................... 
3) Kag yildir §imdiki mesleginizi sürdürüyorsunuz? 
4) $u anki mesleginizden Once yapmi§ oldugunuz iýlerle ilgili genel bilgileri lütfen apgidaki 
bo&klara yazar misimz? 
Isteki Statünüz CaLst&inºz Kurulusun Adi 
I. ............................. 
2. 
3. 
......................................................... 
......................................................... 
......................................................... 
5) $u anki mesleginizi seqmenizde etkili olan etmenler nelerdir? 
6) Cah*ma hayatina ba$lamadan Once, hangi meslek alamnda ýali§mayi dü$ünüyordunuz? 
.................................................................................. 
7) $u anki i$inizden ne 6l9üde memnunsunuz? 
()1. Cok memnunum 
()2. Memnunum 
()3. Fikrim Yok 
()4. Memnun degilim 
()5. Hiq memnun degilim 
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8) Yeni bir seýme $ansimz olsaydi: 
()1. Simdiki meslegimi tercih ederdim b Lütfen 10. Soruya Ge&iz 
()2. Meslegimi degiýtirmek isterdim 
9) Hangi meslek alamnda cali*mak isterdiniz? 
...................................................................... 
10) Mesleki ya§antmizla ilgili olarak gelecege yönelik planlanniz nelerdir? 
........................................................................................ 
......................................................................................... 
11) Cinsiyetiniz? 
()1. Kadin 
()2. Erkek 
12) Yaýmiz? 
13) Medeni haliniz? 
(}1. Evli 
()2. Bo$anrm$ 
()3. Dul (qi sag degil) 
()4. Bekar b Lutfen 26. Soru'ya geginiz. 
14) Evlilik ya, mizi (birden fazia evlenmiý iseniz, ilk evliliginzideki yaýmizi) yazar mismiz? 
15) Evlendiginizde qiniz kar yqindaydi? 
16) E*inizin en son mezun oldugu okulu yazar misuvz? 
17) Esinizin meslegi nedir? 
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18) E$inizin annesinin meslegi nedir? 
................................................................. ......... 
19) Eýinizin babasimn meslegi nedir? 
............................................................................ 
20) Eýinizin babasmin sosyal-ekonomik statüsünü nasal tanmmlarsmiz? 
() 1. Ost seviye 
()2. Ortanm üstü 
()3. Orta 
()4. Ortamn alte 
( )5. Alt 
21) Cocugunuz var nu? 
()1. Hayir 
()2. Evet 
-41ý Lütfen 26. Soruya geginiz! 
22) Kaq rocugunuz var? 
23) Okul gagmda ya da okul gagmi bitirmi* gocugunuz var mi? 
()1. Evet 
( )2. Hayir 
24) Cocuklarimzm egitim gördükleri ya da mezun olduklan okullann isimlerini ve türünü (devlet/özel) 
aeagidaki ilgili boeluklara yazar mismiz? 
Ilkokul. Ortaokul Lise Üniversite 
1. Cocuk 
2. Cocuk 
3. 'Qocuk 
4. Cocuk 
................... 
................... 
................... 
................... 
........................... 
........................... 
........................... 
........................... 
25) Kar, ka. rdessininiz? (Üveyler dahil) 
....................... 
...................... 
...................... 
...................... 
...................... 
.......................... 
.......................... 
.......................... 
.......................... 
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26) Son mezun oldugunuz okulu yazar misimz? 
....................................................................... 
27) Mezun oldugunuz okullarla ilgili olarak apgidaki bo§luklan doldurur musunuz? 
Okulun Adt Okulun Titrii (DevletlOzel) 
ilkokul 
Ortaokul 
Lise 
Üniversite 
Lisansüstti 
............................................ 
............................................ 
............................................ 
............................................ 
............................................ 
....................................... 
....................................... 
....................................... 
....................................... 
....................................... 
28) Üniversite mezunu iseniz, mezun oldugunuz bölümü yazar misiniz? 
...................................................... 
29) Babamzm en son mezun oldugu okulu yazar misimz? 
30) Babamzm görmü5 oldugu egitim türünü (meslek okulu ya da üniversite mezunu ise) yazar mismiz? 
31) Babanizin meslegi nedir? 
32) Annenizin meslegi nedir? 
33) Nerede doAdunuz? 
$ehrin Adi: ............................................... 
()1. Kirsal kesim 
()2. $ehir merkezi 
34) Babamzm dogum yeri neresi? 
$ehrin Adi: 
....................... 
()1. K. irsal kesim 
()2. $ehir merkezi 
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35) ySimdiki toplumsal ve mesleksel 
konumunuzun belirlenmesinde etkili olan en önemli 3 etmeni, 
önem sirasuu belirterek yazar mismiz? 
()1. Ailemin sosyal ekonomik olanaklannm iyi olmasi 
()2. Ailemin (ana/baba) meslegi 
()3. Ki5isel özelliklerim (zeka, karakter, yetenek, ilgi.... vs.. ) 
()4. Gördügüm egitim 
()5. $ans 
()6. Bunlann Diýmda (yazuuz lütfen) ................................................ 
36) Babanizin sosyal-ekonomik konumunu nasal tanimlarsmiz? 
()1. Ost düzey 
2. Ortanin üstü 
()3. Orta 
()4. Ortanin alte 
( )5. Alt 
37) Kendinizin toplum icindeki konumunu nasal tammlarsmiz? 
()1. Üst düzey 
()2. Ortarun üstü 
()3. Orta 
()4. Ortanm alte 
( )5. Alt 
38) Hangi sosyal kulüplere üyesiniz? 
()1. Üyesi oldugum sosyal kulüp yok E;: ý Lütfen 40. soruya ge&iz 
()2. Üyesi oldugum sosyal kulüpler E: > Lütfen isimlerini yaziniz: 
.................................................... 
....................................................... 
............................................................................... . 
(Örnegin: Anadolu Kulübü, Galatasaraylilar, Mülkiyeliler Kulübü, Rotary ve Lions Kulübü, vakiflar, ... gibi. 
) 
39) Bu kulüplere üye olmanizda etkili olan sebebler nelerdir? 
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40) Herhangi bir meslek kurulu§una üyeliginiz var mi? (TÜSIAD, ITO, ASO, TBB, TMMOB, 
TESK, DISK, .... gibi. 
) 
()1. Hayir b Lütfen 40. soruya geýiniz 
()2. Üyesi oldugunuz kuruluýlar: b Lütfen isimlerini yaziniz: 
41) Bu kurulu§lara üye olmamzda etkili olan sebebler nelerdir? 
42) Babanizin oy verdigi/destekledigi siyasi parti hangisidir? 
43) Son genel segimlerde hangi siyasi partiye oy verdiniz? 
44) Yarm bir genet seqim olsaydi oyunuzu hangi siyasi partiye verirdiniz? 
...................................................................................... 
45) En gok begendiginiz ve takdir ettiginiz politikaci/devlet adami kimdir? (Yaeayan ya da yaeamayan) 
.................................................................................. 
46) Üyesi oldugunuz bir siyasi parti var mi? 
()1. Hayir U Lütfen 48. soruya gesiniz 
()2. Evet 
47) Lütfen, üyesi oldugunuz siyasi partinin ismini yazar misimz? 
............................................................................................ 
48) Dini bakimdan kendinizi nasil tammlarsimz? 
()1. Dinle ilgim yok 
()2. Inangh bir insamm 
()3. Oldukra manch bir insamm 
()4. Dindanm 
()5. Cok dindanm 
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49) Mesleginizin toplumdaki yeri, önemi ve i&vi He ilgili fikirleriniz nelerdir? 
...................................................... 
50) Yakin arkadqlarnuz genellikle hangi sosyal gruplarm mensubu? Önem sirasmi 
belirterek qagidakilerden 3 tanesini i4aretler misiniz? 
()1. Aile gevremden 
()2. Kendi meslek gevremden 
()3. Politikaci 
()4. Asker 
()5.1$adamt 
()6. Bürokrat 
()7. Bilimadami 
()8. Medya (basm/yaym) mensubu 
()9. Ba$ka (lütfen yazimz) .................................................... 
51) Sizce sosyal kulüpler-elit kulüpleri (Galatasaraylilar, Anadolu Kulübü, Rotary-Lions, Masonik 
örgütlenmeler, Mülkiyeliler, vakiflar), bireylerin toplumda güqlü ve etkin bir konuma 
gelebilmelerinde ne öl9üde etkili? 
()1. Cok etkili 
()2. Etkili 
()3. Fikrim yok 
()4. Etkisi yok 
()5. Hig bir etkisi yok 
52) Sizce ülkemizde, toplumun genelini ilgilendiren sosyal, ekonomik ve siyasi kararlarin alinmasinda 
en cok etkili olan toplumsal gruplar aeagidakilerden hangileridir? (Önem sirasmi yazarak 3 tane 
iearetleyiniz lütfen) 
()1. Sendikalar 
()2. Politikacilar 
()3. Askerler 
()4. Isadamlan ve isdünyasi 
()5. Üniversiteler ve bilimadamlan 
()6. Ost düzey burokratlar 
()7. Medya (basin/yayin) 
8. Yüksek yargi organlau 
()9. Tarikat ! 5eyhleri ve tarikatlar 
() 10. Baska (lütfen yazimz) ......................... ... ............. ... . .... ... . ... 
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53) Mensubu oldugunuz meslek grubu toplumumuzun tümüne yönelik toplumsal, ekonomik ve siyasi 
kararlann ahnmasinda ne ölrüde etkilli? 
()1. Cok etkili 
()2. Etkili 
()3. Fikrim yok 
()4. Etkisi yok 
()5. Hic bir etkisi yok 
54) Sizce, toplumumuzun tümünü ilgilendiren kararlann almmasmda a$agidaki toplumsal gruplar ve 
güq odaklan ne ölcüde etkiye sahip? (Lütfen her toplumsal grup iýin tek bir seýenek i§aretleyiniz) 
1. Cok etkili 2. Etkili 3. Fikrim yok 4. Etkisiz 5. Hiýbir etkisi yok 
Halk OOOO() 
Politikacilar ()()()()() 
Askerler ()()()()() 
Bilimadamlart ()()()()() 
teadamlan OOOOO 
Medya-Gazeteciler ()()()()() 
Ost düzey burokratlar ()OOO() 
Sendikalar ()()()()() 
Meslek kuruluelart OOOOO 
Tarikatlar ve $eyhler ()()()()() 
Mafya-illegal örgütler ()()()()() 
Amerika & CIA ()()()()() 
Baeka ................... OOOOO 
55) Kendi meslek grubunuzdan insanlarla olan iliskiklerinizi aeagidaki degerlendirmelerden en iyi 
hangisi tanunlar? 
()1. Cok yakm ili§kilerim var 
()2. Yakin iliýkilerim var 
()3. Orta düzeyde 
()4. Zayif ili*kilerim var 
()5. Cok za. yif ili§kilerim var 
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56) Mensubu oldugunuz meslek grubu, hükümet ve politikacilardan (ve onlann etkilerinden) ne öl9üde 
bagimsiz? 
()1. Tamamen bagnmiz 
()2. Bagimsiz 
()3. Fikrim yok 
()4. Bagimli 
()5. Tamamen bagimh 
Ayrica, medya-siyaset ili5kisi konusunda görü51erinizi özetlermisiniz (önce geneldeki 
durum, özel olarak da olumlu ve olumsuz yönleriyle ülkemizdeki durum): 
....................................... .............................. ...................... .......................... ........ ......... 
................................................................................................................................... 
57) Mensubu oldugunuz meslek grubu, öteki toplumsal gruplardan ve onlarm 
etkilerinden ne ölcüde bagimsiz? 
()1. Tamamen bagimsiz 
()2. Bagumsiz 
()3. Fikrim yok 
()4. Bagimh 
()5. Tamamen bagnmh 
58) A*agidaki dü*ünceyle ilgili görü§ünüz nedir? 
" Kadin toplumdaki geleneksel rollerine geri d6nmelidir: Kadtntn temel toplumsal görevi 
analik ve esliktir... " 
()1. Tamamen katihyorum 
()2. Katihyorum 
()3. Fikrim yok 
()4. Kaqi fikirdeyim 
()5. Tamamen kar$i fikirdeyim 
59) Ülkemizin en önemli 3 toplumsal sorunu nelerdir (lütfen önem sirasma göre yazimz)? 
1. 
2 
...................... ........................... .................. . 
....................... 
3. ................. 
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60) Mensubu oldugunuz toplumsal grubun en önemli 3 sorunu nelerdir (lütfen önem 
sirasma göre yazmiz)? 
1. 
2. 
3. 
.......................................................................... 
.......................................................................... 
.......................................................................... 
61) Sizce ülkemizin terör (PKK ve öteki örgütlerin yarattigi) sorunu nasil , ýözülebilir? 
.................................................................................................. 
............................................................................................................... 
............................................................................................................... 
62) Ülkemizde bazi nolitikacilar He tarikat sevhleri arasindaki, eün gectikce artis gtizlemlenen, 
vakin iliskiler konusunda ne düýiinüyorsunuz? 
()1. Tamamen onayhyorum 
()2. Onayhyorum 
()3. Fikrim yok 
()4. Uygun bulmuyorum 
()5. Hiq uygun bulmuyorum 
63) Sizce Refah (Fazilet) Partisi'nin oylarindaki luzh artiým sebepleri nelerdir? 
64) "Toplu sözlesme ve grev hakkma sahip kamu calisanlari sendikalari" He ilgili fikriniz nedir? 
()1. Tarnamen destekliyorum 
()2. Destekliyorum 
()3. Fikrim yok 
()4. Karýiyim 
()5. Tamamen kar*iyun 
65) "Zorunlu eilitimin 5 vildan. 8 vila cikartilmasi" He ilgili fikriniz nedir? 
()1. Tamamen destekliyorum 
()2. Destekliyorum 
()3. Fikrim yok 
()4. Kaqiyun 
()5. Tamamen kar4iyun 
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66) Yakm tarihimizde ülkemizde ya$anmiý 3 askeri müdahalenin Türk toplumuna ve Türk siyasi 
hayatma etkileri konusunda degerlendirmeleriniz nelerdir? 
l. Cok Olumlu 2. Olumlu 3. Fikrim yok 4. Olumsuz 5. Cok Olumsuz 
() () () () () 27 Mayis 1960 
() () () () () 12 Mart 1971 
12 Eylül 1980 OOOOO 
67) "Cok esle evlilik" konusunda frkriniz nedir? 
()1. Tamamen destekliyorum 
()2. Destekliyorum 
()3. Fikrim yok 
()4. Karpyun 
()5. Tarnamen karpyim 
68) "Ölümden sonra havat oldOu" konusunda dü§ünceniz nedir? 
()1. Tamamen inaruyorum 
()2. Inamyorum 
()3. Fikrim yok 
()4. Inanmryorum 
()5. Hiý inanmryorum 
69) "Idam Cezasi" ile ilgili görü*ünüz nedir? 
()1. Tamamen destekliyorum 
()2. Destekliyorum 
()3. Fikrim yok 
()4. Kar$iyun 
()5. Tamamen kaqryim 
70 ) "Aile olanlamasi" ile ilgili fikriniz nedir? 
()1. Tamamen destekliyorum 
()2. Destekliyorum 
()3. Fikrim yok 
()4. Kaqiyun 
()5. Tamamen kaqryim 
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71) "Kiirtai" konusunda fikriniz nedir? 
()1. Tamamen destekliyorum 
()2. Destekliyorum 
()3. Fikrim yok 
()4. Kar$iyim 
()5. Tamamen karýiynn 
72) Hafta sonlannizi ve kisa tatillerinizi nasil ve nerede gegirirsiniz? 
73) Yaz tatillerinizi genellikle nerede gegirirsiniz? 
Yer (Tesis) 
Sehir 
Ulke 
........................................... ............... 
........................................... ............... 
........................................... ............... 
74) Yurt dipmda bulundunuz mu? 
()1. Evet 
()2. Hayir * Lütfen 78. soruya ge&iz 
75) Hangi amaglarla yurt di§uia gittiniz? 
()1. Egitim amaciyla 
()2. Iýim1e ilgili olarak 
()3. Turistik amaglarla 
()4. Ba$ka 
................................................. 
76) Ne kadar sikhkla yurt di5ma gidersiniz? 
()1. Cok nadiren 
()2. Yilda iki defadan az 
()3. Yilda iki kez 
()4. Yilda üý kez 
()5. Yilda dört kez 
()6. Yilda. 5 kez, ya da daha fazla 
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77) Genellikle hangi ülkelere gidersiniz? 
()1. Avrupa ülkelerine 
()2. Amerika'ya 
()3. Ortadogu ve Arap ülkelerine 
()4. Uzakdogu'ya (Japonya, Taywan, Tayland, Kore, Singapur, ... vb. ) 
()5 Eski dogu-bloku ülkelerine (Rusya, Romanya, Macaristan, .. vb. 
) 
()6. Türk Devletlerine (TUrkmenistan, Azerbaycan, Kazakistan, 
Kirgizistan, Özbekistan) 
78) Yabanci dil biliyor musunuz? 
( 
( 
) 1. Hayir 
2. Evet c* Lütfen bildiginiz yabanci dilleri ilaretleyiniz: 
()1. Ingilizce 
()2. Fransizca 
()3. Almanca 
()4. Arabra 
()5. Japonca 
()6. Rusqa 
( )7. Ba$ka .............................................................. 
79) Ki$isel ilgileriniz ve hobileriniz nelerdir? 
................................................................................................ 
80) Genellikle hangi günlük gazeteyi/gazeteleri okursunuz? 
................................................................................................ 
81) Genellikle hangi televizyon kanallarim izlersiniz? 
.............................................................................................. 
82) Arabamzin markasi nedir? 
.............................................................................................. 
83) Kendinizi nasil tanimlarsimz? Hangi özellikleriniz sizi en iyi 5ekilde tammlar? 
...................................................................................... 
84) Nasil ve hangi özelliklerinizle hatirlanmak istersiniz? 
..................................................................................... 
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f Bu araýtirma ve anket formu ile ilgili düýüncelerinizi, birkaq cümleyle ifade etmek ister misiniz? 
.......................................................................................................... 
.................................................................................................................... 
.................................................................................................................... 
.......................................................................................... 
f Ara*tirmamn sonucuyla ilgileniyorsamz ve bu konuda bilgi verilmek icin sizinle tekrar temasa 
gec, ilmesini istiyorsaniz, lütfen adresinizi a4agiya yazar misimz: 
Isim, Soyisim 
Adres 
Tel. No. 
E-mail 
................................. .................. 
................................... ............... 
................................... ............... 
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APPENDIX-3: 
CODE BOOK 
Question/ Variable Column Value Values Missing Range of 
Variable Label Name Location Labels Values Valid Values 
Identification ID 1-3 - - - 1-100 
Number 
Elite Group ELGROUP 4 Political 1 -9 1-4 
Trade Union 2 
Media 3 
Judiciary 4 
Present PREOCCUP 5 President 1 -9 1-2 
Occupation Chief Executive 2 
Mean Years in OCCUPLEN 6 One-Five Years 1 -9 1-4 
Actual Position Six-Ten Years 2 
Eleven-Fifteen Years 3 
Sixteen and Over 4 
Occupational OCUPBACK 7 Public Administration 1 -9 1-5 
Background Professional 2 
Worker 3 
Journalist 4 
Trade Unionist 5 
Factors on Job JOBDEC 8 Organized Struggle 1 -9 1-4 
Decision Chance 2 
The Sense of Responsibility 
Personal Choice 3 
4 
Favourite OCCUPFAV 9 Journalist 1 -9 1-8 
Occupation in Manager (Private Sector) 2 
Youth Lawyer 3 
Caricaturist 4 
Public Administrator 5 
Teacher 6 
Engineer 7 
Scientist 8 
Occupational OCSATRAT 10 Very Satisfied 1 -9 1-5 
Satisfaction Satisfied 2 
Rate No Answer-Undecided 3 
Unsatisfied 4 
Very Unsatisfied 5 
Occupational OCCUPSAT 11 Want Present Job 1 
Satisfaction Do not Want Pres. Job 2 
Wanted OCUPWANT 12 Computer Engineering 1 -9 1 
Occupation Not Applicable 0 
Work Plan in OCCFUTPL 13 Continue Same Job 1 -9 1-4 
Future Attendance to Politics 2 
Scientist in a University 3 
Higher Public 
Administration 4 
Gender SEX 14 Female 1 -9 1-2 
Male 2 
Age AGE 15-16 - - 99 20-90 Marital Status MARSTAT 17 Married 1 -9 1-3 
Single 2 
Widowed-Divorced 3 
Respondent MARAGE 18-19 - - 99 15-60 Marriage Aim 
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Question/ 
Variable label 
Spouse's 
Marriage Age 
Spouse's 
Educational 
Level 
Spouse's 
Occupation 
Spouse's 
Mother's 
Occupation 
Spouse' s 
Father's 
Occupation 
Spouse's 
Father's Social- 
Econ. Status 
Number of 
Children 
Children 
in/post School 
Age 
Children's 
School Type 
Father' s 
Children 
Number 
Respondent' s 
Educational 
Level 
Type of the 
School 
Variable 
Name 
SPMARAGE 
SPEDLEV 
SPOCCUP 
SPMAOCP 
SPFAOCP 
SFASOSTA 
NUMCHILD 
CHISCAGE 
SCTYPECH 
FACIüNUM 
EDLEV 
SCTYPRES 
Column 
Location 
20-21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
Value 
Labels 
University 
High School (Lycee) 
Middle (Junior H. Schl) 
Primary School 
Housewife 
Teacher 
Lawyer 
Journalist 
Social Scientist 
Administrator 
Housewife 
Teacher 
Worker 
Tradesmen (Artisan) 
Professional 
Farmer 
Soldier 
Lower Class 
Lower Middle Class 
Middle Class 
Upper Middle Class 
Upper Class 
No Child 
One Children 
Two Children 
Three Children 
Four children 
Five and More 
Yes 
No 
Mostly State Normal 
Mostly State College 
Mostly Private College 
Not Applicable 
No Child 
One Child 
Two Children 
Three Children 
Four Children 
Five Children 
Six Children 
Seven Children 
Eight Children 
Nine Children 
University 
High School (Lycee) 
Mostly State Normal 
Mostly State College 
Mostly Private College 
Values 
1 
2 
3 
4 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
1 
Missing 
Values 
99 
-9 
-9 
-9 
Range of 
Valid 
Values 
15-60 
1-4 
1-6 
1-2 
2 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
-9 1-5 
i 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
1 
-9 
-9 
-9 
1-5 
1-6 
1-2 
2 
1 
2 
3 
0 
-9 1-3 
09 1-9 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
1f -9 I 1-2 
2I 
1 -9 1-3 
2 
3 
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Question/ Variable Column Value Values Missing Range of 
Variable label Name Location Labels Values Valid Values 
Name of the SCHONAME 33 Gazi University 1 -9 1-6 
School Ankara University 2 
METU (ODTU) 3 
Other Universities 4 
Istanbul University 5 
Not Applicable 0 
Education Type EDTYPE 34 Social Sciences 1 -9 1-7 
Management 2 
Philology (Turkish) 3 
Mathematics 4 
Technical Sciences 5 
Economy 6 
Not Applicable 0 
Father's EDLEVFAT 35 University 1 -9 1-5 
Educational High School (Lycee) 2 
Level Middle (Junior H. Sc) 3 
Primary School 4 
No School Education 5 
Father's EDTYPFAT 36 Law 1 -9 1-3 
Education Type Medical Sciences 2 
Not Applicable 0 
Father's OCCUPFAT 37 Tradesmen (Artisan) 1 -9 1-5 
Occupation Public Administrator 2 
Farmer 3 
Worker 4 
Professional 5 
Mother's OCCUPMAT 38 Housewife 1 -9 1-2 
Occupation Others 2 
Place of Birth BIRPLACE 39 East-Southeast (Rural) 1 -9 1-9 East-Southeast Urban 2 
Black Sea (Rural) 3 
Black Sea (Urban) 4 
Central Anatolia (Rural) 5 
Central Anatolia (Urban) 6 
Aegean-Mediterranean 
(Rural) 7 
Aegean-Mediterranean 
(Urban) 8 
Other Country 9 
Father's Place BIPLAFAT 40 East-Southeast (Rural) 1 -9 1-9 
of Birth East-Southeast Urban 2 
Black Sea (Rural) 3 
Black Sea (Urban) 4 
Central Anatolia (Rural) 5 
Central Anatolia (Urban) 6 
Aegean-Mediterranean 
(Rural) 7 
Aegean-Mediterranean 
(Urban) 8 
Other Country 9 
Factors on FACOCPOS 41 Personal Abilities & -9 1-4 Occupational Chance 1 
Position Personal Abilities & 
Education 2 
Personal Abilities & Family 
Background 3 
Education & Chance 4 
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Question/ Variable Column Value Values Missing Range of 
Variable label Name Location Labels Values Valid Values 
Father's Social SOSTATFA 41 Lower Class 1 -9 1-5 
Status Lower Middle Class 2 
Middle Class 3 
Upper Middle Class 4 
Upper Class 5 
Respondent's SOSTAT 42 Lower Class 1 -9 1-5 
Social Status Lower Middle Class 2 
Middle Class 3 
Upper Middle Class 4 
Upper Class 5 
Social Club MESOCLUB 43 -No 0 -9 1-4 
Membership -Galatasaray 1 
Classical Foundation 
(wakfs) 2 
-Modem Foundation 3 
-Anatolian Club 4 
Reason for MESOCLRE 44 Solidarity and Status 1 -9 1-2 
Social Club Solidarity and Civil Society 
Membership Understanding 2 
Not Applicable 0 
Business MEBUSAS 45 Yes 1 -9 1-2 
Association No 2 
Membership 
Reason for MEBUASRE 46 Civil Society -9 1-2 
Business Understanding 1 
Association Occupational Reason 2 
Membership 
Father's POLCHFAT 47 Liberal Right 1 -9 1-5 
Political Choice Radical Right 2 
Social Democrat 3 
Radical Left 4 
Unanswered 5 
Vote in the VOTELEL 48 Liberal Right 1 -9 1-5 
Last General Radical Right 2 
Election Social Democrat 3 
Radical Left 4 
Unanswered 5 
Respondent POLCHOIC 49 Liberal Right 1 -9 1-6 Political Choice Radical Right 2 
Social Democrat 3 
Radical Left 4 
Unanswered 5 
Undecided 6 
Admired LEADADM 50 Ataturk 1 -9 1-6 
Political Leader II. Abdulhamid 2 
Ozal 3 
Erbakan 4 
Lenin 5 
Unanswered 6 
Political Party POPARME 51 No 1 -9 1-2 Membership Yes 2 
The name of NAPOPAME 52 Not Applicable 0 -9 1-2 the Membered ODP 1 
Political Party Others 2 
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Question/ 
Variable label 
Religious 
Orientation 
Importance of 
Self 
Occupation 
Social Groups 
of Friends 
Influence of 
Elite Clubs 
The Most 
Effective Elite 
Group 
The Second 
Most 
Effective Elite 
Group 
Three most 
Influential 
Elite Groups 
Variable 
Name 
RELIGION 
OCCUPIMP 
FRESOGR 
CLUBINFL 
MOSEFEL 
SECEFEL 
POWELITE 
Column 
Location 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
Value 
Labels 
No 
Little 
Average 
Strong 
Very Strong 
Inseparable Component 
of Democracy 
Important and Effective 
It has Bad Reputation 
in the Society 
Family 
Own Occupational 
Environment 
Politicians 
Military Elites 
Business Elites 
Bureaucratic Elites 
Scientific Elites 
Media Elites 
Very Effective 
Effective 
No Idea 
Ineffective 
Very Ineffective 
Military Elites 
Business Elites 
Political Elites 
Media Elites 
Others 
Military Elites 
Business Elites 
Political Elites 
Media Elites 
Others 
-Military-Business- 
Media 
-Military-Business- 
Bureaucratic 
-Business-Political- 
Bureaucratic 
-Business-Military- 
Political 
-Political-Media-Trade 
Union Elites 
-Media-Business-Trade 
Union Elites 
Values 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
1 
Missing 
Values 
-9 
Range of 
Valid 
Values 
1-5 
1-3 
2 
3 
-9 1-8 1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
-9 1-5 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
-9 
-9 
-9 
1-5 
1-5 
1-6 
Influence of OWELGRIN 60 Very Effective 1 -9 1-5 Own Elite Effective 2 
Group No Idea 3 
Ineffective 4 
Ve Ineffective 5 
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Question/ 
Variable label 
Power of Public 
Power of 
Political Elites 
Power of 
Military Elites 
Power of 
Scientific Elites 
Power of 
Business Elites 
Power of 
Media Elites 
Power of 
Bureaucratic 
Elites 
Power of 
Labour Union 
Elites 
Power of 
Business 
Association 
Power of 
Religious 
Orders 
Variable 
Name 
POWPUBL 
POWPOLEL 
POWMILEL 
POWSCIEL 
POWBUSEL 
POWMEDEL 
POWBUREL 
POWLAUEL 
POWBUSAS 
POWRELOR 
Column 
Location 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
66 
67 
68 
69 
70 
Value 
Labels 
Very Effective 
Effective 
No Idea 
Ineffective 
Very Ineffective 
Very Effective 
Effective 
No Idea 
Ineffective 
Very Ineffective 
Very Effective 
Effective 
No Idea 
Ineffective 
Very Ineffective 
Very Effective 
Effective 
No Idea 
Ineffective 
Very Ineffective 
Very Effective 
Effective 
No Idea 
Ineffective 
Very Ineffective 
Very Effective 
Effective 
No Idea 
Ineffective 
Very Ineffective 
Very Effective 
Effective 
No Idea 
Ineffective 
Very Ineffective 
Very Effective 
Effective 
No Idea 
Ineffective 
VeryIneffective 
Very Effective 
Effective 
No Idea 
Ineffective 
Very Ineffective 
Very Effective 
Effective 
No Idea 
Ineffective 
Very Ineffective 
Values 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
Missing 
Values 
-9 
-9 
-9 
-9 
-9 
-9 
-9 
-9 
-9 
-9 
Range of 
Valid 
Values 
1-5 
1-5 
1-5 
1-5 
1-5 
1-5 
1-5 
1-5 
1-5 
1-5 
Power of Mafia POWMAFIA 71 Very Effective 1 -9 1-5 
and Illegal Effective 2 
Groups No Idea 3 
Ineffective 4 
Very Ineffective 5 
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Question/ Variable Column Value Values Missing Range of 
Variable label Name Location Labels Values 
Valid 
Values 
l 
Influence of POWAMCIA 
wmwý 72 Very Effective 1 -9 1-5 
America and Effective 2 
CIA No Idea 3 
Ineffective 4 
Very Ineffective 5 
Power of POWOTHER 73 Very Effective 1 -9 
1-5 
Others Effective 2 
No Idea 3 
Ineffective 4 
Very Ineffective 5 
Relation with REOWELGR 74 Very Closed 1 -9 1-5 
own Elite Closed 
2 
Group Ordinary 3 
Weak 4 
Very Weak 5 
Autonomy from AUTOGOV 75 Completely 1 -9 1-5 
the Autonomous 2 
Government Autonomous 3 
No Idea 4 
Dependent 5 
Completely Dependent 
Autonomy from AUTOELGR 76 Completely 1 -9 1-5 
other Elite Autonomous 2 
Groups Autonomous 3 
No Idea 4 
Dependent 5 
Completely Dependent 
Idea about WOMPLACE 77 Totally Conservative 1 -9 1-5 
«" ri___ i"nnenruitivn 7 
11 
in Society 
Important 
Problems of 
Turkey 
Major 
Problems of 
Own Elite 
Group 
Terror Problem 
of Turkey 
PROBTUR 
PROELGR 
PROTEROR 
78 
79 
80 
No Response 
Slightly Liberal 
Totally Liberal 
Economic-Democracy 
Political Unstability/ 
Elites-Economic 
Education-Economic 
Terror-Democracy 
Terror-Education 
Economic-Terror 
-Legal Procedure- 
Political Isolation 
-Legal Procedure- 
Membership Scarcity - 
Legal Procedure- 
Economic 
-Legal Procedure- 
Autonomy from 
Government 
Economic-Military 
Precautions 
Economic 
Economic- 
Social/Cultural 
Democratisation- 
Social/Cultural 
Democratisation 
3 
4 
5 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
1 
-9 
-9 
1-6 
1-4 
I 
2 
3 
4 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
-4 1-5 
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Question/ 
Variable label 
Relations 
with 
Politicians 
and Sheikhs 
The idea 
about Islamist 
movement 
Idea about 
White Collar 
Union 
Obligatory 
Education of 8 
years 
1960 Military 
Intervention 
1971 Military 
Intervention 
1980 Military 
Intervention 
Idea on 
Monogamy 
Variable 
Name 
RELIPOLI 
ISLMOVE 
WCOLUNI 
OBLEDUC 
NIILIN60 
Ivut I1v71 
MILIN80 
POUGAM 
Column 
Location 
81 
82 
83 
84 
85 
84 
85 
86 
Value 
Labels 
Totally Approve 
Approve 
No Idea 
Against 
Totally Against 
-Religious 
Propaganda-Poverty 
-Failure of other 
Parties-Poverty 
-Failure of other 
Parties- Religious 
Propaganda 
-Organisation 
Ability-Propaganda 
-Poverty 
-Poverty-Failure of 
Other Parties 
Totally Supporting 
Supporting 
No Idea 
Against 
Totally Against 
Totally Agree 
Agree 
No Idea 
Disagree 
Totally Disagree 
Very Positive 
Positive 
No Idea 
Negative 
Very Negative 
Very Positive 
Positive 
No Idea 
Negative 
Very Negative 
Very Positive 
Positive 
No Idea 
Negative 
Very Negative 
Totally Supporting 
Supporting 
No Idea 
Against 
Totally Against 
Values 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
1 
2 
3 
4 
Missing 
Values 
-9 
-9 
Range of 
Valid 
Values 
1-5 
1-6 
5 
6 
-9 1-5 1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
-9 
-9 
-9 
-9 
-9 
1-5 
1-5 
1-5 
1-5 
1-5 
Life After LIFADEAT 87 Exactly Believe 1 -9 1-6 
Death Believe 2 
No Idea 3 
Unbelieve 4 
Exactly Unbelieve 5 
Reincarnation 6 
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Question/ 
Variable label 
Capital 
Punishment 
Family 
Planning 
Abortion 
Weekend and 
short 
Holidays 
Summer 
Holidays 
Being Abroad 
Purpose of 
Being Abroad 
Frequency of 
Being Abroad 
Variable 
Name 
CAPPUNIS 
FAMPLAN 
ABORTION 
SHOHOLI 
HOLPLACE 
ABROAD 
ABROPURP 
ABROFREQ 
Column 
Location 
88 
89 
90 
91 
92 
93 
94 
95 
Travel Choice FORCOUCH 96 
for Foreign 
Countries 
Value 
Labels 
Totally Approve 
Approve 
No Idea 
Against 
Totally Against 
Totally Approve 
Approve 
No Idea 
Against 
Totally Against 
Totally Approve 
Approve 
No Idea 
Against 
Totally Against 
Occupational 
Activity 
Recreational Activity 
At Home with Family 
With Friends 
All Different Part of 
Turkey 
Foreign Countries 
Yes 
No 
Education 
Occupational- 
Business Reasons 
Touristic Purposes 
Education-Business 
Not Applicable 
Values 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
1 
2 
3 
4 
1 
2 
I 
2 
I 
2 
3 
4 
0 
-Rarely 
-Less than Twice in a 
Year 
-Twice in a Year 
-Three Times in a 
Year 
-Four times in a Year 
-Five and More 
_-Not 
Applicable 
-European Countries 
-America 
-Middle East and - 
Arabic Countries 
-Far East and South 
Asian Countries 
-Ex-East Bloc 
Countries 
-Turkish Republics 
-All Different Countries 
-Europe-Turkish Rep. 
-Not Applicable 
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1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
0 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
0 
Missing 
Values 
-9 
-9 
-9 
-9 
-9 
-9 
-9 
-9 
-9 
Range of 
Valid 
Values 
1-5 
1-5 
1-5 
1-4 
1-2 
1-2 
1-4 
1-6 
1-8 
Question/ 
Variable label 
Foreign 
Language 
Ability 
Type of 
Foreign 
Language 
Interest and 
Hobbies 
Preference of 
Newspaper 
Preference of 
TV Channels 
Brand of Car 
Self 
Definition 
Kind to be 
remembered 
Variable 
Name 
FLANABIL 
FLANTYPE 
HOBBY 
NEWSPAPE 
TVCHAN 
CARBRAND 
SELFDEFI 
REMEMB 
Column 
Location 
97 
98 
99 
100 
101 
102 
103 
104 
Value 
Labels 
No 
One 
Two 
Three and More 
English 
French 
German 
Arabic 
English-French 
English-German 
German-French 
Arabic-European 
Others 
Not Applicable 
Sport 
Reading 
Collection-Poetry 
Gardening 
Fishing-Reading 
Sport-Reading 
Riding 
Islamist Newspaper 
Cumhuriyet 
Milliyet-Hurriyet 
Sabah-Yeniyuzyil 
Others 
No Choice 
NTV 
ATV 
Islamist Tv's 
KanalD 
TRT 
No Choice 
Renault 
Mercedes 
BMW 
Modest Foreign 
No Car/ No Choice 
Industrious 
Liable 
Indulgent 
Harmonious 
Industrious 
Creative 
Honest 
Settled-Capable 
undaunted 
Successful 
Values 
1 
2 
3 
4 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
0 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
Missing 
Values 
-9 
-9 
-9 
-9 
-9 
Range of 
Valid 
Values 
1-4 
1-9 
1-7 
1-6 
1-6 
1 -9 1-5 
2 
3 
4 
0 
1 -9 1-4 
2 
3 
4 
1 -9 1-6 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
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APPENDIXE-4: 
CHAPTER 10 
Table 1 
Gender of Turkish Elites 
Political Elites Trade Union Elites Media Elites TOTAL 
Female 7 3 13 8 
Male 93 97 87 92 
Table 2 
Mean Ages of Turkish Elites 
Variable Value Label Mean Std Dev Cases 
For Entire Population 49.7778 8.8187 90 
ELGROUP 1 Political 52.8667 1.0.0541 30 
ELGROUP 2 Trade Union 45.9333 6.2914 30 
ELGROUP 3 Media 50.5333 8.5004 30 
Total Cases = 90 
Table 3 
Age Characteristics of Contemporary Turkish Elites 
Young 
(39 and lower) 
(%) 
Early Middle- 
Middle(40-59) 
(%) 
Advanced 
(60, +) 
% 
Minim. 
Age 
Max. 
Age 
Entire Turkish Elites 8 77 15 30 74 
Political Elites 3 70 27 38 74 
Media Elites 7 73 20 35 63 
Labour Union Elites 13 60 27 30 57 
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Table 4 
A Comparison of Age Distribution of Turkish Elites and Entire Turkish Population by Sex 
Turkis h Elites Turkish Po ulation 
Age Groups Female Male Female Male Total 
(Number) umber (Number) (Number) °10 
0-4 - - 2902489 3052255 5954744 
10.54 
5-9 - - 3357800 3541409 6899209 12.21 
10-14 - - 3330599 3560900 6891399 
12.20 
15-19 - - 3051408 3165061 6216469 
11.00 
20-24 - - 2514351 2581153 5095504 9.02 
25-29 - - 2377362 2435765 4813127 8.52 
30-34 1 1 1989410 2096899 4086309 
7.24 
35-39 1 4 1705943 1784121 3490064 
6.18 
40-44 3 18 1369640 1418784 2788424 
4.94 
45-49 - 24 1090046 1111113 2201159 4.00 
50-54 2 11 1038853 980115 2018968 
3.60 
55-59 - 1 947119 993402 1940521 
3.44 
60-64 - 10 846746 768547 1615293 
2.86 
65, + - 4 1326221 1091142 2417363 
4.28 
unknown 26381 18101 44482 
0.08 
TOTAL 7 83 27865988 28607047 56473035 
7.8 92.2 49.34 50.66 100.00 
(*): The data about Turkish population is reorganised from the 1994 Yearbook of the State Institute 
of Statistics Prime Ministry of Turkey and covers the findings of the 1990 census year. 
Table 5 
Occupational Tenures of Turkish Elites 
Occupational Tenure in Actual Position (%) 
1-5 years 6-10 ears 11-15 ears 16, + 
Political Elites 10 30 17 43 
Trade Union Elites 33.3 23.3 10 33.3 
Media Elites 3 7 17 73 
TOTAL 16 20 14 50 
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Table 6 
Occupational Background of Turkish Elites, Their Fathers' and Their Spouses' Fathers' 
Occupations and Favourite Occupations in Their Adolescence 
Prop Mon M 
Occupations Respondent Respondents' 
Fathers 
Respondents' 
Spou. ' Fathers 
Favourite Oc. of 
Respondents 
Tradesman Artisan Merchant - 30 30 - 
Public Administration 18.9 12.2 5.6 11 
Medicine-Medical Sciences 1.1 2.2 3.3 6.7 
Fanner - 20 7.8 - 
Worker 3.3 8.9 8.9 - 
Law 4.4 4.4 3.3 11 
Soldier-Police - 3.3 6.7 - 
Politics-Diplomacy - - 1.1 13.3 
Education & Science 20 2.2 2.2 19.8 
Businessman - 3.3 8.9 - 
Engineer-Archit. 4.4 - - 15.4 
Other Professions- Civil Servant 8.9 11.1 20 - 
Manager Priv. 2.2 - - 4.4 
Philosophy - - - 2 
Journalism 22.2 2.2 2.2 11 
Trade Unionist 11.1 - - - 
Contractor 3.3 - - - 
Fine Arts - - - 3.3 
Pilot - - - 1.1 
Chemist-Chemistry - 2.2 
Total 100 100 100 100 
Table 7 
The Major Factors on Job Decision of Contemporary Turkish Elites 
Influential Factors on Job Dec ision 
Organised 
Stru le 
Chance To be Personality- 
Powerful interest 
Ideologica 
1 Reason 
The Sense of Family 
Responsibility Back ound 
Political Elites 17 3 7 13 23 37 - 
Trade Union Elites 53 13 -7 - 27 - 
Media Elites 13 3 7 30 17 20 10 
TOTAL 28 7 4 17 13 28 3 
Table 8 
Job Satisfaction Rate Among Turkish Elites 
Occupational Satisfaction Rate (%) 
Very Satisfied Satisfied Unsatisfied Very Unsatisfied 
Political Elites 60 33 34 
Trade Union Elites 50 50 -- Media Elites 70 23 7- 
TOTAL 60 36 31 
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Table 9 
Occupational Satisfaction Among Turkish Elites 
Elite Groups % 
Occupational Satisfaction Political Trade Union Media Total 
Prefer Actual Job 83 93 77 84 
Not Prefer Actual Job 17 7 23 16 
Total 100 100 100 100 
Table 10 
Future Occupational Plans of Turkish Elites 
Future Occupational Plans (%) 
Continue Same 
Job 
Attendance to 
Politics 
Scientist at a 
University 
Higher Public 
Administration 
Political Elites 97 - 3 - 
Trade Union Elites 73 17 3.3 7 
Media Elites 86 7 7 
TOTAL 86 8 4 2 
Table 11 
Occupational Backgrounds of Mothers, Spouses and Spouses' Mothers of Turkish Elites 
Proportion M 
Occupations Respondents' Respondents' Respondents' Spouses' 
Mothers Spouses Mothers 
Housewife 95.6 40 84.4 
Teacher 1.1 27.8 6.7 
Social Scientist - 3.3 - 
Journalist - 6.7 - 
Painter (Artist) - 3.3 - 
Public Administrator - 12.2 - 
Engineer 1.1 1.1 
Civil Servant 1.1 - 7.8 
Lawyer - 2.2 - 
Others 1.1 3.3 1.1 
Total 100 100 100 
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Table 12 
Family Size of Turkish Elites and Their Fathers 
Proportion % 
Number of Child Elites Fathers 
No 5.6 
One 27.8 2.2 
Two 43.3 8.9 
Three 18.9 21.1 
Four 3.3 24.4 
Five - 18.9 
Six - 4.4 
Seven - 8.9 
Eight - 2.2 
Nine - 2.2 
Ten - 4.4 
Eleven - 2.2 
Twelve 1.1 - 
Total 100 100 
Table 13 
Marital Status of Turkish Elites 
Elite Groups % 
Marital Status Political Trade Union Media Total 
Married 100 100 93 98 
Widowed-Divorced - - 7 2 
Total 100 100 100 100 
Table 14 
Marriage Ages of Turkish Elites 
Elite Groups (%) Turkish 
Marriage e Age Political Trade Union Media Elites 
through h 20 3.3 6.7 - 3.3 
16.7 23.3 16.7 18.9 
40 23.3 26.7 30 
26.7 23.3 43.3 31.1 
r 13.3 23.3 13.3 16.7 
100 100 100 100 
Table 15 
Marriage Ages of Turkish Elites by Gender 
Gender 
Marriage Age Female Male 
Lowest through 20 - 3.6 
21-23 42.9 16.9 
24-26 42.9 28.9 
27-29 14.3 32.5 
30 and Over - 18.1 
Total 100 100 
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Table 16 
Marriage Ages of Turkish Elites by Social Origin 
Respondent's Marriage Age (%) 
Social Class Background round Lowest-20 21-23 24-26 27-29 30 &+ 
Lower Class 12.5 12.5 12.5 50 12.5 
Lower Middle Class - 42 11 21 26 
Middle Class 3 8 50 25 14 
Upper Middle Class 4 22 22 39 13 
Ur Class - - 25 50 25 
TOTAL 3 19 30 31 17 
Table 17 
Marriage Ages of Turkish Elites by Educational Level 
Educational Level 
Marriage e Age University High School Middle (Jun. H. S. ) 
Lowest throw h 20 - 18.2 50 
21-23 15.6 45.5 - 
24-26 35.1 - - 
27-29 33.8 18.2 - 
30 and Over 15.6 18.2 50 
Total 100 100 100 
Table 18 
Marriage Ages of the Spouses of Turkish Elites 
Marriage Age Proportion (%) 
Lowest throu 20 24.4 
21-23 42.2 
24-26 20 
27-29 7.8 
30 and Over 5.6 
Total 100 
Table 19 
Turkish Elites' Spouses' Marriage Age by Their Social Origins 
Spouse's Social Class Spouse's Marriage Age (%) 
Background Lowest-20 21-23 24-26 27-29 30 &+ 
Lower Class 50 - 50 - - Lower Middle Class 33 11 45 - 11 
Middle Class 30 40 17 9 4 
Upper Middle Class 11 56 15 11 7 
Upper Class 16 67 17 - - 
TOTAL 24 42 20 8 6 
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Table 20 
Social Class Status of Turkish Elites, and Their and Their Spouses' Social Origins 
Proportion (%) 
Social Class Status Elites Elites' Fathers Elites' Spouses' Fathers 
Lower Class - 8.9 2.2 
Lower Middle Class - 21.1 10 
Middle Class 
k 
Middle 10 40 51.1 
Middle Class 54.4 25.6 30 
U er Class 35.6 4.4 6.7 
Total 100 100 100 
Table 21 
Inter Class Marriages Among Turkish Elites 
Spouse's Social Class Background (%) 
Respondent's Social 
Background 
Lower Middle 
Class 
Middle 
Class 
Upper Middle 
Class 
Upper 
Class 
Lower Class 12.5 25 62.5 - - 
Lower Middle Class 
E 
11 63 26 
Middle Class 11 61 25 
Ur Middle Class 4 31 52 13 
Ur Class - - l 
25 
ý 
75 
TOTAL 10 51 30 
r 
7 
Table 22 
The Educational Level of Turkish Elites and Entire Turkish Population 
Turkish Elites Entire Turkish Population (*) 
Education Level Male Female Total Male Female Total 
Prima School - - 91.31 87.29 89.35 
Junior High School 2.4 - 2.2 61.90 44.58 53.44 
High School 13.3 - 12.2 42.29 30.84 36.69 
Universit 84.3 7 00 85.6 9.67 7.29 8.51 
(*) The data about Turkish population is reorganised from the official internet web site of the State 
Institute of Statistics Prime Ministry of Turkey and covers the findings of the 1994-1995 census year. 
Table 23 
Educational Level of Turkish Elites by Their Social Class Origin 
espondent's Social Class Background % (Number) 
Educational Level e Lower Middle 
Class 
Middle 
Class 
Upper Middle 
Class 
Upper 
Class 
University 
E97 
22 (17 40 31 25 (19) 4 3) 
Hi h School 18 2 (5 27 3) 
J. Hi h School - - 50 1) 
TOTAL (19) (36) (23) 4 
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Table 24 
Educational Level of Turkish Elites by Their Fathers' Occupations 
Elite's Educational Level 
Father's Occupation University High School J. High School 
Tradesman-Artisan 81 15 4 
Public Administrator 91 9 - 
Fanner 78 17 5 
Worker 87 13 - 
Professional 100 - - 
Civil Servant 100 - - 
Law 75 25 - 
Soldier-Police 100 - - 
Businessman 100 - - 
Teacher 100 - - 
Journalist 50 50 - 
Doctor 100 - - 
TOTAL 86 12 2 
Table 25 
Educational Types of Turkish Elites 
Elite Groups % 
Educational Tvves of Elites Political Trade Union Media Total 
Not Applicable 3.3 33.3 6.7 14.4 
Social Sciences-Politics 6.7 16.7 30 17.8 
Management - 10 - 3.3 
Philology-Turkish Lan ua e - 7 3 3.3 
Mathematics 3 7 - 3.3 Technical Sciences 23 10 10 14.4 
Economy 20 7 13 13.3 
Education 17 10 10 12.2 
Law 13 - 13 8.9 
Public Administration 3 - - 1.1 
Medical Sciences 7 - - 2.2 Agriculture 3 - - 1.1 Journalism - - 13 4.4 
Table 26 
Educational Levels of Turkish Elites' Fathers 
Respondent's Father's Educational Level (%) 
Elite Group 
University High School Middle 
School 
Primary 
School 
No School 
Education 
Political 13 13 7 40 27 
Trade Union 13 7 3 64 13 
Media 43 20 3 24 10 
TOTAL 23 13 5 42 17 
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Table 27 
Educational Level of Turkish Elites By Their Fathers' Educational Level 
Respondent's Father's Educational Level 
% (Number) 
Elite's Educational 
Level 
University High School Middle 
School 
Primary 
School 
No School 
Education 
University 26(20) 14 (11) 5(4) 39(30) 16(12) 
Hi h School g (l) 90) - 64 (7) 18 (2) 
Middle School - - - 50 (1) 50 (1) 
TOTAL 23(21) 13 (12) 4 (4) 43(38) 17 (15 
Table 28 
Educational Levels of Turkish Elites' Spouses 
Respondent's Father's Educational Level % 
Elite Grou University High School Middle School Prim School 
Political 57 30 - 13 
Trade Union 47 33 10 10 
Media 80 14 3 3 
TOTAL 61 26 4 9 
Table 29 
Spouses' Educational Levels of Turkish Elites by Their Own Educational Levels 
Elite's Educational Level (%) 
Spouses Educational Level Universit Hi h School Middle School Total 
University 68 27 - 61 
High School 23 37 50 26 
Middle School 1 27 - 4 
Prim School 89 50 9 
TOTAL 86 12 2 100 
Table 30 
The Educational Levels of the Spouses of Turkish Elites by 
Their Spouses' Mothers" Occupations 
Elite's Spouse's 
Mother's Occupation 
Elite's S 
University 
pouse's Educational Level (%) 
High School Middle Primary 
School School 
TOTAL 
Housewife 76.4 96 100 100 84 
Teacher 11 - -_ 7 Civil Servant 11 4 8 
Hostess 2 - -_ I 
TOTAL 61 26 49 100 
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Table 31 
The Relation Between the Spouses' Educational Levels and 
the Spouses' Fathers' occupations 
Elite's Spouse's Educational Level (%) 
Elite's Spouse's Father's 
Occupation 
University High 
School 
Middle 
School 
Primary 
School 
TOTAL 
Worker 5 4 50 25 9 
Tradesman-Artisan-Merchant 20 56 25 25 30 
Professional-Civil Servant 20 22 - 25 20 
Farmer 4 9 25 25 8 
Soldier-Police 7 9 - - 7 
Teacher 4 - - - 2 
Businessman 15 - - - 9 
Administrator 9 - - - 6 
Doctor 5 - - - 3 
Law (Judge, lawyer, ... etc. ) 5 - - - 
3 
Journalist 4 - - - 2 
MP-Politician 2 - - - 1 
TOTAL 100 100 100 100 100 
Table 32 
The Relation Between the Spouses' Educational Levels and 
the Spouses' Social Origins 
Elite's Spouse's Social 
Back round 
Elite's Spouse's Educational Level (°lo) 
University High Middle Primary 
School School School 
TOTAL 
Lower Class 2 - - 13 2 
Lower Middle Class 13 4 25 - 10 
Middle Class 44 57 75 75 51 
Ur Middle Class 31 39 - 13 30 
Ur Class 11 - - - 7 
TOTAL 61 26 4 9 100 
Table 33 
Spouses' Educational Level by Gender of Elites 
Elite's Gender 
Elite's Spouse's Educational Level (%) 
University High Middle Primary 
School School School 
TOTAL 
Female 100 - -- 8 Male 58 28 5 10 92 
TOTAL 61 26 49 100 
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Table 34 
School Types of Turkish Elites by Elite Groups 
Elite's School Type (%) 
Elite Group State Normal State College Private College Total 
Political Elites 80 10 10 100 
Trade Union Elites 80 17 3 100 
Media Elites 40 20 40 100 
TOTAL 67 15 18 100 
Table 35 
The Proportion of Private School Graduates Among Whole Graduates in Turkish Society 
(According to the Statistics of 1991-1992 Educational Year) (*) 
General Graduates Private School Graduates 
Male Female General Male Female Total in 
Total General 
Primary 691809 604529 1296338 5391 4244 9635 
(53.4) (46.6) 100 55.6 (44.4) 0.74 
J. High School 423636 256462 680098 9320 7379 16699 
62.3 (37.7) 100 55.8 44.2 2.5 
High School 226525 142742 3692 77 6026 5 5385 11411 
61 100 52.8 ) 47.2 3.1 
The data about Turkish population is reorganised from the 1994 Yearbook of Turkey 
(the State Institute of Statistics Prime Ministry of Turkey). 
Table 36 
School Types of Turkish Elites by Their Social Class Origins 
El ite's School Type (%) 
Eilte' Social Background State Normal State College Private College Total 
Lower Class 87.5 - 12.5 9 
Lower Middle Class 79 10.5 10.5 21 
Middle Class 83 11 6 40 
Upper Middle Class 35 35 30 26 
Upper Class - - - 4 
TOTAL 67 15 18 100 
Table 37 
School Types of Turkish Elites by Their Fathers' Educational Levels 
Elite' Father's Elite's School Type % 
Educational Level State Normal State College Private Colle e Total 
University 38 14 48 23 
Hi h School 42 42 16 13 
J. M Rh (Middle) School 75 - 25 5 Primary School 84 8 8 42 
No School Education 80 20 - 17 
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Table 38 
Elites Universities in Turkey 
Elite Groups (%) 
Names of the Universities Political Trade Union Media Total 
Not Applicable 3 33 7 14 
Gazi University - 13 3 6 
Ankara University (SBF-FPS) 50 20 37 36 
METU (Middle East Technical University) 3 4 3 3 
Other Universities 10 20 13 15 
Istanbul University 17 7 20 14 
ITU (Istanbul Technical University) 17 3 7 9 
Bogazici University - - 7 
2 
Foreign Universities - - 3 1 
Table 39 
Children of Turkish Elites in School Age 
Elite Groups (%) 
Children In/Post School Age Political Trade Union Media Total 
Yes 90 90 90 90 
No 10 10 10 10 
Table 40 
School Types of Children of Turkish Elites 
Elite Groups (%) 
Children's SchoolType 
10 
23 
Political Trade Union 
Not Applicable 
Mostly_ State Normal 
Mostly State College 
Mostly Private College 
TOTAL 
Media 
10 
7 
83 
100 
Table 41 
School Types of Children of Turkish Elites by Their Social Status 
20 
10 
60 
100 
10 
37 
30 
100 
Elites' Social Status (%) 
Elites' Children's School T 
Not Applicable 
Mostly State Normal 
Mostly State College 
Mostly Private College 
Midd lass 
11 
44 
11 
34 
Total 
10 
16 
16 
58 
100 
Upper Middle Class Upper Class 
6 16 
18 6 
21 9 
TOTAL 100 
55 
100 
69 
100 
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Table 42 
Foreign Language Abilities of Turkish Elites 
Elite Groups (%) 
Language Abilit Forei n Political Trade Union Media Total 
, No 10 63 10 28 
One 77 20 43 47 
Two 6 17 40 21 
Three & more 7 - 7 4 
Table 43 
Foreign Language Abilities of Turkish Elites by Gender 
Elite's Gender (%) 
Number of Foreign Language Female Male Total 
No - 30 28 
One 71 45 47 
Two 29 20 21 
Three & more - 5 4 
TOTAL 8 92 100 
Table 44 
Foreign Language Abilities of Turkish Elites by Their Educational Levels 
Foreign Language Abilit 
Elites' Educational Level (%) 
University High School Middle School 
No 21 73 50 
One 52 9 50 
Two 23 9 - 
Three & more 4 9 - 
TOTAL 100 100 100 
Table 45 
Turkish Elites' Foreign Language Types 
Elite Groups (%) 
Foreign Language Type 
Not Applicable 
Political 
to 
50 
Trade Union 
63 
17 
Media Total 
28 
English 
French 
German 
Arabic 
English-French 
English-German 
Arabic-European Language 
Others 
Three European Languages 
10 
7 
6 
7 
3 
7 
10 
20 
7 
29 
6 
3I6161 
10 
4 
2 
27 14 
10 
10 4 3 
10 
6 
2ý 
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Table 46 
Foreign Language Types of Turkish Elites by Gender 
Gender of Elite (%) 
Type of Foreign Language Female Male Total 
Not Applicable - 30 28 
English 72 25 29 
French - 6 6 
German - 6 6 
Arabic - 2 2 
English-French 14 15 14 
English-German 14 5 6 
Arabic-European Language - 5 4 
Others - 2 2 
Three European Languages - 4 3 
TOTAL 8 92 100 
Table 47 
Friendship Networks among Turkish Elites 
E lite Groups M 
Social Group Identity of Friends Political Trade Union Media Total 
Family 7 - 10 6 
Own Occupational Environment 80 90 50 73 
Politicians 3 3 23 10 
Business Elites 7 - 14 7 
Bureaucratic Elites - 3 - 1 
Scientific Elites 3 4 3 3 
Table 48 
Occupational Satisfaction Among Turkish Elites 
Elite Groups (%) 
Occupational Satisfaction Rate Political Trade Union Media Total 
Very Satisfied 60 50 70 60 
Satisfied 34 50 23 36 
Unsatisfied 3 7 3 
Very Unsatisfied 3 - - 1 
Table 49 
Elite Consensus Among Turkish Elites 
THE IDEA ON Approve Against 
Famil Plannin 93 7 
Abortion 73 20 
Obligatory Education 87 23 
White Collar Labour Unions 91 8 
Capital Punishment 19 75 
Polygamy 9 82 
The Relation Between Politicians and Sheikhs 13 83 
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Table 50 
Actual Class Positions of Contemporary Turkish Elites 
Elites (%) 
Respondent's Actual Social Status Political Trade Union Media T 
Middle Class 3 23 3 
ffi 
U er Middle Class 54 60 50 
Ur Class 43 17 47 
Table 51 
Turkish Elites in terms of Their Life Views 
Elites (%) 
Idea About Women in Society Political Trade Union Media Total 
Totally Conservative - 7 -2 
Conservative 17 3 -7 
No Response 3 3 -2 
Slightly Liberal 23 34 33 30 
Totally Liberal 57 53 67 59 
Table 52 
Place of Birth of Turkish Elites and Their Fathers in terms of Geographical Region 
Proportion (%) 
Geographical Region 
East-South East Rural 
East-South East (Urban) 
Black Sea (Rural) 
Black Sea (Urban) 
Central Anatolia (Rural) 
Central Anatolia (Uri 
Aegean-Mediterranean (Rural) 
Aegean-Mediterranean Urban 
Other Country 
Total 
Turkish Elites 
16.7 
15.6 
6.7 
3.3 
10.0 
12.2 
10.0 
23.3 
2.2 
100 
Turkish elites' Fathers 
Table 53 
Political Division of Turkish Elites 
Vote in the Last General Elections 
Liberal Right 
Radical Right 
Social Democrat 
Radical Left 
Political 
30 
23 
24 
23 
Elites (% 
Trade Union 
10 
10 
30 
20.0 
11.1 
7.8 
1.1 
12.2 
11.1 
11.1 
22.2 
3.3 
100 
Union Media Total 
10 30 23 
10 17 17 
30 37 30 
20 13 20 
30 - 10 Unanswered 
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Media 
30 
17 
37 
i 
Table 54 
Religious Orientations of Turkish Elites 
Elites (% 
Religious Orientation Political Trade Union Media Total 
No Religious Belief 23 47 47 39 
Little 47 37 40 41 
Average 13 13 3 10 
Stron 17 3 10 10 
Table 55 
Religious Affiliations of Turkish Elites by Gender 
Elites' Gender (°lo 
Religious Orientation Female Male 
No Religious Belief 57 37 
Little 29 42 
Average 14 10 
Strong - 11 
Table 56 
Religious Affiliation of Turkish Elites by Educational Level 
Elites' Educational Level (% 
Religious Orientation University High School Middle 
N Religious Belief 42 9 100 
Little 40 55 - 
Average 9 18 - 
Strong 9 18 
Table 57 
Religious Affiliation of Turkish Elites by Their Fathers' Occupation 
Elite's Father's Occupation 
Tradesman-Artisan-Merchant 
Public Administrator 
Farmer 
Worker 
Professional 
Civil Servant 
Law (Judge, lawyer, 
... etc. ) Soldier-Police 
Businessman 
Teacher 
Journalist 
Doctor 
. No 
26 
55 
39 
75 
25 
17 
75 
33 
33 
100 
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Elite's Religious Affiliation 
(%) 
Little 
37 
36 
39 
25 
25 
83 
25 
33 
67 
100 
100 
Average 
18 
11 
25 
34 
Strong 
19 
9 
11 
25 
Table 58 
Religious Affiliation of Turkish Elites by Their Fathers' Social Class Status 
Elite's Religious Affiliation 
(% 
Elite's Father's Social Status No Little Average Strong 
Lower Class 
[ 
- - 12 
Lower Middle Class 37 5 16 
Middle Class 45 11 11 
U er Middle Class 44 17 4 
Ur Class 100 - - 
Table 59 
Religious Affiliation of Turkish Elites by Their Social Class Position 
Elite's Religious Affiliation 
(%) 
Elite's Social Status No Little Average Strong 
Middle Class 77 22 - 11 
Upper Middle Class 37 51 2 10 
Upper Class 39 41 10 10 
Table 60 
Religious Affiliations of Turkish Elites by Political Choice 
Elite's Religious Affiliation 
Elite's Political Choice No Little Average Strong 
Liberal Right - 53 33 14 
Radical Right - 54 - 46 
Social Democrat 54 46 - - 
Radical Left 68 20 12 - 
Unanswered - 67 - 33 
Undecided 42 42 8 8 
Table 61 
Reasons for Membership to Business Associations 
Reason for Business Association Elites (%) i Membership Political Trade Union Media Total 
Not Applicable 40 - 20 20 Civil SSciety Understanding 23 57 14 31 
Occupational Reason 37 33 40 37 
Civ. Soc. Unders. - Occup. Reason - 7 23 10 
Chance- Personal Interest - 3 3 2 
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Table 62 
Power of Labour Unions and Business Associations in Turkey 
Proportion (%) 
Labour Unions Business Associations 
Very Effective 1.1 8.9 
Effective 41.1 54.4 
No Idea 10.0 6.7 
Ineffective 35.6 28.9 
Very Ineffective 12.2 1.1 
Total 100 100 
Table 63 
Social Club Membership among Turkish Elites 
Elites % 
Social (Elite) Clubs Political Trade Union Media Total 
No 33 70 50 51 
Galatasara - 3 13 6 
Classical Foundation (Wakfs) 20 10 7 12 
Modern Foundations 13 7 17 12 
Anatolian Club 10 10 - 7 
Fenerbahce-Anatolian-Big Clubs 10 - 3 4 
Anatolian-Big Clubs- Modern Foundations 14 - 10 8 
Table 64 
Reasons for Social Club Membership 
Reason for Social Club Elites (%) 
Membership Political Trade Union Media Total 
Not Applicable 33 70 50 51 
Solidarity-Status -Status 20 3 27 17 
Solidarit -Civil Society Understandin 27 24 17 22 
Personal Interests 3 3 3 3 
Ideological Reasons 17 - 3 7 
Table 65 
Power of Elite Clubs in Turkish Society 
Power of the Elite Clubs Political 
Elites (%) 
Trade Union Media Total 
Very Powerful 23 17 53 31 
Powerful 64 60 30 51 
N (Idea 7 13 10 10 
Ineffective 3 10 7 7 
Ve Ineffective 3 - - 1 
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Table 66 
The Result of the 1995 Turkish General Elections 
Political Parties Number of 
Votes 
Proportion of the 
Votes (%) 
Number of 
Seats 
Proportion of the 
Seats (% 
RP 6,012,450 21.38 158 28.73 
DYP 5,396,009 19.18 135 24.55 
ANAP 5,527,288 19.65 132 24.00 
DSP 4,118,025 14.64 76 13.82 
CHP 3,011,076 10.71 49 8.91 
HADEP 1,171,623 4.17 - - 
YP 61,428 0.22 - - 
MHP 2,301,343 8.18 - - 
MP 127,630 0.45 - - 
YDH 133,889 0.48 - - 
YDP 95,484 0.34 - - 
yp 36,853 0.13 - - 
Independents 133,895 0.48 - - 
Total 28,126 993 100.00 550 100.00 
Source: Reorganised from Web site of the DIE (State Institute of Statistics Prime Ministry 
Republic of Turkey) (http//www. die. gov. tr). 
Table 67 
Social Club Membership of Turkish Elites by Their Political Preferences 
Elite's Political Choice 
%) 
Social Clubs Liberal 
Right 
Radical Social 
Right Democrat 
Radical 
Left 
Unanswered Undecided 
No 60 18 38 72 67 50 
Galatasara - -4 8 - 17 
Classical Foundations 6 73 3 - 33 - 
Modem Foundations - 98 16 - 33 
Anatolian Club 20 - 13 - - - 
Fenerbahce- 
Anatolian -Bi Clubs 
7 - 13 - - - 
Anatolian-Big Clubs- 
Modem Foundations 
7 - 21 4 - - 
Table 68 
Political Preferences of Turkish Elites by Gender 
Political Identit 
Gender 
Female Male Total 
Liberal Right 14.3 16.9 16.7 
Radical Right - 13.3 12.2 
Social Democrat 42.9 25.3 26.7 
Radical Left 14.3 28.9 27.8 
Unanswered - 3.6 3.3 
Undecided 28.6 12.0 13.3 
Total 100 100 100 
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Table 69 
Political Preferences of Turkish Elites by Their Educational Levels 
Elites' Educational Leve l (%) 
Elites' Political Choice University Mali School Middle 
Liberal Right 15 28 - 
Radical Right 13 9 - 
Social Democrat 29 18 - 
Radical Left 26 27 100 
Unanswered 3 9 - 
Undecided 14 9 - 
Table 70 
Political Choices of Turkish Elites by Their Fathers' Political Preferences 
Elite's Father's Political Choice 
Elite's Political 
Choice 
Liberal 
Right 
Radical 
Right 
Social 
Democrat 
Radical 
Left 
Unanswered 
Liberal Right 44 8 3 - 17 
Radical Right 8 54 5 - - 
Social Democrat 15 23 38 - 33 
Radical Left 15 - 37 100 33 
Unanswered 7 - - - 17 
Undecided 11 15 17 - - 
TOTAL 30 14 45 4 7 
Table 71 
Political Preferences of Turkish Elites by Their Social Class Origins 
Elite's Father's Social Status 
Elite's Political 
Choice 
Lower 
Class 
Lower- 
Middle Class 
Middle 
Class 
Upper Middle 
Class 
Upper 
Class 
Liberal Right 12 16 14 26 - Radical Ri ht - 16 17 9 - Social Democrat 38 36 17 26 50 
Radical Left 50 32 25 22 25 
Unanswered - - 8 - - Undecided - - 19 17 25 
TOTAL 9 21 40 26 4 
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Table 72 
Political Preferences of Turkish Elites by Their Religious Orientation 
Elite's Religious Orientation 
Elite's Political Choice No Little Average Strong 
Liberal Right - 22 56 22 
Radical Ri ht - 16 - 56 
Social Democrat 37 30 - - 
Radical Left 49 14 33 - 
Unanswered - 5 - 11 
Undecided 14 13 11 11 
TOTAL 39 41 10 10 
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